Warfare and History
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT
NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History
William]. Hamblin
Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC
'Hamblin's book is a goldmine of information - both textual and archaeological -
on ancient Near Eastern warfare before the Late Bronze Age.'
Professor Robert Drews, Vanderbilt University
For many historians, military history began in Classical Greece. Chronologically,
however, half of recorded military history occurred before the Greeks rose to
military predominance. In this groundbreaking and fascinating study, William J.
Hamblin synthesises current knowledge of early ancient Near Eastern military
history in an accessible way, from the Neolitihic era until the Middle Bronze Age.
Drawing on an extensive range of textual, artistic, and archaeological data,
Warfare in the Ancient Near East to 1600 BC offers a detailed analysis of the military
technology, ideology, and practices of Near Eastern warfare, focusing on key
topics including: recruitment and training of the soldiers; the logistics and weap-
onry of warfare, with emphasis on the shift from stone to metal weapons; the role
played by magic; narratives of combat and artistic representations of battle; the
origins and development of the chariot as a mode of military transportation; for-
tifications and siegecraft; and developments in naval warfare. Hamblin pays parti-
cular attention to the earliest-known examples of holy war ideology in
Mesopotamia and Egypt, and argues that this era laid the foundation for later Near
Eastern concepts of holy war, and that such understandings remain of vital sig-
nificance in the world today.
Illustrated throughout, including maps of the region, this book is essential for
experts and non-specialists alike.
William J. Hamblin is Associate Professor of History at Brigham Young
University, specializing in Near Eastern and military history. He is co-author of
World History to 1648 (1993).
Warfare and History
General Editor
Jeremy Black
Professor of History, University of Exeter
I '.'tin in the Age of Total War
|olm Buckley
\ nines of the Caliphs
: \,',n-iy in the liarly Islamic State
I hir.ii Kennedy
<„ Wax, IV 12-1913
t.< iln I it\i World War
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i/ ii.ii i ''i i rns
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Triumph, Trngedy and Failurt
jtmet Scott Wheeler
I'll IWi
> |,i.. i Hi- ./in m
/./.... II ,ii
Medieval Naval Warfare, 1 000-1 500
Susan Rose
Modern Chinese Warfare, 1795-1989
Bruce A. Elleman
Modern Insurgencies and Counter-insurgencies
Guerrillas and their Opponents since 1 750
Ian F. W. Beckett
Mughal Warfare
Imperial Frontiers and Highroads to Empire
1500-1100
Jos Gommans
Naval Warfare, 1815-1914
Lawrence Sondhaus
Ottoman Warfare, 1500-1700
Rhoads Murphey
The Peloponnesian War
A military study
J. F. Lazenby
Samurai, Warfare and the State in Early
Medieval japan
Karl F. Friday
Seapower and Naval Warfare, 1650-1830
Richard Harding
The Soviet Military Experience
Roger R. Reese
I Ictiidiu
Spencer ( '. ' I'm kci
The \\\ti for Independence ami the Transformation
<>/ American Society
1 l.uiv M. W.ird
tt 'in and tin- Stair in luirly Modi in I urojn
Spain, the I httch Repnhlit and S"»i ,/< n ( r
/ , ,,,l military S/.in , / <"<» t(*t>i)
|.,n(il«-i
II gffim and
I v - /.//,
Warfare and Society in Europe, 1898 to the Present
Michael S. Neiberg
Warfare at Sea, 1500-1650
Jan Glete
Warfare in Atlantic Africa, 1500-1800
Maritime Conflicts and the Transformation of
Europe
John K. Thornton
I Varfare, State and Society in the Byzantine World,
565-1204
John Haldon
War in the Early Modern World,
1450-1815
edited by Jeremy Black
Wars of Imperial Conquest in Africa, 1830-1914
Bruce Vandervort
Western Warfare in the Age of the Crusades,
1000-1300
John France
War and Society in Imperial Rome,
31 BC-AD 284
Brian Campbell
Warfare and Society in the Barbarian West
Guy Halsall
War in the Modem World since 1815
Jeremy Black, editor
World War Two
A Military History
Jeremy Black
War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China,
900-1795
Peter Lorge
Warfare in the Ancient Near East, to 1 600 BC
Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History
William J. Hamblin
The Wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon,
1792-1815
Owen Connelly
Indian Wars of Canada, Mexico and the
United States, 1812-1900
Bruce Vandervort
Warfare in the Ancient Near East
to 1600 BC
Holy Warriors at the Dawn of History
William J. Hamblin
13 Routledge
g^^ Taylor ft*. Francis Croup
LONDON AND NfW YORK
First published 2006
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN
Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada
by Koutledge
270 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016
Reprinted 2007
Houtkslge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
| 'mi if, William J. Hamblin
Typeset in Bembo by Taylor & Francis Books
I'm in i'tl and bound in Great Britain by The Cromwell Press, Trowbridge, Wiltshire
All i li'Jns reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized
in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter
invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or
retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.
tititisli Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A i .it.ilojMir record for this book is available from the British Tibrary
Library of (Congress (lataloging-in-Publication Data
Warfare in l he ancient Near East to c. 1600 BC / [edited by] William j. Hamblin.
p. c in. (Warfare and history)
liu hides bibliographical references and index.
1. Military art and science— Middle East— History. 2. Middle East— History,
Military To 1500. I. Hamblin, William James. II. Series.
For Loree, Ken, Karen and Alex
- of course
For Scott Nelson: the Better Man
And for Blake Donnek,
who dared to dream of a world without war
U31.W37 2005
35 5 ' . ( )( )93 9 '4090 1 3— dc22
2005006029
[SBNIO: 0-415-25589-9 (pbk)
ISBN 10: 0-415-25588-0 (hbk)
ISBN 13: 978-0-415-25589-9 (pbk)
ISBN 13: 978-0-415-25588-2 (hbk)
Mightiest of the mighty, hero in battle, let me sing his song!"
(iilgamesh and the Bull of Heaven, Sumer, c. 2000 BCE (EOG 169)
Contents
JJsi of Illustrations xiii
Preface xiv
List of abbreviations xv
Introduction 1
! rhe Neolithic Age and the origin of warfare {to c. 3000} 14
' Early Dynastic Mesopotamia {3500-2334} 35
\ rhe Akkadian empire {2334-2190} 73
1 rhe Neo-Sumerian period {2190-2004} 102
i War carts and chariots 129
f> Middle Bronze Mesopotamia {c. 2000-1600} 154
Warfare in the age of Mari 185
Mcsopotamian sicgccraft 215
l ) Syria and Lebanon 237
In ( '.in, i, in 269
II Anatolia 285
I'.- I hnastu and lurly Dynastic Egypt {3500-2687} 308
I ! - t >U kin-Jon, |-j.vpi | »fiK7 2181 ! 328
I \ \\ .Hi.. i. tint mi- [In ( >K1 Kiiiiulmn 353
CONTENTS
! 5 First Intermediate Period Egypt {2190-2061 }
16 Middle Kingdom Egypt {2061-1786}
17 The military system of the Middle Kingdom
1 8 Early Second Intermediate Period Egypt { 1 786-1 667}
Notes
Bibliography
Index
368
382
412
456
464
494
507
Illustrations
inures
I In "Stele of the Vultures"
I u!v and Middle Bronze Age weapons
1 be "Victory Stele" of Naram-Sin
I n K and Middle Bronze Age war-carts and chariots
\u hery and siege techniques
K. imparts of Middle Bronze Age Ebla, Syria {c. 2000-1800}
Middle Bronze Age gate at Tel Dan, Israel {c. 2000-1800}
I In "Narmer Palette" at Hierakonpolis
Mud brick city walls at El-Kab, Egypt {c. 1600-1000}
Mit Kile Kingdom Egyptian fortifications at Buhen, Sudan
[< . 2000-1800}
\'h go and battle scene, Tomb of Antef
Naval combat scene, Tomb of Antef
55
68
87
133
218
267
278
318
360
444
447
454
I he Near East
lironze Age Mesopotamia and Syria
llronzc Age Anatolia
1 ' i < > ii / < • Age I Igypt and Nubia
7
43
287
309
< limnology of the Ancient Near East, based on tool making
I In tn.ijoi periods of Early Mesopotamian history
\i in u n.ii v of' enemy casualties from Rimush's campaigns
i'.iv \i.rles associated with military ranks
implified archaeological chronology of Syria
Simplified ,m haeological chronology of Canaan
Simplified archaeological chronology of Anatolia
( htonologua! periodization for Egypt
i \jm s ni uoops .Hid weapons found at Beni Hasan tombs
itive i limnology of" the Second Intermediate Period
ni.iii/rd ,md simplified < li.irl of the dynastic divisions of
I i dmmi' tin- Sc.onti Intermediate Period, 1786 1569
5
35
79
196
238
269
285
310
437
457
458
xiii
Preface
Abbreviations
While working on this book over the past few years, my motto, along with
Shakespeare's Prospero, has necessarily been: "Me, poor man, my library was
dukedom large enough" (Tempest, I, ii, 126). As anyone who has written a book
can attest, it is both an exhilarating and an exasperating experience. It is also,
paradoxically, a most lonely endeavor that can only be accomplished with the
assistance of many friends and colleagues.
It is my pleasure to thank numerous people and institutions for their generous
assistance in writing this book. The History Department and the College of
Family Home and Social Sciences at Brigham Young University (BYU) provided
a much-needed sabbatical and research funds to complete this book. The Institute
for the Preservation of Ancient and Religious Texts at BYU provided resources
for released time from teaching and for hiring a research assistant. Likewise BYU's
General Education and Honors Program, Middle East Studies Program, and
Kennedy Center for International Studies, were all liberal with resources for travel
and research. Jake Olmstead provided helpful research assistance. John Gee, Wil-
liam "Bill" Gay Associate Research Professor of Egyptology at The Institute for
the Preservation of Ancient and Religious Texts, BYU, was very accommodating
with his advice on matters Egyptological. Michael Lyon, artist and scholar, pro-
duced the illustrations. Prof. Dr. Eric Gubel, Senior Keeper of Antiquities in
Royal Museums of Art & History in Brussels, kindly provided a digital photo-
graph of one of the cylinder seals from that collection.
On a more personal level, I would like to thank my wife's family for admirable
restraint in limiting the number and frequency of questions to my wife concerning
why her errant husband was not attending certain mandatory family functions. My
father gave a fine rendition of Pope Julius to my less than adequate Michelangelo;
it is a matter of no little irritation that, while undergoing chemotherapy no less, he
finished two books in the time it took me to finish this one. I am more than
thrilled that his personal "al-Qaeda cells" have been defeated, finally, I mnsl
thank my wife and children for their unending patience .md support. To them I
(.in only say: I have at las! emerged from the dungeon
\\ till mi | 1 l.imhlui
I'iovo, Utah. . 1(lil '
AAA
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V\K
NAM
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Ah
\I-.A
Ml
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M \1K
A1N
\l
M 1
Albert Kirk Grayson, Assyrian Rulers of the Third and Second Millennia BC
(to 1115 BC), The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Assyrian peri-
ods, v. 1 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987)
Edwin Yamauchi (ed.), Africa and Africans in Antiquity (East Lansing;
Michigan State University, 2001)
John Baines and Jaromir Malek, Atlas of Ancient Egypt (New York: Facts
on File, 1980)
Walter Wreszinski, Atlas zur altaegyptischen Kulturgeschichte (Leipzig:
Hinrichs, 1923-1936), cited by volume, part, and plate (tafet) number
Anton Moortgat, The Art of Ancient Mesopotamia (New York: Phaidon,
1969), cited by page or figure number (§)
Pierre Amiet, Art of the Ancient Near East (New York: Harry N. Abrams,
1980), cited by page or plate number (§)
Walter B. Emory, Archaic Egypt (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1961)
Dieter Arnold, The Encyclopedia of Ancient Egyptian Architecture (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 2003)
Miriam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Autobiographies Chiefly of the Middle
Kingdom: A Study and an Anthology, Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 84
(Freiburg: Universitatsverlag, 1988)
A. Lawrence, "Ancient Egyptian Fortifications", fEA, 51 (1965): 69-94
Manam Lichtheim, Ancient Egyptian Literature, 3 vols (Berkeley: Uni-
versity of California Press, 1975-1980)
Stephen Quirke, The Administration of Egypt in the Late Middle Kingdom:
The Hieratic Documents (Whitstable, UK: SIA Publishing, 1990)
Karola Zibehus-Chen, Die agyptische Expansion nach Nubien: Line
Darkgung der Grundfakioren (Wiesbaden: Dr. Ludwig Reichert Verlag,
L988)
Hans Goedicke, "Ankhtyfy's Fight", Chronique d'Egypte 73 (1998):
2 X ) II
|oan Am/ (ed.), 7'//e Art of the Iris! Cities: The Third Millennium BC from
flu \lctliwrrtwcttn to the Indus (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art,
AliURIiVIATIONS
AM
A I
AIB
ALB
AM
AMT
AN
ANE
ANEP
ANET
AR
ARE
ARM
AS
ASD
AT
A UP
AW
BAE
MAI I
!*"■.„ Aku, w ,|, 7 7,, ArtoftheHittites (New York: Abrams, 1962) cited
In' page 01 pj.,te number (§) A ^a
Georges Koux, ,1,,,^ J,^, 3rd edn (London: Penguin 1992)
an™:;^ c 8 h 5 ad Berman ' " Amenemhet r ' phD *«**»• ™ e
Eva Strommenger, 5000 y e<3 « o/ ^ ^ of Mesopotamia (New York-
Harry N Abrams, 1964), eked by page or plate number (§)
Yot ZtZm e ° hka ' Meth ° d Md Theory: An Encydopedla (New
ISZS^T^' Asyptm und Nubien (Lund: Haken oWssons
R-tdge^^ Anamt ^ ^ ' 3 ° 0a - 300 BC < 2 V ° k V™*™
James B Ptrichard (ed.), The Ancient Near East in Pictures, Relating to the
Old Testament 2nd edn (Pnnceton: Princeton University Press, 1969)
James B. Ptnchard (ed.), Ancient Near Eastern Texts, Relating to the Old
Testament, 3rd edn (Pnnceton: Pnnceton University Press, 1969)
Kirk Albert Grayson, Assyrian Royal Inscriptions, 2 vols (Wiesbaden-
Harrassowitz, 1972) ^iou«iueii.
James Henry Breasted, Ancient Records of Egypt, 5 vols (Chicago: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 1906; reprint, 2001)
Archives Royale de Man (Pans: Impnmene Nationale, 1950 ff ) cited bv
volume number and text number (e.g. 1.10 = volume 1, text 10)
Peter Akkermans and Glenn Schwartz, The Archaeology of Syria- From
Complex Hunter-Gatherers to Early Urban Societies, (ca. 16,000-300 BC)
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2003)
CU^STT^A Si T'- A Dem0gMpkK StUdy ° fm ^Babylonian
Cty (1894-1595 BC), Uttgaven Van Het Nederlands Historisch-Archae-
ologtsch Instituut Te Istanbul, 36 (Istanbul: Nederlands Histonsch-
Archaeologrsch Instituut, 1975)
D. Wiseman, The Alalakh Tablets (London: British Institute of Archae-
ology at Ankara, 1953); cited by page or tablet number (8)
Giorgio Buccellati, The Amontes of the Ur III Period, Publicaziom del
^ST4 tlca? Rlcherche j (Naples: Intltuto ° nentale di
fZt J* 6 ?' T ° fWarfafe m BMCal LmdS m tHe U * ht of Archaeological
Study 2 vols (Jerusalem: International Publishing Company 1963)
■»' Shaw ^Battle m Ancient Egypt: The Tnumph of Horns or the
■» tins Fdge of the Temple Economy?", m Alan B. Lloyd (ed ) Battle
m Antiquity (Swansea: Duckworth, 1996) pp 239-69
W^lu-r Wolf. /),, Bavaffnung dcs Alt;im ^ l!rn fiith ((
Hnm.lissdu. UtifhlundluMir, l<>26)
m i
ABBREVIATIONS
BH Percy E. Newberry, Beni Hasan, 4 vols (London: Kegan Paul, Trench,
Trubner, 1893-1900); cited by volume and page (e.g. 2:31), or volume
and plate number (§), and a small letter indicating (a) right (b) center, or
(c) left portion of a mural (e.g. 2 §5b = volume 2 plate 5, middle
section)
BI H. S. Smith, The Fortress of Buhen: The Inscriptions (London: Egyptian
Exploration Society, 1976)
BSMK Alan R. Schulman, "Battle Scenes from the Middle Kingdom" , Journal
for the Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities, 12/4 (1982): 165-83
C Century: e.g. {21C} = twenty-first century BCE
Cl/2 I. E. S. Edwards et al. (eds), Cambridge Ancient History, vol 1, part 2:
Early History of the Middle East (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1971)
C2/1 I. E. S. Edwards et al. (eds), Cambridge Ancient History, vol. 2, part 1:
History of the Middle East and the Aegean Region, c. 1800-1380 (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1973)
CAM Michael Roaf, Cultural Atlas of Mesopotamia and the Ancient Near East
(New York: Facts on File, 1990)
CANE Jack M. Sasson (ed.), Civilizations of the Ancient Near East, 4 vols (New
York: Macmillan, 1995)
CB Steven A. LeBlanc, Constant Battle: the Myth of the Peaceful, Noble Savage
(New York: St. Martin's, 2003)
CG Robert Drews, The Coming of the Greeks: Indo-European Conquests in the
Aegean and the Near East (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988)
CH James Mellaart, Catal Huyuk: A Neolithic Town in Anatolia (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1967), cited by page, figure number (f.) or plate
number (§)
COT P. Bar-Adon, The Cave of Treasure: The Finds from the Caves in Nahal
Mishmar (Jerusalem, 1980)
CS William W. Hallo and K. Lawson Younger (eds), Context of Scripture, 3
vols (Leiden: Brill, 1997-2002)
CT R. O. Paulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Coffin Texts, 3 vols (Warminster:
Aris & Phillips, 1973-1978; reprint 1994), cited by spell number (§)
rather than page
DAE Ian Shaw and Paul Nicholson (eds), Dictionary of Ancient Egypt (New
York: Abrams, 1995)
DANE Piotr Bienkowski and Alan Millard, Dictionary of the Ancient Near East
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2000)
1 Mod. 1 )iodorus, Diodorus on Egypt: Book I of Diodorus Siculus y Historical Library,
trans. Edwin Murphy (Jefferson, NC: McFarland, 1985)
l)X T. Macda, "The Defense Zone during the Rule of the Ur III Dynasty",
I, hi Sumcrohgica, 14 (1992): 135-72
FA Fiu Meyers (ed.) 77/c Oxford Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East
(< >\loiT ( )x(ord I hnversity Press, F> ( >7)
AlJMkliVlATIONS
EAA
EAE
EBD
EBP
EBS
ECI
ED
EDE
EDS
EE
EEH
EER
EG
EHA
ELH
EM
EMO
EOG
EOK
R. Miller, \L McHwen and C. Bergman, "Experimental Approaches to
Ancient Near Eastern Archery", World Archaeology, 18/2 (1986): 178-95
Donald B. Redford (ed.), Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt, 3 vols
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001)
E. McEwen, R. Miller and C. Bergman, "Early Bow Design and
Construction", Scientific American, 264/6 (June 1991): 76-82
Michael Hoffman, Egypt before the Pharaohs, 2nd edn (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1991)
Steve Vinson, Egyptian Boats and Ships (Princes Risborough: Shire
Publications, 1994)
Donald B. Redford, Egypt, Canaan and Israel in Ancient Times (Prince-
ton: Princeton University Press, 1992)
"Early Dynastic": the Mesopotamian Early Bronze Age {2900-2300}.
Divided into several sub-phases: ED I {2900-2650}; ED II {2650-
2550}; ED IIIA {2550-2400}; ED IIIB {2400-2300}. (AFC xx-xxi;
slightly different dates given in AI 502-3)
Toby A. H. Wilkinson, Early Dynastic Egypt (London: Routledge
1999)
Harvey Weiss (ed.), Ebla to Damascus: Art and Archaeology of Ancient Syria
(Washington DC: Smithsonian Institute, 1985)
A. Spencer, Early Egypt: The Rise of Civilization in the Nile Valley (London:
British Museum, 1993)
Joan Oates, "A Note on the Early Evidence for Horse and the Riding
of Equids in Western Asia", in M. Levine, C. Renfrew and K. Boyle
(eds), Prehistoric Steppe Adaptation and the Horse (Cambridge: McDonald
Institute, 2003): 115-25
Paolo Matthiae, Ebla: An Empire Rediscovered (New York- Doubleday
1981)
Alan Gardiner, Egyptian Grammar, 3rd edn (London: Oxford University
Press, 1957)
Hans Nissen, The Early History of the Ancient Near East, 9000-2000 BC
(Chicago: University of Chicago, 1988)
P. Moorey, "The Emergence of the Light, Horse-drawn Chariot in the
Near East c. 2000-1500 B.C.", World Archaeology, 18/2 (1986)- 196-
215
J. Postgate, Early Mesopotamia: Society and Economy at the Dawn of History
(London and New York: Routledge, 1992)
R. Faulkner, "Egyptian Military Organization", fournal of Egyptian
Archaeology, 39 (December, 1953): 32-47
Andrew George, The Epic of Gilgamesh (London: Penguin, 1999)
Gae Callender, Egypt in the Old Kingdom: An Introduction (London:
Longman, 1998)
Alan Gardiner, Egypt of the Pharaohs (Oxford: Oxford University Press
1961)
ABBREVIATIONS
ET
EWA
EWP
EWT
EWW
FA
FB
FI
FP
FSW
GDS
GG
GH
GJ
GP
GT
HAAE
HAE
HE1
I 11-2
Martha Joukowsky, Early Turkey: Anatolian Archaeology form Prehistory through
the Lydian Period (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt Publishing, 1 996)
Donald B. Redford, "Egypt and Western Asia in the Old Kingdom",
Journal of the American Research Center in Egypt, 23 (1986): 125—43, cited
by item number (§) rather than page
Rebine Schulz and Matthias Seidel (eds), Egypt: World of the Pharaohs
(Cologne: Konemann, 1998)
Stuart Piggott, The Earliest Wheeled Transport: From the Atlantic Coast to
the Caspian Sea (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983)
Ian Shaw, Egyptian Warfare and Weapons (Princes Risborough: Shire
Publications, 1991)
Doyne Dawson, The First Armies (London: Cassell, 2001)
Walter Emery et ah, The Fortress at Buhen: The Archaeological Report
(London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1979)
Dominique Collon, First Impressions: Cylinder Seals in the Ancient Near
East (London: British Museum, 1987), cited by figure number (§) rather
than page
Robert B. Partridge, Fighting Pharaohs: Weapons and Warfare in Ancient
Egypt (Manchester: Peartree Publishing, 2002)
Douglas R. Frayne, "A Struggle for Water: A Case Study from the
Historical Records of the Cities of Isin and Larsa (1900-1800 BC)",
Canadian Society for Mesopotamian Studies Bulletin, 17 (May 1989): 17-28
Jeremy Black and Anthony Green, Gods, Demons and Symbols of Ancient
Mesopotamia: An Illustrated Dictionary (London: British Museum, 1992)
Othmar Keel and Christoph Uehlinger, Gods, Goddess and Images of God
in Ancient Israel (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), cited by figure
number (§) rather than page
Q, Gurney, The Hittites, 4th edn (London: Penguin, 1990)
Brigitte Jaros-Deckert, Das Grab des Jnj -jtj.fi die Wandmalereien der XL
Dynastie (Mainz am Rhein: Verlag Philipp von Zabern, 1984)
Toby Wilkinson, Genesis of the Pharaohs (London: Thames and Hudson,
2003)
T. Jacobsen, "Historical Data", in H. Frankfort (ed.), The Gimilsin
Temple and the Palace of the Rulers of Tell Asmar (Chicago, University of
Chicago Press, 1940), 116-200
Bill Manley, The Penguin Historical Atlas of Ancient Egypt (London: Penguin,
1996)
Nicolas Grimal, A History of Ancient Egypt (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992)
Michael Astour, "An Outline of the History of Ebla (Part I)", in Cyrus
Gordon, ed., Eblaitica, vol. 3 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1992),
pp. 3-82
Michael Astour, "A Reconstruction of the History of Ebla (Part 2)", in
Cyrus Gordan, ed., Eblaitica, vol. 4 (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns,
><)(>2), pp. S7 195
N i N
ABBREVIATIONS
HEA Alexander Badawy, A History of Egyptian Architecture, 3 vols (Berkeley
and Los Angeles, 1954-68)
Her. Herodotus, The History, trans. David Greene (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1987), cited by book and paragraph
HTO T. Jacobsen, Harps that Once: Sumerian Poetry in Translation (New
Haven: Yale University Press, 1987)
HW1 Philo H. J. Houwink ten Cate, "The History of Warfare According to
Hittite Sources: the Annals of Hattusilis I (Part I)", Anatolica, 10 (1983):
91-109
HW2 Philo H. J. Houwink ten Cate, "The History of Warfare According to
Hittite Sources: the Annals of Hattusilis I (Part II)", Anatolica, 11 (1984):
47-83
ICN Henry G. Fischer, Inscriptions from the Coptite Nome, Dynasties VI— XI,
Analecta Orientalia 40 (Rome, 1964)
IS A. H. Gardiner, T. E. Peet and J. Cerny, The Inscriptions of Sinai, 2nd
edn, 2 vols (London: Egypt Exploration Society, 1952-1955)
ISP Jaromir Malek, In the Shadow of the Pyramids: Egypt during the Old King-
dom (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1986)
ITM Edward Brovarski and William J. Murnane, "Inscriptions from the
Time of Nebhepetre Mentuhotep II at Abisko", Serapis 1/1 (1969): 11-33
TYN Marcel Sigrist, Isin Year Names, Institute of Archaeology Publications,
Assyriological Series, vol. 2 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 1988)
JCS Journal of Cuneiform Studies
JEA Journal of Egyptian Archaeology
JNES Journal of Near Eastern Studies
JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society
K\\ Trevor Bryce, The Kingdom of the Hittites (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1998)
Samuel Noah Kramer, The Sumerians: Their History, Culture, and Char-
acter (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963)
I Wolfgang Heimpel, Tetters to the King of Mari: A New Translation, with
Historical Introduction, Notes, and Commentary (Winona Lake, IN: Eisen-
brauns, 2003)
Wolfgang Helck and Eberhard Otto, Texicon der Aegyptologie, 7 vols
(Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1975-1992)
I II Yohanan Aharoni, The Land of the Bible: A Historical Geography, 2nd edn
(Philadelphia: Westminster, 1979)
I.C M. Roth, Law Collections from Mesopotamia and Asia Minor (Atlanta:
Scholars Press, 1995)
LI) Piotr Michalowski, The Lamentation Over the Destruction of Sumer and Ur
(Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 1989)
I.I IAEE Alessandro Roccati, La Litterature Historique Sous VAncien Empire Egyptieu
(Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1982)
ABBREVIATIONS
I \ J. Goodnick Westenholz, Legends of the Kings of Akkade (Winona Lake,
IN: Eisenbrauns, 1997)
I MB Patty Gerstenblith, The Levant at the Beginning of the Middle Bronze Age
(Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1983)
I | N Marcel Sigrist, Larsa Year Names, Institute of Archaeology Publications,
Assyriological Series, vol. 3 (Berrien Springs, MI: Andrews University
Press, 1990)
M The following reference provides a map
MA EM R. Ritner, The Mechanics of Ancient Egyptian Magical Practice (Chicago:
The Oriental Institute, 1993)
l,i n. Manetho, Manetho, trans. W. G. Waddell, Loeb Classical Library 155
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1940), cited by fragment
number (§) rather than page
MAS B. Foster, "Management and Administration in the Sargonic Period",
in M. Liverani (ed.), Akkad: The First World Empire: Structure, Ideology,
Traditions (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 1993), 25-39
MB Whitney Davis, Masking the Blow: The Scene of Representation in Late
Prehistoric Egyptian Art (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992)
MBA Yohanan Aharoni and Michael Avi-Yonah, Macmillan Bible Atlas, 2nd
edn (New York: Macmillan, 1977), cited by map number (§) rather
than page
MC Piotr Michalowski, "The Royal Correspondence of Ur", PhD Dis-
sertation, Yale University, 1 978
ME Timothy Potts, Mesopotamia and the East: An Archaeological and Historical
Study of Foreign Relations, c. 3400-2000 BC (Oxford: Oxford University
Committee for Archaeology, 1994)
MFM Stephanie Dalley, Myths from Mesopotamia: Creation, the Flood, Gilgamesh,
and Others, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000)
MHT Trevor R. Bryce, The Major Historical Texts of Early Hittite History
(Brisbane: University of Queensland, 1983)
MK S. Dalley, Mari and Karana: Two Old Babylonian Cities (London and
New York: Longman, 1984)
MKT H. E. Wmlock, The Rise and Fall of the Middle Kingdom in Thebes (New
York: Macmillan, 1947)
MM Jack Sasson, The Military Establishments at Mari (Rome: Pontifical Bib-
lical Institute, 1969)
MW Graham Philip, Metal Weapons of the Early and Middle Bronze Ages in
Syria- Palestine, 2 vols (Oxford: BAR International Series, 1989)
NEA G. Gaballa, Narrative in Egyptian Art (Mainz Am Rhein: Verlag Philipp
Von Zabem, 1W>)
( >A< Mogens Trolle Larson, 11 w Old Assyrian City-State and its Colonies
(Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag, 1 ( )76)
OBI I A Robert M. Whiting, |i\. Old Babylonian Letters from Tell Asmar, Assyr-
lologu al Sunlies, No \?. (( "Imago: ( )riental Institute of Chicago, 1 ( >87)
ABBREVIATIONS
OBTR
OHAE
OW
PA
PAE
PE
PH
py
PS
PSE
PT
Rl
R2
R3/1
R3/2
R4
RA1
Stephanie Dalley, The Old Babylonian Tablets from Tell Al Rimah (London:
British School of Archaeology in Iraq, 1976), cited by text number (§)
rather than page
Ian Shaw (ed.), The Oxford History of Ancient Egypt (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2000)
Arthur Ferrill, The Origins of IVar: from the Stone Age to Alexander the
Great (London: Thames and Hudson, 1985)
Jak Yakar, Prehistoric Anatolia; The Neolithic Transformation and the Early
Chalcolithic Period (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 1991)
D. Potts, The Archaeology of Elam (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999)
I. E. S. Edwards, The Pyramids of Egypt, 5th edn (Harmondsworth:
Penguin, 1993)
Yuhong, Wu, A Political History of Eshnunna, Mari and Assyria during the
Early Old Babylonian Period (From the end ofUr III to the death of Shamshi-
Adad) (Changchun: Institute of History of Ancient Civilizations,
Northeast Normal University, 1994)
Jerrold S. Cooper, Presargonic Inscriptions (New Haven: The American
Oriental Society, 1986)
Toby A. H. Wilkinson (editor and translator), Royal Annals of Ancient
Egypt: the Palermo Stone and its Associated Fragments (London: Kegan Paul
International, 2000)
Emma Swan Hall, Pharaoh Smites his Enemies (Munich: Deutscher
Kunstverlag, 1986)
R. O. Faulkner, The Ancient Egyptian Pyramid Texts (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1969), cited by "utterance" rather than page
Douglas Frayne, Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Periods, Vol. 1:
Pre-Sargonic Period (to 2334 B.C.) (Toronto: University of Toronto
Press, 2004)
Douglas Frayne, Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Periods, Vol. 2:
Sargonic and Guitian Period (2334—2113 B.C.) (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 1993)
Dietz Otto Edzard, Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Periods, Vol.
3/1: Gudea and His Dynasty (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997)
Douglas Frayne, Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Periods, Vol 3/2:
Ur III Period (2112-2004 B.C.) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1997)
Douglas Frayne, Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Periods, Vol. 4:
Old Babylonian Period (2003—1595 B.C.) 2 vols, Royal Inscriptions of
Mesopotamia, Babylonian Period (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
1.990)
A. Kirk Grayson, Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Assyrian Periods, Vol
I: Assyrian Rulers of the Third and Second Millennia BC (to 11 / ? UC)
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1987)
ABBFLEVIATIONS
i' \3
HGTC
r 1 1
r I A
KTU
SAF
5D
SDA
st ;ae
sup
M
SIP
SP
SSN
sw
i i;m
TIIL
rs
I'Sl I
Ronald J. Leprohon, "The Reign of Amenemhet III", PhD dissertation
(University of Toronto, 1980)
Repertoire Geographique des Textes Cuneiformes, in Beihefte zum Tubinger
Atlas des Vorderen Orients. Reihe B, Geisteswissenschaften, 7 (Wiesbaden:
Dr. Ludwig Reichert, 1977 ff )
Jerrold S. Cooper, Reconstructing History from Ancient Inscriptions:
the Lagash-Umma Border Conflict (JVlalibu, CA: Undena Publications,
1983)
Erich Ebeling (ed.), Reallexikon der Assyriologie (Berlin: W. de Gruyter,
1932-2000)
Richard L. Zettler and Lee Home (eds), Treasures from the Royal Tombs
of Ur (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Museum, 1998), cited
by page, or by item number (§)
Helga Seeden, The Standing Armed Figurines in the Levant (Munich:
Beck'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1980), cited by page, plate number
(§), or figure number (#)
P. Smither, "The Semna Dispatches", Journal of Egyptian Archaeology, 31
(1945) pp. 3-10; cited by dispatch number (§) rather than page
Andre Parrot, Sumer: the Dawn of Art (New York: Golden Press,
1961)
Wolfgang Decker, Sports and Games of Ancient Egypt (New Haven: Yale
University Press, 1987)
Horst Klengel, Syria, 3000-300 BC: A Handbook of Political History
(Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1992)
Claude Obsomer, Sesostris Ier: Etude chronologique et historique de regne
(Brussells: Connaissance de l'Egypte Ancienne, 1995)
K. Ryholt, The Political Situation in Egypt during the Second Intermediate
Period, c. 1800-1550 BC (Copenhagen: Carsten Niebuhr Institute of
Near Eastern Studies, 1997)
Bjorn Landstrom, Ships of the Pharaohs: 4000 Years of Egyptian Ship-
building (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1970)
H. E. Winlock, The Slain Soldiers of Neb-hepet-Re Mentu-hotpe (New
York: Metropolitan Museum of Art Egyptian Expedition, 1945)
Alan R. Schulman, "Siege Warfare in Pharaonic Egypt", Natural His-
tory: The Journal of the American Museum of Natural History, 73/3 (March
1964): 13-21
Francesco Tiradriti (ed.), The Treasures of the Egyptian Museum (Cairo:
American University in Cairo Press, 1999)
Treasures of the Holy Land: Ancient Art from the Israel Museum (New York:
The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1986)
R. M. Parkinson (translator), The Tale of Sinuhe and Other Ancient Egyptian
Poems. l*W0 1 640 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997)
Jacob Klein, Three Slutlgi Hymns: Sumerian Royal Hymns Glorifying King
Shulgi (»/ ( ) (K. mi. it Cm, Israel: 15. ir Ilan University Press, 1981)
AimRBVIATIONS
USP
VAE
WAM
WBC
WII
WM
WV
Benjamin R. Foster, Umma in the Sargonic Period, Memoirs of the Con-
necticut Academy of Arts and Sciences, vol. 20, April 1982 (Hamden,
CN: Archon Books, 1982)
R. B. Parkinson, Voices from Ancient Egypt: an Anthology of Middle King-
dom Writings (Norman, OK: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991)
Erkki Salonen, Die Wajfen der Alten Mesopotamier (Helsinki: Studia
Orientalia, 1965)
Lawrence H. Keeley, War Before Civilization: The Myth of the Peaceful
Savage (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1996)
Gemot Wilhelm, The Hurrians (Warminster, Wilts.: Aris & Phillips,
1989)
Albert Glock, Warfare in Mari and Early Israel (PhD Dissertation, Uni-
versity of Michigan, 1968)
M. Littauer and J. Crouwel, Wheeled Vehicles and Ridden Animals in the
Ancient Near East (Leiden: Brill, 1979), cited by page, and by figure
number (§)
"Year of king"
Introduction
I or many historians, military history begins with the classical Greeks. Warfare in
World History, for example, starts with the battle of Thermopylae {480 BCE}. 1
The very useful Reader's Guide to Military History has one entry on ancient Egypt
and another on the ancient Near East, but eight on the classical Greeks and
.mother eleven on the Romans. 2 The Art of War in World History devotes eleven of
lis 1069 pages to warfare before the Greeks. 3 Likewise, the World History of Warfare
devotes only twenty-nine pages to the pre-Greek and Persian Near East. 4 This
common misconception of military history beginning at Greece is off by a mere
.2500 years. In purely chronological terms, half of all recorded military history
occurred before the battle of Marathon {490 BCE}.
On the other hand, there is certainly some justification for the Hellenocentric
.ipproach to early military history, largely because the surviving source material for
( ireek military history alone probably exceeds the entire corpus of surviving
militarily significant sources from the ancient Near East from 3000-500 BCE.
lurthermore, the sources for ancient Near Eastern military history are written in a
number of obscure and difficult languages which are seldom studied by military his-
torians. All these languages still present numerous philological difficulties and uncer-
i, unties. Compounding these problems, we find that many of the sources are laconic,
tendentious, fragmentary, and contextually obscure. Furthermore, many modern
scholarly studies on ancient Near Eastern military matters are published in specialist
journals of limited accessibility, often burdened by nearly impenetrable technical
jargon and abbreviations and a bewildering array of unpronounceable transcriptions
of ancient words. Despite these problems, however, there is a vast vista of ancient
Near Eastern military history which remains essentially terra incognita to many
military historians. The goal of this study is to synthesize our current knowledge of
rarly ancient Near Eastern military history in a form that is accessible to the broader
range of military historians who do not specialize in ancient Near Eastern studies.
Those general surveys of military history which deal with the ancient Near East
to some degree frequently do so by giving a brief passing nod to Thutmose III
! 1504 1452 BCE} at Megiddo, Ramesses II {1304-1237 BCE} and the Hittites
,u K.ulesh, the Assyrian Empire (930-612 BCE}, and perhaps the Bible, before
turning to the Creeks. Important as these events and periods are, they are but a
small portion ol the vast array of ancient Near Pastern military history, and the
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
repeated emphasis on these same events necessarily distorts the overall under-
standing of warfare in the ancient Near East. Indeed, this present study concludes
at the end of the Middle Bronze Age {c. 1600 BCE}, before the battles of
Megiddo {1482 BCE} or Kadesh {1274 BCE} took place. Even within this lim-
ited timeframe I found myself hard-pressed to selectively synthesize the available
source materials into the 544 pages of this book.
Geographically this study encompasses the modern countries of Turkey (Ana-
tolia), Syria, Lebanon, Israel, Palestine, Jordan, Egypt, Iraq (Mesopotamia), wes-
tern Iran, and the modern states of the Arabian Peninsula. However, due to the
nature of the surviving sources, most of the emphasis will be on Mesopotamia and
Egypt. Chronologically, this study ranges from the origins of warfare to the end of
the Middle Bronze Age around 1600 BCE; again because of the nature of the
surviving sources, the focus will be on the period from roughly 3000 to 1600
BCE. The selection of the year 1600 for ending this study is based on three con-
siderations. First, major social and political transformations occurred around this
time, as reflected in material culture; scholars use these transformations as the cri-
teria for the transition from the Middle to the Late Bronze Ages. Second, this
period of transformation is marked politically by the fall of Babylon to the Hittites
] 1595 BCE} and the beginning of the rise of New Kingdom Egypt in Thebes
! 1 569 BCE}. Finally, the sixteenth century BCE witnessed the final emergence of
folly developed chariot warfare, creating the "chariot age", which would dom-
ii i.i i e Near Eastern military history for the next half millennium or more (which I
hope to examine in a future study). I will present both a narrative of military his-
tory and an examination of military systems and ideologies of different kingdoms
Uld cultures in the ancient Near East during this period
Chronological issues
Chronological notation conventions
I Jnless other wise noted, all dates are BCE (Before the Current Era = BC) or, in
Other words, before the traditional year of the birth of Christ. I have adopted the
l onvention of placing dates within pointed brackets { }, with parentheses ( ) used
to identify sources, and square brackets [ ] marking editorial insertions into quotations
Ol sources, to help contextualize and clarify the intent of the source. A number
followed by a "C" refers to a century: hence {25C} means the twenty-fifth cen-
tuiv liCi;. A number preceded by a "Y" refers to a regnal year: thus {Y 15} refers to
die fifteenth year of the reign of the king under discussion. Regnal years are generally
■list) translated into the equivalent years of our current calendar when known.
Sources for chronology 6
^ I"' 1 ' '•« liolars ul modem military history can sometimes h mptu.ilK dehm mili
111 ' 1l,v '' ii [t ' the horn ami even minute, Iiim. »i i m . ,, [ ils|
INTRODUCTION
often debate about which century a ruler lived in. The systems of scholarly peri-
odization of the ancient Near East present the non-specialist with a bewildering
variety of names and periods which I have attempted to simplify and systematize.
There are a number of different methods by which scholars attempt to discover
chronological information for the ancient Near East. Each of these methods has its
advantages and limitations; the most secure dates are based on a complementary
combination of as many chronological methods as available. 7
The overall goal of these methods is an attempt to establish absolute chronol-
ogy, in which ancient events are correlated to precise years in our modern calen-
dar. For much of the ancient period, in most of the regions of the ancient Near
East, dates for an absolute chronology are unfortunately not available with cer-
tainty; historians must therefore rely on other forms of periodization based on
estimates derived from a combination of other dating techniques. These include:
• Synchronism, which searches for the correlation of chronologically significant
events in one text with another, or with astronomically datable events.
• Dendrochronology, the study of the patterns of tree rings for certain species of
trees which vary according to differing climatic conditions for each year,
allowing the year a tree was chopped down to be determined.
• Radiometric dating, which provides approximate dates derived from measur-
ing the decay of radiological elements (such as Carbon 14) found in all organic
matter.
• Relative or stratigraphic dating, based on analysing the relative position of an
artifact in relation to other artifacts found at a given site (EA 5:82—8).
• Typological dating, comparing form, pattern, color, material, and construc-
tion techniques of the remains of material culture (EA 450—3). This type of
dating is generally associated with pottery typologies, but weapon typologies
are also very important for military history.
By painstakingly fitting together thousands of minute technical chronological
data from these and other forms of dating, archaeologists have been able to identify
the broad chronological patterns of ancient Near Eastern history, and establish an
absolute chronology for much of the history of Mesopotamia and Egypt. Unfor-
tunately, a number of ambiguities and uncertainties in the data permit several dif-
ferent overall ways of interpreting the chronological information, and hence
different chronologies.
For the most part this study will not deal with technical questions of chronol-
ogy. Instead, I will accept the "Middle Chronology", as used in the standard
reference works such as The Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt (EAE), The Oxford
Encyclopedia of Archaeology in the Near East (EA), and Civilizations of the Ancient Near
East (CANE). 8 Specific chronological charts for regional periodization will be
provided for each chapter. I should emphasize, however, that there is ultimate
uncertainty in much of the chronological information from the early ancient Near
Fast, (ienerally speaking, the older the date the more uncertain the chronology.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
While all dates given here are more or less problematic, I will use the abbreviation
"c." (for the Latin circa, or "approximately") when giving chronological informa-
tion that is especially dubious. Even though the dates given are often mere guesses,
I have chosen to use dubious dates rather than no dates at all, in order to help the
reader keep at least a relative sense of chronological periodization and develop-
ment through time. We must remember, however, that these dates are sometimes
little more than chronological pegs on which mentally to hang our information,
rather than temporal absolutes.
Periodization
There are a number of additional different ways scholars categorize ancient
chronological information besides trying to give a date in our modern calendar.
The first is the appearance of writing, which alone allows us to give precise dates
and specific names to people, places and events. Periods before writing are pre-
historic, while societies with surviving written source materials are historic. The
transition point between prehistoric and historic is different for each region of the
world. Some regions of the world — Australia for example — remained prehistoric
imiil the eighteenth century CE. In Egypt, on the other hand, the first evidence of
writing is about 3000 BCE; thus, before 3000 is prehistoric, while after 3000 is
historic. However, it is generally the case that the first evidence of writing is often
SO sparse and laconic that it provides the historian with very minimal informa-
tiOE — -sometimes nothing more than the name of a king. We thus often speak of a
protohistoric period, where the number of written texts is so limited that it provides
us with only fragmentary historical knowledge.
A second method of periodization is based on archaeological study of the pri-
mary material used for tool making: stone, copper, bronze, or iron. Broadly
speaking, archaeologists speak of three great "ages" in the ancient Near East: Stone
Age, Bronze Age, and Iron Age (EA 4:267-73). The Stone Age itself is divided
into subperiods: Paleolithic (Old Stone Age), Epipaleolithic (Late Old Stone Age) 9
and Neolithic (New Stone Age). In addition, there is a transitional period from
the use of stone to the use of metal, in which the first signs of working copper
appear; this period is known as the Chacolithic ("Copper-Stone" Age), which
generally corresponds with late Neolithic in most regions of the ancient Near East.
This system of periodization by tool manufacturing has its own particular set of
problems. First, based on the tools alone, no absolute chronology can be deter-
mined; assigning specific years in the modern calendar to each "age" results from
syn< 1 iron isms (discoveries of chronological matches or overlaps) with historical
texts, radiometric dating, and archaeological stratigraphy. Second, each of these
an hacological ages begins at a different absolute date in different regions of the
Nt mi [-last. Thus, the Bronze Age in Egypt begins later than the Bronze Age in
Mesopotamia. Some isolated regions of the world, such as parts of New ( luinea or
I he Amazon, lot example, were still in some ways in the "Stone Aee" until the
e.nK twentieth eenturv. Third, the dividing line lm tin ■ periods generally
INTRODUCTION
represents centuries of transition. Stone or bronze tools often remained in wide-
spread simultaneous use for centuries after their "ages", according to the archae-
ologists' periodization, technically ended. From the military history perspective,
i his system is somewhat unsatisfactory. In Egypt, for example, flint arrow heads
were still in widespread use during the Middle Kingdom, even though Egypt was
technically in the Middle Bronze Age by that time. It must be remembered that
i he transition between tool ages is based on when the technology first appears, not
on when it is universally adopted. For the ancient Near East, the following is a
very rough periodization by tools (based on EA 4:269-70), with the caveat that
each region has its own specific chronology with different periods of transitions.
I ; gypt, in particular, generally entered these phases several centuries later than the
i est of the Near East. Table A shows a chronology of the Ancient Near East, based
on the materials used for tool making.
Table A Chronology of the Ancient Near East, based on tool making
1 .pipaleolithic
Epipaleolithic (Mesolithic)
c. 18,000-8500
N eolithic
Pre-Pottery Neolithic
c. 8500-6000
Pottery Neolithic
c. 6000-4500
( halcolithic
Chalcolithic
c. 4500-3300
Bronze
Early Bronze
c. 3300-2000
Middle Bronze
c. 2000-1600
Late Bronze
c. 1600-1200
Iron
Iron Age I
c. 1200-925
Archaeologists also classify chronological periods based on a matrix of material
. nlture discovered at, and named after, specific archaeological sites where a parti-
cular combination of material culture was first discovered. Thus we find in Egypt a
discussion of the Faiyum culture, the Moerian period, as well as the Maadi,
[>adarian, Naqada or Gerzean; all of these, however, are simply specific regional
subphases of the Neolithic period in Egypt. These periods of material culture are
often subdivided into phases, which are generally given Roman numerals. In order
to minimize confusion and complexity, throughout this study I will mainly use the
dynastic and tool-based methods of periodization since these are the most relevant
to military history. I will generally convert pottery-based subphases of material
culture into their dynastic or tool-typology equivalents. At the beginning of each
t hapter I will provide a chart which attempts to correlate all these different forms
of periodization for the region under consideration.
Historical geography and ethnography
I'he historical geography and ethnography of the ancient Near East is also a
complicated subject. One problem is that the modern location for most place
ii. lines mentioned in an< ient texts is not ki
for certain. Even capitals of major
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
empires, like Akkad of the Akkadians and Washukanni of Mitanni, have not been
identified with certainty. The same place might be called different names in dif-
ferent languages; place-names can also change with time. The kingdom of
Mitanni, for example, was anciently called Mitanni, Maitta, Hurri, Khanigalbat,
Khabigalbat, Naharina and Nahrima (DANE 200). Furthermore, different scholars
often translate a single ancient term differently; likewise the English, German,
French, or Italian usages are sometimes quite distinct. All of this is further com-
plicated by the fact that many ancient sites are called by their modern Arabic
names, even after the ancient name has been discovered. Thus, the ancient Ebla is
also frequently called by its modern Arabic name Tell Mardikh. For the non-spe-
cialist, this can create immense confusion. As a general rule I will select one stan-
dardized modern spelling for ancient place names, and consistently use it
throughout this study. Alternate place-names will generally be given in parentheses
or in notes; all alternate spellings in quotations and translations will be standar-
dized. Thus, for example, I will consistently use the modern standard English
spelling for the city of Aleppo, rather than Yamkhad (ancient Near Eastern name),
lieroea (Hellenistic name) or Halab (Arabic name).
Different ancient peoples at different times also defined themselves and others
differently, and such ethnonyms (names of peoples) could change through time.
Many different ethnic groups inhabited the same region simultaneously, with some
groups disappearing and others appearing in different periods. Migration was
common in the ancient Near East, causing frequent changes in ethnography,
furthermore, what groups called themselves was often different from what for-
eigners called them. For clarity for the non-specialist, I have decided to use a
simplified, standardized, and consistent — though necessarily somewhat arbitrary —
system for describing ancient ethnography. Broadly speaking, I will use the following
tCJ ms for peoples living in the following modern regions:
Anatolian
Phoenician
Syrian
t amaanite
Egyptian
! J >■■ m
Nubian
Mesopotamians
I iaiiutc
i ; ;i n
Ancient people of modern Turkey
Ancient maritime people of the Levant coast of modern Syria,
Lebanon, and northern Israel
Land-based peoples of modern Syria and Lebanon
Peoples of modern Israel, Palestine, and Jordan
Peoples of the Nile Valley below Aswan (First Cataract)
Peoples of the deserts to the west of the Nile
Peoples south of Aswan in northern modern Sudan
All ancient peoples living in the Tigris and Euphrates river
valleys in modern Iraq and southeast Syria. Mesopotamians
included a number of different ethnic and linguistic groups
such as Sumerians, Akkadians, Assyrians, and Babylonians,
who will be introduced in the appropriate chapters.
Peoples of" south-western Iran
Mountain pastoral herders m tin u-.m Mountains of Wes
tern Iran and south rastci u I in I ■ \
W
H
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
INTRODUCTION
Nomad Desert and steppe pastoral herders. It should be emphasized
that Early Bronze nomads were generally not horse and camel
riders. They usually migrated and fought on foot. By the
Middle Bronze Age some nomads were beginning to ride
equids and camels, but there is no evidence of large bodies of
cavalry or camelry used by ancient nomads in battle.
Using this method is unsatisfactory in many ways. It is rather like calling
ancient Gauls or Franks by the modern term French; or, more drastically, like
referring to the Iroquois as New Yorkers. While recognizing the problems with
this approach, my goal is to make ancient ethnography and geography more
accessible to modern readers. When introducing new ethnonyms I will always try
to place them in their proper geographical and chronological setting and give
variant spellings. Thus, when, introducing the Hittites and Luwians, I will say they
are "Anatolian" peoples, even though the land the Hittites and Luwians inhabited
was not called Anatolia until nearly a thousand years after the age of the Hittite
Empire.
Sources
13efore roughly 1820 CE, all of our knowledge of the ancient Near East was found
in the Bible and in classical Greek and Latin sources. During the nineteenth cen-
tury the decipherment of ancient Egyptian {1822-1843 CE} and the cuneiform
writing systems {1802-1852 CE}, along with the rapid development of the dis-
cipline of professional archaeology, transformed our knowledge of the ancient
Near East. Indeed, the rediscovery of the lost history of the ancient Near East
through archaeology and the philological decipherment of dead languages is one
of the great intellectual sagas of mankind. 10 Nearly all of the sources for ancient
Near East history used in this book have been discovered through archaeology in
the past two centuries. From these two centuries of archaeological effort we have
foui types of source materials available for the study of warfare in the ancient Near
I ,r,l:
I texts, in a wide range of genres including royal inscriptions, year names,
autobiographies, hymns, letters, administrative texts, myths, epics, and other
literature;
martial artwork: artistic representations of arms and combat, generally
patronized by kings for royal propaganda and aggrandizement, or as religious
veneration and thanksgiving to the gods;
3 fortifications;
■\ weapons and other military-related artifacts.
I .H li of these categories of evidence is complementary, offering different per-
spectives on ancient warfare, but each also has special methodological problems
relating to their interpretation. Some of the technical issues relating to specific
artifacts, art, or texts will be introduced throughout this study. Here some general
methodological considerations will be discussed.
Textual sources
The textual sources of ancient Near Eastern military history before 1600 are lar-
gely in three primary languages: Sumerian, Akkadian (including Old Assyrian and
Old Babylonian dialects), and Egyptian. Hittite texts become crucial for Anatolia
and Syria in the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries. A large archive of admin-
istrative and economic texts also exists in Eblaite, which are of indirect interest to
the military historian. 11 There are a number of other ancient Near Eastern lan-
guages which are poorly attested or poorly understood, or for which we only have
a body of names mentioned in texts written in other languages. These include
lilamite, Hurrian, Amorite, Byblos Syllabic, and Old Canaanite; these languages
have few significant texts for military history. 12 The linguistic Babel of the ancient
Near East is further compounded by the fact that many crucial secondary studies
are in German, French, and Italian.
Another problem in dealing with ancient Near Eastern sources is that there are
a number of different ways to transliterate ancient words and names and to trans-
l,i te technical military terms. Some of the translations I have cited use different
transliteration systems. I have opted to follow the spelling and transliteration sys-
ii'ins found in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt (EAE), the Oxford Encyclo-
pedia of Archaeology in the Near East (EA) and the Dictionary of the Ancient Near East
(1 )ANE). In order to make understanding easier for the non-specialist, I have
t mdardized alternative spellings in sources which use different spelling and trans-
I in ration systems. Thus, I use the spelling "Montuhotep" for the famous Middle
Kingdom Egyptian rulers. If sources I quote use the alternative spellings Mentu-
botep or Mentuhotpe, I have simply changed their spelling to conform to the EAE
Item without comment.
I ikewise, certain technical military terms can be translated in different ways by
different translators. I have chosen to standardize many of these as well. For
example, the Egyptian term imy-r can be translated in different ways according to
( ontext. In texts relating to work crews it is perhaps best rendered as "overseer".
Ina military context the translation of "commander" is probably more appro-
pi i.ito. The problem is that different English words are sometimes used by different
translators to translate this single Egyptian word. Thus, many of the translations I
.in! quoting have been slightly modified by me for consistency of translation of
technical military terminology. I generally give a transliteration of the original
i (Miii I am translating when the concept is first introduced. I also make extensive
use of square brackets | | to indicate my insertion of explanatory terms into a
translation to provide background for the non-specialist reader. For example,
when a (ext stairs "I am the lord of the land" (L 249), I might modify it to read "I
|thr j'.od Shamash] am the lord ol the land |of Mari|" to clarify the context.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
I have made a consistent effort to give as many sources in translation as possible.
Throughout this study I have given preference to citing English translations in
accessible editions, though this has not always been possible. I have generally not
given full bibliographic references to the standard editions for these sources in the
original languages. Instead, I have included references to translations or commen-
taries which include full bibliography on original language editions and studies.
Those who wish to consult the original languages can find that information in the
secondary literature and commentary on the translations I have cited. Such pri-
mary studies are thus at most one bibliographic step away in my notes and refer-
ences. I have also adopted a fairly extensive system of abbreviations to keep the size
of the notes and parenthetical references to a minimum. These abbreviations can
be found on pages xv-xxiv.
Art and weapons
Martial art and surviving weapons are a crucial source for the military history of
the ancient Near East. Throughout my study I have made extensive use of such
sources. Unfortunately, due to publication costs, it has been impossible to include
illustrations of all the items I discuss in the text. Whenever I make reference to a
particular work of martial art: or weapon I attempt to give references to recent and
accessible publications which have reproduced that art, preferably in color. I will
frequently give multiple references to reproductions of the same piece of art to
help those attempting to track them down. I also try to get a full verbal description
for those who cannot get access to the images, though such descriptions are
invariably inadequate.
The interpretation of martial art has its own set of methodological problems
which I will discuss on occasion throughout the text. Three major problems are
idealization, contextualization and anachronism. Idealization is where the martial
scene is presented in an idealized or ritualized context — how things should have
been, rather than how they really were. This is a nearly ubiquitous problem with
iiu ient Near Eastern martial art, since nearly all of it was patronized by kings or
nobles in order to glorify their martial achievements. The second problem, con-
text ualization, is more subtle. It is attempting to determine what precisely the art is
intended to depict. For example, the famous "Standard of Ur" includes scenes of
Suincrian war-carts trampling defeated prostrate enemies (AFC 98—9; FA 84; AW
1 : 132-3). The question is: does the art mean to depict war-carts in the midst of
battle as they knock down enemies in combat, or does it show an after-battle tri-
umph where the war-carts are paraded among the corpses of the dead who have
already been killed by infantry? Such questions plague the interpretation of a great
deal of ancient martial art. Finally, there is the question of anachronism; this is
especially a problem in the context of ritual or mythological martial art. Here the
essential problem is: do the weapons of the kings and gods represent the actual
weapons used in battle at the time the art was made, or are they idealized mythical
•> ipons which are no longer actually used in combat? Here tin example of
INTRODUCTION
( christian religious art depicting the archangel Michael with a sword is analogous.
Such art in medieval churches may depict actual contemporary weapons, while a
depiction of Michael in a twentieth-century church — still with his sword rather
dian a machine gun — is clearly anachronistic. Likewise the British Royal Horse
and Foot Guard continue to parade with archaic weapons and uniforms that are no
longer used in actual combat. Four thousand years from now an archaeologist
might be puzzled by what seems to be the continued use of sword- armed cavalry
in the age of machine-guns, tanks and airplanes.
What is war? 13
I or anyone who has been in one, it seems silly to ask the question "what is war?".
I )nly those who have experienced it can really know, and for them there can be
little doubt as to what it really is. I have been fortunate to never have experienced
war at first hand. I missed the Vietnam War by only a few months, with a draft
number of 53. In one sense this should disqualify me from even discussing the
topic. By what arrogance do I — who have never killed anyone or had anyone try
to kill me — talk about warfare? But in reality, that is not my purpose here. My
l unction is to collect, synthesize and present what the peoples of the ancient Near
Bait had to say about warfare. My function is that of interlocutor, to serve as an
intermediary for voices of ancient warriors — now dead for thousands of years —
.md let them tell their stories. I am, of course, not so naive as to believe that I can
i ell their stories without necessarily distorting their past through the prism of my
I iwn ideas, beliefs, ignorance, and limitations. But, as much as possible, my goal is
to present and elucidate the ancient texts, art, and artifacts related to war.
For the purpose of this study, I am not overly concerned with formulating a
precise definition of warfare; I am actually rather dubious that such a thing could
DC done, or if it could that it would be very useful. Different definitions of warfare
ITS often related to the fact that anthropologists, archaeologists, historians, and
< idler scholars, although all dealing with the same phenomenon, each approach the
1 aie by asking different types of questions and attempting to answer those ques-
tions with different types of evidence and methodologies. Our concern, then,
should not be defining "what is war?", but rather, "what type of model or defi-
nition for warfare is most helpful in understanding the issues and questions related
t<> the strengths and limitations of a given discipline, methodology or body of
« vidence?" A universally useful definition of war is not only unattainable, but
undesirable. Rather, such definitions should be viewed as more or less useful
models for answering a specific range of questions with certain types of metho-
dology. The overall issue of warfare should be explored with as many different
perspectives and methodologies as possible. My goal here, however, is not to for-
niul.iie .in idealized model describing what "tribal warfare", "chiefdom warfare",
oi "state wailare" was supposedly like (FA 48—73). Rather, I will pay close atten-
tion to the evidence we have describing what was actually done by specific indi-
viduals a! \pc< itu times and plates. My particular approach here is thus historical,
II
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
though I will gratefully incorporate the insights provided by anthropology,
archaeology, and other disciplines as frequently as possible.
It is odd that, in attempting to define warfare, so little attention is often paid to
the indigenous concepts of warfare of the peoples being studied. Rather than trying
to decide what we think warfare is, we should begin by asking ourselves what do
they — the objects of our study — think warfare is. This is the important anthro-
pological distinction between insider and outsider perspectives and forms of dis-
course. It is more interesting to the historian to discover what the ancient peoples
thought they were doing when they fought wars, than how modern scholars
choose to describe or model what we think ancient peoples were doing. From the
perspective of ancient Near Eastern peoples, war was conceived of as something
altogether different from the activity often described as war by anthropologists,
archaeologists, and historians. Feeding and equipping armies certainly occurred in
the ancient Near East. Ancient soldiers marched and fought, and killed and died,
just like modern soldiers. But for ancient Near Easterners that was not what was
really important about war. For the ancients, war was the means by which the gods
restored cosmic order through organized violence undertaken in their name by their divinely
ordained kings. Or, to put it in Clauswitzian terms, "war is the continuation of
(lii'iiie policy by other means". Whatever other modern models we might wish to
apply to our study of ancient Near Eastern warfare to help illuminate certain
questions, this definition must never be far from our mind. Throughout this study
I will try to pay careful attention to the ideologies of warfare as conceived by
ancient Near Easterners.
To the modern mind this definition of war is almost incomprehensible, parti-
cularly since in the wake of 9/11 — the destruction by terrorists of New York's
World Trade Center in September 2001 — we tend to view warfare in the name of
God as something abhorrent. In reality, however, throughout most of history and
in most regions and cultures, there has been an intimate connection between
religion and warfare, so much so that one could argue that ancient Near Eastern
warfare was, in many ways, a form of religious worship and mass sacrifice.
To the modern advocating the superiority of the veneration of a god of love
and peace, the ancient would simply reply: "Why would I possibly want to worship
;i god who cannot bring victory in battle?" To the outsider, four thousand years
removed from this world- view, there is something unsatisfying and even disturbing
in this perception of war. But only when we understand this key concept — that
ancient Near Eastern war isn't really about maces and javelins and fortresses, but is
a theomachy, a "war of the gods" — can we begin to understand ancient Near
Eastern warfare. From their perspective it is not that humans cynically invoke the
gods to justify fighting their human wars. It is that the gods use the humans to
fight their divine wars. The cosmic war between good and evil, order and chaos, is
ongoing; the gods simply recruit mortals to fight in that war. To understand the
.m< lent Near Eastern view of war is to read of the acts of the gods in Homers Iliad
not as literary metaphor but as an absolutely authentic description of the actual
pic-sent v ol it'.il, (OMiiK K powci hi! beings using humans as then paw us
I '
INTRODUCTION
But, to return to the world-view of the twenty-first century: rather than
i tempting a narrow definition of warfare and ignoring all war-like human beha-
v lor that does not fit this definition, I will, instead, adopt a loose and broad defi-
niion of war and war-like activities. In its most universal form, warfare is simply
Organized violence between rival human groups. Under this broad definition,
■ving wars" over drug territory in a ghetto would be a form of warfare. Thus, in
mnc sections of this book I will take this perspective, considering fighting
between small forager tribal groups as just as "authentic" a form of warfare as
A orld War Two. But most of the attention of this book will be focused on state-
.mctioned organized violence, directed at either destroying rival political entities,
I forcing them into submission. Much of ancient Near Eastern warfare also had
M important economic component, either to enrich the gods, king and warriors
liirctly, through the acquisition of slaves, plunder, or tribute, or indirectly, by
•ut rolling access to important rare resources such as tin, lapis lazuli, or cedarwood
toi building timber. All of these factors — religion, politics, and economics — had
mi overlapping and integrated impact on war-making in the ancient Near East;
Ji hough we view them as causally separate, they would generally not be clearly
.listinguished in the minds of ancient kings and warriors.
I '•
CHAPTER ONE
The Neolithic Age and the origin of warfare
{to c. 3000}
The origin of war
The question of how, why, when, and where warfare began is a complicated one
that is frequently burdened by many uncorroborated assumptions; proposed
answers are sometimes blissfully unhindered by evidence. Even asking the very
question begins to limit the possible range of answers, since asking "when did war
begin" implies that there was a time when there was no war. In theory we must
allow for the possibility that warfare has always been known among humans.
Attempts to answer this question are also intimately connected to assumptions
about human nature - are humans (or more specifically male humans) inherently
violent? - which are beyond the purview of historians. 1 Asking these questions
also implies that we know what war "really" is, and that we have sufficient evi-
dence from the past to allow us to clearly identify its presence or absence. Both of
these assumptions are dubious. As discussed in the introduction, I doubt an
objective and universally applicable definition of war can be formulated. Rather,
the nature of war has varied from culture to culture throughout history, with war
meaning different things to different people at different times and places.
What war meant to a Paleolithic forager, an Egyptian pharaoh, or a modern
politician, may be quite different things, but that is not to say that those phenomena
should not all be seen as warfare. The mother whose son died in a cattle raid in
Neolithic Anatolia undoubtedly grieved just as much as the mother of an Iraqi or
American soldier killed in the Gulf War; the fact that some modern scholars might
be unwilling to say that "primitive" Neolithic raids are "real" war hardly changes
the poignancy of the mother's grief (WBC 3-24). But the debate over what "real"
war is misses the real point that should be the focus of our attention. Although,
using historical methods, we may not be able to answer questions concerning
when, where, why, and how war began, we can contribute to the discussion by
instead asking: "by what types of evidence can we know that war occurred in the
p.isi lii tcality .ill that we are actually able to discuss is our first evidence for war,
in ol war. The Near Hastern evidence disi ir < d U I. >u indi< ates
n. .1 ill. ,U lll.ll
•
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
that war probably existed millennia before the first surviving written texts that
describe war. War was already commonplace by the time the first writing appears.
Some of our earliest writing describes a mythic or legendary past in which warfare
was present, which may thus serve as possible evidence for prehistoric warfare.
We are therefore left with four types of archaeological evidence which may
point to the existence of prehistoric war: martial art, weapons, human skeletons
with weapon trauma, and fortifications (WBC 36-9). Two of these forms of evi-
dence are not, in fact, helpful in trying to identify the origins of war. Weapons are
I dubious indicator, since almost all Neolithic weapons — axe, dagger, spear, jave-
lin, bow, and sling — were also used in hunting and other non-military activities.
Thus the presence of a bow may indicate hunting rather than war. (The mace, as
discussed below, may be a uniquely militant tool.) A skeleton with weapon trauma
i . also not conclusive evidence for warfare, since the person may be a victim of
murder rather than war. However, the presence of a large number of skeletons
with weapon trauma in mass or simultaneous burials is probably conclusive evi-
dence that they died in warfare, though even here it could point to mass execution
or ritual human sacrifice. Practically speaking, this leaves us three types of
archaeological evidence that can point to the existence of war: art depicting con-
Mi ct, mass burial of skeletons with weapons trauma, and fortifications. Near East-
ern examples of each of these types of evidence will be discussed below It must be
emphasized that, while the presence of these types of evidence should be sufficient
to demonstrate that war occurred, their absence does not necessarily demonstrate
that war did not occur. Absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. Many, if
not most, wars in ancient Near Eastern history have left no archaeologically dis-
l er nable evidence that they were fought. Artistic evidence for archaic warfare
l mind in early cave paintings from Late Epipaleolithic or early Neolithic Spain
J 1 0,000-6000} show organized humans fighting and killing each other with bows
(1 A 52—5; OW 20-3). Likewise some Epipaleolithic or early Neolithic mass burials
with skeletons with weapon trauma have been found in Germany and at Jebel
S.ihaba in the northern Sudan (FA 52-3; OW 23-4). Overall, however, such
.uchaeological evidence is quite sparse for periods before the late Neolithic. War-
i.i re clearly existed, but there is no evidence to show it was endemic.
Most arguments for warfare in the Epipaleolithic and early Neolithic periods
are in fact based on anthropological analogy. The assumption here, and it is only an
assumption, is that human societies go through a sort of evolutionary progress from
"bands" of foragers to "tribes", then "chiefdoms" and finally "states". 2 This is
essentially an anthropological model for the evolution of human social and poli-
neal organization in which it is assumed that human social groups that modern
anthropologists classify in certain categories will behave in similar patterns, even
though they may be separated by thousands of years or tens of thousands of miles,
ii id have completely different languages, cultures, and religions. Thus, if one finds
evidence foi warfare in a thirteenth-century CE chiefdom in North America
i \\ lit f.S *)), it is seen as evidence that warfare would have similarly occurred in
, lu. tdoms" in the Nr.u Fast in M H II ) In T, or Africa m 5(H) CE. Likewise the fact
15
WARIAki: IN Tl II: ANCIENT NHAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
that some twentieth-century CE tribal groups in the Amazon or New Guinea
fight wars (FA 56—60), is viewed as evidence that ancient human groups classified
by anthropologists as tribes should also have fought wars. 3 The problem with this
approach is that, while some tribal groups clearly engage in warfare, others do not.
Some human groups resolve conflict through arbitration and mediation, others
tli rough violence. And the same group might negotiate in one circumstance and
fight a war in another. Thus, while anthropology can tell us a great deal about the
range of possible human social behavior, it cannot tell us that a specific tribe or
town in Anatolia in 5000 BCE did or did not engage in warfare.
My suspicion — and it is only a suspicion — is that war began at least in the Paleolithic
inncs when different foraging clans first began to interact (CB 55—127). Much of this
interaction was undoubtedly peaceful and friendly, such as the exchange of goods
01 intermarriage. If anthropological analogy is any guide, however, it seems likely that
conflicts would also have occurred, be it competition for food or other resources,
k idnapping women, or personal offense taken for a petty insult. In such circumstances
i onflict could turn to fighting, and as groups rallied to support and defend their
I kinsmen, fighting could turn into tribal war. A death or injury needed revenge; stolen
property or kidnapped women needed to be recovered. This is not to say that wars
always occurred between different foraging clans, only that competition and conflict
1 w -t ween rival clans created the social circumstances in which tribal wars could occur.
The "military threshold"
Rather than attempting to answer the question of when and why war began
through anthropological models, I will take an historical approach and ask two
questions: what is our earliest archaeological evidence of warfare (artistic, skeletal,
Or fortification); and, when do the various regions of the Near East cross what I
will call the "military threshold"? By military threshold, I mean the point at which
warfare has essentially become endemic in a region, and at which all peoples in a
region are forced to militarize their societies to one degree or another. In the Near
l ; ,.ist t his seems to have first occurred as early as the sixth millennium in Anatolia, and
is ( losely related to the culmination of a process we call the Neolithic Revolution.
The Neolithic Revolution 4
l-.pipaleolithic {c. 18,000—8500} human hunting bands had low population density
.11 ul were scattered in small clans of a few dozen people living in temporary camps
and wandering in seasonal migration patterns; as time progressed some of these
seasonal ramps in ideal ecological zones with plentiful food had the capacity to
develop permanent villages with populations in the low hundreds. Anthro-
pological analogy would suggest that Epipaleolithic hunting clans were territorial
and ( ould have had periods of competition and conflict with other clans, possibly
iir.iiiiii: (lashes of tribal warfare (AS 39-40; CB; WBC). However, there is little
evidence toi l'.pipa!cohthi< warfare in the Near East,
I he Neolithic period in the ancient Near East {c. 8500-4500} witnessed a
umber of fundamental technological, social, and economic developments which
i I the foundation for the eventual crossing of the military threshold. These
hide the development of the domestication of plants and animals, metallurgy,
■...its, social stratification, the development of large cities with the capacity for
Mm mental building, the worship of militant gods, and the foundation of warlike
royal dynasties. Evidence for the crossing of the military threshold as early as the
Ji millennium can be found in weapons, art, and fortification, as well as mythic
■ 1 1 lections written down in later periods. Each of these developments was a slow
ro( ess, taking centuries if not millennia. Some developments occurred earlier or
K>re rapidly in one area than another, but the increasing network of international
i u\c and cultural contacts - developed largely in pursuit of rare and valuable
■ II ices such as metal, precious stones, and building wood - meant that devel-
ments in one region of the Near East were eventually copied in all others. The
imiilative effect was the formation of new human social structures based on the
state, and the crossing of the military threshold.
Domestication of plants and animals
fundamental development of the Neolithic period is the domestication of plants
id animals. The move from hunting and foraging to domestication seems to have
merged from both ecological and demographic factors. Ecologically there seems
■ i have been an increasing desiccation in the Near East during the Neolithic per-
-!. forcing more people to live in progressively smaller regions with the best
■Piter and food resources. At the same time we see a rise in population, bringing
reasing competition for decreasing resources.
Domestication of plants and animals emerged as strategies to bring greater
in ml and security to food resources, and to intensify the amount of food that
ould be produced from a given tract of land. Domestication of plants, including
• lu.it, Max, barley, beans and peas, allowed increasing sedentarization in the Near
i | i with villages becoming permanent sites of habitation and slowly growing in
| i 1 domestication of animals such as cattle, sheep, goats, pigs, and dogs increas-
i supplanted hunting and fishing as a major source of food. Initially these
lopments occurred in upper Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia, where these
i ints and animals were indigenous in the wild. Eventually these domestication
i ictices moved into the river valleys, where irrigation techniques were first
i i. in cd. In the long run, irrigated agriculture in the great river valleys of the
ii l.ist would prove far more productive, giving those regions significant agri-
Lihur.il surpluses and laying the foundation for the rise of the large city-states of
M late fourth millennium.
A lelated important development during the early Neolithic that was to have
tt< i.il impact nw military history was the formation of two symbiotic systems of
Inoil produc tiou, agricultural and. pastoral, which in turn would create two dif-
lenne mhi.iI systems tanners and nomads (AS 68 79, 126-31). Although today
If,
I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
nomads as a significant military force in world history have essentially disappeared —
largely due to the development of the airplane, motorized transportation, and food
and water preservation and storage technologies — the complex interrelationship of
cycles of cooperation and conflict between nomad and city formed a constant
theme in the military history 7 of the Near East and the world until as late as the
early twentieth century CE, when Arab nomads participated in the liberation of
Damascus and the fall of the Ottoman Empire in World War One. 5
Domestication had a number of significant indirect effects on the military
potential of human societies. First, increasing competition for dwindling resources
could lead to conflict and, potentially, to militarism. Second, domestication of
plants required the new farmers to remain in a single location. Their survival
depended on retaining control of their farms. If a forager or nomad band was
threatened it could migrate. When a sedentary band was threatened, it could not
flee; it had to submit or fight. This basic fact laid the foundation for the eventual
development of fortifications and siegecraft. From the military perspective the
domestication of the donkey, for which we have evidence by at least the early
fourth millennium (EA 2:255), also came to play a significant role in military
logistics. As a pack animal the donkey would prove invaluable for collecting and
moving surplus resources, trade goods, and for campaign logistics. The full military
impact of the domestication of animals will be discussed in Chapter Five.
Agricultural surpluses
Whereas nomads were restricted as to the maximum size of their herds (and hence
food surplus) by the carrying capacity of their grazing land, agriculturalists could
i reate large food surpluses simply by planting and harvesting more food than they
needed for their families. The ability to produce food surpluses created the possi-
bility for both increasing population and, more importantly, for some of the
population to specialize in non-food-producing activities, including warfare. The
major problems for agricultural food surpluses were storage and spoilage. These
problems were resolved by the development of pottery {seventh millennium},
which, when properly sealed and stored, could preserve grains and other food
products for years. The development of pottery permitted storage and transporta-
tion of surplus food supplies. Militarily the combination of agricultural surpluses
and pottery storage systems laid the foundation for the rise of a specialized warrior
class who could control and gather much of a region's food surplus. This, in
( ombination with using donkeys, boats, and eventually carts for transport, created
military logistics, with the potential for the extension of military operations in
i imc .nul space.
Boats
( hi! i .u ht i ( \hlriK r for ho. its tomes from Syria in the Upper luipbratcs around
>ti()(i. when- mil ill moilrl ho.iis were discovered at Tell Maslm.ui.i Mi- rarliest
is
boats were reed canoes covered with pitch and propelled by paddling or punting.
Similar models have been discovered at a number of other sites from Iraq in the
hfth millennium (AS 167-8; EA 5:30-4). River craft developed on the Nile at
m Highly the same time. From the military perspective boats facilitated transporta-
tion and communication in the two great river valleys, the Nile and Mesopotamia,
i he ability to move men, supplies, and equipment more easily and cheaply along
I liese great river systems meant that it was easier to exercise military power within
the river valleys than outside them. As we shall see, river transportation facilitated
the formation of larger, more powerful, and longer lasting military states in the
nver valleys than outside them. The eventual development of sea-going vessels
a ill be discussed later.
Increasing population
Agricultural surpluses allowed for an increase in both the number and the size of
(dements in the Near East throughout the Neolithic period. Rising populations
I >i ought increased contact between various Neolithic clans and villages. Contact
ould be peaceful, involving trade, intermarriage and cultural exchange. On the
• it her hand, competition for resources could create rising tensions, possibly leading
to war. Rising population naturally created the possibility for increased army size,
and thus larger and more complex campaigns.
Monumental building and fortifications
The development of monumental building in the Neolithic had three compo-
nents: the ability to mobilize enough manpower to erect monumental buildings;
the development of the engineering skills necessary to do so; and a cultural
impetus creating the desire to build large communal structures. The earliest form
of monumental building in the Near East was the temple, but militarily the
building of fortifications is most important. The earliest evidence w 7 e have for
fortifications will be introduced later, but, generally speaking, fortification build-
ing is our clearest indicator that a society has crossed the military threshold. The
f.iet that a people are willing to spend the time and resources necessary to build
i <>it jurations implies that they perceive a serious and long-standing military threat,
h.mscending low-level feuding, raiding, or brigandage.
Weapons and the origin of metallurgy {9000-2000} 6
I here are several important military implications of the development of weapons
during the Neolithic period. First, all ancient Near Eastern weapons — with the
probable exception of the mace — originated as Neolithic tools. During the Neo-
hthu, weapons and tools were generally made of flint, chert, or obsidian. Basic
hunting weapons of the Neolithic axe, javelin, sling, bow and arrow, dagger, and
spear are found in numerous Neolithic camps and burials. However, each of
19
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
these tools had both peaceful and military uses: axes for chopping and shaping
wood, projectile points for hunting, and knives for domestic cutting of food or
other materials. The mere presence of these tools alone is thus not necessarily a
clear archaeological indicator of warfare.
All metal weapons were based on stone prototypes. Metal weapons developed
different forms during the Bronze Age, but the basic prototypes for Bronze Age
metal weapons can be found in Neolithic hunting weapons. The origin of metal-
working was one of the most momentous developments in military history, lead-
ing ultimately to metal weapons. Although this process originated in Neolithic
times, developments continued for several millennia. The earliest evidence for the
use of metal dates to the early ninth millennium at Cayonu in Anatolia, in the
form of drilled and polished malachite (copper) as ornamental beads. Copper was
the early metal of choice because it exists abundantly as a metal in its natural
geological context, is easy to polish and drill, and can be hammered into different
shapes., For the next three millennia {9000—6000} the only known copper objects
continue to be native copper beads and pins; a small four-centimeter awl is the
largest known metal object from this period. This type of small ornamental metal-
working is sometimes called "trinket metallurgy". By the sixth millennium this
type of trinket copper- working had spread into northern Mesopotamia, Iran and
Baluchistan (south-west Pakistan). Additionally, the technique of annealing —
heating native copper at low temperatures to facilitate hammering and prevent
cracking — also developed during this period, laying the foundation for the even-
tual smelting of metaL From the perspective of military history, metal -working was
irrelevant during the early Neolithic, since all weapons in that period continued to
be made of flint, chert, or obsidian (CAM 34). This was to change in the city of
Can Hasan in southern Anatolia, however, where a copper shaft-hole mace-head
was discovered dating to the sixth millennium, the earliest known metal weapon,
and the earliest large metal object in the world (EA 4:5b; CANE 3:1503b; ET 125).
It was probably made in imitation of a stone mace. Furthermore, it was found with
the skeleton of a man in a house in a level of the city that was destroyed by fire,
presumably in war. The mace wielding warrior apparently died in battle defending
his doomed home (CAM 46).
The fact that the earliest discovered large metal object was a mace is significant,
for the only purpose of a mace is to kill. The mace may be a Neolithic weapon
uniquely developed for warfare. The antecedents to the mace are both the club
and the axe. The club, in its simplest form of a heavy stick, is probably the earliest
human weapon. The Paleolithic axe was formed from binding a sharpened rock to
the club. A Neolithic mace is distinguished from the axe in that there is generally
no cutting edge on a mace; it is simply a rounded heavy weight fastened to a
wooden shaft . In theory a mace could be used for hunting - for dispatching a
wounded prey, for example. In practice, however, a knife or an axe would do just
as well, for if .i hunted prey is already disabled by archery, then any weapon could
In- used tii kill it. Uninjured animals, on the other hand, are generally too fast to he
i .Mh'.hi and injured by a man with a mace. There is no real reason to design a ni.n e
Ml
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
iplement the axe in the Neolithic hunting arsenal. Even if it eventually came
U ied by Neolithic hunters, the question is: why make a mace in the first
Whereas an axe can have a non-military use - chopping wood - the only
■ . .<■ of a mace is to kill. The mace is specifically designed for smashing things,
) illy skulls and bones.
I next phase in Near Eastern metallurgy {5000-3000} was the development
melting and casting (EA 4:6; CANE 3:1503-6). Copper smelting is first in
ilcni c at Catal Hoyuk in Anatolia in the early sixth millennium, and later at
IN is {c. 5000} and Tepe Ghabristan in Iran {c. 4500}, where a smelting
hop was discovered including crucibles, molds, a furnace and twenty kilo-
i eopper ore. The oldest known metal spearhead was found in Mesopota-
! „n,g to the early fifth millennium (EA 4:3b). During this period the main
i used for weapon-making was copper or arsenic-copper. Burials at Susa in
I u estern Iran from the late fifth millennium included 55 copper axes.. By the
irth millennium copper smelting and casting was known in Syria, Canaan
fe] Mishmar), and Mesopotamia as we'll, where weapons included largely axes,
and spearheads. In other words, logically enough, copper smelting and
i began in Anatolia and Iran, where copper was abundant and where earlier
,,,ua trinket metalworking had existed for several millennia. Although some
a i opper objects could have been traded into Mesopotamia and Egypt, copper
llurgy was transmitted as an already fully developed technology into metal-
Mesopotamia and Egypt, whose new metal industries were completely
ndent on imports for their raw materials.
I he development of metal weapons is another sign of a probable movement
irds the military threshold. For ordinary hunting and household activities,
, .,,<• tools probably served nearly as well as metal tools. Given the relative expense
i the earliest metal objects the average householder would probably not be able to
ifibrd a metal axe for chopping household firewood, or a metal tipped javelin for
lilting antelope. Eventually, of course, metal tools became common and inex-
N niive enough that they could be owned by ordinary householders. But initially
,i.,l weapons were rare and expensive, and affordable only by the elites. While an
at might have used a metal javelin for hunting, there seems to be little need
!,., a metal axe, since aristocrats did not cut their own wood. Although it cannot
I nown for certain, the earliest metal axes, spearheads, and daggers were prob-
,U\ used only by the elites specifically for warfare; the appearance of metal
ipons is thus most likely a sign of militarism.
[Tic need for access to metal mines and markets by the emerging metal indus-
of ] Lgypt and Mesopotamia was one of the driving factors behind Chalcolithic
I Bronze Age imperialism (CAM 35). Once a society became dependent on
i i, found itself increasingly drawn to securing access to the needed ores. In
\,,,iolu where (here is ample copper ore, this did not create a serious problem.
|iu, in Mesopoiaima and Egypt, with limited copper resources, the search for
,,,, Ll | beanie an impetus to imperialism, leading emerging city-states to explore
I n uU . tn nbum (npprr , 1IU ], |.,um, tin. When these peaceful methods proved
M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
insufficient or unstable, they would move to raiding, controlling, or conquering
metal resources. The search for metal became a spur to imperialism, and the pos-
session of metal-armed armies likewise maximized the possibility for military
success in that imperialism.
The third phase in Near Eastern weapon metallurgy is the development of bronze
{3000-2000} (EA 4:8-11; CANE 3:1506-7). Copper is a relatively soft metal
which doesn't hold an edge well. While useful for making large heavy objects such
as maceheads and heavy axes, it is less effective with thinner spearheads, knife
blades or projectile points. Alloying roughly 10 percent tin with 90 percent copper
created bronze, a much harder alloy that holds a sharpened edge nicely and thus
was more useful for bladed weapons and projectile points. The actual tin content
of the earliest Near Eastern bronze varied from 2—15 percent. The earliest known
bronze objects date to about 3000 in Syria - hence the beginning of the Bronze
Age. Bronze was used in Mesopotamia by the twenty-eighth century and in Egypt
by 2700. However, throughout the period we call the Early Bronze age {3000-
2000}, most metal weapons continued to be made from arsenic-copper rather
than tin-bronze (MW 1:182—3). Copper ores with trace elements of arsenic create
a melted copper that is less viscous, and hence easier to cast with superior results.
Although there are some rare examples of the tin-copper alloy we call bronze,
most of the weapons in the Near East during the Chalcolithic and Early Bronze
age are in fact arsenic-copper weapons (CANE 3:1505-6). For example, a hoard
of metal objects found in Susa dating to roughly 2500 contained forty-eight cop-
per objects, of which six (12 percent) had 2 percent tin, and four (8 percent) had 7
percent tin; none had the 10 percent tin content traditionally associated by modern
scholars with true tin-bronze. In other words, four-fifths of the copper objects
found in this hoard contained no tin at all, and those with tin were weak bronze alloys.
Another important thing to note is that, throughout the Chalcolithic and Early
Bronze ages, stone weapons continued to be used alongside metal weapons. At
first metal weapons were undoubtedly rare and precious, used only by the elites -
they were weapons for gods and kings. As time progressed, however, the propor-
tion of metal to stone weapons steadily increased, culminating in the Middle
Bronze age when we begin to see the overwhelming predominance of metal
weapons. Since Near Eastern martial art is nearly entirely the product of the roy-
alty and nobility, depictions of weapons probably tend to show elite rather than
common armament. Another characteristic of the Bronze Age weapons industry
that may distort our data is the fact that metal was quite valuable and invariably
taken as plunder and recycled when damaged. Our finds of metal weapons are not
statistically random, but are significantly skewed by the fact that most of them are
intentionally buried, either in tombs (generally of the elites), in votive offerings to
temples, or in hoards buried for hiding and eventual recovery (EA 4:1-5). The
fundainc proble with early bronze-making was that there were no good tin
sources in the Near East that were accessible to ancient mining technologies
(I )ANE 292). One source may have been available in the Taurus Mountains, but if
ii was exploited it produced only a small quantity of tin that was instill n i m lm the
> '
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
hutgeoning demands of the Near East bronze industries. The main source for tin
bfOUghout the Early and Middle Bronze ages was Afghanistan (known to the
unmans as Aratta or Tukrish), which also supplied all of the Near Easts lapis
uli, a highly valued semi-precious stone (EA 4:8-9; CANE 3:1507-9). From
he Near Eastern perspective, tin, lapis lazuli and gold were ail of roughly equal
iliir. One of the reasons metal armor was not used extensively in the Early and
luldle Bronze periods was that it was inordinately expensive. But whereas lapis
nli and gold were used purely for ornamental purposes, tin had a crucial military
■ ii pose as well, being the key ingredient in making superior bronze weapons. The
I in Koad" trade route from Afghanistan to Elarn and Sumer thus became a key
1 1 ttegic artery, and by the middle of the third millennium had been firmly estab-
: lied with regular trade. From Mesopotamia tin was shipped, with at least a 100
rcent markup in value, to Anatolia, Syria, and ultimately Egypt. The best-
I>m umented example of this tin trade is the Assyrian Middle Bronze merchant
olony at Kanesh (Nesha) in Anatolia {2000-1750}, where a surviving merchant
i. hive describes shipping 80 tons of tin over a fifty-year period to the city-states
■ I Anatolia from Assyria and originally from Afghanistan (see Chapter Eleven).
I lnoughout the Bronze Age Near East, tin was the strategic resource that was as
i [.i I to ancient military systems as oil is to modern armies.
Because of the relative scarcity of tin supplies it was not until the Middle
Bronze age {2000-1600} that true tin-bronze became the predominant metal
illoy for weapon making. Thus, in a sense, true Bronze Age warfare begins only in
Middle Bronze age. This increase in the overall bronze supply also allowed, for
the first time, armies to be equipped entirely with bronze weapons - although the
use of non-metal arrowheads seems to have continued, probably because shooting
ui arrow often meant losing the arrow and bronze arrowheads were still too
I | pensive to lose. By the end of the Middle Bronze period bronze body armor was
•inning to appear, but only for the elite chariot warriors. The specific details of
the impact of metal weapons on different regions of the Near East will be discussed
hi subsequent chapters.
Militant gods
rhe precise nature of the gods worshipped in the Neolithic period is uncertain
because of lack of any textual evidence. What is clear, however, is that when writing
fust appears in the Near East, war-gods were already well established and widely
worshipped, as discussed in the following chapters. Given the conservative though
sviu retistic nature of ancient Near Eastern religions, it is quite likely that the
worship of war-gods antedates their first appearance in iconography and texts by at
[cast several centuries. This would place the worship of war-gods in the Near East
in. |,i ua than the mid fourth millennium in both Egypt and Mesopotamia, and
probably much earlier. It is unclear if the worship of militant gods increased mili-
tarism amom; the worshippers, or if a warlike people naturally gravitated towards
woishippmi', warlike rods. (Vlosi likely the relationship was symbiotic. However
M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
that may be, it is probable that those groups worshipping warlike gods developed
militant social institutions and engaged in a higher frequency and greater intensity
of warfare. However the worship of militant gods may have first originated, their
worship is another sign that a people have probably crossed the military threshold.
Warlike royal dynasties
The creation of a military aristocracy centered around a warlord-king - a ruler
with the economic, ideological, and coercive power to mobilize the entire society
for war - was a crucial step in the movement to cross the military threshold.
Rulers for whom warfare was a means of ideological legitimization, personal
aggrandizement, and increasing wealth were rulers who would be more likely to
bring cities into war. The alliance of warlord-kings with priests was a key ingre-
dient in the crossing of the military threshold. Priests, speaking in the name of the
gods, could legitimize or even command the military endeavors of kings, while
plunder from victory in battle would be shared with the gods by donations to the
priest-controlled temple institutions.
All of these developments — social, economic, political, technological, and
religious - had their origins in the prehistoric Neolithic and Chalcolithic period.
By the time writing first appears in Egypt and Mesopotamia, both of those socie-
ties had already crossed the military threshold. As Arther F err ill aptly put it: "as
soon as man learned how to write, he had wars to write about" (OW 31). The
following sections in this chapter will examine the specific evidence for warfare
and militarism in the major regions of the Neolithic Near East.
Neolithic Anatolia {to 11,000-5500}
The early Neolithic in Anatolia {11,000-6500} broadly parallels similar develop-
ments throughout the Near East: shift from hunting to village-farming economies,
domestication of plants and animals, and development of pottery by around 6500.
Most of the Early Neolithic settlements of Anatolia are similar to other con-
temporary villages in the Near East: small sites with a mixed food-collecting and
hunting economy, and no fortifications. Some, like Cayonu {8250-5000} (EA
1:444-7) and Nevali Cori {8300-5000} (EA 4:131-4) in south-eastern Turkey,
had monumental communal and religious buildings, indicating that they had suf-
ficient population and social organization to have built fortifications if they had
been needed. Their absence implies the lack of a serious and sustained threat. At
the early Neolithic site of Hallan Cemi Tepesi a triangular stone mace head was
discovered, possibly a war weapon (ET 87).
Fortifications
The famous wall and tower at Jericho {c. 7000} are often considered (lie oldest
fortifications in the world (see p. 29). Jericho, however, was essentulh m isolated
■ \ ample of fortress-building designed to respond to a serious but isolated military
1 1 ) teat. In Anatolia, on the other hand, we find a cluster of fortified or quasi-for-
i if led sites - Catal Hoyuk (Qatal Hoyiik), Asikli Hoyuk (A§ikli Hoyiik), Kurucay
I loyuk (Kurucay Hoyiik), and Hacilar - all with fortifications dating to the mid-
io late Neolithic period. The site of Asikli Hoyuk {seventh millennium} in cen-
ual Anatolia has closely packed houses and a defensive wall of mud brick (EA
1:123-4; PA 187-9). Kurucay Hoyuk {6000-5500} has a late Neolithic fortified
i one wall with projecting semi-circular towers (PA 166-72).
Catal Hoyuk (Catal Huyuk) {6500-5 500} 1
The site of Catal Hoyuk is one of the best preserved in the Neolithic Near East.
I or the military historian it is notable for both its walls and its wall paintings. The
vails at Catal Hoyuk are rather peculiar, and could perhaps be described as proto-
fortifications. Most of the houses are built adjoining one another, sharing walls
with other houses, but with no doors between dwellings. The outer walls of the
outermost houses of the village thus formed a solid wall surrounding the entire
complex (CH 68-9). Individual houses were entered by ladders through holes in
i he roof, while entry into the village as a whole was made by ladders which were
leaned against the outside walls, or through a fortified gate (CH 70). What this
effectively created was a walled city which could be defended from the rooftops on
ilie outer perimeter. The outer walls, while certainly a barrier to occasional raiders
.\nd brigands, were not much thicker than the interior walls, and would not have
offered a serious obstacle to a determined enemy. None the less, an enemy
breaking through an outer wall would have access only to a single dwelling. To get
io the next dwelling he would have to break through another wall, or climb a
ladder up through the roof-door. Catal Hoyuk probably represents a transitional
phase in fortification; a first effort to protect a city with minimal additional
expenditure of resources and labor. Weapons found at Catal Hoyuk include stone
daggers, spearheads, arrowheads, and maces (ET 101; CH 209, 213, §113-15, xiv);
although copper trinket metallurgy was known at Catal Hoyuk, all weapons in the
late Neolithic were from flint or obsidian.
The earliest substantial Neolithic art of Anatolia - the wall paintings at Catal
1 loyuk — do not show explicitly military themes. We do have scenes of men
hunting with bows and perhaps slings, weapons which would eventually be turned
to warfare. 8 Another scene shows a deer hunt with bows and lassos (CH §62).
Most of the hunters wear a flowing leopard-skin kilt and are armed with a bow or
I club/mace. Between the two hunting scenes is a third scene, which has been
interpreted as a hunting dance (CH 174, §61), which is certainly an excellent
possibility. It may also, however, represent a war dance or victory celebration, or
even a battle. Twelve men are shown in running postures but are facing in different
directions. Seven are armed with bow and/or club/mace, five are unarmed. No
animals arc present, but none of the men seem to be directly confronting each
other. What points to ,i possible military context is that three of the men are
>>
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
headless,, and one of the headless men is armed with a bow. One unarmed man
stands in the middle, tied to two of the headless men. If the painting represents a
hunting dance, as Mellaart believes, why are there headless men, and why are some
men tied together? An alternative interpretation is that the scene shows an after-
battle victory celebration in which bound prisoners are brought forward and
decapitated.
From the military perspective another intriguing wall painting of Catal Hoyuk
comes from Room 7, which shows carrion birds hovering over headless bodies
(CA 169, §45—9). This has been interpreted as representing the exposure and
excarnation of bodies before burial (CH 167-8). The decapitation of the bodies
may also relate to the preservation and veneration of ancestral skulls (CH 65-6, 84)
such as are found at the "skull house" at Nevali Cori (Nevali Qori) (EA 4:133)
On the other hand, the painting in Room 7 may depict the decapitated bodies of
enemies killed in battle and left to be devoured by vultures, a military practice
memorialized in very early martial art in both Mesopotamia (Stele of Vultures,
AFC 190-1, cf. FI §887), and Egypt (Battlefield Palette and Narmer Palette, EWP
29). A different vulture scene shows a man with a bow or sling in one hand and a
mace or club in the other standing over a headless body flanked by two vultures
(CH §46). Mellaart believes the standing man is "wardfing] off the two vultures
from the small headless corpse" (CH 166), although this runs counter to his overall
interpretation of people intentionally exposing the dead to be eaten by vultures
(CH 167—8) — why chase the vultures away if you intentionally expose the corpses?
A very fragmentary scene shows a man who seems to be carrying a human head,
perhaps a war trophy (CH §51). If this military interpretation is correct, the 8000-
year-old murals of Catal Hoyuk would be the oldest military victory memorial in
the world.
Unfortunately, all of the evidence at Catal Huyuk which I have interpreted
from a military perspective is ambiguous. The overlapping exterior walls may be
intended for protection, but might also simply be a quirky way to save building
materials and time. The mace may be a war weapon, or might be used to dispatch
a deer wounded by arrows on a hunt. The headless corpses amid the vultures may
be war dead, or may be a form of exposure of the dead known anciently in the
Near East, most closely associated with Zoroastrianism and Tibet. 9 Dancing armed
men may be preparing for the hunt or celebrating victory in battle. These ambi-
guities make certainty of interpretation impossible.
Hacilar {5700-4800} 10
. itai y interpretation of Catal Hoyuk, given above, is strengthened by the
fortifications and destruction levels of the late contemporary site of Hacilar. The
originally nn walled village was destroyed around 5500, and rebuilt with a defensive
wall 1.5 3 meters thick. It was destroyed again in 5250, and rebuilt with stronger
"lorlrcsslike characteristics" (EA 2:44%). It was destroyed again and abandoned
J IISUO ('.m f lasan was also destroyed by fire at rough l\ ih- inn time
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
I 1 I 25), leading some to postulate a period of significant military upheaval in the
sixth millennium. In other words, expanding from the proto-fortifications of
• nal Hoyuk, true fortified cities appear in Anatolia by the mid-sixth millennium,
i tiering destruction in war and rebuilding in an even more strongly fortified
edition. This is strong evidence that Anatolia had crossed the military threshold
i Ins time.
Warfare in Neolithic Syria {10,000-4000}
The Early Neolithic Period {10, 000-6 800} n
\ elsewhere in the Near East, the Neolithic period in Syria was one of transi-
tu from foraging to farming and nomadism through the domestication of plants
u! animals, presumably in response to ecological change at the end of the
Pleistocene period. There are a few surviving signs of militarism in the Syrian
Neolithic. Neolithic weapons - flint arrowheads, javelins, knives, and stone
DECS (AS 19-20, 26-7, 79-80; ED 67, 71, 74) - all had hunting or other
domestic functions and are not sure indicators of war. None the less, the discovery
-I a number of skeletons with embedded projectile points, as well as a burned
house with a number of skeletons inside, indicate that violence, and probably
Warfare, was present in the Neolithic (AS 76-7). An international "arms trade"
il.o makes its first appearance in the early Neolithic, with the development of
i ibsidian trade over hundreds of miles from the volcanic regions in eastern Anatolia
Into Syria (AS 82). Obsidian creates a finer and sharper edge for tools, and was
highly prized by Neolithic peoples. Although most Neolithic obsidian pro-
I i tile points or blades were not primarily intended for military purposes in the
Neolithic, the search for such scarce resources created international trade and
contact between scattered groups; competition for these resources was one of
ihe key factors contributing to inter-clan tension, potentially leading to tribal
warfare.
As time progressed the number and size of Neolithic villages expanded,
increasingly engaging in food production (farming and herding) rather than food
gathering. The size of early Neolithic villages in Syria ranged from 1 to 12 hec-
tares, with a population of the largest of these Neolithic villages, such as Abu
1 [urcyra (12 hectares) perhaps reaching 1000 people; the population of most set-
tlements, however, numbered in the hundreds (AS 59). Neolithic villages had
enough manpower and social organization to begin to undertake monumental
building, such as rough stone walls several meters high and terraced platforms for
t itual purposes at Halula and Tell Sabi Abyad {c. 7000} (AS 63—5), roughly con-
temporary with Catal Hoyuk in Anatolia and Jericho in Palestine. Despite
possessing the logistical and organizational capability to build such large stone
walk, however, none of these early Neolithic sites seem to have been fortified,
pointing to a l.n k ol serious and sustained military threat in the early Neolithic; by
'tin" 1 S\ i i.i li.nl not vet crossed the military threshold.
'
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Late Neolithic Syria {6800-4000} (AS 99-180)
By around the sixth millennium spreading Neolithic Syrian farming villages began
to be integrated into a the broader regional Mesopotamian cultural and agri-
cultural system of the Late Neolithic, subdivided into the Halaf Period {5900—
5200} and the Ubaid Period { 5200-4000 }. 12 This phase is characterized by the
development of pottery, increasing similarities of material culture throughout dif-
ferent regions (indicating ongoing interregional contacts), numerous scattered
small villages, as well as the development of a few large villages of over 1000
people. Some sites, like Bouqras, show signs of organized uniform village plan-
ning, perhaps pointing to the beginnings of social hierarchy and emerging elites.
Overall, however, the Late Neolithic is characterized by egalitarian, self-sufficient,
and autonomous communities.
Like the early Neolithic, the late Neolithic archaeological data presents little
evidence of extensive militarism. As its name indicates, the "Burnt Village" level
at Tell Sabi Abyad was destroyed by fire around 6000, possibly indicating destruc-
tion in military conflict. However, the fire has also been interpreted as a ritual act
of destruction; bodies found inside the burned homes had died before the con-
flagration (AS 112-14, 148). Unfortunately, a burn level at an archaeological site is
not certain evidence of warfare, since fires may be started accidentally or even
intentionally in non-military contexts. A burial pit at Tepe Gawra contained 24
bodies which seem to have been "thrown into the pit without any attendant
ritual" (AS 148); they may have been victims of warfare.
There is evidence of some changes in the nature of archery in the Syrian late
Neolithic. It has been suggested that the expanding use of smaller projectile points
may represent some type of change in bow technology. The decline in frequency
of projectile point finds during the Late Neolithic is probably due to the spread of
agriculture leading to the decreasing importance of hunting as a source of food,
and therefore a decrease in the practice of archery (AS 128, 132-3). Two Late
Neolithic Syrian pots have paintings of archers with quivers in a hunting context
(AS 133). We also have the first evidence of the sling in the form of thousands of
clay sling bullets (AS 128,132). In the seventh millennium we also find the first
evidence of the use of copper in Syria, harbinger of the later development of metal
weapons; however, at this period metal objects are only small ornamental objects
such as beads (AS 133).
The last phase of the Late Neolithic is known as the Ubaid period {5200-
4000} (AS 154-80; M = CAM 53), known for increasing uniformity of pottery
styles, housing structure and other aspects of material culture between Mesopota-
mia and Syria. It has been speculated in the past that this uniformity may be rela-
ted to migration or even conquest (AS 154), but it must be emphasized that
uniformity of material culture does not demonstrate shared ethnicity nor the
existence of a single political entity - the existence of Japanese cars in the United
Slates, for example, is not evidence that Japan conquered the United States. It does
indicate, however, that the Ubaid was a period of increasing long-distance social
>N
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
md economic contacts. At Ubaid-period Tell Mashnaqa two small clay miniatures
of boats were found, the first evidence of riverine sailing on the Upper Euphrates.
The actual boats were apparently bundled reed canoes coated with bitumen,
linilar to those used until recently by the Marsh Arabs of southern Iraq (AS 167—
B. The ability to move men and supplies up and down the Tigris and Euphrates
1 1 vers would become important factors in later Mesopotamian warfare. The first
igns of the use of copper for tools rather than ornamentation also appear; a copper
ixehead was made in the late Ubaid period, transitional with the following Chal-
< olithic period (AS 169). Signs of warfare during the Ubaid period in Syria are still
relatively rare. None the less, by about 4000 a number of key technologies and
practices are in place that will allow the eventual transition across the military
threshold.
Neolithic Canaan {8500-4300}
13
Before 8500 Syria and Canaan were inhabited by Epipaleolithic hunting and
loraging bands known by archaeologists as the Natufian culture. The ecology of
i lie region was wetter then, allowing human occupation of areas which are now
deserts. The region was sparsely populated, with humans organized into small
I mship-based bands not much larger than a hundred people. There is no evidence
of warfare before the Neolithic period, although small-scale tribal conflicts
undoubtedly occurred. Hunting technologies developed during the Epipaleolithic
| 10,500-8500}, which would lay the foundation for warfare in the following
millennia. These included the bow and arrow and javelin, with flint or bone pro-
jectile points (THE 42). Likewise flint axes and daggers were in use for hunting
me! domestic purposes, which could also double as weapons if needed.
The beginning of the pre-pottery Neolithic period {8500-6000} is character-
i ed by the transition from food gathering to food production, the rise of perma-
nent dwellings, and new burial practices. It is during this early Neolithic period
i li.it the first signs of fortification in the Near East, and indeed the world, appear at
i he site of Jericho (Tell el-Sultan) in modern Palestine. 14 Human settlement at
I i icho was based on the perennial springs of the region. Initially foragers were
in i acted to the rich plant and animal life at the springs, where they built a small
In me and dwelling huts in the Epipaleolithic. By the eighth millennium, how-
< ver, the development of agriculture had transformed this foraging settlement into
i city with a population between 1000 and 3500 (depending on presumed den-
ii v), which was continuously occupied for nearly 2000 years. During this period
i he people of Jericho built a massive defensive wall of large unhewn stones, almost
iluee meters wide and four meters high. A deep dry moat eight meters wide was
ni in the rock, and a round tower was constructed, measuring 8.5 meters in dia-
meter and 7.7 meters high (FA 76; AW 1:115; THL 45).
I'he appearance of such massive fortifications a thousand years before fortifica-
Miiii in oihei regions has let! some to question their purpose, claiming the walls
were designed t< » piotect the coin n umit y from (lash Hoods out oi the wadis to the
»«,
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
west. However, it seems dubious that protection from flash floods would require
such a massive four-meter-high wall - indeed the ditch alone should have proved
sufficient for flood control. The stronger interpretation is that the wall and tower
had a military purpose. It is possible that these defensive walls were designed to
protect Jericho against rival proto-towns in the region — nearly two dozen proto-
towns are known in Canaan and Jordan during this period. But it seems more
likely that the walls were designed to defend the community from local raiders
who were attracted to the rich springs at Jericho and the food surpluses collected
there from their early Neolithic agriculture. Such walls would have been an insu-
perable barrier to hunting or nomadic clans bent on a quick plundering raid at the
oasis. It is likely that the Neolithic fortress of Jericho was built in response to a very
specific, local, but ongoing threat, rather than reflecting a rise in regional militarism.
Tools with a possible military function - such as flint axes, knives, and projectile
points - are found throughout the region (ALB 46, 50, 52), but no other certain
signs of militarism are known in the Neolithic period {8500-4300}. The archaic
walls of Jericho remained in use throughout this period, however, and were rebuilt
twice; a similar, though less massive wall was found at Beidha (ALB 45). We have
no evidence of other fortification building at other Neolithic sites.
Based upon anthropological analogy we can perhaps assume that conflicts arose
between rival proto-towns, and between sedentarists and hunting nomads, but
such claims remain nothing but assumptions. There was increasing desiccation of
the region throughout the Neolithic period. Many sites in the Sinai, Negev
(southern Israel), and Jordan, which had flourished in the early Neolithic period,
show either significant occupational gaps or complete abandonment during parts
of the later Neolithic (ALB 48-9). Whatever the ultimate cause of such declines in
settlement - probably a combination of ecological degradation due to both desic-
cation and overuse of resources — such stress would create the conditions for
increasing conflict over decreasing resources, and warfare may have been a catalyst
in the abandonment of some of these Neolithic sites.
Neolithic Elam and Iran {7000-3400}
15
Only 10 percent of Iran is arable, the rest being mountain, steppe, or desert.
Throughout the Neolithic outside of Elam there were only sparse settlements
leaving limited archaeological remains. Ancient Elam was roughly coterminous
with the modern province of Khuzistan in south-western Iran, a region of flat
terrain watered by tributaries of the Tigris with good agricultural potential. The
modern province of Fars was also the center of another zone of city building
which would give rise to the ancient city-state of Anshan. The mountains of the
Zagros, running from north-west to south-east, were home to highland pastoral
tribes who would on occasion play an important role in the military history of
Mesopotamia. As with the rest of the Near East, evidence for militarism in early
Neolithic Iran is slight. It is not until the late fifth millennium that we begin to see
sure signs ol warfare.
Susa {4300-3400}
i lie major site showing military activity in Elam was Susa. The region of Susa had
been occupied by small Neolithic villages since the eighth millennium. In the late
fifth millennium, some of the surrounding Neolithic villages, such as Chogha
Wish, were abandoned, perhaps due to warfare. The population seems to have
migrated towards larger centers, perhaps for protection, with Susa being adopted
,i new regional ceremonial center around 4300. 16 The "Apadana" section of
lusa I {4300-3800} included a 2.1 -meter- thick mud brick wall - four times as
thick as the usual walls of the period; this may have served as a citadel for the
Liling elite (PAE 46-7). The city had a population of only a few thousand people,
i ving as a ceremonial center for at least forty surrounding villages. At some point
i! was destroyed by fire, presumably in warfare, and partially abandoned. Arsenic-
opper was smelted during this period, with metallurgical technology stimulated
i -in the Fars highlands (PAE 50). Burials at Susa from the late fifth millennium
included 55 copper axes, possibly for elite warriors. On the other hand, military
1 1 1 i.iges are notably absent from the seals of Tal-i Bakan during this period (PAE 53).
During the Susa II period {3800-3100}, Susa shows strong cultural relations
\ uh Sumer and the city-state of Uruk in Mesopotamia. Political power in Elam
was no longer centralized in Susa, but diffused among smaller towns such as
1 hogha Mish and Abu Fanduweh, each with a population of several thousand.
i he exact nature of the relationship between Sumer and Elam during this period
.1 subject of strong debate (PAE 52-67). In the absence of historical documents,
it military implications of this relationship cannot be determined, but it is cer-
tainly possible that Sumerian military power was exerted in some form in Elam
luring this period (see pp. 37-9). The abrupt appearance of Uruk-style pottery
ii ul proto-writing system at Susa, and more broadly in Elam as a whole, strongly
Miggests the migration of people from Sumer to Elam - whether as merchants, the
■ ourtiers of a married princess, peaceful colonists, or military conquerors is not
< [car. The question of the overall significance of the "Uruk expansion" will be
discussed in Chapter Two.
Anshan (Tel Malyan) 17
Anshan, near modern Shiraz in Fars province, had been occupied since 6000 BCE,
but the region was sparsely populated before the late fourth millennium. It became
.i major center of military power during the Proto-Elamite period {3400-2800},
when the city served as the administrative center of the region with a large copper
sin el ting installation, and a probable population of several thousand. Militarily, it is
most notable for its massive city walls. Built on a stone foundation and protected
b\ ,i mud plaster glacis, the main wall is some five kilometers long, made from
In it k on a stone foundation. There are two parallel inner walls, indicating an
emerging understanding of concentric fortifications. The innermost wall is made
oi hnck ,iih1 is five meters thick. The walls enclosed an area of 200 hectares,
•;n
M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
although only a portion of this was occupied. These fortifications made the city
the most powerful military bastion east of Mesopotamia. It is unclear if the ene-
mies of Anshan were local nomads and highlanders from within Fars, or outside
invaders, but it seems that such massive and sophisticated fortifications would be
excessive to deal with occasional bedouin raids.
Neolithic Egypt {to 3500}
18
Our understanding of the origins of warfare in Egypt must take into account the
ecological transformation of the Sahara from savannah to desert which had
occurred by the fourth millennium BC. In the past few decades the emergence of
the science of climatology and the history of climates has allowed scholars to more
fully understand how past environments differed, often dramatically, from current
ecological conditions. Temperature, rainfall and other ecological conditions have
fluctuated during the past 20,000 years. During this period the Sahara region has
oscillated between dry and wet phases. During the wet phases the Sahara received
sufficient rainfall to create a savannah ecology, with a wide range of animals
flourishing there (EAE 1:385-9; GP 60-1). Between 7000 and 3500 (late Epipa-
leolithic and Neolithic) the regions surrounding the Nile Valley that are currently
desert were much like the current Sub-Saharan savannah, home to large herds of
antelope, ibex, elephant, giraffe, ostrich, and cattle, and to lions (GP 83-112).
During this period Egypt and the Sahara were also home to semi-nomadic foragers
congregating in seasonal camps following the migration of animals and the natural
cycles of the maturation of plants used as food; these foragers also availed them-
selves of food and other resources from the Nile valley.
Thus, for several thousand years, hunting and herding bands lived seasonally in
the savannah surrounding the Nile Valley, and within the Nile Valley itself
Humans in Egypt lived in small hunting and fishing camps, mixed with some
proto-agriculture - as witnessed by grinding stones and the microlithic sickles used
for harvesting grains. Human settlements in this period were generally temporary
seasonal camps. Population was small and societies were probably organized into
kinship-based clans.
Although few details are known, it seems probable that these seasonal foragers
engaged in tribal warfare. The oldest discovered cemetery in the Nile Valley at
Gebel Sahaba in Nubia (northern Sudan) — broadly dated to roughly 12,000—
9000 - provides the earliest evidence of tribal warfare, for roughly half of the 59
skeletons at site 117 had flint projectile points among the bones, probably indi-
cating death in battle; some had evidence of multiple healed wounds, perhaps
indicating repeated fighting. 19 An extended period of drought beginning in the
sixth millennium led to the desiccation of the Sahara savannah, stimulating
increased migration into the Nile Valley as well as a transformation from food
gathering to food production through the domestication of plants and animals
{6000— 4000}. The hunters and herders who had formerly roamed the once fertile
savannah were forced by this desiccation to slowly congregate in tin- Nile valley,
V
THE NEOLITHIC AGE AND THE ORIGIN OF WARFARE
■ mi', mounting competition for increasingly scarce resources. A number of new
technologies, and domesticated plants and animals developed during this
d, laying the foundation for Egyptian civilization and its military system.
I' ock art from herders in the Eastern Desert also provides evidence of warfare
I vpt by at least the fourth millennium, and probably earlier. A recently dis-
red vase from Abydos Tomb U-239 {early fourth millennium} depicts four
ii c armed warriors with ostrich feathers and animal-tail loincloths executing a
Hid of prisoners (GP 79). A similar mace-armed warrior in a boat is depicted in
.i rt from near contemporary Wadi Abu Wasil (GP 79). These figures are
d and armed quite similarly to the figures on the famous "Hunter's Palette",
n ; from a few centuries later (GP 96), indicating a widespread use of a com-
ii set of tribal military equipment: loincloth, feathered headdress, tails of bulls
Other animals as belts, with weapons including spears, bows, maces, and axes,
I .i tribal banner or totem. All of this evidence implies that low-level tribal
irfare was at least occasionally a part of the life of Egyptian hunting clans, an
i p rotation bolstered by anthropological analogy.
Neolithic Mesopotamia {9000-3500} 20
I with the rest of the Near East, there is little evidence for warfare in Neolithic
lopotamia. The Epipaleolithic period {16,000-9000} is characterized by small
i tging bands scattered unevenly throughout the region. The standard tool kit
In ded obsidian blades acquired from eastern Anatolia, indicating some long-
i i. ii ice contacts and exchanges, even if indirect. Most of the excavated sites from
1 lis period are in the uplands or highlands. In part this may be because the earliest
i u ulture developed around the regions where wild wheat and barley grew
u ui ally with normal rainfall. On the other hand, the earliest sites and settlements
ii the river valleys are buried in three meters or more of silt accumulated over the
past eight thousand years, are now beneath the water table (CAM 51-2), and are
1 1 ii is largely inaccessible to archaeologists.
flic development of incipient agriculture and domestication in the Early Aceramic
'■olithic {9000-7000} began in northern Mesopotamia, Syria, and Anatolia,
here wild wheat, barley, goats, and sheep facilitated the transition. Small Neolithic
i!'.i i( ultural villages of the period, such as Jarmo (EA 3:208—9), had only a few
hundred people, practicing a mixture of herding (sheep and goats), farming
i wheat, barley, lentils), and hunting with both flint and imported obsidian weapons.
A number of developments occurred during the Pottery Neolithic phase
' 000 5000) As discussed on p. 18, pottery allowed storage of food surpluses,
Blowing people more easily to remain at a single site all year, along with increasing
ilu- population. Agriculture was becoming more prominent as a source of food,
fin hunting was still widely practiced. A number of important sites such as Tell
II.il.it (I A !:4f>0). Tope (Jawra (EA 5:183-5), and Samarra {6000-5000}
i I A M / \) have been excavated from this period, revealing small villages of a few
luiiultcd prnplr In (he sixth millennium we sec the beginnings of monumental
n
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
building, mainly small temples. During this period we also see the development of
several zones with distinctive pottery styles (CAM 49, 53). The military implica-
tions of this fact are unclear, since pottery styles cannot be translated with con-
fidence into either ethnic or political boundaries. None the less, it is clear that
during this period there are ongoing contacts throughout Mesopotamia and Syria.
It is during this late Neolithic period that we begin to see the first evidence of
warfare in Mesopotamia. Most prominent is the fortification of the site of Tell
al-Sawwan near modern Samarra, where around 6000 a thick brick wall and a
three-meter- wide moat were constructed to defend the settlement (EA 4:473).
Clay sling bullets were discovered at Hassuna, but these could have been used for
hunting rather than war. Trinket metallurgy begins to be seen in Mesopotamia in
this period.
Ubaid {5000-4000} and early Uruk {4000-3500} periods
The final phase of the Neolithic era in Mesopotamia is called the Ubaid period,
after a shared style of pottery and material culture that spreads throughout much of
Mesopotamia and Syria. Ubaid-style pottery was also discovered on the north-east
coast of Arabia, and in Qatar and Bahrain, indicating that ocean-going vessels
existed during the period, initiating the Persian Gulf trade which would culminate
in the military expeditions discussed in Chapters Two and Three. This period
shows clear evidence of increasing settlement size, social stratification, inter-
regional contacts, and monumental building. The impressive temple complex at
Eridu in Sumer shows that communities had the capacity for monumental build-
ing during this period (EA 2:258—9; CAM 52), as do the large buildings at Arpa-
chiyeh with stone walls 1.5 meters thick.
None the less, there is still sparse evidence for either fortification or war during
this period. Despite its magnificent temple complex, Eridu seems to have been
unfortified in the fifth millennium. Eridu may have been a sacrosanct ceremonial
center during this period, supported by many surround villages and towns, rather
than a politically oriented city-state. Some have suggested that some of the
legendary prediluvian kings of the Sumerian Kinglist may have been associated
with Eridu in this period (C 1/2:1 07). There is some evidence of war: at the end
of the Ubaid period the "Round House" at Tepe Gawra, which seems to have
served as a citadel, was destroyed by fire, possibly in war (EA 5:184b). By around
4000 we also see the shift to the Chalcolithic period, where tools and other large
objects begin to be made from arsenic-copper. A copper spearhead, the oldest yet
discovered, was found in Mesopotamia dating to the early fifth millennium (EA
4:3b). A painting on a bowl from Tepe Jowi shows a man with a bow in one hand
and possibly a mace in the other; he wears a loincloth and a feather in his hair
(AANE §186). Thus in the Early Uruk period there were a number of behind-
the-scenes developments which laid the foundation for the crossing of the military
threshold in Mesopotamia that occurred in the Late Uruk period {3500-3000},
discussed in Chapter Two.
CHAPTER TWO
Early Dynastic Mesopotamia
{3500-2334}
\ Mesopotamia and Egypt were the heartlands of the great river valley eco-
i social and political systems that produced the earliest advanced civilizations
• ■rid history. From the military perspective, these two river valleys both wit-
i ! the development of intimately intertwined militant religion and kingship,
inifesting their warlike ideologies by the creation of martial art and inscriptions.
igh warfare in the Near East had been going on for centuries, it is with the
i written and artistic records of Egypt and Mesopotamia that true military his-
y begins. This chapter will examine the rise of the military states in Mesopo-
• tii i.i. These developments should be compared with comparable contemporary
vrnts in Early Dynastic and Old Kingdom Egypt (see Chapters Twelve and
I (in teen).
I he following chart (Table 2.1) shows the major periods of Early Mesopotarnian
nstnry. The exact dates for the division between the different phases and subphases
the Early Dynastic period are interpreted differently by different scholars
ompare with AI 502-3 and C1/2-.998-1001).
Table 2.1: The major periods of Early Mesopotarnian history
Late Uruk
Jamdat Nasr
Early Dynastic I
Early Dynastic II
Early Dynastic IIIA
Early Dynastic IIIB
3500-3000
3000-2900
2900-2650
2650-2550
2550-2400
2400-2300
The Late Uruk (Pre-Dynastic) period {3500-3100} 1
number of developments in the Late Uruk period collectively formed the cata-
i whit ii caused Mesopotarnian civilization to definitively cross the military
thtcshold. Hi esc im I tided the urban revolution, an increase in the size and amount
"i monumental building leading to fortifications, the development of ideological
ut, miii Ii ol n with iiiilii.ii v ilii'incs, and the rise ol social stratification with
'-I
L5
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
domination by martial kings and elites. The formulation of a complex adminis-
trative organization, capable of collecting and dispersing surpluses and running a
city-state, laid the foundation for kings capable of mobilizing armies in the thou-
sands of men and keeping them in the field for months. The invention of proto-
writing (from mnemonic accounting devices), which occurred in Uruk around
3400, was a key component of the new bureaucratic state (PAE 58-67; EA 5:352-
8). In addition to allowing an expanded and more efficient bureaucracy, writing
would eventually permit the state ideology, both religious and military to be
recorded and preserved, thus creating military history.
The city-states of the Late Uruk and subsequent periods were both quantita-
tively and qualitatively different from the towns of the Neolithic period, The shift
of agriculture from the rain-fed lands around Mesopotamia into the river valleys
had a significant impact on population growth. As irrigation developed in the river
valleys agricultural productivity and surpluses expanded, in part because of higher
productivity per acre and in part because of multiple crops per year in the hot
climates of Mesopotamia. At the same time the rivers allowed the easy collection
and transportation of these surpluses into one central location. The combination
of irrigation and river transport meant that cities were no longer dependent solely
on the land immediately surrounding the city, but could collect surpluses from
tracts of land all up and down the river system. The overall impact was to allow the
possibility of having cities many times larger than had been possible during the
Neolithic period, creating the first city-states.
An examination of city size during the urban revolution gives a sense of the
overall growth of population. In the late Ubaid period {4500-4000} there were
very few settlements as large as ten hectares, which could have held a maximum
population of around 2000. By the Early Uruk period {4000-3500}, Uruk
(Warka, Erech, Unu) 2 encompassed 70 hectares, two other cities were 50 hectares,
and a final two 30 hectares each (M = CAM 58-9). The population in these cities
might have ranged from 7000 to 20,000. By the Late Uruk period {3500-4000}
Uruk had reached more than 200 hectares in area, and was the greatest city of the
age, with a population as high as 40,000 to 50,000 - twenty times greater than
the largest towns of the Neolithic period. Cities of this size could probably field
armies of several thousand men, and perhaps up to 5000 with maximum effort,
compared to the dozens or hundreds of men who composed earlier Neolithic
tribal armies. We must also note that the great cities that were developing in the
Late Uruk had a number of villages and small towns as satellites, which were
politically integrated into the city-state and which supplied some of their surplus
resources to the central city. However, as the great cities continued to grow in size,
the number of smaller villages began to decrease rapidly; presumably their popu-
lations migrated into the large centers. Part of the reason for this might have been
the greater security inside the great cities, pointing to increasing warfare in the
region.
These new cities were ruled by a hierarchy ol priests and kings with the
majority of wealth and power in their hands, though thry were always dependent
If,
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
D (own councils for making major decisions. They organized a central hier-
H I ncal government overseeing a stratified society. A large percentage of the peo-
ple of the new Mesopotamian city-states were no longer directly engaged in
I [culture designed to produced the food to be consumed by their own families.
I ' ii her, they increasingly entered non-food-producing occupations such as priests,
i ibes, craftsmen and merchants. The development of economic specialization
ive rise to military specialists, who would develop into military professionals,
lues, and ultimately martial aristocracies. Monarchical rule was not absolute,
quiring advice and consent by the city council of elders. None the less, the new
ings of Mesopotamia had far more military resources at hand than any earlier
niers. One of the primary functions of these new kings (lugal: "big man") was that
i warlord, to protect and expand the power of the city-state. 3
The centralization of power in the hands of allied royal and priestly classes was
ociated with the emergence of a divinely mandated martial ideology, Using
heir new wealth and surplus resources, the kings and priests embarked on a
1 inihoyant program of monumental building of immense temples, palaces and city
fortifications. The most lavish building projects were temples, such as the great
mna ("House of Heaven") temple complex at Uruk (CAM 61-3). None the
. massive monumental fortifications were also built, such as the great mud-
brick wall of Uruk, built around 3000, which had a circumference of six miles; its
i ii is can still be seen 5000 years later. By the Early Dynastic period all Mesopo-
imian cities were fortified with such huge mud-brick walls.
I Hiring this period a royal ideology of divine kingship developed in which the
ing was chosen by the gods as his representative on earth; this could sometimes
•in ompass the idea of the king as son of god, or as a god incarnate (EM 260-74).
When the king acted as warlord, he was acting under the express command of the
jods as revealed through divination and oracles. The gods themselves were the
In mate arbiters of war. It is probably not unimportant that the patron goddess of
1 fruk - where we first see evidence of this new ideology - was Inanna ("Lady of
I leaven", the Akkadian Ishtar), patroness of love and war. In the absence of early
1 1 it cm texts - all proto-writing of the Late Uruk period is administrative - the
bvelopment of an ideology of martial kingship can only be seen in the new styles
"I martial art.
The "Priest-King" 4
I he earliest Mesopotamian art was largely ornamental and often abstract. This
t\ fpe of art continued throughout the Late Uruk period, during which we also find
i he first ideologically-rich martial art, from both sculpture and cylinder seals. The
use of cylinder seals in Mesopotamia dates back to the fourth millennium. They
were made from small two-to-five centimeter long cylinders of stone, similar to
large oblong beads, which were rolled on wet clay as a type of seal to show own-
riship, rathci like a medieval signet ring. The art on cylinder seals is often called
i'Jvpin ait. \vhn h provides us with a number of important martial scenes as sources
vr
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
for military history. Originally designed simply as a stamp to indicate identity and
ownership, they rapidly developed into an extraordinarily sophisticated and ele-
gant art form, like gem-cutting and cameos in medieval and Renaissance Europe. 5
A problem with interpreting glyptic art for the military historian is that much
of it focuses on mythological and religious themes, creating a methodological
question concerning the reliability of the weapons depicted: are the weapons and
combat techniques authentic to the contemporary age, or are they stylized repre-
sentations of archaic weapons in contemporary retellings of ancient myths. An
analogous problem might be if an archaeologist were to insist that twenty-first-
century warriors used swords in combat because he found depictions in twenty-
first-century Christian churches and religious art of the archangel Michael wield-
ing a sword. Thus, if a Middle Bronze cylinder seal shows a god wielding a mace
in a mythological scene, we cannot be certain that the mace was actually used in
real combat during the Middle Bronze Age, since the scene may be a stylized
anachronistic representation which originated centuries earlier, with the god
becoming iconographically standardized as wielding a mace in subsequent art.
Another problem with glyptic art is that many of the cylinder seals are quite small,
measuring only one or two inches. Although many of the scenes depicted are of
extraordinary detail and quality, many others are quite abstract, and it is often dif-
ficult to interpret the details of weapons.
Most art of early Mesopotamia was religious in nature, and presumably Late
Uruk martial art was also fundamentally religious in purpose. None the less, the
glorification of the martial deeds of the gods, legendary heroes, or kings clearly
points to a fundamental martial ideology as a significant indicator that Mesopota-
mia had crossed the military threshold by the mid-fourth millennium. This new
martial art is exemplified by the emergence of the "Priest-king", an icono-
graphically stylized figure of a tall bearded man wearing a kilt or long robe, a flat
round cap, with his shoulder-length hair in a bun. The image of the Priest-king
appears in Uruk, as well as Susa II iconography in Elam. There are a number of
different scenes:
• Hunting: armed with a bow, hunting either lions (AFC 22) or bulls (AFC 23);
• Armed with a bow and a long, mace-like weapon resting on his shoulder
(PAE 68/3);
• Two siege scenes: both show the Priest-king armed with a bow, shooting
enemies while besieging a city. The first shows prisoners with arrows pro-
truding from their legs fleeing from the Priest-king. The city is represented by
a wall and a large palace or temple behind it. The building has three curved
horn-like lines coming from its side which have been interpreted as either
actual architectural features or a divine aura around a temple; they could also,
on the other hand, represent flames coming from the burning of the besieged
citadel, palace, or temple. This scene could represent an attack on an enemy
city, or perhaps the ritual slaughter of captured prisoners before the temple
of the gods (AFC 24; FAR 68/1 , 70; II ; ; I \) fhe second shows,) number of
\H
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
bound prisoners around the city, with one man on the ramparts and another
ill ling from the ramparts; this is clearly a siege scene, but the building lacks
the horns/flames (PAE 68/2). These represent the earliest depictions of sieges
id history;
• Boat scene: the Priest-king sits in a large boat holding a mace in one hand and
rope in the other to which are tied two kneeling bound prisoners. This points
i < > the military use of boats by at least the late fourth millennium;
• Execution of prisoners: two different scenes show the king armed with a six-
foot-long broad-headed thrusting spear, held point downward, overseeing the
torture or execution of bound prisoners (#1 = AFC 23; AAM §L-3; #2 =
PAE 68/5);
Ritual activities (AFC 25, §8; AAM §L— 1— 2): making offerings at a temple
i AFC §9).
Priest-king, armed variously with spear, mace, and bow, is thus shown in a
hole sequence of martial activities, including hunting, fighting enemies, assault-
fortified cities, transporting captives by boat, and torturing or executing bound
i .oners.
I he problem of interpreting the Priest-king is one of context: is he intended to
•• present a god or a mythical figure? Does each image represent the same great
i oiRjiieror king? Or is it a stylized figure representing a number of different kings,
nli of whom is depicted in the same way? The kings of Egypt were always shown
i itylistically similar images, and it is generally impossible to tell which king is
H presented without an inscription. Does each scene represent a separate discrete
iistorical event, or are they idealized depictions? Does the distribution of the
I'nest-king iconography represent the zone of political domination of a single
i. iu\ or is it merely that the Priest-king iconographic style was copied in several
[liferent politically independent regions? Unfortunately, in the absence of histor-
il texts from this period, it is impossible to answer these questions with certainty.
A military maximalist interpretation of the Priest-king would argue that the art
depicts the real military activities of one or more actual kings who extended
I fruk's military power into southern Mesopotamia. The appearance of the Priest-
; in;', iconography in Elam represents the extension of Uruk military power into
I I iii legion as well. All of this may be part of what is called the "Uruk expansion"
ist-e pp. 40—42). Minimally, the Priest-king iconography demonstrates that martial
ingship was ideologically highly developed in Uruk by the late fourth millen-
niun]; Mesopotamia had clearly crossed the military threshold.
Other Late Uruk martial art {3500-3000}
Not .ill m.irti;il art of the Late Uruk period was specifically associated with the
tit'uir of the Pi lest king, although the themes were precisely parallel. Hunting was
i in i|oi martial theme in Late Uruk art. The most famous is the Uruk lion hunt,
showing the Fnrst king with a how m\(\ another man with a spear battling four
}9
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
lions. 6 A similar scene shows the king with a bow followed by a servant with quiver
and arrows; the king is hunting bulls and an onager (AFC 23; AAM §A— 4; FI
§683). Another cylinder seal shows a man with a bow hunting an antelope (AAM
§A— 2). Hunting scenes do not necessarily point to warfare, but they do show a
desire to emphasize royal prowess with weapons; the theme of the martial hunter-
king endures in the Near East through the Sassanid period 7 and into Islamic times.
The importance of the bow in Late Uruk Mesopotamia is emphasized in two
other cylinder seals. One shows the king at target practice with a bow, shooting a
boar target mounted on a pole (FI §682). Another shows an early arms factory
making bows and bronze daggers, and perhaps javelins as well (FI §742). Individual
combat is depicted showing a man grappling with another and stabbing him with a
short javelin or dagger (AFC §22). A siege scene shows defenders on the city
ramparts throwing stones at attackers who appear to be torturing or executing a
prisoner (FI §748). Other scenes also show the beating or execution of bound
prisoners (FI §746); another shows kneeling bound prisoners attacked by vultures
or perhaps mythic winged creatures (FI §887). The marshaling of troops or vassal
clans in preparation for battle or in victory celebrations may be depicted in a scene
showing men with banners with large balls on top, seated before an enthroned
figure (FI §15).
The "Uruk Expansion" {3500-3000} 8
The Late Uruk period also witnessed a phenomenon known as the Uruk Expan-
sion, which is characterized archaeologically by the spread of a similar style of
material culture of pottery, bowls, clay tablets, and cylinder seals from Sumer
(southern Mesopotamia) to far beyond its original core zone; during this period
Uruk-style material culture spreads to northern Mesopotamia, Syria and western
Iran. The cause of this expansion seems to have been largely economic. Mesopo-
tamia has few natural resources besides clay, reeds, and grain. The massive popu-
lation growth and high demand for prestige and luxury products by the new
emerging Sumerian elites created an extensive search outside the Mesopotamian
valley for metal (initially copper, then tin, lead, silver, and gold; ME 143-76),
stone (for building, and semi-precious stones like lapis lazuli for ornamentation;
ME 177-216), and building timber. The Uruk expansion occurred during most of
the Late Uruk period, but rapidly declined by the thirty-first century Some
Sumerian centers, like Habuba Kabira in Syria, were simply abandoned. In others,
like Susa, Sumerian cultural influence also declined rapidly.
The Uruk expansion took three forms. First, and most intense, new colonies
were founded and occupied, largely by Sumerians. Second, Sumerian merchants
and craftsmen, and perhaps other colonists as well, took up residence in already
existing indigenous towns in northern Mesopotamia, Syria and Elam, bringing
with them Sumerian technology, culture, and other social practices. Third,
many cities on the highland fringes were regularly visited by Sumerians or were
indirectly influenced by secondary exchanges. The spread of Sumerian influence
Mi
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
! i olonies seems to have developed along major trade routes to high-demand
-mce areas. The demand for natural resources in exchange for luxury and
Stige items from Sumer created a shared interest between Sumerian merchants
d peoples in the resource rich zones. The major Uruk Expansion trade routes
lud "
led (HE1 14-18; M = CAM 64-5):
Elam, with Susa as a major colonial center;
NW Iran, with Godin Tepe as center on the Lapis Lazuli (and later Tin) Road
to Afghanistan;
The Tigris route via Nineveh and Tepe Gawra;
North to Tell Brak in the Khabur triangle for copper, gold, and silver from
Anatolia;
The Euphrates route to Tell Habuba in Syria for cedars, other timber, and
metals;
The Euphrates route, with extensions southwest to Egypt via Canaan or the
Mediterranean Sea; Sumerian-style motifs have been found on some Pre-
dynastic Egyptian artifacts, though the precise implications of these connec-
tions are disputed;
Persian Gulf route to Bahrain and Oman.
I he intensity of trade and Sumerian influence varied in each of these areas, with
the greatest evidence for direct Sumerian colonization being around Habuba
Kabira in Syria and in Susa in Elam.
From the perspective of military history the important question is what role, if
my, did military conquest play in the Uruk expansion. The essential question
Is whether the expansion of Sumerian cultural influences and material culture can be
explained in purely social and economic terms, or do we need to posit a military
i omponent? The evidence is insufficient for a certain answer. It seems that a
military component is not absolutely necessary, but the evidence fits more nicely
together if we assume that Sumerian armies were involved to some degree in the
Uruk expansion. It seems likely that warfare was a component in the expansion,
but that the phenomenon was not primarily military in nature. This is reflected
most clearly in the fact that some of the Sumerian colonies were strongly fortified;
I labuba Kabira in Syria is the most striking example, with three-meter- thick
mud-brick walls with numerous projecting square towers and strongly fortified
gates (AS 190-7). Sumerian military occupation of Susa and other parts of Elam is
also a possibility, but there are also arguments against this (PAE 52-69). Some have
argued that the Sumerian military system was not yet logistically advanced enough
to conquer Susa. But the distance from Uruk to Susa is only about 160 miles,
requiring a campaign of only 10-14 days. Susa could also have been approached by
the Karkheh river. Contemporary Egyptian armies found operations of this sort
completely feasible (see Chapter Twelve). The artistic sources mentioned above
demonstrate that militarism was a fundamental part of Sumerian kingship at this
time, making it likely that international relations between Sumerian kings and
M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
outside peoples would have had a strong military edge to them; this was certainly
the case a few centuries later.
Unfortunately, in the absence of written texts, all of this remains speculative.
The problem of interpreting both the military significance of the Priest-king ico-
nography and the military significance of the Uruk expansion are examples of the
difficulty of doing military history in the absence of texts.
Legends of the Uruk period
We have no historical texts for the Uruk period. On the other hand, later
Sumerian legendary recollections may reflect some of the historical situation in the
Uruk age. The most important historical tradition is the Sumerian King-list. 9 The
precise significance and meaning of the King-list for fourth-millennium history is
uncertain. It was clearly composed in its final form in the Isin-Larsa period (see
Chapter Six) as a propaganda tool for the legitimization of the kings of Isin. The
text can be divided into three phases: the antediluvian kings who ruled before the
"great flood" (KS 328; Cl/2: 107-8), a group of protohistoric kings (KS 328-
329), a few of whom can be confirmed by other inscriptions, and the historic
kings, whose names are also known from other sources (KS 329-40). The ante-
diluvian kings have reigns of tens of thousands of years; after the flood the proto-
historic rulers reign for hundreds of years, while the historic rulers have ordinary
human reigns seemingly based on actual chronological information.
rron: 1 e mil a y perspective, a i imber of things ai ; important to note. First,
kingship "descends from heaven" (KS 328); it is a divinely ordained institution.
Second, kingship is bestowed by the gods on a certain city, and can be taken away
from that city as well. Thus "kingship", or perhaps what we would call the hege-
mony of Sumer, is transferred from city to city by the gods. The mechanism by
which kingship is transferred is warfare. The King-list repeatedly uses standardized
formulae to describe shifts in the balance of power in Sumer: "city-X was defeated
[in war]" or "city-X was abandoned [by the gods]" or "city-X was smitten with
weapons" after which "its kingship was carried off to city-Y". Thus, when the
gods granted victory in battle, they were revealing whom they had chosen to be
the new hegemon of Sumer.
The Sumerian King-list mentions a great flood, but when this was thought to
have occurred relative to our modern chronological system cannot be determined.
But two things are clear about kingship in antediluvian times. First, kingship passed
between five different cities before the flood; each city in succession lost its
hegemony when it was "abandoned" by the gods, and the "kingship was carried
off" to another city. In military terms I take this to imply that Sumerian myths and
legends remember that warfare and power struggles among Sumerian city-states
occurred in the mythic antediluvian times, which historically are probably recol-
lections of the fourth millennium. Second, after the great flood, kingship was
re-established by the gods and given to the rulers of the city of Kish, at which time
we move from legend into the very beginning of the pro to histm n ,il period.
P
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Early Dynastic I {2900-2650}
10
The end of the Uruk expansion occurred in the protohistoric period. The precise
causes are uncertain, but a shift in the balance of power in Sumer itself, and
increasing military conflict between rival Sumerian city-states, may have been
contributing factors, perhaps related to the legendary establishment of hegemonic
kingship at the city-state of Kish (EM 28-32; KS 328).
A number of characteristics of Early Dynastic Mesopotamia must be emphasized.
One problem with Early Dynastic military history is that we do not have firm regnal
years for most of the kings. We can generally tell the relative order of kings for a
number of cities, and we can often determine synchronisms — that a certain king of one
city was a contemporary of the king of another. But we do not know the length of
reigns for almost any kings other than some of those mentioned in the Sumerian
King-list, which is extremely unreliable for the Early Dynastic period. This means
we can place the kings in order and determine if they were early or late in a given
century, but, for the most part, we cannot give precise regnal years. In the following
discussion I will give dates for most kings, but it should be emphasized that these
are quite speculative and should be used only as broad chronological indicators.
Politically Sumer in the Early Dynastic period was divided into a number of
separate and feuding independent city-states engaged in complex patterns of
cooperation, alliance, conflict, and war. 11 During much of the Early Dynastic
period there was endemic warfare between these city-states, rather like classical
Greece. The scale of this warfare was in many ways rather limited. Umma and
Lagash, whose ongoing feud is the best documented (RH), are only about twenty-
five miles apart. The entire area encompassed by the vast majority of Early
Dynastic military sources is only 300 miles across. The greatest distance of a
known military campaign in the Early Dynastic period, a conflict between Kish
and Elam (PI 35), amounted to a distance of no more than 160 miles. Most mili-
tary operations occurred within a few days' march of the home city.
There was a great deal of cultural, linguistic, and religious unity among the
Sumerians, despite their political disunity. We are provided with only a highly
stylized legendary account of the history of this period in the King-list, which seems
to suggest a succession of city-states. In fact, synchronisms from other contemporary
records indicate that many of the dynasties mentioned in the King-list clearly
overlap rather than being sequential. It appears that, whatever else was occurring
in power politics in Mesopotamia, only one king was able to claim the title of
"king of Kish" at a time. This did not mean he ruled all of Mesopotamia, but that
he was the first among equals; I will describe this ruler as the hegemon, and his rule
as hegemony. This hegemony also seems to have ben associated with religious respon-
sibilities of maintaining the Tummal temple of the god Ninlil at Nippur (KS 46-9).
An inscription describing which kings undertook repairs of that shrine broadly
matches the patterns of Sumerian hegemonic kingship as described in the King-list.
To properly contextualize the Sumerian martial inscriptions of the Early
Dynastic period, it must be remembered that the fundamental purpose ol Sinner inn
I !
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
■ i lptions was to commemorate dedications and gifts to the gods. Most of the
i lptions are almost always associated with giving gifts of land, precious things,
temple buildings to the gods. The inscriptional evidence does not permit us to
rite a complete military history of Early Dynastic Sumer; rather we are given
irnerous snapshots of individual conflicts and military incidents. None the less,
have enough data to give us a good sense of warfare in the Early Dynastic Age.
Kish {c. 3100-2700?} (EA 3:298-300; DANE 171)
i ording to Sumerian legend, the period scholars now call Early Dynastic I was
-Miniated by the hegemony of the kings of Kish (KS 328). Throughout the
merian period the title "king of Kish" (lugal Kish) meant hegemon of Sumer,
I every warlord claiming universal domination of Mesopotamia adopted "king
Kish" as one of his titles (PI 37, 40, 102). We cannot know for certain the
( lse period of the hegemony of Kish. The King-list itself gives each of the
ilr is reigns of hundreds of years, and the dynasty as a whole a duration of 24,510
us. The last two rulers on the Kish king-list, Enmebaragesi and his son Agga
I \1 28—32; KS 238; PI 18) are known from other records to have been con-
uporaries of Gilgamesh, king of Uruk, who dates to around 2700 (DANE 128-
II we assume that each of the twenty-three kings of Kish were historical figures,
K >wever mythically remembered, who ruled for an average of around twenty years
h, the entire period of Kish hegemony in Sumer would have lasted somewhat
i 400 years. Since the dynasty's hegemony ended around 2700 under the last
king, Agga, this would place the beginning of the Kish dynasty around 3100. Of
ourse, such numbers are very rough and can only give us the broadest sense of
limnology.
Militarily, little is known of the period of Kish, which has left scant inscriptions
M martial art - only a fragment of two warriors and an image of a bound prisoner
i war (AFC 89—92). Excavations of royal tombs from Kish show the use of metal
apons and the burial of several early war-carts (EA 3:298; see pp. 132-41).
I i "in the persistence of the title "king of Kish" as the rough equivalent of
mperor" in later Mesopotamia, we can assume their hegemony was substantial
imi at least part of the period. A few of their rulers have left us brief military hints.
I i.i na, the eleventh from the end of the dynasty {c. 2900}, was said to have "made
linn all the lands" (KS 328), which may refer to some type of political hegemony
i'lit could equally be a ritual or religious phenomenon — he is also said to have
k ascend[ed] into heaven" (KS 328; 0/2:109— 10), reflecting the connection of
Smner inn kingship with the gods. The later legend of Etana gives a more detailed
i< * ount of this (MFM 189-202). The legend records the founding of the city by
i In- ",<uls, and their primordial preparation for its defense:
The Sehitti | seven warrior gods] barred the gates [of Kish] against armies.
| I lie Ammiiaki gods] barred them against [other| settled peoples.
I he hnr.i |j..chK| would patrol the city. (Mh'M 190)
IS
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Enmebaragesi {c. 2700} (PI 18; 0/2:110) is said to have "plundered the
weapons of the land of Elam" (KS 328; PAE 87) some 160 miles to the east. This is
the first textual reference to war between Sumer and the neighboring Elam, indi-
cating the logistical reach of Sumerian armies of the period, Enmebaragesi was
succeeded by his son Agga, under whom "Kish was defeated [in battle by Gilgamesh
of Uruk] , and its kingship was carried off to [the temple] Eanna [in the city 7 of
Uruk]" (KS 328).
Gilgamesh and the rise of Uruk {c. 2780-2560}
The shift of hegemony in Sumer from Kish to Uruk illustrates a problem in
Sumerian legendary historiography. Later Sumerian tradition is unequivocal in
attributing Uruk's rise to hegemony to Gilgamesh (EOG 143-8), but the King-list
gives five kings ruling before Gilgamesh (KS 328—9); presumably Gilgamesh s
predecessors before the rise of Uruk to hegemony The dynasty begins four gen-
erations before Gilgamesh with "Meskiaggasher, son of [the god] Utu" {c. 2780-
2760} who "entered the sea and ascended the mountains" (KS 328-9). If this deed
is historical rather than mythical, it may imply that Meskiaggasher was perhaps the
first known Sumerian king to take to the sea in war, and raided into the Zagros
mountains for timber, metal, or stone.
Three of the early legendary kings of Uruk became epic heroes, perhaps
because of early development of a heroic court poetry centered on martial deeds
in Uruk. However that may be, Enmerkar {c. 2760-2740} and his son Lugalbanda
{2740—2720} were attributed in Sumerian legend with an invasion and siege of
Aratta, a mythical and wealthy land to the north-east of Mesopotamia, the source
of tin and lapis lazuli. 12 It is generally thought that Aratta was in central or eastern
Iran, or perhaps Afghanistan (ME 12—4). We need not suppose that Enmerkar and
Lugalbanda actually campaigned to Afghanistan, but rather than Meskiaggasher's
"ascent to the mountains" and Enmerkar's siege of Aratta probably reflect
legendary recollections of Early Dynastic campaigns into the Zagros highlands in
western Iran to secure the immediate source of lapis lazuli and tin, rather than
their original source in Afghanistan.
The greatest warrior-king of early Uruk, however, was Gilgamesh {c. 2700-
2680}, who was destined to become the premier epic hero of the Near East, and
whose tales were told and retold for the next two-and-a-half millennia (EOG).
The military aspects of the Gilgamesh epic are discussed elsewhere, since they
probably reflect warfare in the age of their actual composition rather than in the
time of the historic Gilgamesh (see pp. 126—8). It is quite certain that Gilgamesh
was a historical ruler, but it is difficult to disentangle the epic-hero from the historic
king. He is attributed with building the massive ten-kilometer circuit of walls around
Uruk (CAM 60; EA 5:294-8; C 1/2:110-12). Like his predecessors, Gilgamesh
the epic hero is also a wanderer in search of cedarwood from I e ban on (EOG).
The most historical part of the epic tradition of ( iilgamesh m.i\ be the talc ol
the defeat of Agga (Akka), the last of the hegemonic 1 in- ■ >i Kr.li ' Agra seni
If,
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
to Uruk demanding that Gilgamesh submit to Kish and pay tribute. Gil-
h convened the "assembly of his city's elders" for a consultation. Gilgamesh
■ »sed, "let us not submit to the house of Kish, let us wage war!" But the elders
Hi red and refused to give their consent. Ignoring the will of the city council,
iinesh instead "placed his trust in the [war] goddess Inanna, took no notice of
I his city's elders said", going directly to the "assembly of the city's young
n " of military age, who supported the call for war:
You are their king and their warrior!
( > crusher of heads [with a mace in battle],
Prince beloved of [the god] An
When he [Agga king of Kish] arrives why be afraid?
I he army [of Kish] is small
And a rabble [of untrained troops] at the rear,
lis men will not withstand us! (EOG 145-6)
• nh the young warriors of the city aroused, Gilgamesh prepared for war:
Now make ready the equipment and arms of battle,
I et weapons of war return to your grasp!
Let them create terror and a dread aura,
So when he [Agga of Kish] arrives fear of me overwhelms him,
So his good sense is confounded and his judgment undone! (EOG 146)
Agga is quick to respond to this challenge to the Hegemony of Kish. "It was
.i five days, it was not ten days, [when] Enmebaragesi 's son Agga [king of Kish]
id siege to Uruk" (EOG 146). Gilgamesh sends one of his "royal bodyguard" to
eotiate, but he is captured and beaten by Agga, whereupon:
( hlgamesh climbed up on the wall [of Uruk]
I lis dread aura overwhelmed those [too] old and [too] young [to fight]
But put weapons of war in the hands of Uruk's young men.
At the door of the city gate they stood [marshaled] in the roadway,
I nkidu [Gilgamesh's companion] went forth from the city gate
| leading the army of Uruk into battle against Agga].
( hlgamesh raised his head on the rampart
A myriad | of the enemy] did fall [to defeat]
A myriad [of Uruk] did rise [to victory]
A myriad did thereby roll [dead] in the dust,
I [e |Gilgamcsh| cut down the horns of the [royal] boat [of Agga]
In the midst of his army he took prisoner Agga, king of Kish. (EOG 147-8)
With Agga as prisoner, (hlgamesh proceeded to negotiate from a position of
i Ai-.-.i Im.ilK ar.ieetl that "I huk, the smithy of the gods, its great rampart, a
17
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
cloudbank resting on the earth, is given into your charge" (EOG 149); in other
words Uruk became independent of Kishite vassalage. In return Gilgamesh set
Agga free. This account is interesting in reflecting the fact that the king did not
have absolute power, but had to consult the city councils before making war. The
old men of the council of elders cautioned against war, while the council of the
young warriors carried the day for war.
The predominance of Uruk in Sumer was said to have continued for perhaps a
century {c. 2680-2560}, but no military details are known for the subsequent
rulers. The period of Uruk hegemony corresponds roughly with what archae-
ologists call the Early Dynastic II period {2650—2550}. By the end of the first
dynasty of Uruk, their hegemony was rapidly passing to the city of Ur.
The First Dynasty of Ur, and the royal tombs {c. 2 5 60-2 45 0} 14
According to the King-list, the city of Ur came to hegemony in Sumer after the
first Dynasty of Uruk. Royal inscriptions of this period provide little information
of military matters beyond mere mentions of the names of kings, which none the
less have the merit of confirming the basic historicity of the Sumerian King-list, at
least for this period (PI 97-101; KS 329).
From the perspective of the military historian, the spectacular treasures from
the royal tombs of Ur include a number of artifacts of the greatest importance.
The cemetery of Ur contained hundreds of tombs, of which sixteen are called
"Royal Tombs" because of the richness of their content and because of human
sacrifices buried with the kings and queens, presumably to accompany them into
the afterlife. The absence of inscriptions makes it impossible to know for certain
who was buried in the tombs, but a tentative list has been reconstructed (AFC 96).
The tombs thus cannot be precisely dated, but are generally placed in late Early
Dynastic II through early Early Dynastic IIIA, around 2550-2450.
A number of weapons and other military artifacts have been preserved in the
royal tombs of Ur, which generally reflect precisely the weapons depicted on
contemporary martial art. The weapons include: copper daggers (RTU §147—8); a
stunning ceremonial dagger in gold (AFC §54; RTU §146; AM §xv; AW 1:140-1);
spike-like javelins (RTU 162, §140; AW 1:134); broad-headed spears (RTU 162,
§141-2); and socketed axeheads (AW 1:136-7; RTU §149-51); no archery
equipment was found in the tombs. There were also weapons found in ordinary
tombs in the Ur cemeteries: a preliminary count included 58 spears, 171 daggers
and 309 axes. 15 If these numbers are proportional to the actual use of weapons it
may give an impression of the troop-types of Sumerian armies.
Body army was likewise absent, but the oldest known copper helmets were
found still on the skulls of sacrificed bodyguards sent to accompany their kings in
the afterlife (AFC §56; AW 1:49). The beautiful golden helmet-crown of Meka-
lamdug {c. 2510} (AM §xvi; AANE §45; FA 83) could have been worn by the
king in battle, but it would have afforded little protection; it is somewhal similar to
the helmet worn by Eanatum (AM 66), but I suspect the battle version was in
i
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
iMiize. There were apparently no metal helmets found in the non-royal graves,
huh probably indicates that most helmets were leather. Only elite soldiers and
■ yal guards had metal helmets. Some art from the royal tombs also display martial
hemes, such as symbolic lions, representing the triumphant king, trampling pros-
ii e enemies (AFC §57; RTU §13). A bodyguard in a sheepskin robe with an axe
lends the king at a banquet (RTU §17). Bronze daggers are also common
ipons in the art (AFC §58; RTU 74, §21).
The "Standard of Ur ,A6
Ihe most important artistic source for military history from the royal tombs is the
■ i nous Standard of Ur, a box inlaid with shell and lapis lazuli depicting a scene of
i< torious warfare of the king of Ur. It was discovered in tomb PC 779, which is
lociated with Ur-Pabilsag, who died around 2550 (AFC 96-7). The martial side
Di (lie box is divided into three panels, depicting different phases of combat. I
lieve it should be read from the bottom to the top. In the bottom panel four
Sumerian war-carts charge across a battlefield strewn with enemy corpses. These
ii -carts are described in detail later (see Chapter Five). Each war-cart is pulled by
four equids, and has a driver and a warrior, who wields either a javelin or an axe.
I he middle panel shows a line of eight infantrymen on the left side, and another
nil a dozen collecting enemy prisoners on the right. The eight are all dressed the
nne and carry the same weapons. The men wear sheepskin kilts, and have long
i pes running from their shoulders to their ankles. The capes are fastened at the
ticck and open at the front, leaving the arms free for combat. The capes are polka-
dotted, which some have interpreted as leopard skins, but are more likely simply
■ >lorful designs. Each wears a leather cap or metal helmet fastened under the chin,
perhaps similar to the helmets found in the royal tombs (AFC §56). Each of the
men is armed with a medium-size thrusting spear, held underhand. The right half
»i the middle panel shows the soldiers of Ur rounding up prisoners. All of them
i.tve been wounded and have several gashes with flowing blood. Some of the Ur
I ildiers have collected booty in their arms and are brandishing knives or clubs as
they herd the prisoners.
On the top panel the prisoners are brought before the king on the right side,
naked and bleeding from their wounds. King Ur-Pabilsag stands in the center of
iiie panel, reviewing the prisoners. Behind the king are three soldiers, each armed
with spears and axes. In the rear is the royal chariot, held by the axe-armed driver.
The elite warriors and charioteers all seem to be dressed in sheepskin or fringed
leather kilts and wear sheepskin cloaks over one shoulder. The common soldiers
wear the polka-dotted capes; both classes have the same caps or helmets.
As 1 interpret it the Standard of Ur depicts the aftermath of a victorious battle
rather than the actual combat. The chariots race across the field, pursuing the
1 1 eei ni', foe mh\ trampling the dead. The middle panel shows the infantry following
the ( hat nils i ollet tins', the booty and wounded enemy as prisoners. The final panel
shows the tiiumph celebration where the booty and prisoners are brought before
VI
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
the king. The Standard shows two classes of Sumerian warriors, charioteers and
infantry; there is no sign of archers and none of the corpses or wounded have any
missiles protruding from therm The four weapons depicted are javelins (only
thrown by charioteers), medium-size thrusting spears, and axes or daggers for close
combat. We are not shown, however, how the enemy was defeated. Was there a
phase of missile exchange? Was there an infantry melee? Did the chariots charge,
drive by throwing javelins, or only pursue an enemy already broken by the infan-
try? Despite these unanswered questions, the Standard of Ur is a striking piece of
martial art, both for its depiction of war-carts, arms and armor, and for its evoca-
tion of the martial spirit of the Sumerian kings.
A lesser known, but equally important Ur war-scene comes from a cylinder
seal, which I believe depicts a Sumerian army on the march, with infantry,
war-carts, dogs, pack animals, and boats. 17 The scene shows two parallel panels,
one on the river and one on land, which I interpret to show an army on campaign
with part marching on the bank of the river, accompanied by other troops and
supplies on boats in the river. The upper panel shows a boat with a seated royal
figure being paddled by another man. On shore is a soldier with a long lance
who accompanies a donkey bearing a load of supplies. The bottom panel
shows the army on land accompanying the fleet on the river, with a two-wheeled
war-cart ridden by a man with an axe (?) pulled by long-eared equids. The chariot
is followed by a dog and three soldiers, one with an axe and two with long
spears.
Although we know little of the actual military history of the First Dynasty of
Ur, the royal tombs provide crucial examples of weapons and martial art, giving us
invaluable insights into the Sumerian military system.
Early Dynastic IIIA {2550-2400}
and IIIB {2400-2250}
With the beginning of Early Dynastic III, we enter our best-documented period
for military history before the rise of the Akkadian empire of Sargon. We are
especially fortunate to have a series of martial inscriptions from the kings of
Lagash. Around 2500 we have vague records of a Mesilim who claimed the title
"king of Kish" and who is remembered in later inscriptions as arbitrating a
boundary dispute between Lagash and Umma (PI 40), an apparent reflection of his
position of overlord. However, little is known of his military activities (KS 53). 18
The warrior-kings of Lagash {2495— 2345} 19
Early Dynastic IIIA could be called the age of the w r arlords of Lagash, who provide
us with our richest sources of both military narratives and martial art of the Early
I >\ -Mastic Age. Interestingly, Lagash is nowhere mentioned in the Sumerian King-
list, .in oversight which is generally thought to reflect a propaganda statement by
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
i he kings of early Middle Bronze Isin about the illegitimacy of the kings of Lagash.
I he rise to hegemony of Lagash in Mesopotamia begins with the victories of
1 'rnanshe.
Urnanshe of Lagash {c. 2495—2475}
The first Mesopotamian king for whom we have a detailed contemporary account
6f warfare is Urnanshe of Lagash, who fought against both Umma and Ur. The
background to this war relates to an ongoing struggle between Umma and Lagash
I >ver control of agricultural land, diversion of irrigation water through building
canals and dams, and failure to share the agricultural produce from certain shared
I I acts of land (RH 22-3; PI 54-5).
[Urnanshe, king] of Lagash. went to war against the leader of Ur and the
leader of Umma: [Urnanshe] the leader of Lagash defeated the leader of Ur.
He captured Mu[. . .] the admiral, captured Amabaragesi and Kishibgal the
officers, captured Papursag, son of U'u, captured [. . .] the officer, he made a
burial mound [for the war dead]. He [then] defeated the leader of Umma. He
captured Lupad and Bilala the officers, captured Pabilgaltuk ruler of Umma,
captured Urtulsag the officer, captured Hursagshernah the quartermaster-
general, and he made a burial mound [for the war dead]. (PI 25)
Urnanshe's inscription contains the first textual reference we have to the
Mesopotamian custom of building burial mounds for the war dead at the site of a
victory. We also have an iconographic representation of this in the famous Stele of
Vultures, where the dead are shown placed in a pile by the victors while people
carried baskets of earth to bury the corpses (AAM §121; see p. 55). When a
Mesopotamian king claimed to have "raised a mound" after a battle it indicated
that he was victorious, because his troops were in possession of the battlefield and
therefore buried the war dead. Urnanshe emphasized his capture of important
enemy officers, including the king of Umma, Pabilgaltuk. We do not know the
fate of these captives; in later texts they are often tortured or executed, but are also
often returned to their thrones as vassals of the victorious king. In addition to his
military victories, Urnanshe also "built the walls of Lagash" (PI 25, 28—9), a
defensive action emphasizing the military threat of his age.
Some of the inscriptions of Lagash mention overseas voyages through the Persian
Gulf to Dilmun (modern Bahrain; DANE 45; EA 1:266-8) for timber and stone
for temple building (PI 23, 24, 28-30), Although not explicitly military ventures,
these voyages indicate that seagoing vessels were capable of sailing the Persian Gulf
during this period, and this maritime technology would lay the foundation for the
eventual naval conquests of the Akkadians in the Persian Gulf (see pp. 80—1, 84).
I Jrnanshe was succeeded by his son Akurgal {c. 2475-2455}, about whom we
have no military information (PI 33), and then by his grandson Eanatum, the
greatest warlord of Marly Dynastic Mesopotamia.
a i
.1
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Eanatum I (Eannatum) {c. 2455- 2425} 20
According to Sumerian martial ideology, kings did not win victory in battle by
their own strength and wisdom, but by the gift of the gods. Eanatum is no
exception.
Eanatum, king of Lagash, granted strength by [the high god] Enlil, nourished
with special milk by [the mother goddess] Ninhursag, given a fine name by
[the war goddess] Inana, granted wisdom by [the god of wisdom] Enki, cho-
sen in her heart by [the divination goddess] Nanshe the powerful mistress,
who subjugates foreign lands for [the war god] Ningirsu [patron god of
Lagash] . . . beloved spouse of [the war goddess] Inana. (PI 37)
Not only was Eanatum granted these special gifts by the gods, he was in fact the
son of god on earth. According to one of Eanatum 's inscriptions, the war god
Ningirsu, "warrior [and son] of [the high god] Enlil", "implanted [his] semen for
Eanatum in the womb" of Eanatum's mother. Thus, the hero-king was not a mere
man, but a demi-god, son of the war god, destined to fulfill the gods' commands
and restore the proper divine order in Sumer through victorious battle. When
Eanatum. finally matured, "Ningirsu, with great joy, gave him the kingship of
Lagash" (PI 34).
Lagash had been engaged in an ongoing struggle with Umma over disputed
agricultural land between the two cities for a generation or two. Attempted arbi-
tration ultimately failed, leading to renewed hostilities (RH 22—4). Eanatum's first
campaign was against his nearest rival, the city-state of Umma under their king
Enakale. 21 The great war between Lagash and Umma is recorded in the longest
and most detailed battle narrative of the Early Dynastic period. According tc
Eanatum, the king of Umma "acted haughtily" and broke the divinely established
order by usurping the "Gu'edena", an agricultural region between Umma and
Lagash. Eanatum observed the city of Umma making military preparations to seize
and retain control of this disputed agricultural land.
Eanatum, who has strength [in war] . . . declared: "Now then, O Enemy [king
of Umma]!" [He] proclaimed for evermore: "The ruler of Umma - where is he
recruiting [soldiers for the war]? With [other] men [foreign mercenaries?] . . .
he is able to exploit the [agricultural region] Gu'edena, the beloved field of
Ningirsu. May he [the war god Ningirsu] strike him down!" (PI 34; cf PI 55)
This warlike provocation of seizing land from Lagash would have justified
military action by Eanatum, but the king was further compelled to battle by an
oracular dream.
Eanatum who lies sleeping — [his] be [loved] master [the war god Ningirsu]
approaches his head [in an oracular dream, and says: | "Kish itself |ihe s.u in I
i.'
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
city of divine kingship] must abandon Umma.. . . The sun- [god] will shine at
your right [in battle], and a [crown?] will be affixed to your forehead. O
Eanatum, you will slay [the enemy from Umma] there. [The burial mound
with] their myriad corpses will reach the base of heaven. In Umma [„ . .]
the people of his [king Enakale's] own city will rise up against him and he
will be killed within Umma itself [during the rebellion of his own people].'
(PI 34)
I 'aiakale, king of Umma, was not merely the enemy of Lagash, but the enemy of
(lie gods, who prophesied his defeat in battle. Eanatum does not go to war for
plunder or personal glory, but at the express command of the gods.
The description of most of the beginning of the battle is unfortunately broken,
I nit the narrative picks up again in mid-combat. "He [king Eanatum] fought with
him [king Enakale]. A person shot an arrow at Eanatum. Lie was shot through by
i lie arrow and had difficulty moving. He cried out in the face of it" (PI 34). This
text shows both the use of archery in Sumerian warfare - which is unclear in the
nt of the period — and the fact that the kings fought in personal combat
The next part of the text is again broken, but it is obvious that, despite his
.erious wound, Eanatum leads the army of Lagash to victory. After the victory, a
treaty is made, in which Enakale of Umma is forced to cede land to Lagash
Eanatum, the man of just commands, measured off the boundary with the
leader of Umma, left [some land] under Umma s control, and erected a
monument on that spot [of the victory].- . . He defeated Umma and
made twenty burial mounds for [the battle dead, indicating very high casual-
ties in the war, or perhaps a number of different encounters].. . . Eanatum
restored to [the god] Ningirsu's control his beloved field, the Gu'edena. . . .
Eanatum erected a [victory] monument in the grand temple of Ningirsu.
(PI 34-5)
I he defeated Enakale of Umma is thereafter forced to swear a peace oath.
Eanatum gave the great battle net of [the supreme god] Enlil to [Enakale] the
leader of Umma and made him swear to him by it. The leader of Umma
swore to Eanatum: "By the life of Enlil, king of heaven and Earth! I may exploit
the field of Ningirsu as a[n interest-bearing] loan.. . . Forever and evermore, I
shall not transgress the territory of [Lagash, the city of the god] Ningirsu!
I shall not shift the [course of] its irrigation channels and canals! I shall
not smash its [boundary] monuments! Whenever I do transgress, may the
great battle net of Enlil, king of heaven and earth, by which I have sworn,
descend upon Umma!" Eanatum was very clever indeed! He made up the
eyes of two doves with kohl, and anointed their heads with cedar [resin].
I le released them to [the high god] Enlil, king of heaven and earth [as an
nlTering]. (I'l 35)
53
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Doubting the sincerity of this oath taken under extreme duress, Eanatum forced
Enakale to repeat the exact same oath by five additional gods (PI 35—7). As we
shall see, Eanatum s distrust was justified. Some time after the initial victory, the
oath was broken just as Eanatum had feared: "the leader of Umma smashed the
[boundary and victory] monument" that Eanatum. had set up after his victory, and
occupied the disputed lands. The war god Ningirsu again "gave the order to
Eanatum [to go to war], and he destroyed [the city of] Umma" (PI 39—40).
With its rival Umma subjugated, Lagash was now one of the most powerful
states in Sumer, but was yet by no means predominant. In subsequent years he
launched a whole series of campaigns throughout Mesopotamia. In his first cam-
paigns he "defeated Elam and Subartu [northern Mesopotamia], mountainous
lands of timber and treasure ... he defeated Susa [the capital of Elam]" (PI 37), and
"defeated the ruler of Urua, who stood with the standard [of the god of the city]
in the vanguard [of the battle line]" (PI 43), another indication of Sumerian kings
fighting in the front ranks. Thereafter he turned to subdue the rival city-states of
Sumer,
He defeated Uruk, he defeated Ur, he defeated Kiutu. He sacked Uruaz and
killed its ruler. He sacked Mishime and destroyed Arua. All the foreign [non-
Sumerian] lands trembled before Eanatum, the nominee of Ningirsu. Because
the king of Akshak [a city near Baghdad] attacked, Eanatum , . . beat back
Zuzu, king of Akshak . . . and destroyed [Akshak]. (PI 41-2, 43)
His initial victories over these city-states established his pre-eminence in Sumer, so
that "to Eanatum, ruler of Lagash, Inana [the war goddess], because she loved him
so, gave him the kingship of Kish", meaning official status as hegemon over Sumer
(PI 41). Thereafter,
Elam trembled before Eanatum, he drove the Elamite back to his own land.
Kish trembled before Eanatum; he drove the king of Akshak back to his own
land. (PI 42)
Eanatum s new status as hegemon, however, was not entirely secure. Realizing
they could not defeat him. individually, his defeated rivals began to form coalitions
against him:
He defeated [a coalition of the kings of] Elam, Subartu and Urua at the [battle
of the] Asuhur [canal]. He defeated [a coalition of the kings] of Kish, Akshak
and Mari at the Antasura of Ningirsu. (PI 42)
By the time of his death Eanatum was supreme in southern Mesopotamia, and
hegemon of Sumer, but his defeated enemies chafed under the domination of
Lagash, and grasped the first opportunity to rebel under Han. it inn's successor and
brother, Enanatum I (see pp. 60-1).
'I
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
The Stele of the Vultures 22
urn's great victory over Umma, which left twenty burial mounds of enemy
ii id launched Eanatum on his career towards domination of Sumer, was
Ited in the famous "Stele of the Vultures' 5 , which could perhaps be better
•d "The Victory of Ningirsu through Eanatum". This stele is perhaps the
f surviving piece of Early or Middle Bronze martial art from ancient
|M>i,imia, and merits detailed attention.
K stele is unfortunately broken and fragmentary, but the overall sense is clear.
i it ire stele shows the victories of Eanatum, but each side shows a different
| the celestial and the terrestrial. The divine side, probably the more sig-
ui from the Sumerian perspective, is divided into two panels. The upper
hows the bearded and powerful war god Ningirsu, father of Eanatum and
/ (v . m , / I he "Stele of the Vultures", king Eanatum of Lagash, Sumer {c. 2440}
| ou\i« At ) it) drawing hy Michael Lyon.
>5
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
divine patron of the city of Lagash. Ningirsu holds his mace in his right hand, and
holds the "great battle net" of Enlil in his left hand - surmounted by an emblem of
the mythical Sumerian lion-headed eagle Anzu (also called Imdugud, GDS 107-8;
AAM §117; AM §70a) — by which the defeated king of Umma was forced to swear
an oath that, if he broke the treaty, "the great battle net of Enlil . . . [will] descend
upon Umma" (AM §67; PI 35), precisely as depicted in the stele, The soldiers of
Umma are caught in the net, and the head of one - presumably the king of Umma
who is trying to escape - is being crushed by the mace of Ningirsu (AM §67, 69).
Behind Ningirsu, and about half the size of the god, stands a figure in a feathered
crown holding a battle standard crested with Anzu (AAM §118). This is probably
Ninhursag, mother and councilor to Ningirsu. The standard, possibly an actual
bronze standard of Lagash (PI 43), is Anzu, precisely the same emblematic creature
on Ningirsu 's battle net. When the standard is carried into battle it thus represents
the presence of Ningirsu going into battle beside the king - a motif mentioned in
numerous Mesopotamian inscriptions.
The lower register is quite fragmentary, but clearly shows the edge of a chariot
on the left, and the top of the head of Ninhursag facing the chariot on the right
(AAM §118). This type of chariot of the gods was led in processions at the temple
of Ningirsu at Lagash, where the king Eanatum greets the god and shares the
booty of the victory with him. It is possible that the chariot and Anzu standard
were actually brought into battle as a sign of the divine presence of Ningirsu,
rather like the biblical Ark of the Covenant (Judges 5.20; Joshua 6; 1 Samuel 4-6);
hence the emphasis given by Eanatum on his later capture of the standard of the
enemy king of the city of Urua (PI 41, 43). The overall meaning of the celestial
side of the stele is that Ningirsu grants victory in battle to his son and earthly
representative, Eanatum, king of Lagash.
The other terrestrial side of the stele shows the earthly results of Ningirsu 's
divine intervention on behalf of Eanatum (AFC 190). This side is divided into
four panels, which are probably intended to be read chronologically from top to
bottom. It must be emphasized that the panel does not show the army of Lagash in
actual combat, but at the moment of victory. In the top panel the sky is filled with
vultures - from which the stele gets its name - who fly off with the severed arms
and heads of the dead soldiers of the defeated army of Umma (AM §120). Beneath
the hovering vultures, on the right side of the panel, the victorious army of
Eanatum marches gloriously over the corpses of their fallen enemy (AM §66).
King Eanatum leads the army wearing a thick sheepskin kilt and long sheepskin
robe on his left shoulder and a helmet similar to the golden helmet of Meka-
lamdug from the Royal Tombs of Ur (see p. 48). He is armed with what is
sometimes called a sickle-sword, but what may be a scepter or club (see pp. 66—71).
Behind him his troops are marshaled in a very interesting formation, which is
sometimes described as a phalanx (AM §68). The soldiers are beardless, with long
hair flowing down to their shoulders. They all wear helmets, whi< h might be of
copper similar to those found in the royal tombs of Ur (A I ( ' ; : i(. \\\ 1 !'>).< )ne
text mentions the delivery of a copper/bronze helmet .nui ;<■ uh ul implying
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
1 1 (lie two go together as a warrior's equipment (PI 71). However, it may be that
niy the elite bodyguards, like those buried in the royal tombs, had metal helmets,
rest making due with leather caps.
I he front of the formation is protected by four large body-length shields - only
I heads and feet of the soldiers are visible. The shields are rectangular - about
H and a half meters tall and a meter wide; each has six round, evenly spaced
I |, It is impossible to tell what the shields are made from, but a contemporary
ly shield from Mari (AFC §99) is made of long reeds bound together with
ither straps and a large handle two-thirds of the way up. By analogy it is likely
■ l he Lagash shield were made of reeds and covered with leather. It appears that
i v soldier did not have his own shield. Rather, only the front rank of the for-
n ion carried the shield in both hands, forming a solid shield wall. This is
^parent from two characteristics. First, between each shield we see six spears
II us! forward, and each spear is held by two hands, which means the men in the
U ranks cannot hold a shield. A second feature which points to most soldiers
ing shieldless is that in the second panel, discussed below, none of the soldiers
e shields, nor do those in the Standard of Ur (AFC 98—9). Thus, the overall
mation is seven men deep. The front man carries a shield, probably with both
iids for ease of maneuverability and bearing the weight. The rest of the men in
lollowing six ranks thrust their spears between the shields.
II ie right half of the first panel is generally ignored, but is important for
i h In-standing the scene. The army of Lagash is trampling the dead on the left
p( >n ion of the top panel, while on the right the diminutive and chaotic soldiers of
1 in ma - some fallen, some tumbling, some standing - flee in terror (AFC 190).
« mly the upper left portion of the second panel has survived (AAM §119; AM
'■). On the right Eanatum, in precisely the same dress as on panel one, rides his
ii cart into battle. In his right hand he holds a sickle-sword (or club or mace)
in! m his left hand he holds a long lance which he is thrusting out against the
ininy over the heads of his donkeys (see p. 55). Most of the war-cart and the
quids pulling it is missing, but from its size it is clearly a four-wheeled vehicle,
n«l essentially the same in structure as the war-carts found in the Standard of Ur,
i hough rendered in more detail (see pp. 49-50); the javelin quiver contains eight
l-ivelins and an axe. Behind Eanatum stands his driver, who is mostly effaced by
I image to the stele; his arm by Eanatum's hip is holding an axe (or a javelin?).
1'" hind Eanatum marches the infantry of Lagash. They are dressed in sheepskin
hits, with some type of sash (leather or colored cloth?) over their left shoulders.
1 hey wear precisely the same helmets as the soldiers in the first panel, and are
irmed with spears and narrow-bladed socketed axes, some of which have been
blind by archaeologists (RTU §151; AW 1:136-7). They seem to be marching in
fairly ordered ranks.
Several questions of interpretation arise here. First, are the infantry in panel two
i Ik same as those in panel one, but in a different phase of the battle? Or are they an
tit ire 1\ different tactical unit, performing a different function? One interpretation
i ih.ii the\ represent the same troops in different phases of the battle. In
«,
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
defensive positions, or when advancing slowly, the Sumerian infantry remained
behind the large body-shields. When attacking, however, they abandoned the
shields, which were too bulky to use at a run, and charged forward without them.
The other interpretation maintains that some of the infantry fought without the
shields, and were assigned to tactically support the war-carts at a run. According to
this interpretation, the heavy infantry fought from behind their shield wall
throughout the entire battle, while different units of light, shieldless infantry sup-
ported the war-carts. Another question derives from the placing of Eanatum rela-
tive to the infantry. In both the first and second panels, Eanatum precedes his army
into battle. Does this represent actual tactical practice, or is it a symbolic repre-
sentation of the king as leader of the army? Most importantly, did the war-carts
generally precede the infantry into battle? In other words, did war-carts charge
against enemy formations supported by infantry, or did the infantry defeat other
infantry while the war-carts supported with javelins, or pursued fleeing enemies.
Unfortunately, the evidence from Early Dynastic Sumer is insufficient to answer
these questions with certainty.
Of the third panel, only a triangular fragment of the center-left survives,
showing the aftermath of the battle (AAM §121). The left shows a burial mound:
the dead of Umma - and perhaps the casualties of Lagash as well - are stacked in a
mound, while workers bring baskets full of dirt to bury them. This is the burial
mound whose "myriad corpses will reach to the base of heaven" (PI 34) as pro-
phesied in Eanatum's dream. The right side of this fragment shows the rich bounty
from the reconquest of the field of Gu'edena, the result of Eanatum's victory. In
the far right corner we see the feet of Eanatum, supervising the scene. At his feet a
cow lies bound to a stake, which is probably either to be sacrificed to the gods, or
will be eaten by the troops. The message of this panel is also clear. The result of
war is death to the e3iemies of the god Ningirsu and his beloved city of Lagash,
and prosperity and bounty for the people of Lagash.
Only the barest sliver of the fourth panel remains, but it provides enough
information to reconstruct some of the scene. In the far left of the panel we see a
hand grasping the end of a long lance in precisely the same way that Eanatum
grasps the end of his lance from his chariot in the second panel. I suggest that the
fourth panel showed another chariot scene parallel to that in the second panel, or
perhaps the king standing and using his lance. The precise length of the lance is
difficult to tell, but by comparing its proportional length to the size of Eanatum in
the surviving figures, the lance would seem to be three to three-and-a-half meters
long. All of this implies that, in addition to using javelins from the war-carts, the
Sumer ians also used long lances, which the chariot warrior would thrust over the
backs of the equids against the enemy. On the far right of the fourth panel we see
the tops of four heads, three facing to the right. Only the tops of their heads are
visible, and they are set very close together. They seem to be wearing helmets
similar to those worn by the soldiers of Lagash in the first and second panels. It
may be that they are part of the advancing army of Lagash, but im weapons are
visible above their heads (as they should be by analogy to panel tu<>) I unhei more,
58
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
' .ii latum is always shown on the stele preceding his army, never following it. I
Biggest they are probably enemy soldiers who have turned to flee from the irre-
sistible onslaught of Eanatum's chariot.
The fourth figure, who is taller and slightly larger than the others, faces left,
thout to be stabbed in the face by Eanatum's lance. He seems to be raising his hand
to ward off the blow. This figure probably represents the enemy leader, at the
moment of his defeat by Eanatum, A fragment of the inscription by this head reads
"king of Kish" (PI 37). This may simply be a phrase from a longer part of the now
lost inscription, but some have speculated that this refers to the name of the man
who is being attacked by Eanatum - Eanatum himself is likewise identified in a
superscription on the stele (PI 37). In other words, the fourth panel may show
Eanatum's victory over the king of Kish. This makes some sense in the context of
i he inscriptions, since, as Eanatum's oracular dream prophesies, "Kish itself must
.ihandon Umma, and, being angry, cannot support it [Umma]" (PI 34), implying
that Kish was an ally of Umma in the war. This scene would thus represent the
iftermath of the original victory over Umma in which the "king of Kish" is like-
wise overthrown, paving the way for Eanatum to take that title of hegemony in
Sumer, as he ultimately does (PI 42).
Ironically the Stele of the Vultures may not be a representation of the actual
battle, but rather of the oracular dream in which Ningirsu ordered Eanatum to go
i < ) war with Umma and promised him victory.
Most of the elements of Eanatum's dream are depicted in the stele. On the celes-
tial side we see the appearance of the God Ningirsu holding his enemies trapped in
the great battle net. On the other side we see the defeat of the army of Umma and
ihe huge burial mound reaching to the height of heaven. In the small upper frag-
ment of the lowest panel we see a figure about to be skewered by Eanatum's lance,
who is possibly identified in the inscription as the "king of Kish" (PI 37), whom
i he oracular dream promises "must abandon Umma" and "cannot support
Umma". The stele thus nicely illustrates how oracular dreams, divine intervention,
and actual combat were all inextricably intertwined in Sumerian warfare.
Other artistic sources
Additional Early Dynastic martial art supplements the more famous Standard of Ur
and Stele of the Vultures. Most of the martial art of the Early Dynastic period
often does not have sufficient chronological context to be attributed to a specific
ruler or dynasty All of the art exhibits similar styles and themes. These sources are
important to help us avoid interpreting Sumerian martial art based only on the
artistically most famous and most frequently reproduced items - in other words,
generalizing from limited examples. Some very fragmentary figures from Kish
(AFC §48—9) show close parallels with similar scenes from contemporary Mari and
I hi. i (sec pp. 241-8), which allows us to fill in some conceptual gaps.
In scenes of close-grappling melee combat, either with humans, animals, or
mytliK monsters, the preferred melee weapons include the mace (FI §79), short
>w
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
thrusting spear (or javelin) held overhand (FI §61, §78, §942), the axe, and the
dagger, held either overhand (FI §83, §758; AAM §46) or underhand (FI §837). In
one scene a warrior has grabbed his enemy by the hair and is thrusting his dagger
into his neck (FI §837). Wrestling and boxing are also depicted as sports (AM §46;
AANE §437; AAM §48). The bow is occasionally shown (FI §758, §933; ME 110;
AFC §99), indicating its use in this period even though absent from the Standard
of Ur and the Stele of the Vultures. Several scenes also show javelins used from
boats for hunting (FI §695-7; FI §934); presumably they would have been used in
river warfare as well (AMM §44).
A number of Early Dynastic maceheads were dedicated as temple offerings,
indicating the continued use of that weapon. 23 One example has four carved lion-
heads projecting out of the sides of the mace (AAM §38), which may be related to
lion-headed maces which kings said they dedicated to the gods. 24 The mace was
possibly considered the premier royal weapon of the Sumerians. From Gudea's
dynasty at Lagash alone we have twenty-nine surviving votive maceheads (E3/
1:225—6 for catalog list). Based on archaeological evidence alone, we would con-
clude that the stone mace was the major weapon of the Sumerians. However,
these maces may reflect the continuation of traditional ritual use of the mace -
rather like a royal scepter (AM §65) — rather than its use it combat. The priority of
the mace in ritual did not necessarily translate into its priority in combat, where it
seems to have largely been replaced by the axe, as found in the artistic and textual
sources. In the Stele of the Vultures the god Ningirsu still wields a mace, while all
humans on the terrestrial battlefield use axes (AM §66-7; cf SDA 169). This
emphasizes that caution needs to be used when trying to reconstruct combat
weapon-use from archaeological evidence alone. What gets preserved in the
archaeological evidence is often based not on what weapons were used in combat,
but on what weapons were used in rituals, in temple dedications, or in tombs.
Enanatum I {c. 2425-2405} 25
Upon the death of Eanatum he was succeeded by his brother Enanatum I
Urluma, king of Umma, the son of Enakale who had been humiliated in the wars
with Lagash, took the opportunity afforded by the succession to attempt to regain
the disputed land:
Urluma, ruler of Umma, recruited foreigners [as mercenaries] 26 and trans-
gressed the boundary channel of [the god] Ningirsu, [saying]: "Antasura is
mine! I shall exploit its produce!" [The god Ningirsu] spoke angrily [through
a prophetic oracle]: "Urluma . . . has marched on my very own field. He must
not do violence against Enanatum, my mighty male!' Enanatum beat back
Urluma. (PI 47-8)
Urluma's rebellion against the hegemony of Lagash was apparently not the only
one, for a later inscription informs us that the gods "granted kim-Jnp «>l I .iv.ish to
r,(i
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
I nanatum, put all foreign lands [Elam, northern Mesopotamia] in his control, and
i the rebellious lands [of Sumer] at his feet" (PI 51). Thus, though the details are
not known, it appears that Enanatum faced a serious rebellion upon his succession;
lit' claims to have retained control over Sumer, but if so, it was quite tenuous.
Enmetena {c. 2405-2385} (PI 54-68)
nine of Enanatum's claims may have been prop agandis tic hyperbole (RH 30-1),
for the war between Umma and Lagash continued. The conflict erupted over the
ii lure of Umma to pay the grain tribute that had been established by earlier
I i cities:
When, because of [Umma's failure to deliver] that barley, he [Enanatum I]
sent envoys to him [Urluma], having them say to him, "You must deliver my
barley!" Urluma spoke haughtily with him: "[The] Antasura [agricultural
zone] is mine, it is my territory!" he said. He levied the Ummaites and for-
eign [mercenaries] were dispatched there. At the [battle of the] Ugiga-field,
the beloved field of [the god] Ningirsu, Ningirsu destroyed the Ummaite
army. (PI 77)
More details are provided in the inscription of Enmetena, son and successor to
I nanatum I:
Enanatum, [father of Enmetena and] ruler of Lagash, fought with him
[Urluma of Umma] in the Ugiga-field, the field of Ningirsu. Enmetena,
beloved son of Enanatum, [commanding the army of Lagash], defeated him
| Urluma]. He [Urluma] had abandoned sixty teams of asses on the bank of the
Lumagirnunta-canal, and left the bones of their personnel strewn over the
plain. He [Enmetena] made burial mounds in five places there for them. (PI
55, 77)
I Ins inscription has a number of interesting features. It states that Enanatum
I I night with Urluma, but does not mention a victory. Rather, his son Enmetena is
ikI to have defeated Urluma. This can be understood in one of two ways. Either
I nanatum fought Urluma and was defeated, after which Enmetena took revenge,
< M that Enanatum declared the war but was too old to fight, and the actual battle
is fought by his son Enmetena (RH 29-30). Whatever the actual events, this
i n< i do nt reminds us of an important characteristic of ancient Near Eastern
inscriptions. A king never writes an inscription or raises a monument in which he
idmits defeat. Since, due to the vagaries of archaeological preservation and dis-
( i Any, we lack inscriptions from Umma's side of this war, the conflict appears at
Inst glance to be nothing more than an endless succession of brilliant victories by
1 aj'.ash on hestrated hy die god Ningirsu. The reality was obviously quite different,
limird .it hv tlif la* t thai Enanatum is said to have fouirht Urluma, but not to have
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
defeated him. The other interesting item in this inscription is the mention of the cap-
ture of "sixty teams of asses", meaning, presumably, sixty teams for war-carts. The
implications of this for Sumerian war-cart warfare are discussed in Chapter Five.
In the aftermath of the battle, Urluma escaped. The army of Tagash followed
the fleeing king to the walls of Umma, where Enmetena "sent [envoys to Umma,
saying]: 'Be it known that [Umma] will be completely destroyed! Surrender!' " (PI
85). Urluma apparently refused to surrender and was overthrown and killed in a
coup. He was replaced by II, a priest of the temple at Zabala, who usurped the
throne. Umma apparently made peace thereafter, but the underlying conflict over
the disputed agricultural and water rights continued, with Enmetena prevailing (PI
55). Most of Enmetena's other inscriptions deal with temple building or other
ritual activities. He does mention that he "built a fortress along the Sala- [canal] in
the Gu'edena [agricultural zone], and named it 'Building-that-Surveys-the-Plain'
for him. He built: a wall for the Girsu ferry terminal" (PI 67). These were watch-
towers and provincial fortifications designed to observe and protect against troops
or raiders from Umma.
Enmetena's control over other parts of Sumer was likewise weakened. A
building report mentions that
He [Enmetena] cancelled [labor and tribute?] obligations for the citizens of
Uruk, Larsa and Patibira. He restored [the first] to [the goddess] Inana 's con-
trol at Uruk, he restored [the second] to [the god] Utu's control at Larsa, and
he restored [the third] to [the god] Lugalemush's control at the Emush [temple
in Patibira]. (RH 31)
The obvious import of this inscription is that there were certain obligations of
labor or resources that these city-states had been required to make, but that
Enmetena "restored" them to the city-states. The implication here is that his
hegemony over these city-states was lost, at least to some degree. This is confirmed,
by another text which states that "Enmetena ruler of Lagash and Lugalkiginedudu,
ruler of Uruk, established brotherhood" (RH 31). "Brotherhood" here implies
peaceful relations, but more specifically, independent equal kings called themselves
"brothers". Whereas his uncle Eanatum had "defeated Uruk" (PI 41—2) and
established hegemony over the city, Uruk is now regarded as a fully independent
equal of Lagash, whose obligations of labor and tribute were "restored". This may
hint at the initial military victory by Uruk which laid the foundation for the rise of
that city to predominance under subsequent rulers (see pp. 63-6). Thus, under
Enmetena, the hegemony of Lagash which had been established by Eanatum was
beginning to be undermined.
En-entarzi {c. 2367-2350}
Unfortunately we know almost nothing of the military histon oi I agasli during
the next forty years {c. 2385— 2343 }. 2S The vague i i n)i * .nil »ii' •*. h.iv< pomt to the
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
decreasing military might of Lagash. There is a brief account that during the reign
M En-entarzi {c. 2373-2360} 600 Elamites raided the land of Lagash, but they
ere intercepted and captured by local troops.
Luenna, the sanga [temple administrator], fought with 600 Elamites who were
carrying off booty from Lagash to Elam. He defeated the Elamites and [took]
560 Elamites [prisoner] — They are in Eninmar. He [Luenna] recovered five
vessels of pure silver, twenty [. . .] five royal garments, and fifteen hides.
(KS 331)
lich raids and counter-raids were probably not uncommon in Early Dynastic
iumer, but records of such events have rarely survived. The fact that this raid was
fealt with by the local commander probably points to a military system in Lagash
I if was still relatively strong. On the other hand, the fact that the raid occurred at
ill, and that there is no record of a retaliatory attack by Lagash against Elam,
obably points to the declining prestige and overall military strength of Lagash
i' nig these decades.
Uru'inimgina (Urukagina) {c. 2 343-23 3 S} 29
i lie growing weakness of Lagash is emphasized by the fact that its last king of this
period, Uru'inimgina, was a usurper: "Ningirsu . . . granted the kingship of Lagash
to Uru'inimgina, selecting him from among the myriad people; [Uru'inimgina]
replaced the customs of former times" (PI 71); this implies that there was a period
of social anarchy at the time (PI 74-5). The disorders and weakness of Lagash
increased the threat of outside intervention, causing Uru'inimgina to "[re]build
die- wall of [the city of] Girsu" (PI 70). But this was a case of too little too late. The
Mr names 30 on several tablets mention sieges of Lagash by "the leader of Uruk"
n the fourth {2340} and sixth years {2338} of Uru'inimgina (RH 34), for a new
■I cat warlord had arisen who in one terrible day would erase the century-and-a-
half of domination of Lagash over Umma.
The Second and Third Dynasties of Uruk {2410-2316}
1 he power vacuum created by the declining military strength of Lagash in the
tuenty-fourth century was filled by Uruk, ruled by the epic hero Gilgamesh three
hundred years earlier. Lugalkiginedudu (Lugaikinishedudu) {c. 2410-2390} seems
i" have initiated the revival of fortunes for Uruk by becoming king of both Uruk
ii i.l nearby Ur. It is not clear if he took Ur by force, but the impression from the
mm points to some type of diplomatic union of the states (PI 101-3): "[The god]
\n, king of all lands, and [goddess] Inana, queen of [the temple] Eana, Lugalk-
igmcdudu, king of Kish - when Inana combined lordship with kingship for
I ugalkiginediulu, he exercised lordship in Uruk and kingship in Ur" (PI 102). In
tins text lie also (Linus the title "king of Kish", which the kings of Lagash had
63
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
ceased using. If not pure hyperbole, this probably implies some type of hegemony
in Sumer for Uruk.
We have no military records for the next two kings of Uruk, Lugalkisalsi
{c. 2390-2375} (PI 103-4) and Urzage {c. 2375-2360} (PI 104). However, they
retained the dual monarchy of Uruk and Ur (PI 103), and Urzage, at least, con-
tinued his claim to be "king of Kish" (PI 104), pointing to ongoing predominance
of Uruk during the early twenty-fourth century. The fourth king of Uruk,
Enshakushana {c. 2360—2340} (PI 104—6) spread Uruk hegemony into northern
Sumer with a campaign against Kish and Anshak.
For [the god] Enlil, [divine] king of all lands, Enshakushana, lord of Sumer
and king of the nation [of the Sumerians] — when the gods commanded him,
he sacked Kish and captured Enbi'ishtar, king of Kish. [He defeated] the lea-
der of Akshak and the leader of Kish, having sacked their cities [. . .] [He]
dedicated the statues [of the gods of Akshak and Kish], their precious
metals and lapis lazuli, their timber and treasure to [the god] Enlil at Nippur.
(PI 105)
According to this inscription, Enshakushana conquered Kish and Akshak (near
Baghdad) in northern Sumer; his offerings at the temple of Nippur implied some
type of alliance or suzerainty over that city as welL Taken as a whole, control of
Ur, Uruk, Nippur, Kish, and Akshak gave Enshakushana power over western,
central and northern Sumer. This left only Lagash in the south-east still outside of
the domination of Uruk. Lagash became the target of the last and greatest of the
warlords of Uruk, Lugalzagesi.
Lugalzagesi (Lugalzaggissi) {2340-2316} 31
Lugalzagesi was the son of king U'u of Umma, and great-grandson of II, who had
usurped the throne from Urluma after his disastrous defeat at the battle of the
Ugiga-field (see p. 62). Before becoming king of Umma, Lugalzagesi had been an
important priest of Nisaba, patron goddess of Umma (PI 94). His relationship to
the city of Uruk is somewhat mysterious; he claims he was "brought up by Nin-
girim the mistress of Uruk" (PI 94), perhaps implying an intimate relationship
with the city from his youth. It is probable that he became king of Uruk through
marriage or some type of peaceful acquisition, rather than by war (RH 34). In his
major royal inscription he lists "king of Uruk" (PI 94) as his first title, and he is
called king of Uruk, not Umma, in the Sumerian King-list (KS 330). This would
imply that the sieges by the "king of Uruk" against Lagash and Girsu mentioned in
several year names were undertaken by Lugalzagesi himself, and are the same
events as the sieges described in the Uru 'inimgina inscription. By combining the
city-state of Ur with the kingdom of Uruk, which had conquered most of Sumer
under the previous kings, Lugalzagesi was master of all Sun in e\< epi the old dual
city-state of Lagash-Girsu, to which he turned his attention
f, I
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
The initial attacks by Lugalzagesi against Lagash were unsuccessful. A frag-
mentary inscription describes these initial campaigns. "He [Lugalzagesi] besieged
I .irsu [the second major city of the kingdom of Lagash]. Uru'inimgina battled him
tnd [drove him off] at [Girsu's] wall. [. . .] He [Lugalzagesi] returned to his city
[1 Imma], but came a second time [to attack Girsu]" (PI 78). The year names also
i nention at least three failed sieges against Lagash by the "king of Uruk", pre-
iimably Lugalzagesi (RH 34).
Although the details are not known, around 2335 Lugalzagesi inflicted a
i ushing defeat against Lagash, in which he sacked and destroyed the city. We have
I poetic lament by a priest of Lagash who witnessed the final destruction of
Ins city.
[Lugalzagesi] the leader of Umma set fire to the Ekibira [temple]. He set fire
to the Antasura [temple] and bundled off its precious metals and lapis-lazuli.
He plundered the palace of Tirash, he plundered the Abzubanda [temple], he
plundered the chapels of [the gods] Enlil and Utu. He plundered the Ahush
[temple] and carried off its precious metals and lapis-lazuli. (PI 78-9)
I lie account goes on in this vein, describing the desecration and plundering of
mother dozen shrines. The priest-scribe making this account was in a sense
rearing a judicial record of the crimes and sacrilege of Lugalzagesi, and ends his
l< count with a prayer and curse:
The leader of Umma [Lugalzagesi], having sacked Lagash, has committed a sin
against Ningirsu. The hand which he [Lugalzagesi] has raised against him
[Ningirsu] will be cut off! It is not [because of] a sin of Uru'inimgina, king of
Girsu [that Lagash was sacked] ! May Nisaba, the god of Lugalzagesi, ruler of
Umma, make him [Lugalzagesi] bear the sin [for plundering the temples of
the gods]! [PI 79]
In a sense this bitter prayer was answered, for Lugalzagesi would eventually himself
R defeated and overthrown by Sargon of Akkad; if the scribe who wrote this
iirsc lived to see that day he undoubtedly rejoiced and praised his gods.
liut the day of retribution was not to come for another twenty years, which
ere filled with triumph upon triumph for Lugalzagesi. Using the plunder and
lives from the sack of Lagash, Lugalzagesi was able to muster an even stronger
u my for a series of campaigns over the next two decades. If he was not already
king of Uruk in 2335, he became such within the next few years and seems to
I i.ivc moved his capital there, using "king of Uruk" as his principle title.
I hiving thus conquered the last independent city-state of Sumer, Lugalzagesi
■ i.imied the title of high king of Kish.
When |ihe high god| Enlil, [divine] king of all the lands, gave to Lugalzagesi
the kingship ol the nation |of Simier|, |iiiii!| directed all the eyes [of the other
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
rulers of the] land [of Sumer] toward him [Lugalzagesi, in obedience], put all
the lands at his feet [in submission], from east to west made them subject to
him. (PI 94)
Here we see that, in typical Sumerian fashion, it is the gods who decided to grant
Lugalzagesi supreme kingship in Sumer. Later in the inscription Lugalzagesi lists
the Sumerian cities that "rejoice" under his kingship. It; presumably lists his con-
quests or vassal states, and includes Uruk, Ur, Larsa, Umma, Zabala, Kidingir, and
Nippur (PI 94). Lagash and Girsu, though conquered by Lugalzagesi, are notably
absent from the list - perhaps there was little rejoicing in those devastated cities.
With Sumer fully secure, Lugalzagesi turned his attention to the Semitic-
speaking lands to the north, campaigning along both the Tigris and Euphrates
rivers:
Then, from the Lower Sea [Persian Gulf], along the Tigris and Euphrates to
the Upper [Mediterranean] Sea, he [the god Enlil] put their routes in good
order for [Lugalzagesi 's armies to march, and for communication and trade].
From east to west Enlil permitted him no rival; under him the lands rested
contentedly, the people made merry, and the suzerains of [the various vassal
city-states of] Sumer, and the rulers of other lands [along the Tigris and
Euphrates] conceded sovereignty to him [Lugalzagesi] at Uruk. (PI 94)
Some scholars doubt the historicity of Lugalzagesi 's conquests outside of Sumer,
attributing the inscription to royal hyperbole. It is true that there is little con-
firming evidence for his conquests, although the city of Mari was sacked twice
during this period, which could be attributed to campaigns by Lugalzagesi and
later by Sargon (CAH 1/2:331). On the other hand, there is nothing inherently
improbable about Lugalzagesi being able to campaign up the Tigris and Euphrates.
After all, Sargon and his successors would do the same a few decades later. Meso-
potamian armies of this time had the capacity to campaign over distances of several
hundred miles. The lack of confirming evidence is probably due to the fact that
Lugalzagesi was overthrown by Sargon shortly after his Tigris and Euphrates
campaigns, leaving him no time to consolidate these fresh conquests. In a sense
Lugalzagesi 's campaigns of the unification of Sumer paved the way for the rise of
Sargon. By undermining the independent military strength of each individual
Sumerian city-state, Lugalzagesi made it possible for Sargon to take all of Sumer by
one great military victory — the defeat of Lugalzagesi himself, as will be chronicled
in the next chapter.
The sickle-sword
..
Yadin, followed by many subsequent scholars, believed that the so called "sickle-
sword" originated in Mesopotamia in the twenty-fourth ccntm\ I sec several
phases of development of this weapon, with the classn su k h i "ur, <>nl\
r,(,
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
in the Middle Bronze Age. The earliest evidence we have of a possible sickle-
. word-style weapon comes from Early Dynastic Mesopotamia {2900—2300} (MW
1 : 143). An Early Dynastic fragment of sculpture from Telloh shows a man with a
ickle-like weapon on his shoulder (AM §44a; AW 1:136; see Figure 2a). This
\ capon was also known in Early Dynastic Syria, where a cylinder seal depicts a
i ii, in slaying a lion and a bull with a javelin wielded overhand in his right hand and
i sickle-shaped weapon in his left hand (FI §78). There are two questions about
these weapons: are they made from copper/bronze or wood? Do they have a
1 1 1 ting edge or were they used as clubs? There is insufficient evidence give us a
i ertain answer. As discussed below, I suspect that these Early Dynastic weapons
represent fighting clubs, essentially the same as the similar weapons found in Egypt
\W 1:158-9, 166-7; see p. 426).
The next example of a possible Early Dynastic sickle-sword comes from the
famous "Stele of Vultures" of king Eanatum of Lagash {c. 2440 (see Figure l)}. 33
I I ere, however, the ambiguities are only increased. King Eanatum is shown in two
different scenes holding the same curved sickle-like object. In the top scene the
upper portion of the object is missing, while in the bottom scene the upper por-
tion is partially defaced. The main oddity of this weapon is that it is clearly shown
I I being composed of (at least) three separate parallel pieces. A first glance this
feature might seem to be ribbing on the metal, as is found in some depictions of
i i;',gers. But the object seems to be bound together in at least two places with thin
popes. Since copper/bronze objects were invariably cast as a single piece, it seems
mlikely that the artist was trying to depict a metal sickle-sword, or at least not of
i he classical type found in the Middle Bronze period. None of the other soldiers in
i Ins scene are carrying this type of object. While it is possible that this object was a
u kle-sword, there is clearly ambiguity here. It may, in fact, be a scepter rather
ih. in a weapon; an image of an enthroned deity from the Early Dynastic period
hows the god holding both a mace and a curved club-like object in his left hand,
•Inch broadly resemble the proposed early sickle swords (AM §65; cf. FI 821).
\uother possibility is that Eanatum's weapon is actually a whip used to goad the
Cquids in the chariot, such as is clearly depicted in several chariot scenes; 34 the
most clear comparison is to an Old Babylonian scene (WV §31),
The case against Eanatum's weapon being a sickle-sword is bolstered by the fact
I i.ii the type of object held by Eanatum disappears during the subsequent Akkadian
i ml Ur III periods {2300-2000}. If this object is the ancestor of the classic Middle
Bronze sickle-sword, why does it disappear during the Akkadian period? Instead,
the Akkadian sickle-sworcl-like weapon is clearly a type of axe. The haft and the
lade of the Akkadian weapon would be about 60-75 cm long, judging by its
proportion to the body - when the tip is resting on the ground the edge of the
h iMille reaches to about the lower hip (FI §540, §781; see Figure 2c— e). The haft is
ntnpletely straight until the last foot or so, which has a slight curve to it. A broad
in tangular axe blade is fastened to the upper curved part of the haft; the wooden
h.iti sometimes extends beyond the upper edge of the axe blade (FI §567, §781).
the in i.iniMiLtt axe Made seems to he epsilon shaped (FI §781; see Figure 2b— c).
<
(a)
(b)
(c)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(d)
(e)
(f)
0)
(k)
(1)
Figure 2 Early and Middle Bronze Age weapons (drawings by Michael Lyon)
(a) Warrior with throwing or fighting stick, similar in form to later "sickle
swords" {c. 3000} (Relief from Telloh; Louvre AO 2350); see AM §44a.
(b) Akkadian stele of warrior carrying a sheathed dagger on a belt in his right
hand; an Akkadian war-axe showing the shape of the head and rivets is
sheathed in his belt, partially obscured by a sash {23C}; (Iraq Museum 59205)
see AM §119.
(c) Uruk: Neo-Sumerian god with war- axe in age of Shulgi {21 C} (British
Museum, 116719); see FI §781.
(d) Mari: The goddess Ishtar holding a curved axe in her left hand; colored mural
from the Palace of Zimri-Lim, "The Investiture of the king by Ishtar" {18C}
(Louvre); see SDA §346.
(e) Cylinder seal from Mari showing a god carrying a classic "sickle-sword"
standing on a prostrate enemy {18C} (Louvre AO 21 988); see FI §191.
(f) Classic "sickle-sword" from Abydos, Egypt {19CJ (Museum of the Oriental
Institute, Chicago); see AW 1:172b.
(g) Narrow-bladed "chisel" axe from Ras Shamra, Syria (Louvre); see MW
2:276, §418.
(h) Middle Kingdom Egyptian semi-circular axe; see EWW §23c.
(i) Middle Kingdom Egyptian broad-bladed axe (British Musuem); see AW
1:154.
(j) Middle Bronze Age broad-bladed dagger from Tel Rehov, Israel; see MW
2:434, §628.
(k) Broad spearhead from Serrin, Syria (Oxford, Ashmolean Museum); see MW
2:315, §47.
(1) Spiked javelin head from Khirbet el-Krimil, Israel (Jerusalem, Hebrew Union
College); see MW 2:336, §156.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
In a badly damaged relief of Sargon in a victory procession, he is followed by
several attendants carrying what seem to be this type of "sickle-axe". 35 The clearest
example of this weapon comes from a fragment of an Akkadian relief from Nasriyeh
showing courtiers bringing tribute. In the upper-right-hand portion of this relief a
soldier escorting prisoners is carrying a clearly depicted version of this axe (ME 108).
In the lower-left section another man holds a sheathed bronze dagger in one hand,
and a vase in the other. Inside his belt is a rectangular sickle-axe, about 75 cm long
in proportion to his body (AAM 137; see Figure 2b). The sickle-axe is partially
obscured by a sash, but enough of the top remains to show that the upper portion
of the haft is partially curved and the haft extends beyond the top of the blade, just
as in the other examples. Another clear example can be found in the twentieth-
century relief of Anubanini in Iran (ME 20; PAE 319). The axehead is riveted to
the metal bands which encircle the haft. I will call this weapon the "rectangular
sickle-axe". I believe what occurred is that during the Akkadian period a rectan-
gular axe blade was bolted to the curved scepter-club of the Early Dynastic period,
representing the first step in the evolution towards the classic sickle-sword.
At around 2000 the form of the Akkadian-style rectangular sickle-axe splits into
two different forms of the weapon: the Babylonian curved sickle-axe, and the
classic sickle-sword. The Babylonian version probably originated as a shift in the
form of the axe blade from the original Akkadian rectangular blade to a semi-circular
curved version of the sickle-axe found on Neo-Sumerian and early Old Babylo-
nian cylinder seals (AW 1:150; AAM §138; FI §167, §772). The difference is
subtle, but noticeable, and is transitional to the Babylonian curved sickle-axe. The
Babylonian-style "curved sickle-axe" is held in precisely the same way in precisely
the same ritual contexts as the Akkadian "rectangular sickle-axe". In some of the
depictions it is possible to see that the blade of the curved sickle-axe is quite clearly
a separate object from the wooden haft - they are not a single piece of cast bronze
(SDA §383, 384; FI §538). The best examples of this come from the remarkable
murals at the palace of Zimri-Lim in Mari {c. 1765 (Figure 2d)}. Here the war-
goddess Ishtar holds a sickle-axe in her hand; the painting shows the curved
wooden haft in one color, to which is attached a different colored crescent-shaped
axe blade, on the top of the haft (SDA 279; AW 1:172). Overall the weapon has
the distinctive curve of the Old Babylonian sickle-axe. Another mural from the
palace shows the war-goddess with three hafted weapons in a quiver on her back -
a mace, an axe, and a curved sickle-axe, again with distinctive colors for the haft
and blade (SDA 282-3). 36
The other line of development from the Akkadian rectangular sickle-axe leads
to the classic Middle Bronze sickle-sword, found in both art and archaeology 37 A
very clear cylinder seal from A4ari {1765} shows the new-style sickle-sword with
precisely the features of the surviving archaeological examples of the classic sickle
sword, but depicted in the same ritual context of the earlier Akkadian sickle-axe
(FI §191; Figure 2e). Ritually speaking, in depictions of royal and divine icono
graphy, the weapon was the same, even though the actual lm m <>l the weapon had
gone through several transformations. In the classit mi kle '.umil the blade is
"I"
EARLY DYNASTIC MESOPOTAMIA
tally rectangular (like the Akkadian sickle-axe). Essentially someone seems to
1 1\ v taken the Akkadian rectangular sickle-axe, and cast the entire thing in bronze,
ilt and blade, while retaining the original axe-like form. As with the Akkadian
I (angular sickle-axe and the Babylonian curved sickle-axe, the sharp blade of the
ipon occupies only the upper third, betraying its origin from the axehead.
I rom surviving archaeological examples we can see that the classic sickle-sword
j >i the distinctive quasi-rectangular form of the blade which was modeled after the
Akkadian rectangular sickle-axe. Thus the Akkadian sickle-axe diverged into two
I liferent forms in the Middle Bronze Age: the curved sickle-axe, and the classic
I le-sword. The curved sickle-axe continued the original curvature of the haft,
It kept the wooden haft and metal blade of the original. It seems likely that the
ickl e- u sword" is actually a version of the axe, where the original wooden haft and metal
Made are combined together and cast in a single piece. This would have served to
lease breakage both of the haft and of the joint between haft and blade. The
eapon also invariably appears only in royal and ritual contexts in both artistic and
I laeological evidence. It is quite probably an elite or royal weapon (MW 1 : 170-1).
I Hiring the Middle Bronze Age the new sickle-sword spread rapidly through-
ni the Near East, appearing in Elam, Syria, Canaan, and eventually Egypt. 38
I ".vpt seems to have been the last region to acquire the weapon. It doesn't appear
in Middle Kingdom Egyptian art, making it likely that the weapon was initially
U quired by Egyptians through trade or plunder from Canaan. There is mention of
'iiiity-three "scimitars" - literally "reaping implements" (ECI 79 n49) - taken as
plunder in Syria during the reign of Amenemhet II {1929-1895}. Presumably
these are versions of the sickle-swords found in the royal tombs ofByblos in Syria
Kid Shechem in Canaan during this period. The weapon does not seem to have
1 teen manufactured in Egypt until the New Kingdom, when it frequently appears
in a modified form as the Egypt khopesh (hps) y or scimitar, where the haft of the
weapon is reduced to about one third and the blade extended to two thirds (AW
1:206-7; FP 51).
Warfare in Early Dynastic Elam {2900-2334} 39
Although ethnically distinct and speaking their own language, the Elamites had in
many ways been integrated economically and culturally with Sumer during the
I talk expansion of the late fourth millennium. These bonds remained strong
i hroughout the Early Dynastic period, during which we also have our first records
M warfare between Elam and Sumer. In the Susa III phase of Elamite history
13100-2700}, the early cultural predominance of Uruk expansion-style material
i ulture is replaced by pottery and art styles derived from the eastern highlands of
1 .us and I iirisran. Some speculate that this might be associated with the movement
"I nomadic lughlanders into Elam, perhaps associated with "Awan", a name in
Suinerian records for northern Elam (PAE 88-9, 97-8).
An ' ■lamite kingdom, with its capital at Snsa and encompassing south-western
ban flourished during the Early l)ynasti< oi Proro Elamite period (PAE 71-84;
I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
EA 5:106-10). The precise boundaries and nature of this state are uncertain.
Cultural influence from Elam, including pottery styles and proto-Elamite tablets,
are found throughout much of south-western and central Iran, indicating wide-
spread cultural influence and merchant activity. In some ways, the Elamites
became the suppliers for overland trade to Sumer for lapis lazuli, tin, and other
Iranian products. How much political or military influence Elam might have
exerted in other parts of Iran is unknown.
Militarily, all we know of Elam during the Early Dynastic period derives from
incidental references in Sumerian texts. The Sumerian King-list states that "Ur
was defeated in battle and its kingship carried off to Awan" (KS 329) - either a
city-state in Elam or an alternate Sumerian name for the region as a whole. Its
location in the King-list would place the event in late Early Dynastic II, perhaps
around 2550. Assuming there is some historicity to this claim, it would imply a
major Elamite invasion of Sumer - perhaps Awan highlanders - which may have
resulted in the vassalage of one or more Sumerian city-states to the Elamites (PAE
88). Shortly thereafter, perhaps 2525, Enna'il, King of Kish, claims to have "van-
quished Elam", probably ending this vassalage (PI 21).
The major recorded wars of earliest Elamite history are with Eanatum of
Lagash, who mentions campaigns in Elam a number of times in his inscriptions (PI
37 ? 41-44; PAE 89). Lagash, on the south-east edge of the Mesopotamian flood-
plain, was the closest Sumerian city-state to Elam, and had the most frequent
economic relations with it (PAE 91). Eanatum claims to have defeated Elam, "the
mountainous land of timber and treasure" (PI 37), and "made burial mounds" in it
(PI 41). The details are elusive, but economic texts from Lagash in subsequent
decades show extensive trade in grain, spices, wood, and silver (PAE 91). It is
possible that Lagash exercised some type of suzerainty over Elam during the late
twenty-fifth century.. Arrowheads, daggers, and a four-wheeled chariot were dis-
covered in excavations at Susa dating to roughly this time (PAE 95), indicating the
movement of Sumerian war-cart technology into the region by the twenty-fifth
century. With the decline of Lagash military power beginning around 2400, the
Elamites became independent again, and took to raiding their former suzerains. A
text from about 2360 describes a raid by 600 Elamites into Lagash (KS 331) . It was
undoubtedly only one of many. Thereafter we have no military information on
Elam until the invasion of Sargon of Akkad and his successors in the late twenty
fourth century.
CHAPTER THREE
The Akkadian empire {2334-2190}
nil the rise of the Akkadian empire we see a number of new characteristics
pearing in Mesopotamian military history. 1 First, there is a fundamental shift in
liitary power away from the ethnic Sumerians to Semitic-speaking peoples of
niral and northern Mesopotamia. Second, although a few kings of the Early
nastic period campaigned outside of the confines of Sumer itself, for the most
ii i the military history of the Early Dynastic period focused on struggles among rival
inierian city-states. With the rise of Akkad, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Elam are
integrated into one diplomatic and political system. Third, the Akkadian warlords
i induced new policies of destroying the walls of conquered cities to eliminate
ii capacity to rebel, and of installing Akkadian governors in conquered cities
1 1 iit than keeping the indigenous kings as vassals (R2:l 1-12), who presumably were
Ipported by Akkadian garrisons. Thus, rather than trying to establish himself as
gemon over rival vassal kings who had been defeated, Sargon deposed those
s and took direct rule over an empire administered by appointed governors.
The origins of the Akkadian empire are obscured by lack of sources, and by
tny late legendary accounts. The site of Sargon's capital at Akkad is unknown,
i (>ugh there is a general consensus that it was probably located in the region of
- dern Baghdad at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates (EA 1:41-4). The
ntual discovery of this site may produce additional information about the
I idian Empire from tablets and monuments. Before the rise of Sargon, Akkad
i' I never played an important political or military role in Mesopotamia.
Sargon (Sharrukin) {2334-2279} 2
ItCi preting the military career of Sargon is complicated both because most of his
i iptions lack chronological data, and because of the large number of legends
lih h grew up about him, making it sometimes difficult to distinguish between
ibtory and legend. In this section I will mainly use contemporary sources written
tin mg the lifetime of Sargon or his immediate successors.
II the later legends are to be believed, Sargon was a usurper of the throne. He
'. r,.in his career as the dependent ruler of Akkad under the hegemony of his
\. iloul I Ii /aluha, king of Kish, whom legend claims he served as cup-bearer
13
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
(KS 330). He may have been installed as governor of Akkad by Ur-Zababa. In his
early reign 3 he rebelled against Ur-Zababa, perhaps after the latter had been wea-
kened and his authority undermined in wars with Lugalzagesi of Uruk. Sargon
successfully secured his independence, defeating several subsequent rulers of Kish
during his early reign, and finally conquering the city of Kish itself. This early phase
of his career, centering on the struggle with Kish for independence and pre-
dominance in central Mesopotamia, apparently lasted from 2334 to around 2320.
With his position in Akkad and central Mesopotamia finally secure, Sargon
faced an even greater challenge. While Sargon was struggling with Kish, Lugalza-
gesi of Uruk had risen to prominence in Sumer and even campaigned up the
Euphrates and Tigris (see pp. 64-6). It seems likely that, during some part of
Sargon's early reign, he was in some sense a vassal of Lugalzagesi - though the royal
inscriptions of Sargon would of course never admit such a thing. Sargon's conquest
of Kish was probably viewed by Lugalzagesi as an upstart vassal taking too much
power. War broke out (R2:9— 22, 31), and at the battle of Uruk {c. 2316}, Sargon
defeated the army of Uruk, including "fifty governors" or vassal rulers of Lugal-
zagesi; one suspects that some of Lugalzagesi s vassals may have deserted him at a
key moment in the battle, hoping his defeat would allow them independence, not
realizing, of course, that Sargon was ultimately a greater threat to their indepen-
dence than Lugalzagesi. Sargon claims to have personally captured the aging king
Lugalzagesi (R2:16, 21), and to have led him captive in triumph to the Gate of
Enlil at Akkad.
Sargon, king of Akkad, steward of the goddess Ishtar, king of the world,
anointed priest of the god Anum, lord of the land, governor [on earth] for the
god Enlil, was victorious over Uruk in battle, conquered fifty governors [of
Lugalzagesi] with the [divine] mace of the god Ilaba, as well as the city of
Uruk, and destroyed [Uruk's] walls. Further, he captured Lugalzagesi, king of
Uruk, in battle [and] led him off to the gate of the god Enlil in a neck stock.
(R2:13) 4
Sargon forced his royal captive to watch the erection of a victory stele (R2:15);
Lugalzagesi 's ultimate fate is uncertain, but presumably he was executed, as was the
Akkadian custom with captured kings: Naram-Sin "captured three kings and
brought [them] before the god Enlil", after which they were apparently executed.
Other captured kings were marched through cities in triumph, after which they
were executed "before the gods" in their temples (R2:112, 138, 222).
Following his victory over LJruk, Sargon faced a new challenge. The Sumerian
vassal rulers had asserted their independence after the fall of their overlord Lugal-
zagesi to Sargon, requiring him to undertake at least four additional campaigns in
Sumer to secure Lugalzagesi s entire former domain (R2:10— 15).
Sargon, king of Akkad, was victorious over Ur in kittle, iiMiquerrd the cits
and destroyed its walls. He conquered luiinm.ii T ' < I u walls, .uu\
I
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
conquered its districts and Lagash as far as the sea [Persian Gulf]. He washed
his weapons in the sea. He was victorious over Umma in battle, conquered
the city, and destroyed its walls. (R2:14)
I he important after-battle ritual washing of weapons was designed to cleanse them
■•I blood and purify them (HTO 243). When inscriptions describe Sargon's
veapons being washed "in the Upper and Lower Seas" (the Mediterranean and
' rsian Gulf) (R2:ll, 32, 97), it was meant to indicate that Sargon had reached the
nd of the world, and could therefore ritually cleanse his weapons, since there was
nothing left to conquer (R2:ll, 14, 17).
The destruction of the walls of conquered cities, while not unknown before,
became a standard policy under Sargon. Presumably the city walls were not
entirely destroyed, but were left with major breaches or without gates, rendering
i hem indefensible and thereby making rebellion a very dubious proposition. The
{bet that so many cities in the AJckadian empire repeatedly rebelled despite their
ruined city walls is an indicator of the great hatred the conquered people had for
their Akkadian overlords. A related policy undertaken by Sargon was to install loyal
Akkadians as governors of conquered cities rather than allowing conquered kings
|0 remain as vassal rulers: "from the Lower Sea to the Upper Sea citizens of Akkad
beld the governorship [of conquered cities]" (R2:14). Sargon is also sometime
(edited with creating the world's first standing army, based on one of his inscrip-
tions where he claims "5400 men daily eat in the presence of Sargon" (R2:29).
I his passage probably has reference to Sargon's palace establishment rather than an
ictual standing army, and references to ration distribution to ministers, scribes,
•i iests, courtiers, and perhaps even servants at the palace of Akkad. It is quite
hkely that a portion of those 5400 men were in fact the Royal Bodyguard who
brmed a permanent standing army.
The exact chronological order of his subsequent conquests is uncertain, though
* .e can identify four regions where Sargon campaigned: Elam, Subartu (northern
Tigris), Syria, and perhaps south-central Anatolia. With Sumer secure, Sargon
u ned towards a traditional enemy of Mesopotamia, Elam, in south-western Iran. 5
I lis inscriptions describe thirteen cities or regions which he defeated and plun-
< I* -ied, along with capturing a number of governors and generals, including both
"Khishibrasini, king of Elam" and his son Lukh'ish'an. A victory stele erected at
Busa shows Sargon, with thick beard and long hair tied in a braided bun at his
i k, leading prisoners and booty in triumph after his capture of the city. 6 Elam
MRS apparently not permanently subdued, however, for Sargon's son Rimish was
- ompelled to campaign there again (see pp. 78-80).
Sargon also campaigned into northern Mesopotamia (Cl/2:430— 2). A vague
tradition records his victories in Subartu (northern Tigris), where he "defeated
them, cast | their dead bodies] in heaps [of burial mounds], and overthrew their
\\ ulespread host" (C 1/2:430). Nineveh and Ashur, the homeland of the Assyrians,
vveie i learlv ruled by Sargon's successors, and presumably were conquered at this
niin I'he pi ai tit e of piling the < orpses oft lead enemies and burying them on the
fS
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
battlefield is noted in the inscriptions, which seems to have served both as a reli-
gious ritual, and as a victory monument reminding would-be rebels of the price of
defeat (R2:53, 56, 129, 144). For example, "when [Shulgi] destroyed the land of
Kimash and Hurtum, he dug a ditch and heaped up a pile of corpses" (R3/2:141;
E4:387).
Sargon's campaigns up the Euphrates are more clearly documented in his own
inscriptions (R2:12, 15, 28-31). Sargon began his campaign by seeking author-
ization from the gods for his proposed conquest of Syria. At the city of Tuttul in
the middle Euphrates . . .
Sargon, the king, bowed down to the god Dagan in [his temple in the city of]
Tuttul [seeking oracular confirmation for his plan to conquer Syria]. He [the
god Dagan, through an oracular pronouncement] gave to him [Sargon] the
Upper Land [Syria], [including the cities of] Mari, Yarmuti, and Elba as far as
the Cedar Forest [of Lebanon] and the Silver [Taurus] Mountains. (R2:28-9)
Archaeological evidence shows destructions of Mari and Ebla at this period,
probably by the invasion of either Sargon or his grandson Naram-Sin (AS 277-9).
There are also later legendary sources which claim that Sargon invaded south-
central Anatolia and attacked Purushkhanda, in defense of Mesopotamian mer-
chants who were being abused by local rulers. There is no confirmation of this
campaign in contemporary Akkadian sources, but it is not inherently implausible,
since Anatolia was an important source of silver for Mesopotamia, and would
therefore have been an attractive source of plunder for Sargon (Cl/2:426-9).
Overall, Sargon was clearly the greatest Mesopotamian conqueror before the
Assyrian period some 1500 years later. In military terms his achievements are
remarkable:
Sargon, king of the world, was victorious in thirty-four battles. He destroyed
the [city] walls [of his enemies] as far as the shore of [both] the seas. He
moored the ships of Meluhha [Indus Valley], Magan [Oman], and Dilmun
[Bahrain] at the quay of Akkad.. . . 5,400 men daily eat in the presence of
Sargon. (R2:28-29) ... He [the god Enlil] gave to Sargon [all the land from]
the Upper Sea [to] the Lower [Sea]. Sargon [became] king of the [entire |
world. (R2:32)
He created the largest empire the world had yet known, stretching from the
Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean, and encompassing most of modern Iraq and
Syria, and over twice the size in population and land of contemporary Egypt. '
From another perspective, however, Sargon's empire was what we would call
today a humanitarian disaster, for "the god Enlil instructed [Sargon to conquer the
world] and he showed mercy to no one" (R2:32). Tins men iless feature of Sai
gon's conquests, imitated by all his successors, fomented widespm.id hatred foi
Akkadian rulers, creating a constant underlvinr, ihie.u nl nl ' h< u ihejue.il
•f.
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
1 1 lord finally died, his entire empire rose in revolt, only to be further suppressed
mass devastation by his son Rimush (see pp. 78—80).
Sargon as the ideal warrior-king (LKA 57-139)
I lie reality of Sargon the Warlord as unifier of Mesopotamia was amplified by
I'.equent generations. For later Mesopotamians Sargon served as the exemplar of
conquering warlord, a mythic role similar to Alexander's or Caesar's in
mope — two subsequent kings of Assyria took his name, In the past few decades
holars have been able to reconstruct the legendary account of the life of Sargon.
Ii hough the historical value of these texts for understanding Sargon's historic
■II is limited - rather like the Alexander Romance in relation to the historic
lexander — the legends are useful to illuminate the warrior mentality of the age
hough these literary texts cannot necessarily be viewed as reliable history, they
provide narrative detail of a typical rnilitary campaign that is often lacking in
terse and propagandistic royal inscriptions.
.irgon is described as ever eager for war: "Sargon girds his loins with his ter-
ible weapons. In the palace, Sargon opens his mouth. Speaking to his warriors he
lares: 'My warriors! With [the land of] Kanish I desire war!' " (LKA 109—11).
irgon recognizes the logistical and intelligence problems facing his army in
n|>aigning far from Akkad. When his advisors warn him, "The road, O my
rd, that you wish to travel — it is month-long, it is dangerous" (LKA 111—13),
argon summons merchants "who spy out the regions" to provide him with
■ lligence to properly plan for the march (LKA 115-21).
' )ii the eve of battle, Sargon is depicted as giving a speech to his assembled
H Mors, admiring their "courage, strength, vigor [and] heroism" (LKA 63). His
i Mors are compared to "strong bulls" (LKA 67). His champion responds,
I -morrow, Akkad will commence battle. A festival of warriors will be cele-
i ited" (LKA 63). The army is encouraged to act bravely "so the king [Sargon]
ill proclaim you 'My Warrior' and erect your statue in front of his own statue"
I KA 66—7). "My Warrior" may have been a technical term for personal guards.
I he reference here to making monuments commemorating the bravest warriors
I i .impaign may mean that some soldiers depicted along with the king on
Akkadian monuments may represent actual individuals. The soldiers are described
U wearing fine robes adorned with gold (LKA 67—9), perhaps like those depicted
the Alabaster Victory Stele (AM §119; AFC §131). These may be robes of
honor given as another type of reward for heroic soldiers.
Sacrifices, prayers, and divination preceded and followed battle. 8 Armies are
iv ided into center lines and two flanks (LKA 87, 181), and the troops are divided
battalions (kisri) (LKA 65), armed with "maces and copper battleaxes" (LKA
i S, irgon naturally fights in the front ranks (HTO 244-5), and is compared to a
i in battle: ''Was it not because of his frightening radiance and his bellowing
n i li.it no one dared to approach him? I, Sargon, am your raging lion . . . When
hcte is iomb.it. invoke my name!" (I KA W 101). This may be an allusion to
77
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
shouting the king's name as a battle-cry. On another occasion the men shout
"Charge, man against man!" (HTO 37) to launch an attack.
Even after the battle is won, the enemy's capital must be besieged to win the
final victory. Some narrative details of siegecraft are provided:
Sargon undermined [the walls of] the city, broadened the Gate of the Princes,
[he made a breach] two iku [c. 120 meters] wide. He cast it down; in the
highest part of its wall he made a breach; he smote all of his wine-intoxicated
men. Sargon placed his throne before the gate. Sargon opens his mouth,
speaking to his warriors. He declares, "Come on! Nur-Daggal [the enemy
king] ... Let him stir himself. Let him humble himself! Let me behold [him
surrender]." (LKA 123-5)
With his city walls undermined, Nur-Daggal panics and surrenders, negating the
need for an assault into the breach. In victory the Akkadian army strips the
countryside of both humans and animals, leaving the conquered city a heap ol
ruins depopulated for miles around (LKA 71-3, 91).
Rimush {2278-2270} 9
Even during Sargon's lifetime, there were hints of rebellion among the conquered
peoples of Mesopotamia (R2:30; Cl/2:433). It is clear there was substantial dis
satisfaction with Akkadian rule, and upon Sargon's death most of the empire rose
in revolt. Sargon's son and successor Rimush probably spent most of his short reign
trying to keep his empire in one piece. It is difficult to obtain an accurate picture
of the extent and success of these rebellions, since they are only mentioned in the
Akkadian annals after they have been suppressed; successful rebellions are never
discussed.
Rimush recorded a lengthy inscription in which he details his suppression oi
these rebellions. His inscription, however, is highly formulaic, repeating over ami
over that a city revolted, Rimush defeated it, killed and captured a certain number
of men, captured the rebel leaders, and destroyed the walls of the rebellious city.
Here is an example:
Rimush, king of the world, was victorious over Adab and Zabala in battle and
struck down 15,718 men. He took 14,576 captives. Further, he captured
Meskigala, governor at Adab, and Lugalgalzu, governor of Zabala. He con
quered their two cities and destroyed the walls of both of them. Further, ln-
expelled many men from their two cities and annihilated them. (R2:41)
After six campaigns, Rimush had apparently suppressed the rebellion, con
eluding that, like his father, he "[was] king of the [entire| world tin- god Enlil did
indeed grant kingship to him. ... He took aw.iv ihen iniuitr |hom defeated
enemies from| as far as the Lower Sea | Persian < nill| I'
78
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
1 lie inscriptions of Rimush introduce a new element into Akkadian military
i lice: mass slaughter, enslavement, and deportation of defeated enemies, and
Be total annihilation of their cities (R2:42, 44, 46, 48). The policy was that, if a
itv rebelled against the king of Akkad, that city should be utterly destroyed as a
lining to others contemplating revolt. Rebellion against the king was tanta-
mount to rebellion against the gods. Table 3.1 summarizes the casualty reports
iom Rimush s inscriptions, emphasizing the widespread human suffering caused
Akkadian imperialism.
The names of a number of important captured aristocrats are also given,
hiding Kaku, king of Ur (R2:46— 7). Since Ur had been previously captured by
irgon, this would indicate either that he had left Kaku as vassal prince of Ur, or
I ii Kaku restored kingship in Ur as part of the rebellion. Other cities in Sumer
described as being ruled by rebellious "governors" (enst). To the extent that the
ines given by Rimush are not pure fabrications — he repeatedly insists "by the
ods Shamash and Ilaba I swear that [these] are not falsehoods, [but] are indeed
mie", perhaps protesting too much (R2:49, 54, 57-8) - these numbers undoubt-
llv represent casualties among the entire civilian population of the defeated cities,
| idier than just numbers of soldiers. 10 If so, they represent the first evidence for a
w policy of mass destruction as punishment for rebellion, one which will endure
• i several thousand years in the Near East, bearing terrible fruit under the
\ssyrians and Babylonians, and which continues to be practiced by some modern
lit Idle Eastern tyrants who, like the ancient Akkadians, rule with blood and
horror upon the earth.
I laving solidified his rule, Rimush launched a campaign against Parahshum in
I lam, winning a great victory at the battle of the Middle River {c. 2273}, for
• huh we have a detailed description (PAE 103-6; ME 100-2).
Kimush, king of the world, w^as victorious in battle over Abalgamash, king of
Parahshum. Zahara, Elam, [Gupin, and Meluhha,] 11 had assembled in Para-
hshum. for battle, but he [Rimush] was victorious [over them] and struck
down 16,212 men [and] took 4,216 captives. Further, he captured Emahsini,
king of Elam, and all the [nobles?] of Elam. Further, he captured Sidga'u,
general of Parahshum, and Sargapi, general of Zahara, in between [the cities of]
A wan and Susa, by the "Middle River". Further, he heaped up over them a
/.//'/c *. / Summary of enemy casualties from Rimush's campaigns
City
Killed
Captured
Expelled
Source
Lib and Zabala
15,718
14,576
—
R2:41
i Imma and KI.AN
8900
3540
3600
R2:43-4
1 i iinl 1 agasli
8049
5460
5985
R2:45~6
1 Imr kittles in Sinner
11,322
-
14,100
R2:47-8
lIIu
12,052
5862
-
R2:48, 51
' u .I hvhntn (Flam)
16,21 I
4216
-
R2:52
"
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
burial mound in the area of the city. Further, he conquered the cities of Elam,
destroyed their walls, and tore out the foundations of Parahshum from the
land of Elam. [Thereby] Rimush, king of the world, ruled Elam. The god
Enlil showed him [the way to victory] . . . When he conquered Elam and
Parahshum, he took away 30 minas [roughly a pound each] of gold, 3,600
minas of copper and 300 male and female slaves and dedicated [them] to the
god Enlil. (R2:52-5)
An interesting element of this inscription is the reference to troops from.
Meluhha - the Indus Valley civilization - serving in the anti-Akkadian coalition at
the battle of the Middle River. 12 Rimush saw this victory as definitive for his
reign, describing himself in later inscriptions as "Rimush, king of the [entire]
world: the god Enlil gave to him all the land. He holds the Upper Sea and the
Lower Sea and all the mountain [lands] for the god Enlil" (R2:59). Overall
Rimush managed to keep much of the Akkadian empire together after significant
rebellions, and solidified Akkadian power in Elam.
Manishtusu {2269-2255}
13
According to later legend, Manishtusu usurped the throne after the murder of his
brother in a palace coup; certainly Rimush's reign was rather short. As was usual at
Akkadian succession, his reign began with a general uprising of most conquered
provinces, which was probably an extension of the revolts against his predecessor
Rimush: "all the lands . . . which my father Sargon left had in enmity revolted
against me [Manishtusu] and not one stood fast" (Cl/2:437— 8). There is no
account of his suppression of this revolt, but he apparently maintained control over
most of the empire. An inscription from Ashur indicates that the local ruler Azuzu
recognized Manishtusu as his overlord (ATS).
The military affairs of Manishtusu's reign are poorly documented. His single
martial inscription alludes to two great campaigns:
Manishtusu, king of the world: when he conquered Anshan and Shirihum [in
south-west Iran], had . . . ships cross the Lower Sea [Persian Gulf]. The cities
across the Sea, thirty-two [in number], assembled for battle, but he was vic-
torious [over them]. Further, he conquered their cities, struck down their
rulers, and after he roused them [his troops] plundered as far as the Silver
Mines. He quarried the black stone of the mountains across the Lower Sea,
loaded [it] on ships, and moored [the ships] at the quay of Akkad. He fash-
ioned a statue of himself [and] dedicated [it] to the god Enlil (R2:75-6).
Here we see a first campaign into eastern Elam, solidifying and even expanding
the conquests of his brother in that region. (Anshan is Til i M.ilv.m near modern
Shiraz, while Shirihum is the area west of modern Bandai A hi lis i 1 hereafter, he
launched a major maritime campaign "across the I. own Si i <>\ the [Vim. m (hill.
M
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
The specific target of this offensive is not named, but there are three lands gen-
ially reached via the Persian Gulf during this period: Dilmun (Bahrain), Magan
'( )man) and Meluhha (Indus delta). Most scholars assume it to be Oman, since it is
i source of the "black stone" which is probably diorite (R2:117). None of the
ihree regions can be excluded, however. Given the mention of a Melluhan con-
migent allied with the Elamites at the earlier battle of the Middle River against
R imush, it is possible that Manishtusu's expedition included a punitive raid on the
Indus delta as well. The ability of the Akkadians to launch a successful maritime
\pedition in the Persian Gulf in the twenty- third century BC indicates a fairly
' >phisticated level of administration and logistics, as well as ocean-going naval
technology. Manishtusu's ocean campaign (c. 2260) comes almost a century after
Veni's maritime campaign against Canaan (c. 2340) (see pp. 336-40); together
hese events represent the beginning of recorded naval warfare.
Naram-Sin {2255-2218}
14
Mier his grandfather Sargon, Naram-Sin was the greatest of the Akkadian
warlords. The widespread use of terror and massacre by his uncle Rimush to sup-
press revolts had done little to endear the people of Mesopotamia to their
Akkadian rulers, and Naram-Sin 's rule was likewise inaugurated with a massive
i -volt. 15
When the four quarters [i.e. the entire world] together revolted against him,
[which] no king whosoever had [ever] seen [before]: when Naram-Sin, the
mighty, [was] on a mission for the goddess Ishtar, all the four quarters together
revolted against him and confronted [him] (R2:96).. . . Through the love
which the goddess Ishtar showed him, he was victorious in nine battles in one
year, and the [three] kings whom [the rebels] had raised [against him], he
captured. (R2:113)
| >l course the suppression of the rebellion was not nearly as straightforward as
jatam-Sin wanted to make it seem. The exact order of the different phases of the
$ bellion and its suppression cannot be established, since the inscriptions lack a
limnology. None the less, it is clear that the rebellions nearly toppled the empire.
As the rebellion began, the newly independent city-states elevated anti-Akka-
lian rulers as new kings, and organized large coalitions to oppose Naram-Sin.
Akkad's old rival Kish rebelled under Iphur-Kish, rallying half-a-dozen cities to his
i use, enlisting the aid of Amorite bedouins (shadu) (R2:104, 109), serving as an
ominous precursor to the Amorite invasion and migration into Mesopotamia in
Hlbsequent decades (see pp. 157-9). As leader of the rebel coalition, Iphur-Kish
mustered his force and marched toward Akkad, where "he drew up battle lines
|hefore the eity| and awaited battle" at the "Field of the God Sin" (R2:104).
With a rebel army at the gates of Akkad, Naram-Sin was seriously threatened:
N.imiii Sm, tlu' mij'Jiiy, |mobili/ed| his young men there [in Akkad], and he held
si
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Akkad. He closed [the city gates]" against Iphur-Kish (R2:104-5; LKA 255-7),
Rather than face a lengthy siege, which would only give other cities the oppor-
tunity and motive to join the rebellion, Naram-Sin mustered his army and
immediately attacked Iphur-Kish. "In the field of the god Sin the two of them
engaged in battle and grappled with each other. By the verdict of the goddess
Ishtar-Annunitum, Naram-Sin, the mighty, was victorious over the Kishite
[Iphur-Kish] in battle at Tiwa", capturing "300 officers and 4932 captives"
(R2:105— 6). Thereafter Naram-Sin pursued the routed rebels:
Further, he [Naram-Sin] pursued him [Iphur-Kish] to Kish, and right beside
Kish, at the gate of the goddess Ninkarrak, the two of them engaged in battle
for a second time, and grappled with each other. By the verdict of the goddess
Annuntium and the god Anum, Naram-Sin, the mighty, was [again] victor-
ious over the Kishite in battle at Kish. (R2:106)
Another 3015 men were captured in battle, and the city and its walls were
destroyed. 16
The immediate threat to Akkad was thus averted, but unfortunately for Naram-
Sin, rebellion spread rapidly throughout Sumer. Ur and Uruk had joined lphur-
Kish's coalition (R2:109), but, because of Naram-Sin's swift response and victory,
they were apparently unable to arrive with their armies in time to face Naram-Sin
in the initial battles. After the fall of Kish, rebellion continued in southern Sumer
under the leadership of Amar-Girid of Uruk, who formed an alliance with nearly
all the Sumerian city-states including Ur, Lagash, Umma, Adab, Shuruppak, Isin,
and Nippur (R2:107). Amar-Girid "drew up battle lines" near Ashnak (R2:108).
Wasting no time, Naram-Sin "hastened" to successfully attack Amar-Girid
(R2:108), thereby apparently crushing the rebellion in Sumer. In all, Naram-Sin
was victorious in nine battles in a single year {2255}, capturing three of the rebel
kings (R2:113, 115-17; LKA 260-1). By any military standard it was a remarkable
victory.
In grateful recognition for the divine intervention that preserved Naram-Sin 's
rule and saved city of Akkad, the people of Akkad spontaneously prayed that the
gods might accept Naram-Sin as one of their own — at least if you believe Naram-
Sin's account:
In view of the fact that [Naram-Sin] protected the foundations of his city
[Akkad] from danger, [the citizens of] his city requested from [the following
gods] - Ishtar in [the temple of] Eanna, Enlil in Nippur, Dagan in Tuttul,
Ninhursag in Kes, Ea in Eridu, Sin in Ur, Shamash in Sippar, (and) Nergal in
Kutha - that [Naram-Sin] be [made] the god of their city, and they built
within Akkad a temple [dedicated] to hirn [as a god]. (R2:l 14)
Thereafter Naram-Sin took the title "king of the fom ipi.nh i meaning the
entire world, and was frequendy called the "god of Akkad" (C1/2:44<H As with
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
Alexander the Great, it is impossible to determine whether this self-deification was
megalomania, shrewd propaganda, or a sincere religious belief- or, most likely, a
■mbination of all three.
The rebellion against Akkadian rule was not limited to Sumer, however; city-
•aates in northern Mesopotamia (Subartum) revolted as well. Naram-Sin appar-
ntly undertook two campaigns in this region. 17 The first, up the Tigris river
illey, is poorly documented (R2: 125—30). He claims to have "smashed the
.veapon of all of [the land of] Subartum" and to have conquered "fourteen for-
:i esses" (R2:141— 3): Naram-Sin boasts of having "reached the source of the Tigris
River and the source of the Euphrates River" during his campaigns (R2:140).
With the Tigris Valley subdued, Naram-Sin turned his attention to the
I nphrates, where the revolt was galvanized under the leadership of the lord of
\pishal, swearing to fight Naram-Sin "whether I die or keep myself alive"
K2:91, 141). 18 One inscription gives us a feel for the nature of Naram-Sin's
uiipaign and an itinerary of his march against this northern rebellion (cf.
' ': 1 25). The rebels mustered their troops and marched to the battle of Mt. Bashar
|ebel Bishri on the west bank of the Euphrates in Syria):
Naram-Sin, went from Ashimananum to ShishiL At Shishil he crossed the
Tigris River and [went] from Shishil to the [east] bank of the Euphrates
River. Ele crossed the Euphrates River and [went] to [Mount] Bashar, the
Amorite mountain.. . . He [Naram-Sin] marched to Habshat. Naram-Sin,
[going] from the Euphates River, reached Bashar, the Amorite mountain, He
personally decided to fight: [the two armies] made battle and fought one
another. By the verdict of the goddess Ishtar, Naram-Sin, the mighty, was
victorious in battle over Apishal at [Mount] Bashar, the Amorite mountain.. , .
He struck down in the campaign a total, of 9 chiefs and 4,325 men. Naram-
Sin, the mighty captured [?] captives and the king of Apishal.. . . [He cap-
tured] leaders and chiefs, as well as 5,580 captives. [Enemy casualty list for this
campaign]: Total: 6 generals. Total: 17 governors. Total: 78 chiefs. Total: [?]
captains.. . . [Grand] total: [?] kings. [Grand] total: 13 generals. [Grand] total:
23 governors. Grand total: 2,212 chiefs. Grand total: 137,400 men [including
civilian casualties?]. The god Enlil showed [him the way and] Naram-Sin, the
mighty, struck down as many as there were in the campaign, and captured
| them]. (R2:91-4)
I Vspite the probable hyperbole in the total of 137,400 casualties he claims to have
miii cted on his enemies, this inscription makes clear the magnitude of the oppo-
sition to Naram-Sin, with over two dozen city-states allied against him, together
with the Amorite tribesmen from the Syrian Desert (R2:93).
I lis subjugation of the rebellion in the northern Euphrates left him in a position
to undertake tint her campaigns into Syria (R2:163, 167). Naram-Sin's inscription
describing Ins conquest of Armanum (Aleppo?) and Ebla contains the most
mi port an I description ol fortifications anil siegecraft lor this period. 10
83
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Whereas, for all time since the creation of mankind, no king whosoever had
destroyed Armanum [Aleppo?] and Ebla, the god Nergal, by the means of [his
divine] weapons opened the way for Naram-Sin, the mighty, and gave him
Armanum and Ebla [through conquest]. Further, he gave to him [by con-
quest] the Amanus [Mountains], the Cedar Mountain, and the Upper Sea. By
means of the [divine] weapons of the god Dagan, who magnifies his kingship,
Naram-Sin, the mighty, conquered Armanum and Ebla. Further, from the
[west] side of the Euphrates River as far as [the city of] Ulishum, he smote the
people whom the god Dagan had given to him for the first time, so that they
perform service for the god Ilaba, his god. Further, he totally [conquered] the
Amanus, the Cedar Mountain (RS2:163, 167).
The regions described here are all in western Syria. The Amanus Mountains are
the range north-west of modern Antioch, while the Cedar Mountain is in modern
coastal Syria or Lebanon. From central Syria Naram-Sin marched to the
Mediterranean Sea and to "Talkhatum", apparently in south-central Anatoli;)
(C 1/2: 442-3). At least large portions of Syria were incorporated into the
Akkadian empire, with Nagar (Tell Brak) in northern Mesopotamia becoming
the main Akkadian administrative center, flourishing during this period (AS
279-80).
With Syria subdued and his conquests extended to the "Upper Sea" or the
Mediterranean, Naram-Sin turned his attention to the Akkadian overseas domain
in the Persian Gulf, which had been established by his father Manishtusu. His
army "crossed the [Lower] Sea and conquered Magan [Oman], in the midst of the
sea", capturing its ruler Manium (R2:97, 117, 138, 140, 163). Naram-Sin also
attacked Elam and Parahshum in south-western Iran, but these campaigns arc
poorly documented (R2:130, 167; PAE 106-8; ME 105-16). There is archae
ological evidence of direct Akkadian rule in Elam in the form of victory monu-
ments and other Akkadian artifacts.
Ominously, the inscriptions of Naram-Sin include a vague reference to
"smiting the people and all the [Zagros] Mountain Lands for the god Enlil"
(R2:138, 140). Mountain Peoples, or highlanders (shadu) is a somewhat vague
term, but is generally understood to refer to fierce mountain tribes of the Zagros
Mountains. Evidence of direct Akkadian rule in part of the central Zagros is
found in copper and stone votive maceheads which were discovered in the aren
(ME 112). Most importantly, the famous Victory Stele of Naram-Sin describes
a punitive campaign against the highlander tribal confederation of the Lullubu in
the central Zagros (AANE §49; Figure 3): "Satuni, the king of the the highlanders
of Lullubum assembled together . . . [for] battle. . . . [Naram-Sin] heaped up a
burial mound over them . . . [and] dedicated [this object, the stele] to the god
[who granted victory]" (R2:144). The Lullubu highlanders who "assemble*!
together" to attack Akkad were an ominous precursor to tin- invasion of Akkadian
empire by Gutian highlanders within a few years aftn N.u.nn Sin's de.ilh (see
pp. 102-4).
si
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
Akkadian martial art
• liven the warlike nature of the Akkadian kings, the fact that we have only nine
irviving pieces of Akkadian monumental martial art — all but two of them
h.igmentary — clearly emphasizes the point that we are at the mercy of random
lance for both survival and discovery of our evidence for ancient Near East
rilitary history. I will examine each of these pieces here for the insights they can
ive us into Akkadian military history
Victory Stele of Sargon (Susa). 20 King Sargon, identified by an inscription, is
shown in procession with soldiers and prisoners (AM §115). This badly
damaged stele, which is a small fragment of a much larger original relief that
probably included item lb below, consists of only half of two panels. The
upper panel shows a row of naked prisoners with their arms bound behind
them at the wrist. The lower, more important panel shows Sargon leading a
victory procession. Sargon is dressed in a robe, with his long hair and beard
precisely matching the famous bronze bust of an Akkadian ruler (9, below).
He may have a dagger in his belt. Two characteristics of the stele make it
slightly possible that Sargon is riding in a war-cart. First, there is a triangle of
damaged rough stone in front of Sargon, about waist high. It is in high relief,
and if Sargon were walking one would expect this portion of the panel to be
in low relief, as is the rest of the background on the stele. This piece of the
stele is in the rough shape of the upper front of a two-wheeled war-cart from
the period (see WV §8, §13, §17, §18, §31), but is too damaged to see any
confirming details. Something is there, which has the vague shape of a war-
cart; if it is not a war-cart, what is it? Second, Sargon is taller than the rest of
his soldiers; this may be because of the widespread tradition in Near Eastern
martial art of representing the king as larger than ordinary mortals, but may
also be because he is standing on a war-cart. The bottom and front part of
image that would have shown the wheels and equids are both missing. Sargon
is followed by a courtier carrying either a standard, a banner, or perhaps a
parasol. Behind march five soldiers with long pleated robes on their left
shoulders and carrying large Akkadian battle-axes. 21
1 D The Prisoner Stele of Sargon (Susa). This shows prisoners led by an Akkadian
soldier with an axe (AFC §127). 22 This is likely, but not certainly, a different
piece of stele la. It shows an Akkadian soldier in a kilt with a broad-headed
battle-axe escorting naked prisoners with their arms bound behind their backs
at the wrist.
I The War-net stele of Sargon (Susa) (AAM §126-7; AFC 193). This highly
fragmentary relief shows a war-net scene based on iconography quite similar
to Ningirsu's war-net on the Stele of the Vultures (see pp. 55-9). Here Sargon
holds a net in which a dozen enemy prisoners are ensnared. As with Ningir-
su's net, one prisoner is trying to escape and is being bashed on the head by
Saigon's mate, Sargon is presenting the net to the war goddess Ishtar
83
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
(Sumerian Inana) who is seated on her throne. All we see is her skirt, and a
mace over her shoulder (presumably in a quiver on her back), which icono-
graphically point to Ishtar.
Stele of Rimush (two sides) (from Telloh) (AFC §129a-b; Figure 5e, p. 219). 23
All that survives of this stele is one triangular fragment with reliefs on both
sides. Parts of three panels of war-scenes are shown on either side, On side one,
the upper panel depicts two archers with their tassel ed quivers on their backs,
and vague outlines of bows; they are very similar to an archer from an Akkadian
cylinder seal (AFC §139). The second panel of side one shows an archer with a
drawn bow. In front of him, a soldier with an axe dispatches a naked enemy.
The third panel shows a man wielding his pike with two hands, stabbing a fallen
enemy who is missing from the fragment. The second side, panel one, shows a
soldier carrying a large axe. On the second panel, a soldier dispatches a kneeling
man pleading for his life. Behind him, a soldier with a long 2. 5-meter pike
escorts a prisoner. This man's marching stance with his pike is very similar to
that in the Victory Stele of Naram-sin (4), On the feet just below the pikeman
is the head of an archer with the top of his bow visible. Taken together we see
four archers, three axemen and two pikemen.
Victory Stele of Naram-Sin (AANE §49; Figure 3). The the most famous
Akkadian martial monument, 24 this stele shows the king and his army
ascending into the Zagros Mountains and defeating the Lullubu highlanders.
This scene is the first in the history of Mesopotamian martial art to attempt to
depict the natural terrain of the battlefield in a single scene rather than in
stylized panels. The terrain shows a number of ridges covered with trees and a
high mountain peak in the background. The inscription reads in part, "Satuni,
the king of the highlanders of Lullubum assembled together . . . [for] battle.. . .
[Naram-Sin defeated them and] heaped up a burial mound over them . . . [and]
dedicated [this object, the stele] to the god [who granted victory]'* (R2:144).
The Lullubu soldiers, with their distinctive long braided pony tails, are shown
in an utter rout. Several lie dead; one has an arrow or javelin protruding from his
neck. Another falls from the mountain. Two more run away, one with a broken
pike. The Lullubi king Satuni stands before Naram-Sin, begging for his life.
The Akkadian army, on the other hand, marches boldly forward in good order.
All six of the Akkadian soldiers wear kilts and helmets, broadly similar to
those shown in the earlier Sumerian Standard of Ur and Stele of the Vultures
(Figure 2). They all also have narrow-bladed axes for melees. Two carry war
banners, two hold 2.5-meter pikes at the butt, resting the shaft on the shoulder
like a rifle on the parade-ground. The fifth Akkadian has a bow, while the sixth
seems to have an axe. The heroic Naram-Sin leads his army into battle on the
crest of the mountain, standing twice as tall as anyone else, and stepping on the
bodies of fallen enemies. He has a similar kilt, but has a thick beard and loin-,
hair, and wears a horned crown symbolic of his divinity. In his hand he carries an
axe, a bow, and an arrow. His bow is often said to be the eaihest reprcscnta
tion of a composite bow, an issue that will be ilis< m < d !■■ !'■ • pp N'J ( >S)
86
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
/ igure 3 The "Victory Stele" of Naram-Sin, Akkadian {c. 2230}
nice: Louvre, Sb 4; drawing by Michael Lyon.
Darband-i-Gawr rock cut relief of Naram-sin (AAM §157; Figure 5d, p. 218).
This gives a different version of the events depicted on Naram-Sin's victory
stele (4). The king is shown in precisely the same martial pose, striding for-
ward to victory carrying a bow and a mace or axe. Beneath him are the fallen
bodies of the dead Lullubu highlanders, again with long braided ponytails.
I Royal Stele of Naram-Sin (from Pir-Hussein), (AFC §130). 25 This stele shows
the king in courtly robes in a ritual pose. In each hand he holds the haft of a
weapon, probably an axe or a mace; unfortunately, the heads of both weapons
are missing.
Alabaster Victory Stele (from Nasiriyya). The three fragments show a triumph
scene of yoked prisoners and booty with an armed Akkadian escort. 26 Frag-
ment A (left, AM §119), shows two Akkadian soldiers bearing booty, includ-
ing two nicely rendered bronze daggers in leather sheaths and belts. The
Akkadian solider wears a long kilt with a sash-like fringed robe over his
shoulder, and a helmet/cap with stripes, either striations on metal, or colored
bands. The solider has a broad-headed axe thrust in his belt. A comparison
with the dress of soldiers in combat leads me to suspect that this is the court
dress of the bodyguard, rather than combat dress. Fragment B (center, AM
I '<>) shows .i line of naked prisoners with their arms bound behind them at
B7
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
the elbows, yoked together at the neck with long poles. The middle soldier
has a beard and a long braided ponytail similar to the Lullabi soldiers on the
Naram-Sin Victory Stele (4; see also 8). Fragment C (right, AFC §131) shows
an Akkadian guardsman wearing the same robes and helmet as the soldier i
Fragment A. He holds a broad-headed battle-axe which is nicely rendered,
showing the details of the blade and how it was riveted to the haft. Above him
are the feet of another guardsman with what appears to be the spiked-shape
head of a spear pointing downward.
Vase. This shows a bound highlander captive, with long beard and braided
hair similar to that of the Lullubu (SDA 190-1; AANE §367), and the prisoners
in 4 and 7.
Cast bronze bust of Sargon or Naram-Sin. Technically not a piece of martial
art, this is however the most striking example of royal iconography, and shows
details of how the hair of the king, and possibly other warriors, was braided
and bound for combat. 27
Other sources of martial art
Akkadian period weapons included the mace, dagger, bow, javelin, narrow-headed
axe, broad axe, spear, and pike, all of which are depicted on contemporary cylindci
seals; several have surviving archaeological examples. Contest scenes depicting ;
grappling with animals or mythical creatures may show ancient wrestling stance",
(FI §95-1.01 §703), and presumably Akkadian warriors were trained to fighi
without weapons. In other hand-to-hand combat the dagger is frequently used
(FI §566, §876). A finely rendered and well preserved glyptic scene shows
four armed men, one with bow, arrow, and quiver, one with javelin, and two with
small narrow-headed axes (AFC §139, §150; FI §641). The two-handed long spear
or pike makes a frequent appearance in Akkadian art. In one scene two gods
attack a seven-headed monster with longs spear held overhand with both hands
(FI §840).
The mace is actually the most frequently represented weapon in Akkadian
cylinder seals, but it appears mainly in mythical scenes of combat between heroes
monsters, and gods, where the mace is a primary weapon (FI §445, 516, §77* *
§849; AFC §143-4, §156-7; AM §113b). Sometimes maces appear in ritual poses
but other times they are used in combat (FI §126), where a broken mace shaft is a
symbol of defeat (AFC §156; AM §113b). Some scenes show maces with handles
roughly a meter long which would best be wielded with two hands (FI §103- 5
§126, §896). One god holds two large maces, one in each hand (FI §896). The
widespread presence of the mace in Akkadian glyptic art may be because of ico-
nographic conservatism resulting in representing archaic weapons in mytliii al
scenes, since the mace is rarely seen in actual combat scenes between humans
Thus, these mythic scenes may not tell us about real Akkadian - > ipomv, but Un-
certainly show the importance of the mace in earliei times
HH
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
(Vtesopotamian archery and the Akkadian composite bow 28
I 963 Yigael Yadin, in his magisterial study The Art of Warfare in Biblical Lands, 29
ned that two Akkadian stelae depict "the very first representation of the com-
iie bow in the history of ancient weapons". He maintained that the Akkadian
mposite bow "explains . . . [how] the Akkadians were able to conquer and gain
'ii union over Mesopotamia.. . . It is indeed no exaggeration to suggest that the
ention of the composite bow with its comparatively long range was as revolu-
nary, in its day, and brought comparable results, as the discovery of gunpowder
ousands of years later" (AW 1:47-8). Yadin later included a then newly dis-
ered archery scene from Mari as a third example of what he believed to be the
•i Mposite bow in Akkadian times (Figure 5c, p. 218). 30 Since Yadin, many scholars
-• accepted this interpretation. 31 The standard interpretation holds that, during
Akkadian period, the combination of the greater range and power of the
i nposite bow, with the added penetrating power of bronze arrowheads, gave a
i isive tactical advantage to Akkadian archers. Thus, the Akkadian conquests
re due at least in part to the new technological innovation of the composite
iw with bronze-tipped arrows.
In order properly to evaluate Yadin 's argument, we need to re-examine the
idence for the development of Mesopotamian archery, some of which has been
iblished since Yadin's book, and some of which Yadin did not consider. The
1 1 1 x of Yadin's argument for the development of the composite bow in the
Mty-fourth century is based on an interpretation of three artistic depictions of
> bow. As far as I can tell, no one has presented any archaeological or textual
idence for the composite bow before the Middle Bronze period. Yadin's argu-
■ I- mi, then, rests entirely on the iconographic interpretation of these three pieces
martial art. To properly interpret their significance, these depictions need to be
►laced in the broader context of Mesopotamian artistic representations of bows
id archery.
I he bow was known in the Neolithic Near East by at least 6000, and
M.loubtedly much earlier (EBD). Many figures depicted at Catal Hoyuk {c.
000] use the bow (CH 171, §54, 61-4; xiii). Likewise Syrian pottery {sixth
nillennium} 32 and Mesopotamian pottery {c. 4200} have examples of hunter/
■ ii riors with bows (AANE §186); these weapons seem to be simple wooden self
bows. The bow is also well represented in Pre-Dynastic {3500-3000} Mesopota-
mia!) martial art. The Priest-king figure (see pp. 37—39) is shown using the bow
'"i hunting and in a siege. The most famous archery scene is the Uruk lion-
liuni, u in which the nocks of the bow are clearly recurved. However, this scene is
ml the most informative. Less well-know are cylinder seals showing the Priest-
\ \\\\\ limiting bulls using the same type of bow (Figure 5a, p. 218; AFC 23; FI
f|u83), and. in target practice (FI §682). In two siege scenes the Priest-king again
the same bow (AFC 24; FI §743; PAE 68/2), which is also found in a
mythological F.arlv 1 )ynastic hunting scene (FI §993). Burials at Susa in Elam from
the early third millennium included copper arrowheads (PAE 95). All of these
B9
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
depictions seem to show the same type of bow. It is fairly large proportionally
(a 100 cm), going from above the head to the waist when drawn. It is also clearly
recurved at the nocks or tips of the bow. The most pronounced recurvature is
found on the Uruk lion-hunt stele, but every example shows some degree
recurvature at the nocks. My suspicion is that the Uruk stele artist was simpl
exaggerating the size of the nocks because of the difficulty of working in a basalt
medium with only copper or stone carving tools.
While some have interpreted this Pre -Dynastic bow as composite (PAE 67), the
most decisive argument against a Pre-Dynastic composite bow comes from a Pre-
Dynastic cylinder seal showing an arms factory (Figure 5b, p. 218; FI §742). In this
scene, five unstrung bows are shown. They are all essentially straight when unstrung,
although they show a clear difference in thickness - thicker in the limbs and
thinner in the handle and nocks. But each shows a pronounced hook-like recur-
vature at the nock, very similar to the nocks on the drawn bow of the Uruk lion
hunt stele. The fact that the overall shape of the bow is not recurved in the
slightest when unstrung implies that the weapon is probably a self bow with some
type of highly recurved nocks for the bow string. Another crucial piece of evidence
comes from Uruk, where a stele shows the Priest-king carrying a bow which is
not drawn and may be unstrung (PAE 68/3). This bow may exhibit some recur
vature of the limbs and also has the curved nocks.
In overall structure, this Pre-Dynastic bow appears quite similar to the late Early
Dynastic bow from Mari, which Yadin believes is a composite bow (Figure 5a,
p. 218). 34 In the Mari scene the archer seems to be depicted as he begins to draw
the bow, which certainly appears to be recurved. This creates a problem: if the
Mari bow is definitely composite, as Yadin argues, one would have to argue thai
the Pre-Dynastic Mesopotamian bow, which seems to have the same basic shape
and type of recurvature, should also be composite. This would place the origin oi
the composite bow in Mesopotamia at around 3400, a thousand years earlier than
Yadin suggests. It also ignores the fact that in the bowyer scene mentioned above,
the bow has no recurvature when unstrung (FI §742). If the bow in Pre-Dynastit
art is not composite, there is no reason to believe the Mari bow is either.
Archery does not appear frequently in either the art or texts of the Earls
Dynastic period. This has led Yadin to conclude that "the bow . . . was not: used by
the Sumerian army" (AW 1:47). There are, however, several examples of its use.
Two cylinder seal from Early Dynastic Susa show the use of a bow (FI §758, §933;
ME 110), but these are from Elam. The Early Dynastic archery scene from Mari
also shows archery, but this is from Syria. None the less, although there were sig-
nificant cultural differences between Mari and Sumer, there were also many pai
allels in military equipment; a martial scene from Mari shows the use of the bow
(AFC §99). In textual evidence, an inscription of king Eanatum of Lagash {2455
2425} claims that "a person shot an arrow at Eanatum. He was shot through In
the arrow and had difficulty moving" (PI 34), indicating the use of "archery on tin
battlefield among the Sumerians. The infantry on the Stele of the Vultures an
protected by large body-length rectangular shields (I \ s 1 \\1 '■<,<, l )) t whu h
uo
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
ikes sense as a defense against missiles (see p. 55). There is thus limited evidence
i the use of the bow among the Early Dynastic Sumerians.
Furthermore, although there is no artistic evidence of the bow among the
imerians in the Neo-Sumerian period {c. 2200-2000}, there is extensive textual
• \ tdence for their use of the bow at that time. In a twenty-second-century myth
li god Ninurta uses the bow (TITO 244). Gudea of Lagash {2141-2122} had a
bow for a chariot he built (R3/ 1:96-7). A twenty-first-century text mentions the
e of a bow in battle (LD 61), while king Shulgi of Ur {2094-2047} mentions
m (scripting archers for his army (R3/2:101). Hymns of Shulgi also mention the
■Qg shooting a bow in battle (TSH 79), while a quiver is among objects dedicated
(he god Ningirsu (R3/l:34). The importance of archery is further emphasized
the seal of "Kalbaba, bowmaker ( GI Kban-dim), servant of [king] Ishbi-Erra [of
n 5 {2017-1985}]" (R4:12), The possession of seals was generally associated with
elite of Mesopotamian society; Kalbaba was thus an important man, perhaps
be king's personal bowyer. What we actually have in the sources is evidence for
1 extensive use of the bow in Pre-Dynastic art, Hmited evidence for the bow in
ii ly Dynastic sources, and extensive evidence again Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian
Hires. It is impossible to tell if this reflects a change in the importance and
U tice of archery, or a change in the nature and survival of our sources.
In the 2048 the king of Ebla sent Shulgi of Ur tribute (gun) consisting of "500
■ t//w- weapons of sudianum-wood and 500 containers ( GI§ .kab-kul) of the same
• ood." 35 This text leads us to the complicated problem of the philology of ancient
apon names, an issue with many ambiguities leading to possible confusion,
ichler has argued that the tilpanu is a javelin, 36 while Groneberg has made a strong
rgument that it should be a bow 37 I believe that the fact that the 500 tilpanu-
• capons are sent along with 500 "containers" strongly points to the tilpanu being a
bow, in which case the 500 "containers'' would obviously be quivers. Otherwise,
4 what use are the 500 "containers" for javelins? At any rate, if the tilpanu here is
in fact a bow, as seems probable, it is said to have been made out of the same
utdianum-wood which is used to make the quivers. The most straightforward
ading of this evidence is that the tilpanu-bow of the twenty-first century is an
ordinary self bow made from wood, not a composite bow. It is, of course, possible
ili.it the sudianum-wood is used only for the wooden part of a composite bow, or
that these bows were self bows, while other weapons were composite bows. Once
again, the evidence is inconclusive.
The Akkadian artistic sources provide Yadin with two pieces of evidence that
ii r crucial to his argument: one shows Naram-Sin holding an undrawn strung
low, the other shows an Akkadian warrior drawing a bow. Yadin argues that
" -nun-Sins bow "bears the two characteristic features of the composite weapon;
it is small - about 90 centimeters from end to end (an estimate based on its rela-
tionship to the si/e of the figure holding it); and its arms tend to recurve near the
ends .ind then become straight" (AW 1:47), In actuality there are a number of
othei ait ist k representations of the use of the bow by Akkadians, which serve to
inudd\ the interpretative w, iters. The two sources discussed by Yadin need to be
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
compared with six others showing an undrawn Akkadian bow, and two others
with drawn bows.
We have a number of examples of gods or kings posing in Naram-Sin's "archer
stance" from his Victory Stele, showing the Akkadian bow strung but not
drawn. 38
• Naram-Sin's famous victory stele (4 in the list on p. 86; Figure 3, p. 87) shows
the conqueror holding a 95-cm bow which recurves and becomes quite
straight toward the end. Indeed, about a third of each limb appears straight in
this example. 39
• Often neglected in the study of the Akkadian composite bow is the parallel,
but less famous, war monument of Naram-Sin, the rock-cut relief at Dar-
band-i Gawr (5 on p. 87; Figure 5d, p. 218). 40 This source is important
because it shows Naram-Sin in precisely the same dramatic stance, holding a
bow in the same way. However, at Darband-i Gawr, Naram-Sin's bow does
not appear to be a composite bow. Whereas the tips of Naram-Sin's bow are
straight and parallel with the string for about one third of the limb on the
Victory Stele, at Darband-i Gawr the bow is shorter (70 cm to the stele's 95 cm)
and immediately curves away from the string; it is actually more triangular in
shape. Now it is, of course, possible that Naram-Sin is depicted using two
different types of bows, but it is equally possible that the differences between
the bows of the two monuments are based on artistic style rather than tech-
nological substance. Assuming Naram-Sin had a powerful and expensive
composite bow, why would he use an ordinary self bow in battle, or order a
monumental propaganda depiction of himself with the inferior weapon?
• Another soldier on the Naram-Sin victory stele also holds a bow (c. 90 cm).
The bottom part of the image of the bow is damaged, but the top part shows
that the bow is smaller than Naram-Sin's, and has less recurvature towards the
tip; in style it seems midway between Naram-sin's bow on the stele and that
on the Darband-i Gawr relief.
• A god holds a somewhat longer bow (102 cm) and arrow; the bow shows very
little recurvature towards the tips (FI §761; AM §113a; SDA §237; AFC §139).
• A god holds a rather small, undrawn bow (67 cm) which displays moderate
recurvature towards the tips (FI §849).
• A cylinder seal shows an Akkadian archer with an undrawn bow (94 cm) and
a quiver with tassel. 41 Here the fine work of the artist shows a moderate
recurving of the limbs toward the nocks, but it is less pronounced than in the
Naram-Sin stele.
9 In the lower right corner of the right fragment of the Victory Stele of
Rimush (p. 86) we see the head and top of the bow of an archer (AFC § 1 2*
AAM §135). This bow, on the same stele as the drawn bow that Yadin saw as
composite, shows no recurvature and no straightening at the end. The slighi
outline of the bottom of a bow on the other side of this st< I* in the upper leh
panel also appears to have no recurvature and no sii.u m the noi I
• j -
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
Also, the ends of two other bows on the Rimush stele show no straightening
at the nocks.
in summary, these examples show a range in both size and recurvature: 95 cm,
"ong recurvature (Naram-Sin stele); 90 cm, moderate recurvature; 67 cm, mod-
ii te recurvature; 94 cm, moderate recurvature; 102 cm, little recurvature. From
Ins evidence we note that Naram-Sin's weapon on his victory stele is of average
length, but is by far the most recurved of all these weapons. Yadin's deduction that
be Akkadians used the composite bow is thus a generalization from an atypical
unple.
We also have three depictions from the Akkadian period of a drawn bow.
I Yadin's example comes from Akkadian monumental martial art (Figure 5e 3
p. 21 9). 42 Yadin believes that the bow's "arms still curve outward slightly" at
full extension (AW 1:47; AFC §129), but if so, it is quite slight. In my view, the
shape of this flexed bow is much closer to that of a self bow than the classic
composite bow (EBD 78-9); it is certainly less recurved than the next example.
• A god draws a bow which remains quite recurved in form (FI §876).
• An archer shooting a bow; the image is unclear, but there is not much
apparent recurvature (FI §685).
( )f these latter three examples, I would classify one drawn bow as recurved, and
as not recurved. This leaves the evidence for the Akkadian recurved (and
nee composite) bow ambiguous. It either means that the Akkadians used both
lie composite bow and the regular self bow, or that the Akkadian artists were not
i tly concerned with accurately representing the weapons they saw. None the
when recurvature on Akkadian bows is seen, it is a distinctive enough feature
: li .it it seems unlikely that it would have appeared as an arbitrary artistic aberration.
the composite bow was known to the Akkadians, it was certainly not uni-
rsally used by Akkadian archers; some, probably most, would have continued to
■ self bows.
I litis I would suggest that, while the existence of the composite bow among
he Akkadians is possible, it is still uncertain. More to the point, however, the
nlii.iry impact of the Akkadian composite bow, if it existed, is also unclear. The
more technological capacity to make composite bows would not necessarily
I inslate into a tactical revolution on the battlefield. What percentage of all
I I .u 1 1, in troops used the bow? What proportion of these had composite bows (if
my) instead of self bows? How many bronze (as opposed to copper or flint)
irrowheads were available? One Neo-Sumerian text mentions that the king him-
l! shot "flint tipped arrows" (HTO 330). If the king is still using flint arrow-
ir.uk, how widespread could bronze arrowheads be? How many arrows could
• nil .in her realistically shoot in a battle or siege? There is no hard evidence to
.invwei ,uiv of these questions. If I he composite bow existed in Akkadian times I
uuilil Mii'.t'esi ili.n K was .i rare ami expensive weapon used by kings and other
93
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
elites. As discussed elsewhere (p. 255), the expense of making bronze (as opposed
to copper or flint) arrowheads would probably limit the overall tactical impact of
the Akkadian composite bow. A few dozen archers in an army of several thousand
would not be tactically decisive.
Old Babylonian martial art also has a few representations of the bow, but the
surviving textual and artistic evidence does not give a great importance to the
weapon. One scene shows a god holding a bow in the Naram-Sin archer stance; it
is a short weapon with little or no recurvature (FI §160, §686). A scene from Ebla
shows an archer hunting with a quiver and what appears to be a short self bow
(AANE §451; SDA 292). During the Middle Bronze period, the god Ashur gives
the king of Assyria a bow at his investiture, indicating its continued importance as
a royal ceremonial weapon (Al:21). King Anubanini of Lullubi (modern Luristan)
is also depicted in the Naram-Sin pose, trampling a fallen enemy. In one hand he
holds an axe, and in the other a bow and arrow; the bow itself is not recurved, but
has slightly recurved tips where the string is attached (PAE 319; ME 20). In the
Old Babylonian version of the Epic of Gilgamesh, the hero arms himself with dag-
ger, axe, and "his quiver with the bow from Anshan" in south-west Iran (EG 113).
In the Beni Hasan murals in Egypt, Canaanite warriors have bows similar to those
of the Egyptians - though this may be the artistic convention of an Egyptian artist
who is told to draw a Canaanite with a bow, and draws the Canaanite with an
Egyptian bow, the only weapon the artist knows (AW 1:166—7). The textual evi-
dence for the bow from Mari, again indicating its relative unimportance, is dis-
cussed on pages 254-5.
If, as Yadin argues, the composite bow existed in Mesopotamia in the twenty-
fourth century with revolutionary military impact, the following questions
become difficult to answer. Why does the bow seem to decline in importance in
later evidence from Mesopotamia and Syria? Assuming the composite bow made
archery more effective, one would expect its use to increase, not decline, relative
to the Akkadian period. Why did the composite bow not spread to Canaan and
Egypt by the Middle Bronze Age, if it had already existed in Mesopotamia for
several centuries? Most other Syrian military technologies — fortifications, axes,
chariots - spread quite rapidly to Canaan. Assuming the Beni Hasan murals are
accurate in showing the Canaanites using Egyptian-style bows, why are the
Canaanites not using the superior composite bow if the technology had been
known to their Syrian neighbors for centuries? Why are arrowheads so sparsely
attested in martial tombs with other weapons burials? Why does archery appear to
play a relatively minor role in warfare in the Mari archives? Why are charioteers
not shown using a bow in martial art before the eighteenth century (see Chapter
Five)? Why do we not see the rapid spread of body armor and shields from the late
third millennium for protection from the new, more powerful composite bow?
I would argue that the most probable interpretation of the evidence is that the
composite bow - or at least an efficient version that could be produced in
reasonable quantities — developed only in the nineteenth m eighteenth century.
The dramatic military impact one would expect from \\u- ■!■ ' • lopim m of a new
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
weapon like the composite bow, with twice the range and penetrating power of
■' he self bow (EBD), only begins to be seen in the eighteenth century. We also find
■rtual evidence for the increasing weight of bronze arrowheads which could have
fcen shot from the more powerful bows (ARM 18.5; MK 63; see pp. 254-5).
I taring the seventeenth century we see marked evidence of the use of the bow
1 i om chariots, and the weapon is introduced into Egypt probably in the seventeenth
I rntury by the Hyksos (see Chapter Eighteen). Increased use of body armor and
1 1 1 elds is found in the seventeenth century and throughout the Late Bronze Age,
>nt is not found in the Akkadian and Old Babylonian periods. If the Akkadians
Bid have the composite bow, it was either a less efficient version of the weapon, or
ii was so difficult and expensive to make that only the elites could afford it, and
therefore its tactical importance before the late Middle Bronze Age was limited,
Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian military systems 43
1 )nly a partial understanding of the Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian military systems
an be obtained from fragmentary bits and pieces of information. Sumerian city-
Itates apparently organized their population into "clans", each with a different
name and emblem, who were called up in labor corvees for construction of canals,
dikes, and temples (R3/1-.78). Presumably, a similar organization existed for
recruiting levees for warfare, which were treated administratively as a type of labor
duty to the state. Each band of warriors served within a kinship or socially related
group. Each Sumerian family owed military service to the state. Shulgi named one
-i his years "the year the citizens of Ur were conscripted as spearmen". Ele also
describes his "conscription with the bow and arrow; nobody evaded it - the levy
being one man per family" (R3/2:l 01). These levees were recruited on an ad hoc basis
lor a specific war, with soldiers returning to their homes after the campaign (MAS 27).
As a special privilege, the military and labor conscription required of a city could
be cancelled. For example, Ishme-Dagan of Isin {1953-1935} "relieved the citizens
of Nippur from military service ... and made the nation content" (R4:32-4, 89).
Sargon is sometimes credited with having created the first-known standing
army in the world. His claim that "5400 men daily eat in the presence of Sargon"
(R2:29, 31), however, refers not just to soldiers, but to priests, scribes or other
■ mirt functionaries see (see p. 75). None the less, a substantial number of the 5400
were probably soldiers. On the other hand, it is very likely that earlier rulers also
h.ul professional guards. Texts of Amarsin mention the elite gardu, translated as
"royal body guard" (R3/2:239), who were probably professional troops. A seal
from the reign of Sumu-El of Lagash mentions an "Iemsium, lieutentant of the
elite soldiers (ugula aga.us.sag.ga)" (R4:136), perhaps another professional regiment.
I here is ,i group know as the aga-ush - "followers of the crown" - who seem to be
professional full tunc soldiers as opposed to levees (MAS 27). Soldiers are some-
ni lies desci ibed as receiving land in return for military service. 44
['lie Akkadians and Neo Smnerians had a sophisticated bureaucracy over all
aspects ol the si. He, including the military (EM). City governors (en si) seemed to
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
have had responsibility for military recruitment and supplies in their jurisdiction
(MAS 26-7). Within the homeland, cities were expected to provide supplies and
accommodation for armies passing through their province. Numerous Sumerian
and Akkadian economic texts describe the requisitioning of food and equipment
for government use, although it is not clear if this is for labor gangs or soldiers
(MAS 26). From the Mesopotamian perspective, there was probably no distinction.
Surviving archives describing the disbursement of supplies and equipment to
soldiers demonstrate that, at least by the Akkadian period, Mesopotamians had
developed a well organized commissary system which kept detailed records of the
collection and distribution of supplies. 45 The archive recorded "the number of
workers [or soldiers] and how long they worked on the one hand, and the numhei
of times they had been fed on the other" (USP 25). They dealt with the collec-
tion, storage and distribution of grain, foodstuffs, personnel, livestock (including
donkeys), textiles, and equipment, including weapons (USP 38). A typical record
reads:
580 shu-loaves [of bread,] 29 jars of 30/30 beer did the chief of the work
troops receive. 20 loaves, 1 pot of 30/30 beer to the soldier of Adda. Tin
bread and beer are a disbursement. Year 5, month 5, day 27.
This extensive and complex bureaucracy facilitated the creation of the Akkadian
army and the management of the lands conquered by the armies.
The capture of booty was a major purpose of war. Several "booty tablets"
(namrak) have survived from the Neo-Sumerian period, giving lists of booty taken
on a campaign and its disbursement (R3/2:236). A portion of the booty w;is
generally donated to the temples of the gods, for practical use by the priests. One
text mentions, for example, the "booty dedicated to the god Shara [taken as
plunder] from the city of Sharithum" (R3/2:238). Since the gods were the most
important allies of the king, and granted him victory, they deserved their share of
the plunder just as any other allied king would, even though this portion of the
plunder was not of immediate practical military use. Part of the booty was directly
distributed to soldiers, both for food while on campaign, and as rewards after battle
(R3/2:108, 110). Great victory feasts were held for the "heroes" of the campaign,
in which captured animals were roasted (R3/2:109, 239). Finally, a portion of the
booty went to the king, some of which would eventually be recycled to fund thr
army. The logistical and economic costs of maintaining this standing army may
have caused Sargon to create the world's first predatory army — a force which is too
large to be maintained by the economic resources of the kingdom, and must per
force campaign every year to provide plunder for its own upkeep (war must fee< I
war). A number of the texts focus on the plunder and captives taken from con
quered regions, indicating these important economic aspects of Akkadian warfan
(R2:23-4, 31, 60-7).,
The commander-in-chief of the Akkadian and Sumerian arniv was the king
who regularly campaigned in person. I [owever, the kmr ■>■ i i ■ ■ d h\ ,i numhei
•>,,
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
lifferent types of military officers, although the specifics about their differences
i unctions are sometimes obscure. The Sumerian epic Gilgamesh and Agga has
non where Gilgamesh lists five military offices in order of ascending rank
NG 148):
\gula lieutenant (overseer)
sbanda captain
/ governor (or perhaps colonel in a military sense)
hagina general
.K.una erin "general of the army", or perhaps field marshal
Wxagina (Sumerian gir.nita, roughly "general") was probably the highest mili-
oliice, and occurs repeatedly in inscriptions (R3/2:349, 353). Successful
i. (Is were honored in royal inscriptions (R2:32). Generals also appear as mili-
■ overnors of conquered cities; for Mari we have a list of seven generals who
med the city for the Akkadians (R2:231-7; R3/2:143), with several others
1 1 nng Elam (R2:302-8). Under Naram-Sin a warrior named Lugal-uru-si was
ii' ial of the land of Sumer and Akkad" (R2:103), the supreme army com-
mit t under the king, and perhaps the same as the shagina erin. As in many
lent societies, generals often held many additional government and religious
ices - Caesar, for example, served as a priest as Pontifex Maximus. Under king
in, Irnanna served simultaneously as governor, a sanga priest of the god Enki,
the gir.nita of several different provinces (R3/2:323-4). In addition to his
i v duties, general Babati served as royal steward, accountant, canal inspector,
i anga priest (R3/2:341— 2). Likewise, city governors (ensi) are often described
ni u ipating in campaigns, and seem to have ranked immediately under the
I ral.
I In- second most frequently mentioned military office is nubanda, roughly
[llivalent to captain (R2:93; R3/2:239). They were clearly of lower rank and
it numerous than the generals. We can get a sense of the relative status, rank,
i numbers of Akkadian period officers by some of Naram-Sin 's prisoner lists.
i l.i i ins during one of his extended campaigns to have captured six shagina
\\ nerals), seventeen ensi (city governors), 78 rabi'anu (nomad "chiefs"), and 2000
mia (captains) (R2:92-3). At the battle of Tiwa, Naram-Sin captured the
' niia (general) of Kish, along with four of his nubanda (captains) (R2:105— 6).
/ las were often assigned specific types of duties; under Shusin we hear of
I ug.ilmagure, captain of the watch" (nubanda ennuga) serving as governor of Ur
i ! 126, 418).
I he Akkadian army was also organized into military units, though these seem
i have been rather flexible in size. The basic term for a military unit was kiseri, or
i'liiM-ni; Sargon is said to have mustered nine kiseri against Uruk (R2:16). Several
onls ties* n'ne companies of roughly 200 men commanded by a nubanda (MAS
U nl 1) I he piofcssioii.il nature of the Akkadian army allowed it to campaign at
ul perils, .i N, ii. nil Sm insuiption describes .i forced march in which the
''•
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
Akkadian army moved at over twice the normal rate of march for several days
running (R2:125). Soldiers on campaign are described as eating "bread [baked] on
coals" and "drinking water from skins" (LKA 179), Some type of camp fortifica
tions on campaign seem to be implied when Naram-Sin "made firm the founda
tions of the army camps" (R2:141).
Manishtushu (R2.75-6), Naram-Sin (R2:97, 117) and Shar-kalli-shan
(R2:192) all claim to have undertaken maritime expeditions in the Persian Gulf.
Conquest of the coast of the Persian Gulf allowed Akkadians to control much of
the maritime trade of the region, with merchants arriving in Akkad from Meluhha
(the Indus valley), Magan (Oman), and Dilmun (Bahrain) (R2:28— 30). The cap-
tain of a boat is also called a nubanda (R3/l:41), like his land-based counterparts.
The "chief sea-captain", or admiral, is called nam-garash (R3/247— 8); this
inscription has specific reference to trading activities, but presumably this office i
would be involved in any naval military affairs as well.
Weapons in the Akkadian and Sumerian arsenals included lance, spear, javelin,
narrow-headed axe, broad battle-axe (or scimitar- axe), mace, dagger, and bow.
Weapons were kept in a special arsenal, sometimes inside a temple complex, which
were protected by images of divine beings. King Gudea {2141—2122} gave a
description of one of these arsenals: "in the inner [arsenal] where the weapons
hang, [at] its Battle Gate, [Gudea] posted the warriors 'deer-of-six-heads' and
'Mount Sinjar' " (R3/l:85) - the latter apparently being images of mythical war-
rior demons slain by Ningirsu. 46
A ritual blessing given by lmdugud, a mythical dragon-like creature, to the epic-
hero Lugalbanda, describes the arms of a Sumerian king:
May your flint- tipped arrow 7 hit its man . . .
May it; be sharp like the point of an axe . . .
May [the god] Ninurta, Enlil's son,
Cover your crown with the helmet, "Lion of Battle" . . .
When you have wielded the net in the mountain,
May the net not let loose [your enemies]. (HTO 330-1)
The throwing net mentioned here was used to entangle enemies (HTO 236),
perhaps as depicted on the Stele of the Vultures (AM §66-9, see Figure 1, p. 55).
A description of a ritual inspection tour by Gudea of Lagash included a catalog
of some of the weapons at the temple arsenal at Lagash:
Gudea brings to [the god] Ningirsu . . . [the officer] Sbul-shaga . . . holding
the seven-spiked mace, and opening the Ankar, the Battle-Gate [to tin-
arsenal], that the
dagger blades [eme-gir]
the mitu ["dead-man"] mace,
the "floodstorm" weapon
98
Hie "bitter one" [khurratum]
.ind all the weapons of war;
Bight all exactly hit their targets, that he might flood all the lands of [the god]
I n Ills enemies. Gudea brings along with himself [for the inspection] to [the
ii-m
M
i
pie of] Ningirsu the mighty weapon "Slaughterer of a Myriad", which
nines all lands in battle, [and] the officer of [the temple] Eninnu, hawk of
lie rebel land, [and] his general Lugalkurdub. 47
text apparently refers to a special blessing for weapons before battle. Weapons
often viewed as magical objects, as gifts from the gods imbued with divine
- which was the real source of victory (R2:133). Many of these special cer-
nial weapons were made of very precious and rare materials and given evo-
names such as "Mace-unbearable-for-the-regions", "Three-headed-lion-
", and "slaughterer-of~a-myriad" (R3/l:34). Sargon claimed that "the god
tba, mighty one of the gods - the god Enlil gave to [me] his weapons". Sargon
ribes his victory over LJruk to the power of the "mace of the god Ilaba": per-
•omething similar to a mace he dedicated to the gods as a victory trophy
2: 13, 1 7-18). Bur-Sin of Isin donated a "three-headed gold mace with heads of
in lazuli as a great emblem for Ninurta" (IYN 30). Sargon's grandson Naram-
• hided this same mace (or another of the same name) in battle (R2:94). At his
onadon Naram-Sin was given "a weapon of heaven from the temple of the god
P (R2:85), as well as divine weapons of the gods Dagan and Nergal (R2:133),
■1 Ishtar (LKA 195, 199); Shu-sin received the a'ankara weapon from Ninlil (E3/
K>2, 307; cf. R4:391). The shihirru weapon - sometimes called a "scimitar" -
apparently a special weapon of kingship (LKA 199-200). What distinguished a
ivine weapon from an ordinary one is unclear. They may have been ancestral
capons preserved in the temples, or weapons that were manufactured with a
c< ial ritual and consecration by the priests. Meteoric iron was worked by the
idians (R2:68); such a mace could perhaps have been described as coming
from heaven". These weapons of the gods are said to have the power to make the
iicmy panic in battle (R3/l:93).
Akkadian martial ideology
i id Enlil, whose major temple was E-kur ("mountain house") at Nippur, was
particular focus of Akkadian martial devotion. Sargon became ruler by the
• idirf of Enlil, and ruled as his "governor" (R2:10, 13, 19, 34, 133). Enlil
died Manishtusu "by name", granting him the "scepter of kingship" (R2:77).
nlil granted Sargon "surpassing intelligence", thereby insuring that Sargon had
no rival" in the world (R2:34, 11, 14, 20, 29, 31, 45).
I Ik- kings ruled as they were "instructed" by the gods, presumably through
•i.ules and divination. Divination often preceded battle. Enlil's instructions
liuiol tin- command to "show merry to no one", which the Akkadian rulers
«»«*
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
followed religiously (R2:32, 34, 56, 192-3): "Naram-Sin, the mighty, by the
authority of the god Enlil, showed mercy to no one in those battles" (R2:138).
The gods also "go before" or "open the way" for the king in battle, granting
victory (R2:50, 133; LKA 181).
The link between Akkadian kings and the gods was strengthened and empha-
sized under Naram-sin, who was no longer merely the representative of the gods,
but the "spouse of the goddess Ishtar-Annumitum" (R2:88). When he defeated a
rebellion of "the four quarters" (i.e. the entire world), thereby saving the city of
Akkad from destruction, Naram-Sin was proclaimed a god, and a temple was
dedicated to him (R2:l 13—14). Thereafter, his name was always written with a
divine determinative - a linguistic marker indicating the name of a god. His son
Shar- -kalli-shari also claimed divinity in one of his inscriptions (R2:206).
Shar-kalli-shari {2217-2192}, and the decline
of the Akkadians 48
Naram-Sin's son and successor, Shar-kalli-shari ("king of all kings") was the last of
the great Akkadian rulers, but was unable to retain power over the vast empire his
father had controlled by brutal repression. As with all Akkadian kings, the exact
chronology of his reign is uncertain. He is noted as a great temple builder, who
undertook resource gathering expeditions to Syria and Lebanon (R2: 185-91,
193); he may have been more interested in religious and cultural pursuits than in
warfare. Be that as it may, at some point during his reign a major rebellion broke
out, which is described in terms similar to those used by Naram-Sin:
When the four quarters together revolted against him [Shar-kalli-shari], from
beyond the Lower Sea as far as the Upper Sea, he smote the people and all the
Mountain Lands for the god Enlil and brought their kings in fetters before the
god Enlil. Shar-kalli-shari, the mighty, by the authority of the god Enlil,
showed mercy to no one in those battles. (R2: 192-3)
Although he claims to have suppressed this rebellion, it is clear that his victory
was tenuous. Whereas his ancestors consistently called themselves "king of the
four quarters [of the world]", Shar-kalli-shari is satisfied with "King of Agade", as
were his feeble successors.
Shar-kalli-shari's inscriptions are far fewer and less instructive than those oi
Sargon and Naram-Sin, but a basic picture begins to emerge of an empire in crisis.
In his "year names" he mentions three campaigns, claiming victories in all. The
Amorites were defeated in their mountain stronghold at Bashar (R2:183), when-
Naram-Sin had fought them earlier. Shar-kalli-shari claims to have defeated the
Elamites at the battle of Akshak, near modern Baghdad (R2:183; PAE 108). Sig
nificantly, rather than campaigning into the heart of Elani, Shar k.illi shari fought
the Elamites as they were invading the Tigris valley Finally, the < iuti.m highlantler
Kill
THE AKKADIAN EMPIRE
mi the Zagros mountains under their ruler Sharlak were defeated (R2:183), but
I destroyed. In a few years Sharlak reappears as Sharlagab (KS 330), a Gutian
I lord ruling in Mesopotamia (see pp. 102-4).
I hus Shar-kalli-shari's inscriptions reveal the empire surrounded by powerful
I militant enemies: the Amorites to the north-west; the Gutians to the east, and
Elamites to the south-east. These problems were further complicated by the
rnal revolt of recalcitrant city-states. Although royal defeats are never men-
■ii'd in the Akkadian annals, they were obviously occurring with increasing
quency, and would culminate with the collapse of the Akkadian state shortly
i Shar-kalli-shari's death. The Gutian invasion and collapse of Akkad will be
iissed in the next chapter.
mi
CHAPTER FOUR
The Neo-Sumerian period {2190-2004}
The Neo-Sumerian period is characterized by the cultural and political revival of*
Sumerian peoples after a century-and-a-half of domination by Semitic Akkadians.
The collapse of the Akkadian empire was in part caused by, and at the same time
facilitated, the migration of highlander warlords known as Gutians into Mesopo
tamia. For over half a century these foreign warlords dominated local peoples, bin
were never accepted by them as legitimate leaders. Sumerian kings first achieved
local independence, and then ousted the foreign warlords, creating the culturally
dynamic Third Dynasty of Ur. The Neo-Sumerian age lasted less than a century
and-a-half, however, ending with a second wave of outsiders invading Mesopota
mia. This time, Semitic Amorite warlords from Syria were successful in integratiiii-.
themselves into Mesopotamia!! civilization, creating a new political and militan
order that transitioned into the Middle Bronze Age. 1
Gutian warlords {c. 2190-2115} 2
At the death of Shar-kalli-shari the military crisis of Akkad was exacerbated by an
apparent civil war in which four kings ruled in only three years {2192-2190 j
There are vague allusions in the inscriptions to inter-city warfare during this per
iod (R2:209-18), which the Sumerian King-list succinctly summarizes: "Who was
king? Who was not king? Igigi, the king; Nanum, the king; Imi, the king; Elulu,
the king - the four of them were kings but reigned only three years." (KS 330)
Although Dudu {2189-2169} finally emerged as ruler of Akkad, by that time his
domain had been reduced to one city-state among many in central Mesopotamia
During this period of chaotic anarchy, Gutian highlanders emerge as a majoi
military power in Mesopotamia. Earlier vague allusions to Gutians appear in Akkadian
texts, where they are described as highlanders of the Zagros Mountains to the easi
of Akkad (ME 24-7), but their first major reference is to the defeat of the Gutian
king Sharlak by Shar-kalli-shari, mentioned on pp. 100-1 (R2:183). Thereafter,
Gutian warbands appear in Mesopotamia, first as devastating raiders, 3 and even
tually as conquerors. The specific pattern of Gutian conquest is unclear. From tin
military perspective, the fall of Akkad was characterized by h<»tli internal revolt
and outside invasion. The city-states of Sinner, I'l.un. and muilnm Mesopotamia
In '
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
became independent, while outsiders simultaneously invaded Mesopotamia.
i >iin tain highlanders from many surrounding regions seem to have participated
migration, including the Hurrians (from the northern mountains), Lullubi
i ibors of the Gutians in the Zagros mountains), Elarnites from the south of Zagros,
norites from the Jebel Bishri region of Syria, and perhaps the obscure Umman-
inda. 4 Archaeological data confirms the devastation of a number of cities in
hern Mesopotamia during this period (RA3:71 0). Later epic literature describes,
< onsiderable hyperbole, the panic and devastation of these invasions. 5 The
idian armies are defeated, the land devastated, cities are destroyed, and the rites
i gods blasphemed (LKA 271-7); all of Mesopotamia is overrun (LKA 315).
I he most important invaders were the Gutians, described as fierce and lawless
irians from the mountains. Some of the Gutian warlords managed to establish
Ives as kings over some of the city-states of Mesopotamia. The Sumerian
■ list mentions twenty-one Gutian rulers reigning for a period of about 90
I with each king ruling for only a few years (KS 330); an alternative possibility
H many of these Gutian kings were contemporaries. They should not be seen,
vever, as forming a coherent dynasty ruling all of Mesopotamia. It is more
i hey were loosely allied warlords who ruled as a foreign military aristocracy
i number of city-states. Perhaps it is best to view them as broadly similar to
(lei manic kingdoms following the fall of Rome.
1 he Sumerians viewed this period as one of chaos and devastation:
I lie Gutians [are] the fanged serpent of the mountain, who acted with violence
against the gods, who carried off the kingship of the land of Sumer to the
i Mountain land, who filled the land of Sumer with wickedness, who took
away the wife from the one who had a wife, who took away the child from the
one who had a child, who put wickedness and evil in the land of Sumer. (R2:284)
1 Hilary sources for this period range from vague to non-existent. Only the
igns of the Gutian king Erridu-pizir have substantial documentation. An
i i iption describing the revolt of one of his rebellious vassals, the king of Madga,
rhaps reflective of the anarchy of the age:
1 i i idu-pizir, the mighty, king of Gutiurn and the four quarters, hastened [to
confront] him [the rebellious king of Madga]. [Since the Gutian ruler of
Madga | feared [Erridu-pizar] he retreated [into his own original] mountain
| homeland], and [Erridu-pizir] hunted him down, captured him, led him
away [captive, and executed] him. Erridu-pizir, the mighty, king of Gutium
niil the four quarters took [him] away by force through the gate of the god of
« .in mm, struck him, and killed him, the king [of Madga]. (R2:221— 2)
v we see a ( mtian warlord ruling a city in Mesopotamia as the vassal of another
man When a conflict arises between the two, the vassal flees back to his origi-
iiiani homeland, hoping vainly to escape the wrath of his lord.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
Erridu-pizir's greatest victory was a campaign against the rival highlander Lul
lubi tribe in the Zagros. Erridu-pizir provides an itinerary for his campaign into
the mountains, forcing mountain passes and capturing the enemy commanders an J
mountain strongholds:
KA-Nisba, king of Simurrum, instigated the people of Simurrum and Lullubi
[highlanders] to revolt. Amnili, general of [the enemy Lullubi] . . . made the
land [rebel] . . . Erridu-pizir, the mighty, king of Gutium and of the fom
quarters hastened [to confront] him. He proceeded [through] the peaks ot
Mount Nisba. In six days he conquered the pass at Mount Hamemepir .
entered its pass. Erridu-pizir, the mighty, pursued him [Amnili] and con
quered the pass at Mount Nuhpir. Further, he struck down Amnili, the
[Lullubi] ... on its summit ... In a single day he . . . conquered the pass ot
Urbillum at Mount Mumum. Further, he captured Nirishuha. (R2:226-7)
Gutian domination in Mesopotamian was not universal. Many Sumerian citiei
like Ur, Uruk, Umma, Lagash, and Mari, achieved some degree of independence
during this period. Their few inscriptions, however, provide little concrete mill
tary information. From these independent Sumerian city-states arose a nationalis
tic anti-Gutian movement aimed at ousting the hated invaders. The mow
successful leader of this movement was Utuhegal of Uruk {2117-2111}, who is
credited with driving out the Gutians and inaugurating the Neo-Sumerian period
(see pp. 105-7).
Gudea, Second Dynasty of Lagash {2155-2122} 6
While the Gutians dominated much of Sumer, the city of Lagash remained inde-
pendent under the kings of its Second Dynasty. Although this period is renowned
as a cultural golden age under king Gudea {2141-2122}, the Second Dynasty ol
Lagash has not produced many military inscriptions, leaving our understanding < .1
warfare during this period rather vague. The corpus of inscriptions from Laga '
focuses instead on temple building and other ritual activities. When compared to
his lovingly detailed description of temple building, Gudea's most importai:
campaign is laconically described: "Gudea defeated the cities of Anshan and Elam
and brought the booty there from to Ningirsu in his Eninnu [temple]" (R3/1 :>
Indeed, the allusion to the campaign only occurs in the context of describing tl
materials gathered to build his beloved temples.
From the inscriptions of Lagash, it would seem that there was relative pen
during the reign of Gudea. Gudea praises the god Ningirsu, who "opened for hii
all the roads leading from the Upper to the Lower Sea" (R3/L33), which pn
sumably meant for trade rather than for warfare. His inscriptions describe bringir
building materials, precious metals and jewels from Feb. num. Finn, the IVrsi
Gulf, Magan (Oman), and the Meluhha (Indus valley) (R3/ 1:33-4, 7K). None ol
Gudea's numerous splendid statues depicts llie kine. m .ur martial context (SI > •
HU
202-17). This is generally true of the next several centuries of Mesopotamian art;
whatever reason, martial themes are seldom depicted (SDA 1 96-25 1); 7 martial
i essentially disappears during the Neo-Sumerian period.
I 'nlike the first dynasty, described in Chapter Two, the second dynasty of
ish was not an expansionist state, but apparently had a sufficiently strong mili-
I o insure its own survival. Several of the year-names are associated with the
nstruction of ritual divine weapons for dedications at temples. These include
he year the wooden [shaft] of the [divine weapon of Ningirsu] 'Mow-down-a-
i Lad' was made"; "[the war-god] Ningirsu's mace with fifty heads was fash-
>ned" (R3/l:27, 33, 75). But even these are, strictly speaking, ritual rather than
I nary activities. It remained for the warlike king Utuhegal of Uruk finally to
e the hated Gutians from Sumer.
Puzur-Inshushinak (Kutik-Inshushinak) and the Elamites
{c. 2120-1990} 8
Fhe collapse of Akkadian power allowed local nobles in Elam to gain indepen-
iii e for the first time in a century, recreating their Elamite kingdom based at
it. Puzur-Inshushinak, who began as an Akkadian vassal viceroy in Elam,
n I u ally asserted his independence, taking the title "mighty king of Awan
ii n |" by the end of his reign. His main martial inscription describes his rise to
er in Elam, capturing two rival kings "Kimash and Hurtum" and "crushing
lider his feet in one day 81 towns and regions". The king of Shimashki, a land
i of Elam, "grabbed his feet", begging for mercy, and was allowed to live as a
1 1 of Puzur-Inshushinak (PAE 123). Claiming imperial titles from the
imbling Akkadians, Puzur-Inshushinak proclaimed that "[the god] Inshush-
ik looked graciously upon him and gave him the four quarters of the earth"
! ) :653).
I'ledominant in Elam, Puzur-Inshushinak turned his attention to Mesopotamia.
t from Ur from the reign of Urnammu lists several regions of central
x)tamia as being under the rule of Puzur-Inshushinak, including Eshnunna
I Akkad itself. This brought Puzur-Inshushinak into conflict with the rising
K>wer of Urnammu of Ur (see pp. 108-9). Urnammu claims he "liberated
1 Ink, Marad, Girkal, Kazallu, and their settlements, and for Usarum, whatever
intones] were under the subjugation of [Puzur-Inshushinak] of Anshan"
S 2:409a; PAE 124-5). Elamite incursions into Mesopotamia were thus
mporarily forestalled, but a century later they would return to sack Ur itself (see
I Mi).
i
Utuhegal of Uruk {2117-2111}"
i !i overthrow of the Gutian warlords occurred in the reign of Utuhegal, king of
il Seizing the opportunity afforded by the uncertainty surrounding the
>•-» rnsmu of .i uc\y Gutian monarch named Tirigan, Utuhegal rebelled against his
III
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
Gutian overlord. He left a vivid inscription of his victory over the Gutians which
contains one of the most detailed military narratives of the third millennium,
illustrating one of the fundamental principles of ancient Near Eastern warfare: that
the decisions of the gods, even if inscrutable, control the course of history.
The god Enlil, lord of the foreign lands, commissioned Utuhegal, the mighty
man, king of Uruk, king of the four quarters, the king whose utterance can-
not be countermanded, to destroy [the Gutian] name. Thereupon Utuhegal
went to the [war] goddess Inanna, his lady, and prayed to her, saying: "My
lady, lioness of battle, who butts the foreign lands, the god Enlil has commis-
sioned me to bring back the kingship of the land of Sumer. May you be
my ally."
The enemy [Gutian] hordes had trampled everything. Tirigan, the king of
Gutium, had [seized kingship in Sumer] . . . but no [Sumerian lord] set out
against him [in battle] . He had seized both banks of the Tigris River. In the
south, in Sumer, he had blocked water from the fields. In the north, he had
closed off the roads and caused tall grass to grow up along the roads of the
land.
The foundation of Utuhegal's success was that the god Enlil chose him to "destroy
[the Gutian] name". What this meant in practical terms is uncertain, but it likely
has reference to oracles presented by the prophets of Uruk calling upon Utuhegal
to overthrow the Gutians. Utuhegal, however, does not act alone.
Utuhegal, the mighty man, went forth from Uruk and set up [a wai
banner?] ... in the temple of the god Ishkur [in Uruk]. He called out to the
citizens of his city [Uruk], saying: "The god Enlil has given Gutium to me.
My lady, the goddess Inanna, is my ally" . . . Utuhegal made the citizens ol
Uruk and Kullab [a suburb of Uruk] happy. His city followed him [in the
decision to go to war] as if they were just one person.
Having received oracles of victory from the gods Enlil and Inanna, Utuheg.il
summons a city council at the plaza before the temple of Ishkur. He announces the
oracles and he rallies the citizens of Uruk to support his rebellion against the
Gutians. This incident emphasizes that Sumerian kings had to rely on the suppori
of their citizens for war, and that oracles could sway public opinion in these mat-
ters one way or another. With the support of the city, Utuhegal launches his
campaign.
Utuhegal arranged in correct array his select elite troops. After Utuhegal
departed from the temple of the god Ishkur [in Uruk], on the fourth day In-
set up [camp] in the city of Nagsu on the Iturungal canal. On the fifth day h<
set up [camp] in the shrine Ilitappe. He captured Ur Nin.i/n and Nahi Enlil
generals whom [Tirigan, king of the Gutians | had smi i to the land <
Sumer, and put handcuffs on them. After he departed from the shrine Ili-
tappe, on the sixth day he set up [camp] at Karkar. He proceeded to the god
Ishkur and prayed to him, saying: "O god Ishkur! The god Enlil has given me
his weapon. May you be my ally"
Fhe reference to "select elite troops" is important, demonstrating a ranking of the
I- i.i 1 1 ty and value of soldiers. Utuhegal's itinerary is our most detailed description
i Sumerian army on the march. He emphasizes his daily piety, repeatedly caUing
■ the gods for assistance, attempting to act in accordance with the will of the gods
P battle. A rough estimate of a days march for a Sumerian army can be deter-
mined from Utuhegal's itinerary. The next passage notes that battle took place
i |>M ream from Adab" some fifty miles north of Uruk, which was reached after a
day march, thus averaging about eight to nine miles a day. Utuhegal then
i ibes the day of battle.
In the middle of that night [Utuhegal] got up, and at daybreak proceeded to a
point upstream from Adab. ... In that place, against the Gutians, he laid a trap
and led his troops against them. Utuhegal, the mighty man, defeated their
generals. Then Tirigan, king of Gutium, fled alone on foot to Dabrum..
Since the citizens of Dabrum realized that Utuhegal was the king to whom
the god Enlil had granted power, they did not let Tirigan go. The envoys of
Utuhegal captured Tirigan along with his wife and children at Dabrum. They
put handcuffs and a blindfold on him. Utuhegal made him lie at the feet of
the god Utu and placed his foot on his neck. [Thus Utuhegal] removed [the
( lutians and] . . . brought back the kingship of the land of Sumer. (R2:284-7)
mIk gal's use of a stratagem to trick the Gutian should remind us that, although
ing on the will of the gods for victory, the Sumer ians none the less also fought
i in the real world of weapons, supplies, and tactics. Even if Enlil had promised
• tory, Utuhegal still used a stratagem. This auspicious victory over Tirigan was
m. inhered m later years in books of divination (Cl/2:462). The mention that
irigan "fled [the battle] alone on foot" undoubtedly has reference to the standard
oi War-carts in battle at this time.
tuhegals victory, although decisive, was apparently not complete. Most of
OJthern Mesopotamia rallied to his support, but the full extent of his domain is
»t certain. He did not, however, found a stable dynasty. After a reign of only
Vtn years he died, according to legend, by accidental drowning while inspecting
dike. Real political power in Sumer passed into the hands of Urnammu, the
nine governor of Ur, founder of the glorious Third Dynasty of Ur.
The Third Dynasty of Ur {2112-2004}
10
lh',,1 Dynasty of Ur (or Ur III) witnessed the last flowering of Sumerian
u|[uljl •" Inevement; indeed, most of the literature, art, and architecture generally
I IK,
in'
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
associated with Sumer was produced during Ur III. Militarily, this was also a pci
iod of Sumerian ascendancy in Mesopotamia, in which the kings of Ur were the
dominant military force in the region.
Urnammu {2112-209 5} 11
Although best known for his cultural achievements in law, literature, and art, an
for the building of the magnificent ziggurat of Ur, Urnammu also played i
important military role as well. Unfortunately, his surviving inscriptions focus m
his building projects, leaving us with fragmentary information about his milit.n
activities. Furthermore, as is often the case in early Mesopotamian military histoi \
a precise chronology of Urnammu s campaigns cannot be established from 1 1 1
fragmentary evidence.
Under Utuhegal of Uruk, Urnammu had served as governor of Ur; somi
scholars suspect that he was the son-in-law of Utuhegal (R3/2:9). While governoi
of Ur for Utuhegal, Urnammu engaged in a border dispute with Lagash, defeatin
them and annexing a portion of their land with the acquiescence of Utuhcg.
(R3/2:10). Upon the death of his suzerain Utuhegal, Urnammu declared hinisc
an independent king {2112}, initially ruling only the city-state of Ur and its sui
rounding land; the fortifications of Ur were significantly strengthened early in in
reign (R3/2:ll, 19, 25-6). Later the fortifications of Nippur were also refurbishes
(R3/2:76).
The anarchy of the Gutian period left brigands and pirates infesting bol
Mesopotamia and the Persian Gulf Part of Urnammu s achievement was to "pu
the road in order from the south to the north" (R3/2:14) and to resume tradi
with Magan (Oman) in the Persian Gulf (R3/2:41, 47). This restoration ol
order and trade in Mesopotamia laid the foundation for the economic and oil
tural renaissance of the Neo-Sumerian period. One of Urnammu 's claims was I
have cleared out the brigands and to have made river and land travel secun
(CS 2:409). As part of this process he mentions the "sea-captains" who "has
control of the foreign maritime trade" in the Persian Gulf; Urnammu "establish- d
freedom" for the Sumerian maritime traders (CS 2:409a). These "sea-captains"
can be interpreted in one of two ways. It could simply refer to non-Sumeri.m
merchants who had taken control of ocean trade during the Gutian anarchy. C h
the other hand, they may be Persian Gulf pirates who were pillaging Sumerian
merchants, in which case Urnammu is describing the first anti-pirate nava
campaign in history. He also mentions the return of a "Magan-boat" at Ui
probably a reference to a boat capable of sailing the Persian Gulf to Magan-Omai
(CS 2:409a).
Urnammu undertook a number of campaigns which resulted in the hegemon
of Ur in Sumeria. His armies conquered Lagash in battle, absorbing the city inn-
his domain, although leaving it to be governed by local at istoi rats (R 3/2:47). 1 I<
also defeated his former masters at Urnk (R3/2: NO I vmiuallv Ik- "banished
malediction, violence and strife" which is to say he defeat- J Ins rivals and
|()
hi igands. Ur's predominance in Mesopotamia was ritually recognized in a
ii festival at Nippur, culminating in his declaration as "king of the lands
and Akkad" who "restored the ancient state of affairs", which is to say,
red Sumerian rule in a unified Mesopotamia. 12
i 'h Urnammu's direct military power was limited to central and southern
I ii nia, he formulated an alliance with Mari to the north-west in Syria to
the growing power of the Amorite nomads in the Syrian steppe, who
iip-lv threatened Mesopotamia throughout Ur III. 13 This alliance was sealed
marriage of Urnammu's son with Taram-Uram, the daughter Apil-Kin,
■ Mari (R3/2/.86).
une point in his reign Urnammu began to campaign to the east outside of
i imia. As noted above, the Elamite kingdom under Puzur-Inshushinak
M advantage of the power vacuum in Mesopotamia following the collapse
hi power in Mesopotamia to sieze several Sumerian city-states (R3/2:48).
inn campaigned into "highland Elam", defeated the coalition of the
king, and liberated the Sumerian city-states (R3/2: 19-20, 65-6; PAE
n are fragmentary inscriptions describing campaigns by Urnammu against
hi ins as well. Although driven from dominance in Mesopotamia by the
ii of Utuhegal, the Gutians had not been decisively crushed, and still
nted a serious potential threat to Mesopotamia. Gutarla, king of the
Still had garrisons in parts of Mesopotamia, from which he conducted
\ (R3/2:67). Urnammu campaigned victoriously against the Gutians "in their
in binding "the bloody hands of the Gutian" prisoners (R3/2:ll, 21).
this victory did not fully break the Gutians, however, for, according to
1 1 ms funerary lament, he died in battle against them in 2095, when his
roke and fled, leaving him stranded on the battlefield: "in the place of
'lit a they [the army of Ur] abandoned [their king] Urnammu [in battle] like a
pitcher
This is one of the rare examples of Mesopotamian royal
1 1 pi sot is describing the defeat and death of a king in battle.
Shulgi {2094-2047}
15
■it!\ after the death of his father Urnammu in battle, Shulgi carried out a
iilive campaign against the Gutians to avenge his death (R3/2:20). Thereafter,
tin most part, the early years of Shulgi 's reign are generally associated in his
i names with peaceful religious and building activities. There were, however,
military undertakings; in his seventh year {2088}, the highlander "Su peo-
n hI the lands of Zabshali [northwest Iran], from the border of Anshan to the
Sea, rose like locusts" and invaded Mesopotamia. Shulgi undertook a
ntive expedition against them (DZ 138-9).
n the second half of his reign {2076-2047}, however, war becomes increas-
\ loinmon, with about hall the year names associated with campaigning. In
last p. lit nl Ins u-igii Shulgi undertook a generally expansionist policy, leading
So' j
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
to conquests throughout Sumer and hegemony abroad, which was continued by
his son Amarsin, creating a Sumerian empire.
Shulgis campaign against Der {2076} contains some interesting tactical details.
On the eve of battle Shulgi apparently destroyed some irrigation dikes, flooding
the enemy's positions: ''The banks of the River Diyala and the River Taban he
smashed, and in a swamp he annihilated the enemy. [In] the land which he inun-
dated he smashed his enemy's weapon" (R3/2: 142-3). Thereafter, Shulgi under-
mined the walls of Der and destroyed the city: "I [Shulgi] arrived at the rebellious
land [of Der]; [my army] ripped out the brickwork [of its walls] by its foundation.
May the city I have smitten not be restored! The houses which I destroyed were
ruined heaps" (R3/2:103). After the destruction of Der, Shulgi built two
fortresses — Shulgi-Nanna and Ishim-Shulgi - to maintain Sumerian control of
the region (R3/2:103), assigning Ur-Suena as military governor of the area
(R3/2:190).
Thereafter Shulgi was at war on a regular basis. One of his major efforts was in
the north against the Hurrian invaders, who had migrated into much of northern
Mesopotamia during the Gutian period. Shulgi launched three multi-year wars
against them in the upper Tigris region. Although he was generally successful in
these campaigns, the Hurrians remained an important and growing military
power. 16 Most of Shulgi 's campaigns are only vaguely described, with standardized
formula such as "the year X was destroyed". Some of these sites cannot: be securely
identified. Shulgi claimed victory over Karahar {2071}, Harshi {2068}, Shasru
{2053}, and Simashki (R3/2:104, 108; 451). At some point in the latter part of his
reign, Shulgi added to his original title "mighty man, king of Ur", the title "king
of the Lands of Sumer and Akkad" and "king of the four quarters [of the world]"
(R3/2:149), indicating his claim to military pre-eminence in Mesopotamia
(93/2:1 11-16).
We are given more detail on a few of his campaigns. Over the course of twenty
years Shulgi campaigned against the recalcitrant Hurrian stronghold of Simurruni
five times {2069, 2068, 2062, 2050, 2049}, eventually capturing the city and its king
Tappan-Darah. This was considered a great victory, as it is referenced several times
in later oracular literature (R3/2: 104-5). Attempting to improve relations with Elam,
Shulgi married his daughter to the "governor of Anshan" in 2065. The alliance
was unstable, however, and he invaded and defeated Anshan in 2061 (R3/2:104— 5).
There are signs in the later part of Shulgi 's reign of increasing military stress. In
2059 he built the "Wall of the Land", also known as the "Wall Facing the High
land". The location of Shulgi s wall is not certain, but it was probably aimed al
preventing incursions by the Tidnumite nomad tribe of the Amorites (R3/2:106)
The "highlands" possibly refers to Mount Bishri (Bashar) to the west of the Upper
Euphrates, which had been a haunt of Amorite nomads since the days of Narain
Sin two centuries earlier. If so, the wall was the first attempt to limit or control the
access of the Amorites into central Mesopotamia. The building of the wall was leli
in the care of his general Puzur-Shulgi; part of the Icitei in whn h Shulgi ouli i
the building of the wall has survived:
The wall is to be finished in the period of one month! There are to be no
further inquiries pertaining to these building activities! For now the Tidnum
| tribe of the Amorite nomads] have come down from the mountain (R3/
2:106)
lis letter seems to indicate that the building of the wall was taking longer than
ipected and presumably going over budget, and that part of the reason for this
is that the Tidnum nomads were harassing the builders, having already "come
i) from the mountain".
This wall seems to be the first phase of the more famous "wall that repels
u< nites" which was built by Shusm against incursions by Amorite nomads,
►resenting the beginning of a shift from an offensive posture against highlanders
defensive walls to limit their raids. This represents a significant psychological
ifi in the martial mentality of the age: the Amorites, Hurrians, and Gutians
mi iot be decisively defeated - the best we can do is hold them at bay. This "great
Wr mentality, more famous in its monumental Chinese manifestation, became
ftdamental to the Ur III martial policy in the twenty-first century The wall was
■ I ompanied by the development of military garrison colonies and cities along a
R nsive zone facing the Zagros Mountains to attempt to prevent incursions from
Ighlanders (DZ 153-6). The wall and defensive zone may have been initially
essful, for we hear of no further Tidnum incursions for over twenty years. On
i 'flier hand, as noted below, the policy was ultimately to fail
In the last five years of Shulgi's reign {2051-2047} Ur was involved in repeated
impaigns against coalitions of partially subdued Hurrian city-states in northern
bopotamia. The problems began with a coalition between the city of
"mui-rum - which Shulgi had already defeated three times - and the highlanders
I I ullubu. Shulgi claims to have defeated them in 2051. If so, it was not a decisive
i( tory, for in 2050 they were back in alliance with Urbillum (modern Arbil) and
ii 1 1 Kir. The campaigns of 2049-2047 were directed against another rebel coali-
b« of Kimash, Hurti, and Harshi (R3/2: 107-9; 455), whose defeated dead he
k aped up [in] a pile of corpses" (R3/2:141). The need for repeated campaigns
unst Hurrian and Lullubi coalitions again points to declining military strength,
rhaps associated with the fact that Shulgi was by now probably in his sixties or
- lines, and may have been too old to effectively rule or lead his armies. Despite
h mixed success in warfare, Ur was none the less the predominant military
power of Mesopotamia at the death of Shulgi.
Military themes in the Shulgi hymns (TSH)
lin,rl of ki »K Shulgi of Ur {2094-2047} - who proclaimed himself a
init) prepared a number of panegyric hymns praising the kings divine
iltties, including Ins military prowess. It goes without saying that the king is
undsomr, stmnj-, courteous and brave (TSH 73-5). By all accounts Shulgi was a
"I"'!' .iihlrtc. I.r [hums o! hav.ng run from Nippui to Ur (over 100 miles)
110
I 1 !
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
some 1500 years before Phidippides' more famous effort in Greece (R3/2:97,
157; Her. 6.106), in which he was later emulated by Ishme-Dagan of Ism
(R4:37).
The Shulgi hymns provide us with some detailed literary narratives of actual
combat in Neo-Sumerian times. One of Shulgi's hymns gives an epic description
of a battle against the Gutians. Despite its hyperbole, poetic language and ritual
setting, the hymn provides a useful window into the characteristics of Sumerian
battle. The battle begins with an exchange of missile fire:
I will raise my spear against [the enemy]
I will set up my banner against the border of the foreign land
I will fill my quiver,
My bow will distend, ready to shoot, like a raging serpent,
The barbed arrows will flash before me like lightening
The barbar-ar rows, like swiftly flying bats
Will fly into the "mouth of its battle".
Slingstones will pour down on its people;
Heavy clay lumps, like the "hand stones",
Will be striking on their back.
The crushed people of the rebellious land,
I will cut down with my bow and sling like locusts. (TSH 79)
Following the missile exchange, the battle transforms into a bloody melee witli
maces and axes:
My [mace?] will sharpen its teeth at the "head of the land"
My m^wm- weapon will shed the blood of the people like water.
My weapon, the double-edged axe,
Will [spill?] their blood, which will cover the [land]
Having been spilled on the highland, the contents of a broken wine-jug . . .
In its wadis the blood will flow like water. (TSH 79)
In many periods of history, being taken captive after a battle or siege was often
only marginally more satisfactory than dying. But in the ancient Near East the
plight of the prisoner was particularly miserable. Royal prisoners were often mar-
ched naked and in stocks back to the capital of the victorious king, where they
were paraded in triumph, brought before the gods, and ritually debased by having
the victorious king stand on their heads or bodies in the courtyards before the
temples of the gods. The great hero Shulgi boasts that he will "set my foot on his
[the defeated king's] head ... I will make him die amid dripping blood" (TSH 77);
the enemy was ritually executed by being disemboweled (TSH 77) in what prob
ably amounted to a form of human sacrifice.
In the aftermath of the battle the adults were often killed, children were
enslaved, and the fields and city destroyed.
1 I >
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
I he children of the foreign land, he made them embark on his ships
I he adults he killed in revenge.. . .
I he hero avenged his city,
Whatever has been destroyed in Sumer, he destroyed in the foreign [Gutian]
land ... In its cultivated fields of shining barley, he caused weeds to grow,
I I e destroyed its wide and large trees with the axe. . . .
The king, after he destroyed the city, ruined the city walls . . .
I [e dispersed the seed of the Gutians like seed-grain. (TSH 85)
I ii iv other prisoners were kept as slaves and sent to work on agriculture, canal
;ing, mining, and quarrying or building projects (USP 47-50).
\lier the victory, great plunder is brought back to Sumer in a triumphal
The pure lapis-lazuli of the foreign land he loaded into leather-bags
I le heaped up all its treasures
\ massed all the wealth of the foreign land,
I I s fattened oxen and fattened sheep.
I [e invokes the name of [the god] Enlil,
I le invokes the name of [the god] Ninlil
The hero [Shulgi], having carried out a noble revenge in the foreign land
| The king rode in] his shining royal magur-hodX . . .
Shulgi, the righteous shepherd of Sumer,
Placed his feet upon [his enemy's neck]
I Fpon a throne he took seat.
Die sim and ala-drums resounded for him,
The tigi-drums played for him music:
My king has destroyed the foreign land, you have plundered its cities
I ike a wild bull in the mountain",
Sang the singers a song for him. (TSH 85-7)
1 1 ill; 1 , i then enters the temple of Enlil, dedicating the plunder to the gods, and
• < riving in return a divine decree of long, prosperous, and victorious rule (TSH
9), In another context it is clear that the soldiers also received their fair share of
inder. Alter defeating the Elamites, the king "brought the booty to the god
1 1 1 hi. my lord, in Nippur, and marked it for him. The remainder I presented as a
lit to my troops" (R3/2:66).
Amarsin (Amar-Suena) {2046-2038}
17
i ill the reign of Amarsin is rather poorly documented for military affairs.
hi it in Mm ceded his father Shulgi in the midst of an ongoing war with Urbil-
iuiit. against which he dispatched his general Niridagal in 2045 (R3/2:236), Nir-
hl.ii-.il semis to have (let lsively defeated that city, which is later listed as having an
i I ;
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Ur- appointed military governor (R3/2:324). Thereafter Amarsin turned his
attention to the north, launching two expeditions under general Haship-atal
against Shashrum and Shuruthum in 2043 and 2041. According to the recon-
struction of events by Frayne (R3/2:238-9), the campaign went northwest
from the Diyala river, also conquering the cities of Rashap and Arrapha. In
2040 Amarsin invaded Huhnuri in Elam (R3/2:239). At some point in his reign
he built a "watchtower" in Ur, but its precise military function, if any, is obscure
(R3/2:259).
Some idea of the size of the empire of Ur can be discerned by the seal
inscriptions of Ur-appointed city governors. Eventually the rulers of Ur are
known to have had dependent governors in at least sixteen Mesopotamian cities,
including Umma, Push, Kish, Lagash, Kazallu, Nippur, Sharrakum, Adab, Ishkun-
Sin, Shuruppak, Marad, Simudar, Kutha, Uruk, and Eresh (R3/2:xli-xliv, 3, 271-
7). There were undoubtedly other governors as well, for whom we lack records,
along with additional vassal states. There were other cities with known Sumerian
governors outside of Sumer itself, including Ashur, Babylon, Eshnunna, Simur
rum, and Susa in Elam (R3/2:27T-7); Ashur was governed by a general (gir.nita)
named Zarriqum (R3/2:278, AT.9).
At the height of its power the empire of Ur III was divided into three zones,
each with a different relationship to the city of Ur. 18 In the central heartland of
Sumer and Akkad (southern and central Mesopotamia), the cities were ruled by
governors directly appointed by the king of Ur, directly paying taxes (bald) of
goods and services. The second zone, along the central Tigris valley and parts of
Elam, were conquered lands which had garrisons of soldiers (erin) with military
commanders (shagina) appointed from Ur. These provinces paid the "tribute of the
provinces" (gun mada) in livestock and other products. In one year alone this tri-
bute amounted to 28,000 cattle and 350,000 sheep (CAM 102). The third zone-
consisted of allied and vassal states, who had their own independent rulers but who
were dependent in some way on Ur. This region is rather amorphous and infor
mal, with changeable relations with specific cities, but included at different times
parts of western Iran, the upper Tigris, the middle Euphrates and parts of Syria.
These regions sent ambassadors to Ur, intermarried with the royal family, and sent
various forms of tribute or diplomatic gifts (HE2:85-101). The middle Euphrates,
including Mari and Ebla, seemed to have some type of tributary status to Ur (HE
2:125—33), while ambassadors were received from as far away as Byblos on the
Mediterranean coast (EH2:122). In 2048 Shulgi received tribute (gun) from Ebl.i
consisting of "500 tilpanu-wezpom of sudianum-vsood and 500 containers ( G ^.kab-kul)
of the same wood" (HE2: 128-9), which I interpret to be 500 bows and quivers
(see p. 91). This substantial tribute in weapons points to some type of vassalage on
the part of Ebla to Ur, and further emphasizes the importance of archery in Nco
Sumerian armies.
Amarsin's overall predominance in Mesopotamia is reflected in his continuinv
claim to the title "king of the four quarters |of tin- u<mU|" later legend
remember that, during Amarsin's reign, "the homeland n-\i«ln-d" (K \ ?. 136) bui
I I
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
cannot be confirmed by any contemporary documents. It seems succession
M i nrred without incident.
Shusin {2037-2029} and the Amorite Wars
hAilitarily speaking, Shusin's reign is one of the better documented of the Ur III
K nasty (R3/2:285-359). As noted above, most of Shusin's predecessors had
used their attention on the conquest of the Tigris valley in north-eastern Iraq.
'nh this flank stabilized, Shusin turned his attention to the west and the middle
i I'h rates basin. Early in his reign he entered into a military alliance with the
■I ih Euphrates city-state of Simanum (north-east Syria) through the marriage of
daughter Kunshi-matum to Arib-atal, son of king Pusham. 19 Although the
nls are unknown, in 2036 a coup occurred in which Pusham and his family
1 1 ousted from power. The perpetrators of the coup are not named, but they
) have been Elurrians, and they received assistance from the Amorite nomads.
'nli the help of the gods Enlil and Inanna, Shusin - who "makes the foreign
Ountry tremble" — launched a campaign against the rebels in Simanum in 2035,
bit h quickly turned into a much larger extended war with the Amorites.
I Usui his base at Ashur, Shusin led the army of Ur northward up the Tigris,
H <uiring Nineveh, Talmush, and Habura. At this time Nineveh seems to have
pen in the domain of the Hurrian king Tish-atal of Urkish (modern Mozan),
vho appears to have dominated the upper Tigris during the early Ur III period,
• I who may have been Shusin's uncle. 20 Shusin continued his march up the
us, eventually reaching Simanum, where Shusin "smote the heads of Sima-
iii Habura, and the surrounding districts". With the rebels defeated, Pusham
1 Ins family were restored to the throne.
We are provided with some details of the fate of prisoners from this campaign,
Uio were deported and settled in a new town on the frontier of Nippur, perhaps
work on Shusin's defensive wall described below. Shusin boasts: "Since the
nythical] days of decreeing the fates [at the foundation of the world], no king has
f il dished a town for the god Enlil and the goddess Ninlil on the frontier of
ippur, with people he had captured." This type of mass deportation of citizens
in defeated cities would become a standard practice throughout Mesopotamian
litory. Conquered people became in many ways a form of war plunder, to be
"lire ted and transported just like silver or lapis lazuli or building timber. Warfare
ited a mobile market of displaced migrant workers whom the kings could move
• support new agricultural or building projects.
I Vspite this victory, Shusin was forced to deal with an ongoing threat from the
tmoritc nomads, which his grandfather Shulgi had temporarily suppressed twenty
s earlier, in around 2059. The Amorite nomads of the Tidnum tribe had
idy been raiding, or migrating into, the agricultural land along the middle
uphratcs, since Shusin's continuing campaign in 2034 is said to have been
iidertaken in order to "remove any cause for complaint from the [people who
■ >\\ the] furrows nl the |agricultural| land |by| vengeance [against the] Tidnum
1 I i
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
[nomadic raids]" (R3/2:290). Perhaps using the newly conquered Simanum as
base, in 2035 Shusin launched an attack against the Tidnum Amorite nomadv
possibly advancing as far as Aleppo (Yamhad) (R3/2:290, 299, 301). He claimi
that "the big mountains [where the Amorites live] were subdued . . . the towih
the populations, and their settlements, were turned into ruins".
Despite these claims, the campaign was far from decisive, for in the followin
year, 2034, Shusin decided to build "the Amorite wall called Tt keeps [the] Tie!
num [nomads] at a distance' " (K3/2:290, 328). A letter from the building com
missioner to king Shusin provides an informative description of the wall:
To Shusin, my king . . . thus says Sharrum-bani, the high commissioner, youi
servant. You have sent me as an envoy in order to build the great wall "II
keeps Amorites at a distance". I am presenting to you how matters stand. Tli
Amorites are descending upon the land. You have instructed me to build iM
wall, to cut off their path so that they may not overwhelm the fields by .i
breach between the Tigris and Euphrates.... As a result of my building
activities the wall is now 26 danna long. When I sent for word to the area
between the two mountains it was brought to my attention that the [Amoi
ites] were encamped in the mountains. [The Hurrians at] Simurrum had
come to their aid. Therefore I proceeded to the area "between" the mountain
ranges of Ebih in order to do battle. 21
The text is somewhat vague, but it seems the Amorites had already crossed thi
Euphrates, probably in the north, and were raiding southward between thi
Euphrates and the Tigris. The wall was being built from the banks of the Tigris t<
the Euphrates to forestall further penetration southward into central and southern
Mesopotamia. Ruins of this earth and clay wall - estimated to have been about
170 miles (280 km) long - can still be seen north of Baghdad. 22 The wall would
thus be similar to Nebuchadnezzar's later "Wall of Media". The "mountain range
of Ebih" have not been identified with certainty, but might perhaps have reference
to the twin mountains Abd al-Aziz and Sinjar in northern Mesopotamia. 'IT
building of this wall shows the concern over the growing military threat from ch<
Amorites, who would eventually participate in the destruction of the empire o
Ur. None the less, Shusin's campaigns were successful in temporarily holding the
Amorite threat at bay.
The Zagros highlanders posed a simultaneous threat which was opposed with i
vigorous campaign in 2031 against Indasu, king of Zabshali (R3/2:30T-6). Shusin
describes their depredations as being "like a swarm of locusts from the border ol
Anshan (in south-east Iran] to the Upper [Mediterranean] Sea", listing ovei
dozen subsidiary tribes or city-states who formed a confederation against I U
Details of the battle are lacking; attention is paid to killing, scattering, and decap
itating the enemy, finally piling their corpses into a heap. The captured leadci
were bound and brought as captives before the god luilil Others scattered
attempting to . . .
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
ive their lives by fleeing to their cities, [but Shusin marched] against their
i nes, screeching like an Anzu [dragon]. He turned their cities into ruined
heaps; he destroyed their walls. He blinded the men of those cities . . . and
ublished them as slaves in the orchards of the gods ... [the women] he
'llercd as a present to the weaving mills of the god Enlil and the goddess
mlil. (R3/2:309-12)
i captives were enslaved and forced to work in the silver and gold mine at
i i. one of the conquered cities. In addition to slaves, Shusin lists livestock and
'her sacks filled with gold and silver" and bronze as his booty. In triumph,
n created a monument depicting himself trampling the captive king Indasu,
• with the names often other captured leaders of the coalition.
fragmentary inscription describes a naval campaign of Shusin to "Magan
in], along with its provinces . . . [and] the other side of the sea ..." (R3/
I I which could have been an extension of Shusin's Elamite campaign. The
Miation of his campaigns on the Upper Euphrates, against Elam, and in the
hi Gulf allowed Shusin to claim the ancient Akkadian title of ruler from the
>i to the Upper Sea" (R3/2:302, 317), maintaining the Third Dynasty of Ur
dominant power in Mesopotamia.
Ibbisin (Ibbi-Suen) {2028-2004} and the fall ofUr 23
ms reign marked the decline and collapse of the Ur III dynasty, unleashing an
iii!» period of invasion and chaos. Ibbisin s year names and inscriptions show
more concern with religious ritual than with the collapsing military and poli-
ii nation of Ur. None the less, a number of campaigns are mentioned. For the
i part these were defensive in nature, against provinces or cities which had
i submitted to Ur, but had now gained independence.
In 2023 {Y6} Ibbisin undertook repairs and expansion on the walls of Nippur
lh, perhaps reflecting a perception of an increasing threat to the heartland
! 363). In a propagandistic inscription describing the building of the walls,
i 'iiii wrote: "in order to make the land secure and to make the highlands and
* lands bow down before him, he surrounded his city with a great wall, whose
i holes cannot be reached, and which is like a yellow mountain" (R3/2:369).
low a defensive wall on a city in Sumer would make the highlanders "bow
m\\ n" before the king of Ur is not explained. The defensive attitude, perhaps an
tension of the great wall mentality, could not mask an increasingly desperate
■ niln.it v situation.
1 he fall of the empire of Ur is rather well documented by the standards of the
\ ii Iv lironze Age. Psychologically for Mesopotamians it was rather like the fall of
1 nine m (he West, and from the military perspective it marks the end of the Early
llrnn/e Age and the beginning of the Middle Bronze. A number of factors con-
nhuted to the I. ill ol Ur. Internal political instability is reflected in the defection
ind independence ol a number ol citv states in both rlie heartland and the
117
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
periphery of the empire, which had been brought into submission by the cam
paigns of Shulgi, Amarsin, and Shusin. "The lands that had been in obedience to
Ur were split into factions' 5 (LD 43). By 2027 {Y2} Eshnunna and the province oi
Simurrum had cast off allegiance, leading Ibbisin to send an army against them the
next year (R3/2:366, 362). The campaign was apparently a failure, because the
defections increased rapidly: Susa and Elam in 2026 {Y3}, Lagash in 2024 {Y5j,
Umma in 2023 {Y6}, and Nippur in 2022 {Y7}. Girsu became independent
under kings Ur-Ningirsu and Ur-Nanshe (R3/2: 427-31).
Although we lack full documentation, other cities undoubtedly followed suit,
while "brigands roamed the roads" (LD 42). More ominously, the Elamites were
not only independent, but becoming increasingly hostile towards Ur, which
would culminate in their destruction of the city In an effort to stabilize the situa-
tion in Elam, Ibbisin "marched [eastward] with heavy forces against Huhnuri [near
modern Behbehan] the 'open mouth' of the land of Anshan" in 2020 {Y9} (R3/
2:363). This operation was indecisive, however, for he was back in 2015 {Y14j :
Ibbisin "roared like a storm against Susa, Adamdun and the land of Awan [in
Elam]; he made them submit in a single day and took their lords as bound cap
tives", dedicating part of the plunder to the gods. The booty from this war appears
to have caused a temporary economic boom in Ur, but was insufficient to save the
state (R3/2:364, 371-2). Overall, prices of foodstuffs increased manifold during
this period. 24
At the same time the situation was also rapidly degenerating on the north-west
frontier, where the Amorites were becoming an increasing military threat. A series
of letters exchanged between Ibbisin and his governors in the north-west shed an
interesting light on the unfolding crisis. Despite the defection of south-eastern
Mesopotamia, Isin remained temporarily loyal under its governor Ishbi-Irra. From
2020 to 2010 {Y9-19}, the degenerating situation began to threaten the grain
supply to Ur. Ishbi-Irra, governor of Isin, wrote to Ibbisin explaining the situation:
Thus says Ishbi-Irra, your servant: You have instructed me to proceed on an
expedition to Isin and Kazallu in order to purchase grain. The market price ol
grain has reached one gur [of grain] per shekel [of silver] ... . Word having
reached me that the hostile Amorites had entered into the midst of your land I
brought all of the 72,000 gur of grain into Isin. And now all of the Amorites
have entered into the land. One by one they have seized all the fortifications
Because of the Amorites I have been unable to thresh the grain. They are too
strong for me, I am trapped [in the city of Isin]. 25
Here we see a countryside overrun by Amorite nomads to the extent that the Sumei
ians are simply hiding in their cities, unable to harvest their fields as the price of grain
skyrockets. At some point Ishbi-Irra, exasperated with the weakness of Ibbisin.
declared his independence, leading to war with his former overlord (see pp. 1 59— 62).
In 2013 {Y17} Ibbisin made the enigmatic claim tli.it "tins veil die Amorin
of the southern border, who from ancient times haw kiinwn im » it us, submitted
Ibbisin, king of Ur" (R3/2:364; AUP 94). Importantly, the text does not a
mi military victory over the Amorites, but only that they "submitted", perhaps
turn for a payment of tribute. This "submission", however, apparently repre-
Bted the formation of some type of coalition between Ibbisin and the Amorites
■mist Ishbi-Irra, the erstwhile governor of Isin; it may be alluded to in mythic
i ins in the following inscription: "[the god] Enlil, my helper, has summoned the
bnorites from their mountain, Elam will come to my side and catch Ishbi-Irra
I governor of Isin]" (AUP 95). Thus, as has happened on occasion in history,
ii two rivals are locked in a civil war for the control of an empire, one may
mi to outside barbarians for assistance, buying short-term victory at the cost of
term security. What exactly this submission or coalition entailed is unclear;
bile it may have represented a temporary set-back for Ishbi-Irra, it was a major
tory for the Amorite invaders, whose spread throughout Mesopotamia was
by facilitated.
Instead of providing military assistance to his beleaguered governor, Ibbisin
ited Ishbi-Irra for dereliction of duty and malfeasance:
lh ns says your king Ibbi-Sin: . . . You received twenty talents of silver to buy
grain and you proceed to buy two gur of grain for each shekel, but to me you
send one gur for each shekel. How is it that you permitted the Amorites, the
enemy, to enter my land against Puzur-Numushda, the commandant of Bad-
igihursagga? I sent you weapons with which to strike; how is it that you sent
the "men without heads" [fools? decapitated soldiers?] who are in the land
against the Amorites from the north? (R3/2:367)
I he degenerating relations between Ibbisin and his governor eventually led to
ul war. By 2010 {Y19} Ishbi-Irra of Isin had declared independence from the
■ ttcetual Ibbisin, and had begun carving out his own state in central Mesopota-
I lie situation was described by Puzur-Shugli, governor of Kazallu, apparently
« List governor in the region loyal to Ibbisin:
| Ishbi-Irra] has built the wall of Isin.. . . He has taken Nippur, set his men as
the garrison, and captured Nigugani, the highest priest of Nippur. He has
made [his general] Idi enter Malgium and plundered Hamasi. He has put
/annum, governor of Subartu, in prison. He has returned Nur-Ahum, gov-
ernor of Eshnunna, Shu-Enlil, governor of Kish, and Puzur-Tut, governor of
Uorsippa, to their [former] positions [from which Ibbisin had removed them
Idi disloyalty?].. . . Ishbi-Irra proceeds at the head of his army.. . . He captured
the banks of the Tigris, Euphrates, [and] the Abgal and Me-Enlila canals. He
brought in Idin-Malgium [as an ally] He quarreled with Girbubu, the gov-
ernor of ( rirka] . . . and took him prisoner. His battle cry lies heavy upon me.
Now he has set his eye upon me. I have no ally, no one to go [to battle] with!
Mthoiii'h his hand has not yet reached me, should he descend upon me, I
hall have to flee '''
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
By this time, however, Ibbisin was in no position to help his last loyal governor in
central Mesopotamia. "Ur's king sat immobilized in the palace, all alone. Ibbi-Sin
was sitting in anguish in the palace, all alone. In the Enamtila, the palace of his
delight, he was crying bitterly" (LD 43).
By 2007 {Y22} the chaos had reached the capital of Ur. Amorite nomads from
the north, along with Gutian highlanders and Elamites, overran all of Mesopota
mia. Ibbisin records an obscure inscription: "Ibbisin, king of Ur, held firm the city
of Ur . . . which had been devastated by the 'flood' which had been commanded
by the gods and which shook the whole world" (R3/2:365). Many scholars view
this statement as a euphemistic metaphor: the "flood" is a flood of enemies who
overran much of the kingdom, but were unable as yet to capture Ur itself. Indeed,
this same flood metaphor is used to describe the attack of Gutians and Elamites
against Ur (LD AX)? 1 The next year, 2006 {Y23} Ibbisin also describes the com
ing of a "stupid monkey" to Ur, which some scholars see as a euphemism for an
attack by an enemy king (R3/2:365). In 2005 {Y24}, the final year of Ibbisin 's
reign, a fragmentary inscription describes the Elamites as "smiting Ur", ending the
dynasty (R3/2:366); Ibbisin was dragged in chains to Elam (LD 39; PH 7).
The Lament for Ur
An important document describing the fall of Ur is The Lamentation over tin
Destruction of Sumer and Ur (LD) — a kind of Sumerian City of God. Althougl i
clearly a literary text filled with hyperbole, it none the less contains a vivid
description of how the Sumerians viewed the fall of their civilization, with
numerous details on military matters. As with all affairs in human life, the
destruction of Ur is, from the Sumerian perspective, the result of the inscrutable
decrees of the gods: "the gods An, Enlil, Enki, and Nimah decided its fate. Its fate,
which cannot be changed, who can overturn it - who can oppose the commands
of An and Enlil?" (LD 39, 37). For although "Ur was indeed given kingship [In
the gods] ... it was not given an eternal reign" (LD 59). The war goddess "Inanna
handed over victory in strife and battle to a rebellious land . . . revolt descended
upon the land [of Sumer], something that no one had ever known, somethin!"
unseen [until now]" (LD 41).
To accomplish this decreed destruction, the gods unleashed the foreign bat
barians, the Amorites, Gutians, and Elamites. The god "Enlil then sent down
Gutium from the mountains. Their advance was as the flood of Enlil that cannot
be withstood, . . . the teeming plain [of Sumer] was destroyed [by the Gutian
invaders], no one moved about there" (LD 41). The Gutians settled in the land
like a nest of vipers: "the snake of the mountain [the Gutians] made his lair then
it became a rebellious land; the Gutians bred there, issued their seed" (LD 45)
The Elamites, who would actually destroy Ur, were also unleashed by the gods
"Enlil brought down the Elamites, the enemy, from the highlands ... Fin
approached [the god| Ninmar in the shrine Guabba, later Uuis wciv < arrying "I 1
its precious metals and stones [as plunder)" (1 1 J I' 1 Iikr\\i\<- the nom.ud
I ><i
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
niorites from the west joined in the slaughter: "To the south, the Elarrhti e P-
d in, slaughtering ... To the north, the [Amorite] vandals, the enemy . The
\ 1 1 lonte] Tidnumites daily strapped the mace to their loins [for battle] " (LD -3 ) •
I he culmination of these invasions was the siege of Ur by the Elamite Tlie
Mu-nt of the poet, who may have been an eyewitness, provides our mos ivid
"iint of a siege from ancient Mesopotamia:
I aments sounded all along its city wall,
I )aily there was a slaughter before it.
I drge axes were sharpened in front of Ur,
The spears, the arms of battle, were being launched,
The large bows, javelin, and siege-shield gather together to strike,
The barbed arrows covered its outside [wall] like a raining cloud,
I arge stones [from slings], one after another, fell with great thuds.. . .
I h, which had been confident in its own strength, stood ready for slau ter '
Its people, oppressed by the enemy, could not withstand their weapons
Those in the city who had not been felled by weapons died of hunger,
I lunger filled the city like water, it would not cease.. . .
Its people dropped their weapons, their weapons hit the ground..
Ur - inside it there is [only] death, outside it there is [only] death,
Inside it we are being finished off by famine,
< hitside it we are being finished off by the Elamite weapons.. . .
I .lain, like a swelling flood wave, left only the spirits of the dead..
I I h\s] refugees were unable to flee, they were trapped inside the walls. (LD 1_3 )
rounded and starving, the citizens of Ur finally give way to despair, disse] ion '
I i reachery:
In Ur no one went to fetch food, no one went to fetch drink,
lis people rush around like water churning in a well,
I heir strength has ebbed away; they cannot even go on their way,
I I he god] Enlil afflicted the city with an inimical famine,
He afflicted the city with something that destroys cities, that destroys ten° les '
He afflicted the city with something that cannot be withstood with wea ons '
He afflicted the city with dissatisfaction and treachery. (LD 55)
the end, the Elamites breached the walls and sacked the city, and "Ur, like ci ty
• ( has been wrought by the hoe, became a ruined mound" (LD 59). "Th( sol ~
n of Shimashki and Elam, the enemy, dwell in their [the Sumerians'] ^ ace '
miki'sI shepherd [king] is captured by the enemy, all alone; Ibbisin is tab to
1 ind oi Elam in letters" (LD 39).
Ill' h "I the rest of the Lamentation consists of poetic descriptions of the ( eso ~
■ifha the fall of Ur, with temples deserted, cities destroyed, unpl^ tcd
»'d infested fields, and livestock captured. People were massacred, lc; vm < ! '
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
By this time, however, Ibbisin was in no position to help his last loyal governor in
central Mesopotamia. "Ur's king sat immobilized in the palace, all alone. Ibbi-Sin
was sitting in anguish in the palace, all alone. In the Enamtila, the palace of his
delight, he was crying bitterly" (LD 43).
By 2007 {Y22} the chaos had reached the capital of Ur. Amorite nomads from
the north, along with Gutian highlanders and Elamites, overran all of Mesopota
mia. Ibbisin records an obscure inscription: "Ibbisin, king of Ur, held firm the city
of Ur . . . which had been devastated by the 'flood' which had been commanded
by the gods and which shook the whole world" (R3/2:365). Many scholars view
this statement as a euphemistic metaphor: the "flood" is a flood of enemies who
overran much of the kingdom, but were unable as yet to capture Ur itself Indeed,
this same flood metaphor is used to describe the attack of Gutians and Elamites
against Ur (LD AY). 21 The next year, 2006 {Y23} Ibbisin also describes the coin
ing of a "stupid monkey" to Ur, which some scholars see as a euphemism for an
attack by an enemy king (R3/2:365). In 2005 {Y24}, the final year of Ibbisin
reign, a fragmentary inscription describes the Elamites as "smiting Ur", ending th<
dynasty (R3 72:366); Ibbisin was dragged in chains to Elam (LD 39; PH 7).
The Lament Joy Uy
An important document describing the fall of Ur is The Lamentation over tfa
Destruction of Sumer and Ur (LD) — a kind of Sumerian City of God. Although
clearly a literary text filled with hyperbole, it none the less contains a vivid
description of how the Sumerians viewed the fall of their civilization, with
numerous details on military matters. As with all affairs in human life, th«
destruction of Ur is, from the Sumerian perspective, the result of the inscrutable
decrees of the gods: "the gods An, Enlil, Enki, and Nimah decided its fate. Its fate,
which cannot be changed, who can overturn it - who can oppose the commands
of An and Enlil?" (LD 39, 37). For although "Ur was indeed given kingship |b\
the gods] ... it was not given an eternal reign" (LD 59). The war goddess "Inann.i
handed over victory in strife and battle to a rebellious land . . . revolt descended
upon the land [of Sumer], something that no one had ever known, something
unseen [until now]" (LD 41).
To accomplish this decreed destruction, the gods unleashed the foreign bar
barians, the Amorites, Gutians, and Elamites. The god "Enlil then sent down
Gutium from the mountains. Their advance was as the flood of Enlil that cannot
be withstood, ... the teeming plain [of Sumer] was destroyed [by the Gutian
invaders], no one moved about there" (LD 41). The Gutians settled in the land
like a nest of vipers: "the snake of the mountain [the Gutians] made his lair then
it became a rebellious land; the Gutians bred there, issued their seed" (LD I >
The Elamites, who would actually destroy Ur, were also unleashed by the god
"Enlil brought down the Elamites, the enemy, from the highlands ... fin
approached [the god] Ninmar in the shrine Guabba, large boats were < arrying oil
its precious metals and stones |as plunder|" (ID I 'i Id i the nonudi.
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
■I ites from the west joined in the slaughter: "To the south, the Elamites step-
in, slaughtering ... To the north, the [Amorite] vandals, the enemy . . . The
norite] Tidnumites daily strapped the mace to their loins [for battle]" (LD 51-3).
I lie culmination of these invasions was the siege of Ur by the Elamites. The
ni of the poet, who may have been an eyewitness, provides our most vivid
nut of a siege from ancient Mesopotamia:
I .nnents sounded all along its city wall,
I > lily there was a slaughter before it.
I arge axes were sharpened in front of Ur,
I he spears, the arms of battle, were being launched,
I he large bows, javelin, and siege-shield gather together to strike,
I he barbed arrows covered its outside [wall] like a raining cloud,
I arge stones [from slings], one after another, fell with great thuds.. . .
Ur, which had been confident in its own strength, stood ready for slaughter,
Its people, oppressed by the enemy, could not withstand their weapons.
I hose in the city who had not been felled by weapons died of hunger,
I lunger filled the city like water, it would not cease
lis people dropped their weapons, their weapons hit the ground
Ur - inside it there is [only] death, outside it there is [only] death,
Inside it we are being finished off by famine,
I hitside it we are being finished off by the Elamite weapons.. . .
I lam, like a swelling flood wave, left only the spirits of the dead
I I Fr's] refugees were unable to flee, they were trapped inside the walls. (LD 61-3)
rounded and starving, the citizens of Ur finally give way to despair, dissension,
d treachery:
In Ur no one went to fetch food, no one went to fetch drink,
Its people rush around like water churning in a well,
I heir strength has ebbed away; they cannot even go on their way,
| I he god] Enlil afflicted the city with an inimical famine,
I le afflicted the city with something that destroys cities, that destroys temples,
Me afflicted the city with something that cannot be withstood with weapons,
I le afflicted the city with dissatisfaction and treachery. (LD 55)
die end, the Elamites breached the walls and sacked the city, and "Ur, like a city
■ I has been wrought by the hoe, became a ruined mound" (LD 59). "The sol-
ol Shimashki and Elam, the enemy, dwell in their [the Sumerians'] place,
i s| shepherd [king] is captured by the enemy, all alone; Ibbisin is taken to
land ol Khun in fetters" (LD 39).
Mu< 1 1 oi the lest ol the Lamentation consists of poetic descriptions of the deso-
' Mene .iftei the (all oi Ur, with temples deserted, cities destroyed, unplanted
d mlested fields, ami livestock captured. People were massacred, leaving
I 'I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
"corpses floating in the Euphrates" (LD 42), while others were enslaved (LD 53).
The few survivors are "refugees, like stampeding goats, chased by dogs" (LD 47)
who were "scattered as far as Anshan" (R4:17). The text lists many majot
Sumerian cities destroyed by invading Gutium and Elamites, repeating the refrain,
"Adas, the destroyed city, my destroyed temple." With these invasions the old
Sumerian order and the Early Bronze Age ended. The new political and military
order of Mesopotamia was to be forged by Amorite warlords (see Chapter Six).
Ideal warfare in the Epic of Ninurta
Though describing a mythical tale of the gods, the Epic of Ninurta (HTO 233-
72) provides our most detailed literary account of the Neo-Sumerian army at
war. 28 Written in the twenty-second century, shortly after the overthrow of the
Gutian highlanders from Mesopotamia, the myth centers around the great struggle
between the god Ninurta and Azag, a demonic ruler of the Zagros Mountains to
the north-east of Sumeria and personification of the Sumerian view of the high
land warriors such as the Gutians. Azag is plotting to "take away the kingship and
sacred offices" of Ninurta in Sumeria, just as the Gutians had done (HTO 239).
Azag is a "fearless warrior", a "killer out of the highland", a "towering man" and
"true fighter" whose highland "warriors constantly come raiding the cities" of
Sumeria (HTO 237-8).
Ninurta is roused to anger by these incursions, and raises an army to destroy
Azag. The advance of his army to battle is compared with the terror and destruc
tiveness of a rising storm and flood:
Rising, the lord [Ninurta] abutted heaven
Ninurta marching to battle kept abreast of the hours
A very storm he went to war,
Rode on seven gales against the rebel country.
Javelins he held cradled in the arm,
The mittu-ma.ee opened its mouth against the mountains,
The weapons raged at the hostile horde.
The evil wind and the south storm were tethered to him,
The flood storm strode at their flanks,
And before the warrior went a huge irresistible tempest,
It was tearing up the dust, depositing it again
Evening out hill and dale, filling in the hollows;
Live coals [lightening] it rained down [from heaven]
Fire burned, flames scorched. (HTO 240—1)
Mesopotamia was a land criss-crossed by rivers and canals, and boats were used
to transport troops and supplies in almost all campaigns. This is reflected in the epn
as Ninurta "hastened toward battle" in "the boat Makarnuntaea 'bo.it sailing fron
the royal quay' " (HTO 241). As Ninurta approached the l.nul »>! A/ai'. he sent
I * ■
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
1 1 id agents "slipping into the rebel country" to "cut off communication
tueen its cities" (HTO 241). His agents "brought an enemy captive back" to
1 1 ( >gate, while bringing additional information about the enemy's movements
l preparations (HTO 242).
\\ hen combat finally came, Ninurta s "heart was brightening for him from
mire in this lion-headed mace". The pre-battle arming of Ninurta is described like
I nbrace of the beloved". In pre-battle preparations, a small portable shrine for the
\ .is established for prayer, sacrifice, and divination (HTO 243). The marshaling
m ips for battle is described as preparations for a religious ritual, "the festival of
hood, [the war-goddess] Inanna's dance" (HTO 243). This may refer either to
battle war-dance undertaken in honor of Inanna, or a description of actual
bal as being a ritual dance honoring Inanna. This relationship of dancing with
may point to the rote-learning of combat actions and marching in unison in
form of a ritual war-dance.. In some ways these war-dances are probably the
in of martial arts - the teaching of stylized patterns of combat through dance.
I hroughout the myth, Ninurta's mace, named Sharur, is described as a sentient
"!', who spies for Ninurta and gives him council (HTO 236-8). This may sim-
U the personification of a divine weapon, but may alternatively reflect a
i < of giving weapon-titles to great champions of the king, just as Ninurta
II is called the sky-god "An's mace" (HTO 242). Elsewhere in the epic,
mirta's soldiers armed with long spears are simply called his "long spears" (HTO
Ninurta holds a war council, and his councilors advise caution, fearing the
m ! of Azag in his mountain retreats; "we will prove no match for Azag; we
not to enter the highland!" (HTO 244).
I iturally, Ninurta is not dissuaded by their fears, but marshals his troops for
! tl
I he lord [Ninurta] stretched the thigh
[The chariot pulled by a] donkey steed was mounted
I le girded himself with warbelt
( 'a st over the highland his long august shadow . . .
I hito Azag's stronghold [in the highland] he attained
And stood in the front line of battle
He gave his [regiment of] long spears instructions . . .
I he lord called upon his weapons, set out most completely arrayed.
battle itself is described as overwhelming natural chaos, with the sky darken-
mder the rising dust cloud caused by the combatants.
I Hi" the hay i he warrior [Ninurta] rushed . . .
i n\v and battle sling he wielded well,
Shattered was the |anny of the] highland, it dissolved
Mefore Niniii ta's battle array
As the w.iiiiui | Ninur t.i | ordered his weapons "gird yourself" [for battle].
I ' I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
The sun marched no longer [through the sky], it had turned into a moon,
In the highland the [mountain] peaks were wiped from [view]
The day was made black like pitch [from the dust] (HTO 244) .
The enemy king Azag, however, described as a gigantic dragon which struck
fear into the hearts of the gods, was not yet defeated: "Azag rose to attack in the
front line of battle" (HTO 245-6). At least in mythic texts, kings challenge each
other to single combat (HTO 297), or use champions (HTO 309-10); one such
champion is described as wearing a lion skin (HTO 316). Such a single combat
occurs between Ninurta and Azag, described metaphorically as a struggle between
the natural forces of desert and water (HTO 245—7). The enemy "sent arrows
flying at [Ninurta] . . . and threw elite troops against him like bolts of lightening' 1
(HTO 258). The combat culminated in Ninurta's final charge:
Howling like a storm, [carrying] his long spear,
Ninurta . . . rammed his battalion like a prod into the highland. . . .
The mittu-ma.ce smote [enemy] heads with its bitter teeth,
The shita-weapon, which plucks out hearts, gnashed its teeth,
The long spear was stuck [through the enemy] into the ground
While blood flowed from the hole it made. (HTO 248)
Ninurta is described as a "warrior, striding into battle, trampling down all
before him, putting a fighter's hand to the mittu-mzce, reaping like grain the necks
of the [enemies]" (HTO 235). At last Azag's army begins to collapse:
The warrior [Ninurta] set up a howl loudly in the highland . . .
He battered the heads of the enemy horde,
The highland was brought to tears,
The lord [Ninurta] bound up [captured] soldier teams like looted goods . . .
Ninurta passed through the [dead] enemies
Laid them out as if they were fatted calves. (HTO 249-50)
Azag is killed by Ninurta, who celebrates his victory by ritually dismembering
Azag's corpse, perhaps in imitation of the god Marduk's dismemberment of tin-
monster Tiamat at creation (MFM 254—5). Abuse of enemy corpses in Mesopo
tamia should probably be understood in this mythic context.
The victory was followed a cleansing ritual in which the arms and body wei i
cleaned from the gore of battle.
The lord [Ninurta] rinsed belt and weapon in water,
Rinsed the mittu-m&ce in water,
The warrior wiped his brow —
And sounded the victory cry over the corpse (of A/ag|;
He carved up Azag, who he had killed like a fitted i .ill ill I ( > ' ><))
I
I Ins ritual is probably alluded to in several royal inscriptions in which the kings
i h their weapons in the waters of the ocean (R2:ll, 14, 17, 32, 97).
With Azag and the highland army defeated, Ninurta brings civilization, irriga-
■ii and agriculture to the area (HTO 250-4), including fortifications to protect
tneria: "He made a bank of stones against the highland ... and placed it as a
U before the country [of Mesopotamia] like a great wall" (HTO 252). He then
ible to exploit the "gold and silver . . . copper and tin" of the region (HTO
15), as well as numerous types of stones and gems (HTO 256-68). Returning to
boat Makarnuntaea, which had been left in the river valley, Ninurta sails
ome in triumph, where he is met with hymns praising his great victory (HTO
.; 7i).
What we have in the epic of Ninurta is a complete description of the ideal
i » Sumerian campaign, from its inception to the triumphal return of the king to
apital. Although this ideal model could not always be fully followed in reality,
likely that Sumerian kings made conscious efforts to have their real campaigns
inform as closely as possible to this ideal.
Triumphal procession
Ifter victory the warriors celebrated a triumphal procession, to honor both the
roes and the gods. The "Hymn to Inanna", the goddess of war, describes such a
imph, which concludes with the ritual sacrifice of prisoners of war.
I )rums, silver inwrought, they are beating for her -
Before holy Inanna, before her eyes, they are parading -
The great Queen of Heaven, Inanna, I will hail!
I loly tambourines and holy kettledrums they are beating for her . . . 29
The guardsmen [sag-ursag] have combed their hair for her . . .
Iliey have made colorful for her the back hair with colored ribbons . . .
( >n their bodies are sheep skin robes, the dress of divinities . . .
I hey are girt with implements of battle . . .
Spears, the arms of battle, are in their hands . . .
Playfully, with painted buttocks, they engage in single combat . . .
( aptive [enemy] lads in neck stocks bewail to her their fate . . .
I diggers and maces rage before her . . .
I he kurgaru |warriors] mounted on chariots swing the maces . . .
( .ore is covering the daggers, blood sprinkles . . .
In the courtyard of the place of assembly
I Ik temple administrator-priests are shedding blood
As loudly resounds there the music of tigi-hzrps, tambourines and lyres.
(HTO 11 5 17)
in likely thai celebrations like this were organized for most victorious armies,
Toh.ibl\ represent the archai< origins of the later Roman triumphs.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Warfare in the Epic of Gilgamesh
The Epic of Gilgamesh is a Mesopotamian literary epic which tells of the adventures
of Gilgamesh, king of Uruk. The historical Gilgamesh reigned as king in the early
twenty-seventh century (see pp. 46—8), and is noted for constructing the walls ol
Uruk (EOG 1). He was worshipped as a deified king by the twenty-fourth century,
by which time it is assumed oral tales were told of the famous ruler. The oldest
extant parts of the Gilgamesh epic cycle date from the twenty-first century in
Sumerian. By the eighteenth and seventeenth centuries, nearly a thousand years
after the death of the historical Gilgamesh, the epic had reached its classical form
in Old Babylonian (EOG lx). Thus, from a military perspective, the epic probabK
best reflects military practices of the late third or early second millennium.
The Epic of Gilgamesh provides a number of interesting descriptions of military
activities associated with the battle against the monster Humbaba (EOG 22-47).
Gilgamesh represents the ideal Mesopotamian martial king, who "has no equal
when his weapons are brandished" (EOG 4). The first part of the epic focuses on
Gilgamesh's battle with Humbaba on Mount Lebanon (EOG 19); although
mythic, it none the less represents the military ideal, if not necessarily the reality.
The description of Gilgamesh's preparations and march to Lebanon probabK
reflect actual practices on military campaigns. When Gilgamesh conceives of the plan
to attack Humbaba, his first act is to cast new bronze weapons: axes and daggers
with "gold mountings" (EOG 20). He then summons the town assembly, composed
of the elders and the "young men of Uruk who understand combat" (EOG 20—1).
In other words, the assembly is composed of the military-age males who deb.it <
issues of war and peace, broadly paralleling similar institutions in early Greece
This body debates Gilgamesh's military proposal; the elders advise the king of thi
perils of his proposed undertaking, objecting that "you are young, Gilgamesh.
borne along by emotion; all that you talk of you don't understand" (EOG 2
Gilgamesh laughs at their fears, and in the end the assembly gives him advice and
prays to the gods to bless him: (EOG 28—9). They advise Gilgamesh "not to rely on
your own strength alone", but to take Enkidu as counselor and war-companion
(EOG 28). They also give advice in the form of a military proverb: "who goes ii
front will save his comrade, who knows the road shall guard his friend" (EOG 2
apparently meaning that proper scouting and intelligence will protect an army
Gilgamesh's companion on the campaign against Humbaba, then, is Enkidn
"savage man from the midst of the wild" (EOG 7); he probably represents th
Mesopotamian view of highland hunters and nomads who are said to have in
tasted bread and beer (EOG 14). Enkidu is explicitly said to have been "born ii
the uplands" where the monster Humbaba dwells (EOG 13, 18), which are asso
ciated with "the mountain of cedar" in Lebanon (EOG 34, 39). In strength and
military prowess he is described as being the "equal" of Gilgamesh (EOG II, I ■
although Gilgamesh defeats him in a wrestling match (EOG 16). I le is repcan .1
said to be as "mighty as a rock from the sky" (E(>( i 5, 10), possibly a referent e t.
meteoritie iron, the hardest substance known to the Mesnputamiaus
1 »c,
THE NEO-SUMERIAN PERIOD
I living prepared his weapons, met with the council of the military assembly,
■elected his companion-at-arms, there remains the crucial issue of consulting
ill of the gods and gaining their support. For this Gilgamesh consults his
ither, the goddess-priestess Ninsun. In historical terms the "goddess" Ninsun
• probably represented by her mortal high priestess, who led divination rituals
presented oracular responses from the gods, broadly paralleling the Pythia at
I phi or the Sybil at Cumae. Ninsun performs various purification rituals, climbs
the top of a ziggurat, and invokes the blessings of Shamash the sun-god on
Itf.unesh and Enkidu, concluding with a ritual in which she adopts Enkidu as
on, and thus as Gilgamesh's brother (EOG 24-7). In a badly damaged portion
die tablet, Gilgamesh and Enkidu also perform various rituals to insure their
v and victory in battle (EOG 27). Such divination and the reception of
I tble oracles were crucial for any military undertaking; no one in Bronze Age
opotamia expected victory in battle if their plans were not approved by the
(see pp. 186-92).
rhe Epic of Gilgamesh thus presents us with three phases of military preparation
In. Ii were probably normative for most Bronze Age armies: 1, preparation of
ipons, equipment, and supplies; 2, consultation with the assembly of military-
Mi.n to determine the battle plan and selection of those to participate in the
ditionary force; and 3, divination and invocation of the gods to insure divine
ihorization and blessing. Elements of these three phases of military preparation
n be seen in many other historical and literary sources.
I he inarch from Uruk to the Cedar Mountain is described, with regular stops
I i< >od and encampment. The emphasis in this section of the epic is on preparing
pe< ia] evening ritual which allows Gilgamesh to receive five oracular dreams;
h was a nightmare, filled with distressing images causing Gilgamesh to fear that
mission will fail. Enkidu, however, cleverly interprets each dream as reflecting a
mvr outcome for Gilgamesh (EOG 30-7). This doubtless reflects actual practices
■ impaigns. Oracular dreams were widely regarded as authentic communications
M the gods throughout the Ancient Near East. As such, the dreams of the
i ii i n a i } der of an expedition were particularly important. Such dreams always needed
aonal dream interpreters to explain their meaning, and a clever interpreter
I nkidti could make almost any omen or dream seem to favor his rulers plans. 30
I to the campaign, and in battle, Gilgamesh and Enkidu encourage each other.
1 "ui shout resound like a kettle drum, let the stiffness leave your arms, the
mors your knees," Gilgamesh proclaims, encouraging his friend on to battle.
shall go on together, let your thoughts dwell on combat; let him who goes
M he on guard for himself, and bring his comrade to safety" (EOG 38-9). When
Itf.mieshs courage fails him at the sight of the terrifying monster Humbaba,
kin berates him: "why my friend, do you speak like a weakling? With your
words von make me despondent.... Don't draw back, don't make a
it! Make youi blow mighty!" (EOG 41).
\ hi heron ( irccc e, one of the principle goals of the warrior is to garner fame
l,tl( ' ( hli'.amesh de< ides to light I lumbaba in order to "establish for ever a
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
fame that endures, how Gilgamesh slew ferocious Humbaba!" (EOG 43). Details
of the battle itself are sparse. Gilgamesh and Enkidu fight hand to hand with dag-
ger and axe; no missile weapons are mentioned (EOG 39, 44-5, 70). As with a
Homeric duel, the battle begins with challenges and taunts; Humbaba boasts, "
will slit the throat and gullet of Gilgamesh, I will feed his flesh to the locust bird,
ravening eagle and vulture" (EOG 41). Again paralleling Homeric literature,
humans can also challenge and threaten the gods. Later in the epic, Enkidu
threatens the goddess Ishtar that he will "drape your arms in your guts" (EOG 52)
When, with the help of great winds sent by the god Shamash, they finally subdue
Humbaba, the monster pleads for his life (EOG 43). When Gilgamesh refuses to
relent, Humbaba curses them: "May the pair of them not grow old, besides Gil
gamesh his friend, none shall bury Enkidu", after which Gilgamesh slits his throat
while Enkidu cuts out his lungs (EOG 44). Thereafter they plunder the cedai
forest - Humbaba's kingdom - and take the timber back to be made into a
monumental door for the temple of Enlil, while Gilgamesh carries the head ol
Humbaba home in triumph (EOG 47), where he purifies himself and washes his
weapons (EOG 48).
128
CHAPTER FIVE
War-carts and chariots
>ng the many military innovations in the Bronze Age Near East, two would
m impact on warfare for thousands of years: the enlistment of animals into
ii \ service, and the creation of machines to facilitate war-making. The crucial
played by animals in warfare has declined only in the twentieth century CE.
I ii lies, on the other hand, are playing an increasingly dramatic role in warfare;
would argue that we may be on the verge of seeing machines become more
rtant than men in determining the outcome of war. All of this began in
m,i with the donkey and the wheel.
Animals and warfare (MK 156-65)
ol the most important and long-lasting Neolithic military innovations was the
i animals in warfare (CAM 36-7). There were five ways in which animals
tally became employed in the ancient Near East to supplement human war
i for guarding humans, and supplementing their sense of smell and hearing
.is a mobile source of food (goats, sheep, cattle); transporting food and
merit as pack animals (donkeys, mules, horses, camels); pulling wheeled
ii< Its (donkeys, onager-donkey hybrids, mules, horses, oxen), and for riding
ys, mules, horses, camels).
I he oldest military animal partner of humans was the dog, which has been
ticated in the Near East since at least the tenth millennium. Dogs were
im.iIK used for hunting and protection, a function they continued in the
!u it v ( ontext. Watchdogs appeared with paramilitary functions protecting cities,
roves .ind camps (EA 2:166-7; EAE 1:229-31; AEMK 82-4). They occasion-
al c ompanied soldiers into combat: "the frenzied dogs were wagging tails
U -if i hi enemy, [as if asking] nave you killed a victim?' and were drooling slaver
: ii forepaws" (HTO 245; FI §723; AM §64). Although there are some
1 1 ol tamed lions or cheetahs, these were probably rare, and were used
foi court spectacle than for day-to-day protection (EAE 1:513-16).
I hi next use ol animals in warfare was as a source of food. With the beginnings
ii domestic ation ol animals in the Neolithic period, humans were able to shift
n liuntini', to henliup;, creatinu; a more reliable and controllable food source.
I "'
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Animals had a significant advantage over other possible military food sources sucli
as grain or fruit, in that animals could move themselves along with the army, ratlin
than requiring a man, pack animal or vehicle to carry them. On the other hand, n
arid regions animals competed with humans for water, required supervision ai>J
protection, and, depending on the gait and speed of an animal, could slow an arim
down. In the ancient Near East goats, sheep, and cattle were the main mobile fo< >< I
sources which accompanied armies on campaign; on the other hand, donkey
mules, horses, and camels, though primarily draft and pack animals, were also
eaten when necessary.
The most significant military use of animals in the Chalcolithic and Eark
Bronze Age was the pack animal. The donkey, in particular, was domesticated and
used to carry burdens in all aspects of Near Eastern life: domestic, agricultural,
mercantile, and military. Throughout the Early and Middle Bronze ages, th<
donkey (or donkey-onager hybrid) was the primary means of land transportation
(EA 2:255-6; EAE 1:478-9; AW 1:166-7). The military use of the donkey pet
mitted armies to stay in the field longer, to campaign over greater distances, and to
have extended marches in desert terrain (AEE 1:25-6). On the other hand
although we know donkeys were ridden, there is no evidence of donkeys being
extensively ridden in combat situations.
The fourth possible use of animals in ancient Near Eastern warfare was as dr.ilt
animals to pull wheeled vehicles. In the late fourth millennium (c. 3300-2800;
kings in Mesopotamia were conveyed in palanquins (FI §711) or on throne
dragged on wheel-less sledges by bovines (FI §10; WV §2); while the sledge was
the ceremonial precursor to the chariot, it obviously had little military potential
The wheel seems to have developed from modifications made to log rollers lor
sledges. It is possible that wheeled vehicles appear in Mesopotamia as early as the
thirty-second century though the ambiguous depiction in our evidence may show
a sledge on rollers rather than true wheels (WV 13, §1). In addition to carrying
loads, the earliest archaic vehicles were used for the ritual transport of images ol
the gods. Indeed, in Mesopotamian mythology the gods are frequently described
as riding in wheeled vehicles. 1 Kings were also conveyed on vehicles in ceremonial
processions. There is evidence that wheeled vehicles were extensively used for tin-
transportation of goods, supplementing pack animals and boats (EA 1:433—4);
Hammurabi's law code {c. 1760} includes laws concerning renting wagons, di i
vers, and oxen (ANET 177). During the Bronze Age the use of equids to pull
wheeled vehicles in battle was their most important military role.
By about 2700, wheeled vehicles begin to be used in warfare in the form ol
war-carts which will be discussed in detail below. 2 Militarily, wheeled vehicles
were probably used to carry supplies on campaign, and, along with boats and pack
animals, remained the primary means of transporting supplies and military equip
ment throughout the Near East. Despite the fact that the Egyptians had ample
trade relations with Syria, where war-carts and wheeled vehicles were known
during the Early Bronze Age, there is no evidence ol the extensive use of wheeled
vehicles in Egypt before the New Kingdom [attei I * '>; ■ , || M \ci A thousand
■
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
i after the first appearance of the wheel in Mesopotamia. 3 Presumably the fact
it nearly all of inhabited Egypt is within a few miles of the Nile rendered the use
\ heeled vehicles irrelevant for any type of long-distance travel, which could be
implished more efficiently and quickly by boat. Furthermore, the existence of
■ Mierous irrigation canals and ditches in the fertile river valleys of Egypt and
i >potamia complicated travel by wheeled vehicles. In this context it must be
Biphasized that early wheeled vehicles were not necessarily superior in either
ted or carrying capacity to simple pack animals or boats, and the mere knowl-
;c of the existence of wheeled vehicles did not necessarily constitute a com-
. ; reason for their widespread use or adaptation for transportation. 4 The
►'\ptians adopted the widespread use of wheeled vehicles only at the very end of
Middle Bronze Age in the seventeenth century, probably in response to the
i< uluction of the war-chariot by the Hyksos. 5
I he final military use of animals was combat riding. The precise date and place
the origin of equid 6 riding is still somewhat controversial, due to the limita-
u. of evidence and ambiguities of interpretation. It seems to have first occurred
the Eurasian steppe in the third millennium, although some scholars argue that
nay have begun as early as the early fourth millennium. 7 Given human nature, it
ins likely that informal riding was spontaneous and simultaneous with the first
lomestication of equids; but this is something quite different from developing an
ntire culture of horse-riding. Furthermore, it must be emphasized that domes-
ition of equids does not necessarily imply riding, nor does riding necessarily
imply military equestrianism. Nor does military equestrianism necessarily imply
fighting from horseback, since horses can be ridden by mounted infantry, scouts,
I messengers, and riders can dismount to fight.
1 1 1 the Near East, the donkey was probably domesticated no later than the late
• 'in th millennium, and is widely used as a pack and draft animal until the present
y. C )nagers were probably not domesticated, as they tend to be intractable (EEH
17a). Onager-donkey hybrids, however, were widely used and highly prized in
I ale Early Bronze Age; the kunga onager-donkey hybrid could cost forty times
I much as an ordinary donkey (EEH 117a). The first evidence for the domes-
li iied horse appears in Mesopotamia by the late third millennium (EEH 117b).
I quid riding is first documented from the royal tombs of Ur {2550-2400}, where
. ylinder seal shows a man riding an animal, possibly with a weapon in his hand
r !U 65). More clear evidence comes from the twenty-third (FI §685) and
tity first centuries. 8
For our purpose, however, the crucial question is not the appearance of equid
iding, but of equid riding in combat. There is some evidence of early horse riding
ombat. An Akkadian seal {23C} shows a man riding an equid holding what
nuld be a javelin (EEH 118). Another scene shows an equid rider in a combat
I trampling a fallen man (EEH 118). A Canaanite ruler is shown riding an
equid while holding an axe during the reign of Amenemhet III {1843-1797} (IS
\'M However, these scenes may depict riding an animal to battle rather than in
kittle I he lightest interpretations ol the evidence point to the beginning of the
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
widespread use of mounted warriors in the Near East probably occurring in the
early Iron Age, perhaps around the tenth or ninth centuries. 9 Although horses or
donkeys may have been ridden on campaign, or used by scouts or messengers, we
have no evidence for widespread combat equestrianism in the Early or Middle
Bronze ages in the Near East. Either as draft animals for vehicles, or mounts, the
intimate union of man and equids in war has been one of the most momentous in
military history, continuing for at least 4500 years, and fading only within living
memory. 10
Two other animals with potential use in military contexts were also known in
the ancient Near East, the camel and the elephant. Dromedary (one-humped)
camels were indigenous to Arabia, while the Bactrian (two-humped) camel
inhabited Iran and Central Asia; camels were introduced into Egypt and North
Africa only during Classical times. Camels were probably domesticated by the late-
third millennium; an eighteenth-century Syrian cylinder seal depicts men riding a
Bactrian camel (FI §738), However, the camel did not have an appreciable military
impact until the Late Bronze Age. 11 Elephants were also widespread in North
Africa and Syria, where they were famously hunted by Thutmose III {1504-
1452}, who is said to have hunted 120 elephants in the Orontes valley in Syria
(ANET 241a); there is no evidence of the use of elephants in combat in the Near
East, however, until Classical times (EAE 1:467).
Sumerian war-carts {2700-2000} 12
The evidence for the use of the Sumerian war-cart, though striking, is rathe i
sparse. We have three types of evidence: archaeological, artistic, and textual
The remains of war-carts were discovered from burials at Kish, Ur, and Susa
(WV 16; RTU 21-5, 32-8); these were found in a highly decayed state, bin
enough was preserved both to confirm and to elucidate the war-cart depicted in
artistic sources. 13
Early Dynastic four-wheeled war-carts {2700-2300}
The military use of wheeled vehicles first occurred in southern Mesopotamia in
the twenty-seventh century, or perhaps somewhat earlier. Although there was
undoubtedly a period of experimentation and development of both wheeled
vehicles and their military potential, in our surviving sources the war-cart appear-,
fully developed by no later than the middle of the Early Bronze Age in Sumer. I
will here only review the artistic sources, leaving a discussion of the military use ol
the war-cart for later. The following are the major artistic sources for Earlx
Dynastic four-wheeled war-carts. 14
1 Cylinder seal on a pot from Urak, Sumer {ED, 2000 2300 J (Fl 24i, p. 159,
FI §499). A four-wheeled war-cart led by one man. i.iiivini r , a seated man
with axe; the cart's wheels are grooved foi hctu-i n.u (ton
I P
(a)
(c)
(d)
(e)
Early and Middle Bronze Age war-carts and chariots (drawings by Michael Lyon)
(a) Sumerian four-wheeled war-carts from the "Standard of Ur", tomb of king
Ur-Pabilsag {c. 2550} (British Museum 121201); see AFC 98-9.
(h) Akkadian war-cart trampling enemies; cylinder seal from Nagar (Tell Brak,
Syria) {c 2250}; see EEH 116 §2.
(( ) Neo-Sumerian two-wheeled war-cart, relief from Ur {26C} (University of
Pennsylvania Museum of Archaeology and Anthropology, 17086); see AFC
72 §31.
(il) Warrior in two-wheeled chariot trampling enemy; cylinder seal from Baby-
lon ! 1779] (British Musueni 16815a); see WV §31.
Warnoi (in seale armor?) shooting a bow from a two-wheeled chariot;
i vtinJri seal (mill Syria ] IX 17C|; see WV §36.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
2 Vase painting from Khafajah {ED II, 2650-2550} (AW 1:128). A four
wheeled war-cart with studded wheel rims, carrying two men and perhaps
four javelins in a side quiver-box.
3 "Standard of Ur" {ED IIIA, 2550-2400} (cover art; Figure 4a, p. 133; pp. 49
50; AFC 98-9; FA 84; AW 1:132-3; SDA 146-7; WV §3; AM §72, §x-xi)
Along with the Stele of Vultures, the Standard of Ur is our most important
war-cart scene. Five war-carts are depicted being drawn by long-eared equiti
(donkeys or donkey-onager hybrids) with barding for the animals. All tin
war-carts have javelin quiver-boxes; half the men hold axes in their hands, halt
are throwing or thrusting javelins. Judging from the gait of the equids, the
war-cart on the top panel is being walked in a procession, as is one war-cart
on the bottom panel; the other three, with long strides for the animals, seem
to be running, while trampling the dead bodies of enemies.
4 "Stele of Vultures" of Eannatum of Lagash (from Telloh) {ED IIIA, c. 2440 ;
(FA 82; AFC 190-1; AW 1:135; SDA 134-7; AM §66-9). The wheels an
missing; this could be a four or two-wheeled vehicle. Most of the war-cart i
missing, but the remaining fragment shows a war-cart with a large javelin
quiver and the king holding a javelin (or thrusting spear?) and what appears to be
a proto-sickle-sword. This image is discussed in detail on pp. 55-9, Figure 1, p. 55
5 Inlaid shell panel from Mari {ED III, 2550-2300} (AFC 159). A standard
Sumerian four-wheeled war-cart with javelins in a front quiver-box, accoin
panied by a spear- armed foot soldier; the war-cart is trampling a corps >
Overall, the composition is similar to the that depicted on the Standard of I ' i
6 Inlaid shell panel from Mari {ED III, 2550-2300} (AW 1:139). Fragmentary
probably four-wheeled, but possible only two-wheeled war-cart.
7 Cylinder seal from Syria (Mari?) {ED III?, 2550-2300} (FI §722). A standard
Sumerian four-wheeled vehicle with one rider, drawn by four equids and
followed by a soldier with a javelin.
8 Cylinder seal from Kish {ED III, 2500-2350} (FI §724; ELH pi. 1). Seated
figure on four-wheeled war-cart being led by another man; the war-cart h.is
javelins in a front quiver-box and is trampling a fallen enemy.
Early Dynastic {2700-2300} two-wheeled war-carts 15
As far as we can tell, four-wheeled and two-wheeled war-carts appear rough h
simultaneously in Sumer. Both utilize essentially the same technology, and .in
both shown in similar military situations. The four-wheeled war-cart, discussed
above, appears more frequently and in more intense military contexts than an
shown in any of the representations of the two-wheeled version. The relativi
military merits of both will be discussed on pp. 137-41. The major artistic souk i
for Sumerian two- wheeled war-carts include:
9 Cylinder seal from Sumer {ED, 2900-2300} (FI §723; AM §64). Royal figui
armed with axe entering a two- wheeled war-cart, accompanied by a dog an
three men, two armed with axes anil one with a spcai
I H
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
I opper model from Tell Agrab {ED II, 2650-2550} (AW 1:39, 129; SDA
I S2-3; WV §7; AM §49). Drawn by four horses, studded block wheels; there
IS no apparent military context.
Votive plaque from Ur {ED II; 2650-2550} (Figure 4c, p. 133; AFC 72; AW
I I 30; AAM §43; WV §8). The driver is standing on the ground behind the
war-cart, holding the reins, and carrying a javelin; there are other javelins in
the box-quiver on the war-cart. The war-cart seems to be draped with a
i Opard skin. It is pulled by two (possibly four) equids which are not protected
barding. It is probably part of a ceremonial scene similar to that depicted in
the votive plaque from Khafajah described below.
i .live plaque from Khafajah {ED II?, 2650-2550} (AAM §42; AM §45; SDA
i ) ). The overall layout of this scene closely parallels the votive plaque from
I i described above; indeed each complements the gaps in the other. A festival
m process in which the third and lowest panel shows a war-cart drawn by
bur equids, preceded by a man with a javelin or short thrusting spear.
1 1 hough the parallel scenes depicted in the Ur and Khafajah plaques are
remonial rather than military, these two-wheeled war-carts clearly have a
n utial purpose, with a javelin quiver-box, and both the driver and accom-
I niying foot soldier armed with javelins.
The Sumerian war-cart 16
the archaeological and artistic evidence outlined above, we can obtain a
understanding of the Sumerian war-cart. The classic Sumerian war-cart
'/f| (2600-2300} was essentially a wagon adapted for military use. The four-
■ pled version seems to have preceded the two-wheeled version, but by the time
n idespread military use both the two- and four-wheeled versions were used
ttie. The major limitation of the four-wheeler was weight; the Sumerian war-
had ,i heavy wooden frame with four solid disk wheels. The cart itself was
mil narrow, allowing only one person abreast, the driver generally in front
he warrior behind. The cart was surrounded by a high front and lower side
I lot protection and for the driver and rider to hold to stabilize themselves. A
mid major limitation on the four-wheeler was that the front wheels could not
'i independent of the vehicle as a whole, giving it a very wide turning radius.
In nigh the royal-cart was originally pulled by oxen, which continued in use for
nli in. il and commercial carts, in military settings the war-cart was always
il by equids - since bovines could move at only a few miles an hour, a war-
[Milled by oxen would be slower than a man on foot (CG 77).
nt e < >ui sources are generally vague in both naming and depicting equids, it is
ii tun possible to determine with certainty what specific species of equid was
I «S, 1 1 3). I )onkeys were the most common equid in Mesopotamia.
i U asses) were probably not used because they are difficult to domes-
iml tontml; 1 1 it donkey onager hybrid was common with war-carts, being
I I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
larger and stronger than the donkey, but more docile and manageable than the
onager. The horse was introduced into Mesopotamia in the late third millennium;
the horse or mule (horse-donkey hybrid) was probably adopted for pulling war-
carts by the late Early Bronze Age (ELH 197—8). It must be emphasized that,
although the Bronze Age horse was larger, stronger and faster than the donkey ii
was still substantially smaller than modern horses; based on evidence from bones
we can estimate that ancient horses ranged from 12-14 hands high at the shoulder
(130—150 cm; one hand = eleven centimeters), while the modern Western riding
horse is 15—17 hands (160—185 cm). Due to the weight of the war-cart and the
limited size and strength of the draft animals, the speed of the Sumerian war-carl
was rather slow. Experimentation with modern reconstructions have demonstrated
that its speed ranged from 10 to 12 miles per hour, or five to six minutes per mile
(WV 33), slower than the top speed of an unarmed fast man, but probably some
what faster than the average man in a combat situation.
Development of the Sumerian war-cart
The evidence, though inadequate, allows the following hypothetical reconstriu
tion of the development of the Sumerian war-cart. The first war-carts seem to
have developed directly from ritual vehicles used for conveying divine images oi
kings in ceremonial processions, initially drawn by oxen rather than equids. Ai
some point, probably in the twenty-seventh century, kings began to ride then
ceremonial war-carts to the battlefield rather than simply in ceremonial proces
sions for civic and religious purposes. Carts were also made to carry statues of tin-
gods in ritual processions, and were dedicated to the temples (PI 100). Initially tin
king probably had the only war-cart on the battlefield. Presumably he rode his
war-cart to the battlefield, dismounted and fought, and then rode again after the
battle. For example, in the Stele of Vultures {c. 2440}, Eannatum of Lagash ]
2455-2425} is shown in the lower panel in the only war-cart depicted in thi
entire battle scene (although others might have existed in the large damaged poi
tion of the stele). In the upper register, on the other hand, Eanatum is shown
fighting on foot (item 4, pp. 131—3). Military leaders were undoubtedly quick K
able to recognize the military potential in the royal war-cart. The king could mo\
among his own troops more quickly, giving orders and receiving reports. A fleeing
enemy could also be pursued more quickly by war-cart. At some point the kin
began to ride the war-cart during the battle, and fight from it. In due course, th<
number of war-carts on a battlefield increased, either because members of the ro\ .il
family and other nobles wanted to share in the high status of riding war-carts, o
because military leaders recognized that, by increasing the number of war-can
an army could potentially gain a tactical advantage over an enemy. Some spe< iti
changes in the design of the cart may have had military impetus. Increasing Hi
height of the side and front panel would afford greater protection and stabilil
to the rider. Sheep skins, strips of leather, or other types nl [urding, were liunj», «<i
the chests of the equids for their protection (item • | I '>4; MM 32), wltili
I K,
din quiver-box and probably other weapon containers were added to increase
ammunition supply and make it more readily accessible (item 3 above) The
I iod roughly from 2600 to 2300 was the classic age of the Sumerian war-cart, as
i tacularly represented in the military art of the Standard of Ur (item 3) and the
le of Vultures (item 4), described above. By at least the twenty-fifth century this
Imology had spread up the Euphrates to Mari and south-eastern Syria (items
The Sumerian war-cart in battle
archaeological and artistic evidence can be supplemented by a few texts giving
i basic understanding of the military use of the Sumerian war-cart. The weap-
<>i the warrior of the Sumerian war-cart were the javelin and the axe - the
Bldard weapons of the ordinary Sumerian warrior. Javelin quiver-boxes are
most always found on the war-carts; warriors are shown wielding both javelins
i axes from within the war-cart (item 1). There is no indication that the bow
used. The war-carts are almost always accompanied by foot soldiers,
loubtedly to protect the war-cart from attacks by enemy infantry. The equids
ometimes shown being led by a man (item 1), generally in a procession. The
i arts are often preceded by an armed man (items 3, 8, 11-12), or followed by
m (items 1 and 7) or a group of men (items 4 and 9) armed with javelins and/
es.
\n important question posed by the artistic evidence is, why did the Sumerians
both four-wheeled and two-wheeled war-carts? The four-wheeler has advan-
|n stability and having room for a driver allowing the warrior to give his full
ntion to combat. Psychologically, the larger war-cart was probably more ter-
mg to the enemy The two-wheeler, on the other hand, would have the
mtage of speed, since it was lighter, and maneuverability, since the four-
cclcr war-cart lacked a pivoting front axle and therefore had a wide turning
Since the Sumerians used the javelin rather than the bow - which requires
hands to shoot - as the major missile weapon from war-carts, a single warrior
Id drive a two-wheeler holding the reins in his left hand and a javelin or axe in
nghl hand, as several drivers are depicted. Overall, it seems that the two-
i fled war-cart proved to be the most effective in battle, for, as we will see on
I '. the four-wheeled war-cart disappeared entirely from the battlefield by the
y Middle Bronze Age.
Most of the war-cart scenes in Sumerian martial art are rather static. There are only
di'P" ' 'ons of the Sumerian war-cart in which we get a sense of the actual use in
Ifae Standard of Ur (kern 3; cover art, Figure 5a, p. 133) and Stele of the Vultures
ll. both dating to the twenty-fifth century The Standard of Ur shows five
•iris. Structurally they are all almost exactly the same: four disk-wheels, a
il panel between chest and neck height, and side panels about knee or thigh
i In .i sense, ihe war carl can be seen as ;, mobile shield whose high front panels
•"'"I P'otecuon «. the driver and warrior from enemy missiles. All are pulled
I •
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
by four long-eared, long-tailed equids which have strips of sheep-skin or leathei
barding covering their necks and chests to protect them from enemy missiles. Tin
war-carts are shown in two panels. The first shows a victory procession, with ;i
single war-cart to the rear. It does not have a visible javelin-quiver, but the uppei
part of the top register is partly missing, so this may simply be lost. The driver, axe in
hand, stands on the ground holding the reins; the equids are depicted with walking
gait (all four legs visible at angles). The king - the presumed rider of the war-cart
stands at the head of three soldiers armed with spear and axe, and receives pris
oners of war from other soldiers in an after-battle triumph ritual. The other foui
war-carts are shown in the bottom register in the midst of battle, all with javelin
quivers. The equids on three of the war-carts are shown in full gallop gait, tram
pling the corpses of fallen enemies. The fourth war-cart, at the rear, is shown with
equids walking and not trampling enemies. Each war-cart has two riders, a driver
in the front and a warrior standing on the very edge at the rear. They all ha\ ■
sheep-skin kilts and sheep-skins flung over their left shoulders for protection iu
their upper torso; they also have either leather or metal helmets with a strap undci
the chin. Of the drivers, one holds an axe on his right: shoulder (though the hea.
of the axe is missing), holding the reins in his left hand, just like the driver in 1 1 1 •
upper panel; the image of one of the drivers is damaged and it can't be seen for
certain what he is doing with his right hand. The other two drivers hold sonn
thing in their right hands, it but it is uncertain what — possibly axes or a javelins
Several things seem clear from the Standard of Ur. Both driver and warrioi
were expected to fight, since the drivers are also shown armed with axes. Tin
javelins were thrown, since the javelin quiver-box attached to the war-cart con
tains multiple weapons. Axes were considered useful weapons for war-carts, whi
ther to fight off infantry that might attack the war-cart, or to use whi •
dismounted. Sumerians recognized that the greatest vulnerability of the war-< ai
was the equids. Since the easiest way to stop a war-cart was to kill or disable
single equid, they were given some type of protection on their chests. War-carl
could, move across the battlefield at a gallop and pursue fleeing enemies.
Unfortunately, there are number of ambiguities in the Standard of Ur whi< h
make a complete interpretation impossible. First, is the scene meant to depict foul
war-carts simultaneously, or one cart at different moments in a cartoon-like
sequence? It probably shows four different war-carts, since each warrior has a dii
ferent weapon. Second, does it represent a line of war-carts following one anothi i
or a group of war-carts side-by-side? Third, are they charging forrned-up enenr.
ranks, or chasing and overwhelming already defeated and fleeing enemies? In othi
words, were the war-carts used to break formed- up enemy ranks, or simply t
chase down a fleeing enemy whose ranks were already broken? The Standard o
Ur seems to indicate the latter, since all the enemies have their backs to th<
advancing war-carts; no one is making any serious resistance. Are they trampling
the enemies, or riding around and beside them? In later depictions of war-can
riding over a prostrate enemy becomes a stylized depiction of victory in ban I
Unfortunately, the evidence is insufficient to answri must <>l these questions !<•
i but it must be remembered that, whatever the artist of the Standard of Ur
ying to depict in this particular instance, it does not demonstrate that this
I" icfore the only way the war-cart could have been used by the Sumerians. It
possible that the Sumerians both fought from the war-cart and dismounted
> I he war-carts could have been marshaled in line or rank depending on
ti< aJ circumstances. They may have on some occasions attacked formed-up
»i enemy, and on other occasions chased down fleeing enemies. There is no
i" assume the Sumerians were incapable of tactical flexibility in their use of
mis. It is also important to emphasize that Sumerian art almost invariably
not actual battle, but victory after battle. The Standard of Ur may thus not
ig to tell us how war-carts were used to win a battle, but how they were
I i the battle was already won.
Stele of Vultures {c. 2440} (item 4; Figure 1, p. 55) shows king Eanatum
ptfc charging into battle on his war-cart, followed by a large body of infantry
I with spears and axes. The depiction may be intended as symbolic rather
M deal - the king is always said to lead his army into battle even if, in reality,
II the rear of the army. But it may also represent a real tactic of the war-
preceding the infantry into battle. The king stands at the front of the war-
lolding a long spear overhead in his left hand and what appears to be a proto-
sword (or perhaps a club or a scepter, see pp. 66-71) in his right hand. The
ft is also equipped with a quiver-box with half a dozen javelins, as well as a
The depiction of a spear in Eanatum's hand is unique in Sumerian
all other war-cart warriors hold javelins. The spear is held overhand in
I hand, so far to the rear of the shaft that it would seem to be unbalanced.
kgh the head of the weapon is lost and we cannot tell the length of the spear,
II ty not a javelin. A fragment of a parallel scene from the same stele shows
Oi the largely lost fourth panel of the Stele of the Vultures. 17 There, the
I i igment at the far left of the fourth panel shows the hand of a man grasping
d of the long lance in the very same unbalanced way Eanatum holds the
ill the second panel. In the fourth panel the length of the entire lance is
R i(h the lance head about to be thrust into the face of the enemy king. This
di us shows the use of a long thrusting lance from the war-cart rather than
lin. In the upper register of the stele, Eanatum stands on the ground in
4 his army, indicating that Sumerian chariot warriors could dismount and
« m the ground with axe and spear, along with the infantry. Each of the soldiers
fag Eanatum is similarly double-armed, with thrusting spear in one hand
! '"I axe in the other.
• 'i Ik-i odd characteristic of Eanatum's war-cart is that the driver appears to be
line hrliiml Kanatum. The torso and head of the second figure is missing in a
• d portion of the stele, and his legs are largely hidden behind the side panel
w.ii cart. The only indication of a second occupant of the war-cart is the
""> ."id f ii-hi hand which extends to the side of Eanatum's hip, and appears to
"'Win)- an axe I he reins of tin- (art rest on the top of the front panel, but then
" ' •"»•"""' *-K--iH> is not holding them, since he has a weapon in each
1 >8
I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
7VR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
hand. Unless this scene is composed with unrealistic artistic license, I suspect thai
the reins go behind Eanatum to his left side (and hence are invisible in the scene)
and are held in the left hand of the nearly obscured man to the rear of Eanatum
The Standard of Ur shows the king standing in front of the war-cart while his
driver stands on the ground holding the reins in his left hand and an axe in In
right, just like the largely defaced driver of Eanatum's war-cart seems to be doini'
I suspect that if each man stood on opposite sides of the war-cart it would not b<
impossible for the man at the rear to drive, though it does seem quite awkward
On the other hand, since the equids and everything to the front of Eanatum arc
missing because of damage to the stele, it may be that there was originally a man
leading the war-cart in front of the equids.
Another important characteristic of Sumerian war-carts depicted in art is 1 1 1
development of the theme of the war-cart trampling the enemy as a symbol o(
victory in battle. It appears most strikingly in the Standard of Ur (item 3). A pi«
cisely analogous scene, though fragmentary, occurs at Mari (item 5), and in I
cylinder seal from Kish (item 8). It may also possibly have been shown in the St t I
of Vultures prior to damage; the area under the war-cart is now missing, but thi
infantry in the register above the war-cart are trampling enemy corpses under thru
feet (item 4). This issue will be discussed more fully on p. 150.
These artistic representations of war-cart battle can be supplemented by ex «
sional references to war-carts in Sumerian royal inscriptions. The most importai
comes from an inscription describing a battle in the agricultural Ugiga-fn I
between king Enmetena of Lagash {c. 2400} and Urluma of Umma, in win
Enmetena "confronted the retreating Urluma, ruler of Umma, at the base of tin
Lumagirnunta- canal, and [Urluma] abandoned his sixty teams of asses there, am
left the bones of their personnel [of the war-carts] strewn over the plain" (PI i
77). This text describes a battle occurring on a flat open agricultural field, ideal lei
war-carts; unfortunately, the details of the actual battle were not recorded. I I
result, however, is clear: Enmetena defeated the army of Umma, which fled bcf<
him until they reached a canal which their war-carts could not cross. The wan ioi
abandoned their war-carts and tried to flee on foot, but many were run do
either by pursuing war-carts or by infantry. The text also provides anotln i
important detail - that king Urluma had "sixty teams of asses", or, in other word
60 war-carts. We cannot be sure that some of the war-carts did not escape, s< i I
should be considered the minimum number in Urluma s army. None the lesi
shows that an average Sumerian city-state could probably muster 50-80 war i i
for battle. At this point they were no longer merely ceremonial vehicles or 1 1 1
conveyances, but were an important combat component in the Sumerian arn
When Enmetena wished to emphasize the magnitude of his victory, he underlin
the capture of 60 war-carts, rather than the total number of enemy dead or cap-
tured.
Enmetena of Lagash {c. 2400} also built a war cart named "Ningrsifs < h.ti
that heaps up [burial mounds of dead enemies in| deleaied foreign lands" (PI
cf. 100); it is obviously a divine war-carl loi teinpli utiul inn its name show
BUlitary functio, The war _ cart brlngs vlctory m batde> resuking m
| up burial moi jds of the cor pses of the defeated enemies - a standard
"" meta ph° r for Military victory depicted in the Stele of Vultures (item 4;
| ). 55) . Althou (l to t h e mo dern mind the ceremonial aspects of the war-
1 "" etlmes seen to mply a lack of serious application to real combat, to the
'"" quasi-sa.,. ec j qualities of a war-cart enhanced rather then detracted
military value. T, e fact t hat a war-cart was dedicated to a god, carried a
image of a god i, re ligi OU s rituals, was kept in a temple treasury, and was
n mutation of the celestial vehicles used by the gods, gave the war-cart a
•us duality, making more effecdve by psycho]o g ically mcreas ing the fear of
ho faced it in battl.. To the mnd of the Sumerian warrior, the war-cart was
;low-movmg woo, en box on heavy wheek pulkd by asses as ofen descnbed
'" Scholars; rath V, it was a chariot of the gods, representing and convey-
nu- power to the k, tde fie]d. It was perhaps viewed by the Sumerians more
biblical Ark of tb. Covenant. Indeed, against an ancient enemy, the psy-
' " n P act of the S nnerian war-cart - its size, weight, speed, heroic warrior
me aura - was prc iably as signl f lcant as lts actual notary impact.
eremomal aspec of the war-cart and chariot as the proper vehicle for
Ignity is emphasize in one of the much later Mari texts {1760s} Here
Um is advised abo, t proper riding decomm:
lord should prese: ve his royaJ dlgnity Even though yQu are ^ king rf ^
«iad] Haneans, y Su are also the king of the Akkadians. Thus my lord
■mIJ not ride hors^ but a charlot with mules {kudanu)y and maintaln the
tlge ofhis soverev nty (ARM 676; EEH 120b; MR 165)
Ot as a symbol a f kingship was as significant as its practical military
I'M! IO
•us m war.
U " CartS and th< ir equid teams seem to have been housed in special
Uru inimgma of L lgash describes bmldlng « a cha riot-house for [the war-
Imgirsu, a building whose awesome sp l e ndor overwhelms all the lands" (PI
I k Bau, ruler of Lagash> bmlt the « house of the donkey . sta]lions » (E3/
were probabjy building complexes for constructing, repairing, and
I carts and their equipment, and for the care and breeding of their equid
War-carts in th* Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian periods
{2300-2000}
recently it has genei lllv hccn thought that the Akkadians essentiaUy aban-
thc use ol the for~
■ I th
M wheeled war-cart in battle. Crouwel and Littauer sum-
ins position: the 'Vv.dcnce for [the] use [of war-carts] in warfare, for
' ,hrvWtTC * 4 lr - 11 lv Unsuitable, lades rapidly after the middle of the fthirdl
1,1111 ( 1 ■- A >: V|.|- \v \ ii . |, ,, , i- , , ,- , . n
vv\ I I >i Recently published cylinder seals from
I }<>
141
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
ancient Nagar (Tell Brak; Figure 4b, p. 133; EA 1:355-6) in the Khabur Triangle
n north-eaftern Syria, however, prov.de some new, fairly conclusive evidence thai
he "e of the war-cart continued unabated dunng the Akkadian period £*»
Sin {2254-2218} built a large palace at Nagar, which became the major Akkadian
administrative center in northern Mesopotamia. The discovery of three mjhtar>
scenes of four-wheeled war-carts on Akkadian-period cylinder seals from Nag
indicates the ongoing Akkadian use of the four-wheeled war-cart - ^(EE
116 $1-4) On the other hand, none of the better-known monumental Akkad,,
martial art depicts the use of the war-cart. For the Akkadian rour-wheeled wa,
cart in battle we have:
- Akkadian cylinder seal {c. 2250} (EEH 116 §1). A four-wheeled war-cai
drawn by eqmds with protective barding on their chests One seated man
drives the cart, with a man stepping into the war-cart behind, and anothe
standing on the ground. The war-cart is trampling a corpse, while anot ..,
wounded man on the ground is being dispatched by a warrior armed with ,
dagger or axe, while a vulture eagerly hovers nearby.
14 Akkadian cylinder seal {c. 2250} (EEH 116 §2; Figure 4b, p. 133). A fou
wheeled war-cart drawn by equids. The seated driver is foUowedby one man
stepping into the war-cart from the rear and another standing brandishing
dJL over his head. The war-cart is trampling a fallen corpse Underneath
this scene may be four prisoners sitting on the ground with their arm
pinioned behind their backs.
15 Akkadian cylinder seal {c. 2250} (EEH 116 §4). A four-wheeled war-cn
tramples an enemy and is followed by a foot soldier.
Additionally, there are two non-military Akkadian scenes with similar foul
wheeled carts:
16 Cylinder seal {Akkadian, 2220-2159} (AFC §143; WV §13; SDA 189; I
§725) This mythological scene depicts a god riding in a standard fou!
wheeled war-cart being drawn by a griffin. The god holds a whip, bu, ,
weapons are apparent, though there may be a javelin m a quiver-box.
17 Cylinder seal {Akkadian, 2220-2159} (AM §113). God riding in a I
wheeled war-cart drawn by a griffin, similar to item 16 above.
For two-wheeled Akkadian war-carts we have:
18 Akkadian cylinder seal {2334-2193} (WV §17; FI §726). God riding in
two-wheeled celestial war-cart drawn by a griffin, similar to items 16 and
above.
Ur III period (2112-2004} there is addition..! evidence foi i
During the Ur 111 p-
wheeled war-carts
i r
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
' fragmentary scene from Ur III (AAM §192-3; WV §18). Man riding a two-
heeled war-cart with grooved disk-wheels; the upper portion is missing, so
i here is no indication of military use.
I ragments from the stele of Urnammu {2112-2095} (AFC 445). These are
too damaged to determine if any military accoutrements are present.
I Vpiction of two-wheeled war-cart from Tepe Hisar, northern Iran, south-
Ltf of Caspian Sea {2350-2000} (WV §21; ELH 199). This is a badly com-
i m >sed scene of a man riding a two wheeled war-cart; there is no clear military
■ 'Mtext. Some have argued that the partially damaged wheel is spoked; others
I I "lie that it is a cross-bar wheel (WV 40). This may represent the spread of
war-cart technology into Iran, or perhaps reflects a transitional form between
the steppe war-carts of Central Asia and those of the Near East.
I hus, for the period from 2300—2000, there is an apparent shift in the depiction
ii cart warfare, with fewer and less dramatic military scenes. None the less, it
it that carts continued to be used during this period (items 13—15 above).
this apparent change in our source material reflect a change in actual combat
s, a change in the way warfare was depicted, or merely the random chance
ii martial art happens to survive and to have been discovered and published?
the recent publication of Akkadian-period cylinder seals from Nagar (EEH
there was no clear example of the depiction of a war-cart in a military context
M' that period (WV 44-5). Now 7 there are three examples, which should serve
ti minder that, in ancient archaeology and history, absence of evidence is not
hi e of absence. Much of what we claim to know about ancient history is often
i on the rather random preservation and discovery of a fragmentary, obscure, and
i range of sources. None the less, despite their fixation on war, no Akkadian
is shown riding in a war-cart in battle in surviving monumental Akkadian art.
re is additional literary evidence that is generally overlooked in the discus-
: <il war-carts in the Neo-Sumerian period. We are fortunate to have detailed
u.il descriptions of the Sumerian war-cart from Gudea of Lagash {2141—
11 J , from precisely the period in which it is sometimes claimed that the war-
snit out of military use. 19 Gudea built a ceremonial war-cart for the god
en mi, taking special care in the selection and preparation of the materials:
I he good shepherd Gudea [king of Lagash] . . . broke the seal on his store-
house [in the city of Girsu], pulled aside the wooden [bolt of the door].
( tutle.i checked the wood [for the war-cart] piece by piece, taking great care
i ii. The mes wood he smoothed and he split the khalub wood, and fitted
them together to make his blue chariot..., He decorated the chariot with
and lapis lazuli, with arrows protruding from the quiver like the [shafts]
oi daylight |from the sun]; he was especially careful with the anhar [mace], the
"warrior's ann , \... lie harnessed to it [donkey] stallions, the "lions-sum-
moiu-d foi running". Gudea fashioned for Ningirsu his beloved standard and
vvmte his |Nmgirsu\| own name on M
I I \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
The use of a mace from a war-cart is also mentioned in the epic of Ninurt.i
(HTO 117).
A description of the completed war-cart and weapons donated by Gudea to the
temple of Ningirsu provides a poetical description of the Sumerian war-cart in
battle:
The chariot named "It subdued the mountain" [lands],
Bearing terror and dread [to the enemy],
Drawn by the donkey "Merrily-Neighing- Wind"
Harnessed with the other donkeys.
The seven-spiked mace, fierce battle mace,
Weapon unbearable from the North to the South . . .
The rnittu-mace, a lion-headed weapon of hulalu stone,
Which does not flee from enemy lands . . .
Nine banners
The "warrior's arm" [mace]
A bow [ CI§ -ban] that roars like a forest of mes- trees,
Its terrible arrows [ti\ flashing like lightening in battle
On its quiver [mar] a leopard and lion [were depicted]
With a serpent flicking its tongue
The weapons of battle
The power of kingship . . .
Gudea, ruler of Lagash, presented to the Temple. 21
There is one ambiguity in interpreting the meaning of this text; Gudea i
clearly describing the building of a ceremonial war-cart for use in rituals in tin-
temple of the god Ningirsu. Does this mean that this war-cart was purely ecu
monial, or was it taken into battle as well? However that may be, this is clearly .1
ceremonial uw-cart, and represents our best contemporary description of the
building, purpose, and conceptualization of the role of war-cart of this period
The war-cart was the "power of kingship", which brought "terror and dread"
upon the enemy If the military function of the war-cart had all but disappean
during the two centuries previous to Gudea, as is sometimes claimed, it is unlikcT
he would have so dramatically emphasized precisely those obsolete military fun<
tions in his dedicatory inscription. We should also avoid imposing modern pr<
conceptions on ancient peoples: if a vehicle is "ceremonial" for a procession to
temple, it cannot simultaneously have a "practical" function in battle. In actual 11
to some extent, all ancient battle was ceremonial; indeed, in some ways, the woiM
of ritual was more "real" for ancient peoples than what we consider today as thi
world of real events.
The other striking feature of Gudea's war-cart is the emphasis on the use oi th
bow and arrow in war-carts, our earliest example of the bow and chariot conihi
nation which would become standard in the Late Hmn/e Ayy The use of the Imv
from the chariot in Neo Sumerian limes is .ilso imph< J in tin i pit of Niiiiih 1
I !
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
u tory over Azag. There Ninurta is said to have mounted a chariot to fight, and to
have shot his bow in battle (HTO 244); although not explicit, this may imply the
I tc of a bow from the chariot. This represents a major transition from the Early
I Hnastic javelin to Neo-Sumerian bow as the war-cart missile weapon, and is a
v transformation in the development of the "true" war-chariot which occurs in
he later Middle Bronze Age, as will be discussed on pp. 145-722
In summary, by the end of the Early Bronze Age the Sumerian war-cart was a
apon in transition. That the Sumerians retained the two-wheeled war-cart, and
vcmi experimented with using the bow from it, demonstrates that the war-cart was
nil considered useful in battle, even if it was not decisive. In the right terrain
unst the right enemy and used at the proper moment in battle, the war-cart
•nld create a rnilitary advantage and perhaps win a battle. Thus experimentation
ontinued in the coming centuries to discover the ideal formula for the building
md use of the war-cart, leading to the innovation of the trie war-chariot, and the
rcat chariot revolution of the seventeenth century.
Middle Bronze Age and the origins of tlu war-chariot
{2000-1600} 23
I lie Middle Bronze Age saw the rise of what is often called the true war-chariot,
apposed to the early Sumerian war-cart. The txansformition from war-cart to
iii not required a transformation of biological, technological, social, and military
L< tors to create the ideal vehicle for Late Bronze Age warfare. Once that proper
ombination of factors had developed, the war-chariot spread rapidly throughout
Miu h of the Old World, encompassing Central Asia, the Near East, Europe, India,
1 hina, and North Africa.
Scholars tend to define the "true" chariot, which would revolutionize warfare
I the Late Bronze Age, by the following characteristics (CG 74-120; ELH; WV
I 5, §24-36). The chariot was drawn by horses rather than by other equids,
flowing faster speed. Lighter construction techniques, two wheels instead of four,
«d spoked wheels rather than disk wheels, also contributed to decreasing the
ight and increasing the speed of the chariot. The change from four to two
• heels allowed greater maneuverability. A shift from the nose ring for controlling
lie horse to bit and reins, along with improved yoke and harness, created a more
fficient means both for controlling the horse and for the hcrse to pull the chariot,
'in boosting maneuverability and speed. The overall impict of new lightweight
"iisi ruction, improved harness and horse-power, resulted by the seventeenth
Mirny m vehicles which could attain a maximum speed of thirty miles per hour
01 short distances, two-and-a-half times the speed of the iarly Bronze Sumerian
• mi wheeled war-cart (CG 84). To the improved speed of the chariot was added
use of the composite bow, allowing rapid fire at a distance. The greater pene-
tting powei of the composite bow with bronze arrowheads made the chariot a
rapidly moving platform shooting the most powerful nrssile in the ancient
• HM ' tul ' h llsn lrtl to the adoption of bronze scale armor for chariot warriors,
145
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
and often for their horses. The fact that the bow required two hands to be shot
meant that chariots were most efficient when they had a battle-team of driver an* i
archer. This complex and expensive combination of chariot craftsmanship, com
posite bow-making, horse grooming and training, and metal- working for armor,
created the need for large and expensive royal workshops and stables to maintain
the chariots. It probably required half a dozen men - carpenter, bowyer, groom,
metal-worker, and a servant or two — to maintain a single chariot in combal
readiness. The building and repairing of chariot wheels is mentioned (L 377)
along with reference to a courtier named Yashub-Ashar who seems to have been
in charge of chariot production at Mari (MM 31).
Chariots were obviously valuable and somewhat rare, since they were given a-
gifts to vassals and nobles (ARM 5,66, 5,58, 10.113). The relative scarcity of both
chariots and the skilled craftsmen necessary to build and repair them is emphasized
in one of the Mari texts, where a nobleman, Ila-salim, requests a new chariot from
the king Zimri-Lim:
The king gave me a chariot, but when I went away between the country ami
the mountains, that chariot broke in the middle, and now as I travel to and fro
there is not chariot for me to ride. If it please my lord, may my lord give mi
another chariot, so that I can organize the country until my lord comes. I am
my lords servant; may my lord not refuse me another chariot. (ARM 5.66
MK 164)
This text is interesting at a number of levels. The fact that the chariot broke ii
the mountains shows the problem of the use of the chariot in the rough terrain
outside the flat plains. It also appears that this nobleman had the only chariot in In
city; he had no other vehicle, and didn't seem to be able to borrow one. Fui
thermore, he had no craftsmen in his employ able to repair the chariot or bin hi
him a new one. He had to ask for one from the king. The chariot is also not use d
in a military context, but as a vehicle to assist the nobleman in administering 1 1 1
province.
Texts mention "harnessed teams" of chariot horses, grooms, and trainers (MK
161-2; ARM 18.55), indicating an organized stable system for chariot horses. Im
every pair of horses pulling a chariot, another half a dozen horses would be needed
in reserve for breeding, training, and replacement for horses that were injun d
captured or killed. All of this required a state that was wealthy and powerful
enough to maintain armies with hundreds of chariots. More importantly,
required the creation of a new military rnind-set focused on the tactical advani.i;
and hmitations of the chariot. As the experiences of soldiers with new technolo
gies in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries CE amply demonstrate, it prob.il >l
required several generations to fully develop such tactical expertise, and sewi i
more generations for soldiers and other elites to fully accept ill the social a in
military changes required by the new chariot wail am It was not until the scv< i
teenth century that all of these complex clement' i im.ilh in place in id
I |r,
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
I -per balance to maximize the military potential of chariot warfare. From the
ihtary perspective, the transition from the Middle Bronze Age to the Late
■ nze Age - usually dated to around 1600 BCE - can be defined as the transition
in non-chariot-centered warfare to the new chariot warfare.
Artistic evidence on the development of the chariot 25
I here are a few examples of the continued use of the four-wheeled chariot in the
ulv Middle Bronze Age {2000-1600} in Anatolia, but depictions of fbur-
leeled war-carts in a military context have disappeared by the nineteenth century 26
roughout the rest of the Middle Bronze Age the majority of the depictions of
I 1 vehicles - nearly all from cylinder seals - are two-wheeled vehicles drawn by
< « horses (ELH). A rough outline of the development and use of the war-chariot
ii be culled from these examples. The data can be broadly divided into roughly
i periods, the early Middle Bronze {2000-1800} and the late Middle Bronze
1 ><)-1600}. It must be emphasized that our evidence is quite limited and we are
mially reduced to generalizing from inadequate data. The following is a list of
major evidence with a military context.
Early Middle Bronze evidence {2000-1800}
< ylinder seal, Kultepe (Karum), Anatolia {2000-1850} (WV §29; ELH §4).
A single rider, a royal figure with an axe, in a chariot with two four- spoked
wheels, drawn by two horses with nose rings rather than reins (cf. WV §28).
( ylinder seal, Uruk, Iraq {20-19C} (WV §30, p. 69). Single rider in chariot
with two spoked wheels.
i lay tablet with cylinder seal impression, Babylon {1779} (Figure 4d, p. 133;
II §730; WV §31). The single rider is a king on a chariot with two four-
spoked wheels, trampling a prostrate enemy, and followed by four soldiers in a
procession before the gods.
C ylinder seal, Syria {19-17C} (FI §728). A single rider in a chariot with two
four-spoked wheels, trampling a prostrate enemy
Based on this - admittedly limited — evidence, we find the following char-
tei lstics of chariot warfare in the early Middle Bronze period {2000—1800}. Only
n s wo -wheeled chariot was used for military purposes, a practice which had prob-
begun in the Neo-Sumerian period {2200-2000} as discussed on pp. 141-5.
I lie Early Bronze technique of having a single rider on the two-wheeled Sumer-
i war cart continued throughout the early Middle Bronze Age; all of the
ilcpn lions from this period show a single rider. This obviously had its limitations,
illy when facing archery to which the charioteer could not respond at a
mce. The earlier Sumerian trampling-the-prostate-enemy motif, whether
mholn oi tactical, continued throughout the Middle Bronze Age (items 24 and
1 i hove) ( 'h.i i lots are sometimes accompanied by infantry, who generally follow
I I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
the chariot (item 24). This characteristic is also found in Neo-Sumerian chariot
warfare. From hints in the depiction of equids, we find the increasing and even
tually exclusive use of horses (characterized by short ears and manes) to pull
chariots. Horses are first attested pulling war-carts in the Neo-Sumerian period,
becoming universal during the early Middle Bronze period. The axe continued to
be used by chariot warriors (item, 22), but there are no early Middle Bronze artistic
examples of the use of the javelin or the bow from the chariot, although the use ol
the bow is attested in the Neo-Sumerian texts discussed on pp. 143—5. Finally, we
see a shift from, disk wheels to spoked wheels (items 22—25). In other words, other
than the adoption of the spoked wheel, which is the major innovation of the early
Middle Bronze Age, all of the characteristics of early Middle Bronze chariot war-
fare were also found in the early Neo-Sumerian period. What happened during
the early Middle Bronze Age seems to have been the universal adoption
throughout the Near East of late Neo-Sumerian practices.
Late Middle Bronze evidence {1800-1600}
In contrast, during the later Middle Bronze period we find a number of innova
tions in chariot warfare depicted in our artistic sources.
26 Cylinder seal, Syria {19-17C} (FI §729). Chariot with two six-spoked
wheels; single rider has quiver on his back and is followed by four soldiers on
foot.
27 Cylinder seal, Syria {1850-1650} (WV §33; ETH §5). Chariot with two
four-spoked wheels drawn by two horses with two riders, trampling a pros
trate enemy who raises his arms to protect his face.
28 Cylinder seal, Syria {1850-1650} (WV §4; ELH §6). Chariot with two foui
spoked wheels drawn by two horses; driver has a quiver on his back, while a
man behind him with an axe and a dagger is either attacking him, or, more
likely, stepping into the chariot to ride with him.
29 Cylinder seal, Syria {1750-1600} (ELH pi. 2). Chariot with two four-spoked
wheels drawn by two horses trampling a prostrate enemy who raises an arm to
protect himself; the single rider is followed by three infantrymen
30 Cylinder seal, Syria {1750-1600} (ELH pi. 3; MK 160; WV §35). Chariot
with two four-spoked wheels (with metal rims?) drawn by two horses; singlr
driver with bow and quiver on his shoulder is followed by three men on foot
wearing helmets. A partially damaged lower portion seems to show a nun
being trampled.
31 Cylinder seal, Syria {1750-1600} (ELH pi. 4; MK 160). A single rider in a
chariot with two four-spoked wheels, drawn by two horses; a prostrate body
and severed head indicates a military context.
32 Cylinder seal, Syria {1750-1600} (ELH pi. 5). A single rider in a chariot will.
two seven-spoked wheels, drawn by two horses; the ruin h.is a quiver on In
back and is followed by four soldiers on tool I li< iltivci seems to have
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
helmet, and the hatched markings on his long skirt may dicate bronze scale
trmor.
I ylinder seal, Syria {1750-1600?} (Figure 4e, p. 133; W 63, §36). A single
i ider in chariot with two eight-spoked wheels, drawn by vo horses; the rider
I lis a quiver on his back and is shooting a bow while drivirj- He apparently has
I I le reins wrapped around his waist (or tied to the front pane^f the chariot?); this
I the first representation of this practice (WV 63), which widely depicted in
later New Kingdom Egyptian chariot warfare (e.g. E\P 198, 240). The
1 1. itched markings on his long robe may indicate bronze s^e armor.
< vlmder seal,. Anatolia {17C} (FI 57, §841). A huntm^cene depicts four
i wo-wheeled chariots each drawn by two horses on the hnt; three carry one
nun, one has two men. The scene is small and the detail<?oniewhat obscure,
I 'lit one man seems to have a quiver on his back. Another in a chariot with a
0! iver, is shooting a bow; several animals seem to have ar?ws in them.
1 Minder seal, Syria {1800-1600?} (MK 162). A sing* rider in a two-
heeled chariot pull by two horses, followed by one mP with a spear and
I iother with a dagger.
I his evidence from the late Middle Bronze period {180C"1600} attests to a
llliber of fundamental innovations in chariot warfare. The d& from the use of
ft »e ring to bit and reins, allowing for more efficient drivig, is first attested in
ton in the early eighteenth century (items 24, 26-28). Al^ough the use of a
i ider remains the norm, we begin to see the driver and w™or combination
<" ( omes predominant in Late Bronze chariot warfare (ite^s 27, 28 and 34).
Hie of a lighter frame and spoked wheels decreased the wight of the chariot
•i' i nly to allow the cart eventually to be widened enough o allow two riders,
main light enough to be faster than an enemy on foot.
idence of a close association of archery with chariotry arpears with increas-
fr quency, generally as a quiver and/or bow on the back of he chariot warrior
ins 2(>, 28, 30, 32, and 34). This raises an important issue.The association of
Jft v equipment with a charioteer does not necessarily meai the bow was shot
I moving chariot during warfare. It may simply be that he chariot warrior
■I the full panoply of Middle Bronze weapons with hm in his chariot,
ludtng the bow. He may have dismounted to fight and shoo his bow Thus, in
Hon to the mere presence of a bow, it is important to note he appearance, for
« nine, of scenes of actually shooting the bow from chariot, both by a driver
md by a warrior accompanied by a driver (items 33 and 34).
1 h.u tots continue to be accompanied by infantry, as they we r e in the Sumerian
I nlv Middle Bronze periods (items 26, 29, 30, and 32). This emphasizes the
portant potential vulnerability of the chariot to light infants The chariot was
dice me wh.cn used with combined-arms tactics in conjunction with infan-
I Ims chariot warriors continue to be armed with axe aril dagger as melee
■pons [oi dismounted combat (item 28). Finally, although tK interpretation of
rti tu evident e is nn« main, two charioteers have hatch mirked ' Nothing that
t I
WAP.FARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
may be intended to represent bronze scale armor (items 32 and 33). In summary,
the late Middle Bronze period {1800-1600} was one of significant innovation in
chariot warfare, including the bit and rein, driver-warrior teams, archery from
chariots, and the introduction of bronze armor. Thus, all of the elements of the
revolutionary chariot warfare of the Late Bronze were in place by the seventeenth
century
The symbolic or tactical trampling- the-prostrate-enemy motif retains its
importance in the late Middle Bronze period (items 27, 29, and 31). As noted
above, the war-cart trampling scene became a standard symbol of victory in Early
Bronze Sumer, appearing frequently in Middle Bronze depictions of chariots,
indicating a continuity of symbolic ideology from Early Bronze war-cart to Mid-
dle Bronze chariot, as well as the probable tactical continuity in the actual use of
the chariot in battle. Although the precise means of ideological and artistic trans-
mission are unclear, by the eighteenth century the trampling scene is found in
Anatolia (item 27), Syria (items 29—31) and Babylon (item 24); in other words, it
has become a universal war motif throughout the Near East outside of Egypt.
In this regard, an important question for the military historian is whether the
trampling scene was intended to represent an actual military tactic, or was merely ;i
striking means to symbolize victory in battle. However this may be, it is certainly
possible that war-carts could have trampled corpses, wounded or fleeing enemies,
and, under the right circumstances, could in theory have broken standing enemy
infantry formations as welL Two of the later Middle Bronze trampling scenes show
that the victims on the ground are animate and clearly alive, raising their arms to
protect themselves from the oncoming chariot (items 27 and 29; ELH §5-6).
Chariot warfare in Middle Bronze texts 21
Compared with artistic representations of chariots, the Middle Bronze texts about
chariot warfare are rather elusive. None the less, enough evidence survives to give
us a broad picture of the chariot in battle. Ishme-Dagan, king of Isin {1953-1935 \
has left: us a detailed literary description of a chariot from the early Middle Bronze
which complements Gudea's description given on pp. 143— 4. 28 The hymn praises
both the god Enlil, for whom the chariot was made, and Isme-Dagan, the kin;'
who ordered its construction. It provides both a detailed description of the parts ot
the chariot, a mythic account of the cosmic meaning of the chariot, and some
hints as to its military significance (see also ARM 7.161). The chariot was built
and possibly specific elements of its design were specified - by order of Enlil in .in
oracle given in his temple.
O lofty chariot; Enlil, the lord of intelligence, the father of the gods,
Spoke about your construction, in the Ekur [temple], his sublime shrine..
A number of specific parts of the chariot are mentioned, with a coinpli
technical terminology for the various parts of thr < h.n mi p. >l -I - n >p<
I a.
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
pole pin, front guard, platform, beams, side boards, and foot board. These types ol
.terns are also mentioned in several of the texts from the Man archive, though the
technical terminology is somewhat opaque (MK 162-3; ARM 18.45 7 161) It h
adorned with "silver, gold and precious stones". Since the chariot was to carry the
statue of the god in ceremonial processions, it was apparently a portable temple
and is described as a microcosm of the universe.
Although the text is fundamentally mythic in function, some military details of
the chariot are also mentioned. A bow may be mentioned in an uncertain passage
(line 12), supplementing the mention of a bow in Gudea's chariot. Both driver and
warrior are described as fighting: "[On] your [the chariot's platform], warriors
[are] fighting together" side-by-side. The poem describes the god Enlil entering
the chariot to go orT to war, undoubtedly paralleling the practice of earthly kings.
[Enlil] completed his great harnessing, he stepped in [the chariot!
He embraced Ninlil, the Mother [goddess], his wife.
[The wargod] Nmurta [son of Enlil], the hero, [went in front (as driver?)]
The Anunnas [a class of gods] . . . [marched] after him
The chariot shines like lightning, its bellowing [noise] a pleasure.
[. . •] the donkeys harnessed to the yoke.
Enlil [is in] his mighty chariot, his shining [glory] is bright.
I. is appears to be a textual reference to Ninurta, the war-god and son of Enlil
Ither driving the chariot for his father, or perhaps preceding the chariot on foot'
' m is accompanied by the Anunnas, a class of gods, who follow or surround the
■ .not on foot, just as infantrymen are frequently shown accompanying chariots
hi the artistic sources.
The use of chariots (narkabtum) in battle is not mentioned extensively in the
Man archive (WM 144). It appears that, by 1750, the chariot had not yet become
major element of Mesopotamian warfare. There are, however, a number of hints
hil .night point to the limited use of chariots in combat. One problem in inter-
I ■■nng the use of combat chariots is that the distinction between the terms for
Ight wagon and for chariot is unclear; both are probably best translated as cart 29
i example, one passage mentions the itinerary of an army on the march
• I ibing the "elite troops, chariots and gear"; it is not clear from the text if the
Chariots" were war-chariots or carts carrying the gear (L 222). There are
limerous references to carts for transportation purposes (L 184, 223). Chariots
re clearly used for messengers and for transportation of small valuable goods
hie text mentions the delivery by chariot of silver cups (MK 161). Chariots were
' usee! m religious ceremonies (MK 161); the "golden chariot" mentioned in
Man archive was probably intended to carry statues of the gods, or perhaps for
UU king in ceremonial processions (L 324; MM 32).
\n additional problem in interpreting the textual evidence for chariots is the
- "I the term rakib ansi-:iii a, "rider of cquids" (L 593 index). A double ambi-
' UIU rX,S,S m thls P 11 '^'' " ,h '- "Mdi-r riding the a,uid .(self or riding a chariot
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
drawn by equids? Second, what specific species of equid is intended? I agree with
Heimpel's interpretation that this phrase is a technical term for charioteer (L 593).
Several lines of evidence point in this direction. First, the artistic evidence dis-
cussed above clearly points to the prominence of the chariot, and the rarity oi
actually riding equids. Second, the texts strongly imply that these "riders" arc
persons of importance; culturally speaking, this would associate them with char-
iots, the vehicles of kings and gods, as indicated by concepts of proper royal riding
decorum discussed on p. 141 (ARM 6.76; EEH 120b). Third, even when discussing
a single "rider", the texts use the plural for the equids (L 296, 402) - thus a single
rider rides multiple animals, an impossibility if the man was riding the back of an
animal, but the norm if the equids are pulling chariots.
The texts mention "riders" as royal messengers, or perhaps better ambassadors,
men not just carrying a clay tablet but on special missions from the king, accom-
panying "high ranking servants" (L 322, 385, 402, 517). In a sense "rider of
equids" almost seems like an aristocratic title in the texts rather than a description
of a means of transportation. It is perhaps closer to the idea of an English "knight"
in the Hundred Years War period, who did not necessarily actually fight from
horseback, just as the Roman equites was a member of an aristocratic order and nol
necessarily a combat cavalryman.
There are two texts which give some indication of the actual combat use oi
chariots. One text implies that chariots were vehicles used by officers in battle
One army is described as having "four thousand good troops; the generals
Hammu-Rabi and Dada and the diviner Kakka-Ruqqum, riders of equids, an
those in the lead of those troops" (L 225). Clearly the chariot is mentioned here .is
a vehicle for a high official to ride to or during battle. But three chariots among
4000 men would not be sufficient to have a significant tactical effect on the out
come of a battle. On the other hand, the text does not explicitly state that their
were not other combat charioteers as well, only that the three highest officers m
the army were "riders of equids". The limited scale of the employment of char i< »i
on Middle Bronze battlefields was probably related to the enormous cost of hot.'
One horse could cost five minas (300 shekels: MM 13), fifteen times the comb I
wages of a captain (see pp. 196-7). At such a cost a king would be hard pressed i«
field a large number of chariots, and would be wary of risking such valuable horse
in combat.
There is another text, however, which points to substantial numbers of comba
charioteers in battle. A general defeated an army of 500 men operating on th<
plains area of the middle Khabur River, and claimed to have captured "t\v<T
riders of equids" (L 417). These were apparently important: men, because 1 1 1
were being held for prisoner exchange for two officers. Assuming each of tin ■
a charioteer, we have a ratio of at least one charioteer per forty infantrymen tl
actual ratio was probably lower since presumably some of the charioteers est ,i|
or were killed rather than captured. This compares nicely with the one ehai lot
per thirty-five infantrymen in contemporary Anatoli, i (Ml II !7; see p. \() \)
may imply there was a substantial chariot component in sunn nntihern S\ n
I 12
WAR-CARTS AND CHARIOTS
n-mies in the mid-eighteenth century. It mav u • . f , ,
Syrian army, rather than an army from Tm Slgmfkant that thlS 1S a northerl
team pointing to northern Syria and Anatol' MeS ° P0tamian " Ver val H P« ha P
ptsm warfare. la as the zone of greatest use of char
Conclusi on
In the Near East the final synthesis of all of m f , •
*ems to have occurred m Syria and central T T" f ^ C ° ^"^ "^
imong the H.ttites, Humans, and Syrians v u '" ^ Seventeenth centur y
Interesting observation about the relative in , HammUrabi ofBabylon made an
"ion in Syria and Mesopotamia- "The „ P ° rtan f ° f wa 8 on vs - boat transpor-
bnri-Lim's] land [the city of Man in SvnT* I , tranS P omtion ] of Y™ [king
asportation] of this land [Babylon] is W-V^Sf T^u""?"" ^
rtainly known m Babylon the rivers and } ' MAou & the charlot ™»
tovided ideal avenues for transport by boat^T* T^ ^ lrrigatl ° n dkcheS
I -port. Furthermore, the same canals L f r ^/f " ^ ""^ ^ ^
not transport. The situation was much I faCllltated , boat trans P°" hindered
m transformation from war-cart to the ! ""t * "** ^ Thm the
Bd Anatolian highlands, where carts rathl T ^T™* * ^ Synan
*re the standard means of transport By the I ac u? lmgati ° n SyStemS '
■ find texts describing the actual us / of heend oftheL ^ Bronze Age we begin
I littite archive (WV 63-5). Given the exnl * m ' es P ecialh / from ^
Hittites in Anatolia, Syria, and MesonrT^ ^ UI1 P recedented vlct °"« of
■). one is tempted to sulpect ^ZV^Tk T ^ ^T ^
M foUy and successfully synthesized all of tW ? ^T ^ ^ **' ^
Ingle system, which would bring about the be ^ u °' "^ mt ° &
» 'are for the next half-millennium be S lnnln g of the new "chariot age" of
hanc
I ncia
I S I
CHAPTER SIX
Middle Bronze Mesopotamia
{c. 2000-1600}
There are three main military characteristics of the Middle Bronze Age in Meso-
potamia. First, we see the increasing importance of non-Mesopotamian peoples
who migrate into, and in various ways come to militarily dominate, Mesopotamia.
These include Elamites from south-western Iran, Hurrians from eastern Anatolia,
and most importantly Amorites from the steppe fringes of Syria. In the earl
Middle Bronze period Amorite warlords managed to usurp control over most of
the city-states of Mesopotamia, establishing a series of Amorite dynasties. Whil
most of the population of Mesopotamia remained Akkadian or Sumerian speakers
the military elites tended to be Amorites. The domination of Mesopotamia by
non-Mesopotamian military aristocracies was to remain a regular, though not
constant, feature of Mesopotamia military history for the next four thousam
years. 1
The second major military development was the disappearance of political
unity for the first two-and-a-half centuries of the Middle Bronze Age, and the
reintegration of Mesopotamia into a single state under Hammurabi of Babylon
{1792-1750}, himself a descendant of Amorite warlords. The period of disunity is
often called the Ism-Larsa period {2017-1792}, after the two dominant city-state
of Mesopotamia. The second phase is known as the Old Babylonian period
{1792-1595}, during which Babylon arises as the predominant power am
reunites Mesopotamia. The period ends in 1595 with the destruction of Babylon
by an invading Hittite army under Mursilis I (see pp. 183-4, 301-2).
Isin-Larsa period {2017-1792}
For the two centuries after the fall of Ur, southern Mesopotamia was embroiled in
a complicated see-saw struggle between numerous city-states for domination i
the region. Although the broad outline of events can be established, the precis
details are often elusive, due to numerous lacunae and ambiguities in the evidern i
The internecine and often chaotic warfare characterizing the Isin-Larsa perio.
culminates m the early eighteenth century as two new centers of military pow< i
begin to emerge in Mesopotamia: Assyria in the norih und< i Sli.umhi Adad, .in.
Babylon in the center under Hammurabi. The Nni-Lam period begins with th
I .1
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
dgration of the Amorites into Mesopotamia and the fall of Ur, as described in
I liapter Four.
The Amorites (mar.tu, Amurru) {2200-2000} 2
in some ways the predominance of the Amorites marks the commencement of the
lu idle Bronze Age. Beginning around 2200 from their original homeland in the
Syrian steppe country to the west of Mesopotamia, they migrated throughout
Syria, Mesopotamia, and Canaan during the following centuries. Amorite is a
nguistic term defining an ethnic group speaking a North-west Semitic language.
I In 1 name derives from the Sumerian mar.tu (Akkadian, Amurru), meaning
West" or "Westerner" — a reference to the land and people in the deserts and
mi -arid regions to the west of the Euphrates River. The Amorites were a
Dmadic people who "from ancient times have known no cities" (K3/2:364);
(heir nomadic background is clearly reflected in Sumerian administrative texts,
lure Amorites are frequently associated with livestock and animal products
hich they exchange for manufactured goods from the cities (AUP 16-45, 282—
1 I). From the Sumerian perspective they are described as:
lent dwellers buffeted by wind and rain, who dig up mushrooms at the foot
( >f the mountain; he does not know how to bend the knee [to Sumerian royal
authority] . He does not cultivate grain, but eats uncooked meat. In his life-
time he does not have a house, and on the day of his death he will not be
buried. The Amorite does not know house or city; [he is] an awkward man
living in the mountains. 3
I rom a military perspective, the Amorites were described as fierce warriors, "as
p< iwerful as the southern wind" (AUP 94), who frequently created fear among the
■ uinrrians (AUP 336-7). "The hostile Amorites" are "a ravaging people, with the
1 1 -i incts of a beast, like wolves" (R3/2:299; AUP 332). Centuries later their fierceness
lid military prowess remained legendary; the Israelite prophet Amos describes
the Amorite, whose stature equaled the cedar, and whose strength equaled the
oak" (Amos 2:9).
Nomadic herders predominated in many of the ecological zones of the Near
.ist, both mountain pastures and steppe, during much of the Bronze Age. 4 Care
must be taken to distinguish between the pastoralism of the Bronze Age and that
il Liter periods. The full domestication and integration of the camel and horse
iniu nomadic economies and military systems significantly changed the nature and
nilitary impact of nomadic groups in the Near East, especially after the develop-
in of horse-archery in the tenth and ninth centuries. The Arabian camel was
probably domesticated by the late third millennium, but military camelry did not
have extensive impact before the early Iron Age.
I here weir, however, several military advantages for Bronze Age nomads.
1 hm w.iv ol lift* rreated hardened warriors, with instinctive survival skills often
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
not found in sedentary populations. As non-agricultural tribal groups, a greate
percentage of their male population were available for military service, since the \
were not bound to agricultural work on the land for lengthy periods of time. /
tribe of a few thousand could produced as many effective warriors as a city-stat<
with many times their numbers, since most of the male population of the cities
knew little of warfare and were required to spend much of their time caring 1
their farms. Furthermore, their lack of a central city and fields meant that they
were difficult to defeat permanently, since they could simply flee into the wild
erness with their herds where sedentary armies found it logistically difficult to
operate for any period of time.
The agriculturalists admired the martial skills of the nomad, while despising
their perceived barbarism. Uncontained nomads represented a serious militar
threat to sedentary kingdoms, either from raids on fields, villages, and caravans, 01
from widespread invasion and plunder. One standard sedentary response was to u
various means to hire the nomads to provide protection and military service.
The highlander pastoralists were viewed much the same as the steppe nomad
and are described as being "warriors constantly coming to raid the cities" (HI
238). The archetypal leader of the highlanders is the mythic demon Azag, .
"fearless warrior" whose "attack no hand can stay, it is very heavy" (HTO 23
239). Demonic warriors in mythic texts are described in terms probably reflectin
the Mesopotamian view of nomad mercenaries:
The men who went after him for the king were a motley crew
They knew not [civilized] food, knew not drink,
Ate not flour strewn [before the altars as offerings]
Drank not water [poured to the gods] as a libation . . .
They set not tooth into the pungent garlic;
They were men who ate not fish, men who ate not onions.. . .
[They] stunk of camelthorn and urine of the corner . . .
Around their necks hung fly-shaped beads [stolen] from anointed priests . .
Weapons and severed heads [were] tied to their hips (HTO 35-7, cf. 222).
In the Bronze Age, nomads generally fought on foot, or occasionally in w.i
carts, as did all other armies. Whereas horse and camel riding were spread in : .
during the Middle Bronze Age, actual combat on horseback was rare or unknown
during this period.
The earliest recorded Amorite homeland was in the area around Mount Bash
(or Basalla, modern Jebel Bishri in Syria), the "mountain of the Amorites" (Al
236-41; HE2 116-21). Although originally nomads and semi-nomads on i
western fringes of Mesopotamia, Amorites began to migrate into Sinner in tl
early third millennium, drawn to the fertility and wealth of the cities in the rivel
valley. They are mentioned in documents as living in Sinner as early as the tweni
sixth century; eventually Sumerian administrators developed a specific otfu ei i
charge of Amorite affairs, the "Inspector of the Aniontes" ' I he earliest Amoim
156
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
ked political unity, being divided into several different and often feuding tribes,
■ I over by tribal chiefs known as the ahum or "father" (R3/2:297; AUP 332-
I hese chiefs could hold high status in Mesopotamian society; some apparently
irried into royal Sumerian families (AUP 338—9). Among the most important
Amorite tribes are the Yahmadu, Tidnum (Didnum), and Yahmutum (AUP
5). Despite these tribal divisions, feuding Amorite clans were known to have
lined together on occasion into larger confederations to fight the Sumerians
MM* 334). Another important fact to remember is that, although the Amorites
re originally nomadic, by the year 2000 many can be found already settled in
and farming villages. While generally retaining their old tribal bonds and
lines, many Amorites had become city-dwellers or farmers. Others became
hi nomads, farming part of the year in semi-permanent houses, but wandering
I of the year to care for their herds. Still others remained pure nomads, con-
g to herd their animals in their original mountain and desert wilderness.
ii is impossible to tell for certain if the crisis at the end of the Bronze Age was
ised by the Amorites, or was created by conditions - ecological stress in pas-
i- -lands, combined with political and military weakness in sedentary lands -
lich facilitated the migration and conquests of the Amorites. Most likely a
implex combination of factors contributed to the Early Bronze crisis, in which
\morites were both a cause and an effect: climatic, ecological, social, and
I meal difficulties created conditions which facilitated Amorite migration and
tiquest, while the Amorite migration exacerbated the already existing political
risis in Mesopotamia. It must also be emphasized that, while from an archae-
ological perspective this transition seems rather rapid, it in fact transpired over two
mdred years, roughly equivalent to the time from Napoleon to the present day If
nk one major city-state was conquered by the Amorites every five years, the
unulative effect over the course of two centuries would be the transition of
l" >wer in forty city-states — in other words, most of the major cities in the Near East.
I he* migration of Amorites from their original homeland around Mount Bashar
i Syria clearly began before 2200, and spread in all directions. However, the crisis
the end of the Early Bronze Age created a military climate of anarchy which
I I Mated more extensive Amorite migrations, as well as their ability to usurp
power m the city-states and regions into which they migrated. From around 2200
1 900 Amorite tribes and warlords migrated and conquered much of the Near
is! seizing power in a number of important city-states in Canaan, Syria, and
< potamia. During this same period the Hurrians spread south and east from
h ii tore zone in the Khabur triangle (see pp. 303—7). The specific impact of
\iMorite conquests will be discussed in the chapters devoted to each of these
The rise of the Amorites in Mesopotamia {2100-1900}
I In In t military appearam e <>l the Amorites in the historical consciousness of the
Sumerians oct ins in tin- Ml idiati pnt.nl, when Naram Sin {2255—2218} claims
is;
WAF.FAP.E IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
to have defeated the Amorites who formed part of a rebellious coalition against
him. His son Shar-kalli-shari {2217-2192} undertook an expedition against their
mountain stronghold at Mount Bashar in Syria. 7 Thereafter the Amorites appear
with increasing frequency in Mesopotamian texts.
Amorite migration into Mesopotamia occurred by both peaceful and military
means. Many Amorite tribes traded with Sumerian cities, and sent envoys on
diplomatic missions (AUP 337—8), thereby becoming accustomed to urban ways
and products (AUP 323—62); people with Amorite names were found in many
cities in Sumer during the late Ur III period, but most prominently in Drehem
(near Nippur), Isin, and Lagash (AUP 253-73). Some became fully integrated into
Sumerian society, taking service with Sumerian lords, as indicated by references to
Amorites on government ration distribution lists (AUP 34—64). Others became
agriculturalists or engaged in other sedentary occupations (AUP 46-7). Still others
were allowed to graze their herds in marginal pastures surrounding the rich irri-
gated agricultural land of Mesopotamia. Amorites passing through Sumerian land
are once described as having a Sumerian military escort, presumably to prevent
pillaging or other trouble (AUP 343). Increasing interaction between Sumerians
and Amorites also led to some transfer of military technology; wagons or carts
(gigir) are described as being given to the Amorites (AUP 24), though it is not
certain if these vehicles were for transportation or war. The process of partial
integration combined with continued nomadism in the hinterlands was to have
important military consequences in the following centuries.
Most importantly from the military perspective, some Amorites who settled in
Mesopotamia eventually became mercenaries or government officials (AUP 340-
1, 357). As the Ur III political order disintegrated during the reign of Ibbisin
{2028-2004}, high officials or military commanders of a number of city-states
became functionally independent. These included the Amorite Nablanum {2025-
2005}, who became king of Larsa after the fall of Ur III, as discussed on pp. 1 17—20.
His successor, Zabaia of Larsa {1941-1933}, and others of the early dynasty con-
tinued to use the title "chief of the Amorites" (rabian Amurrim) as part of then
royal nomenclature (R4:112, 122). At the same time, Amorite warbands invaded
and conquered much of Mesopotamia, eventually taking control of a number ot
cities where their chiefs were established as kings. By the nineteenth century
Amorite dynasties were in control of most of the major Sumerian city-states,
including Larsa, Kish, Babylon, Sippar, Marad, and Urah, becoming the most
powerful military force in Mesopotamia.
The rise to power of Amorite warlords in Mesopotamia is illuminated to somi
degree by our fragmentary knowledge of the Amorite chieftain (rabian Amurrim)
Abda-El and his son Ushashum, They appeared around 2000 in north-central
Mesopotamia, where they astutely played the game of power politics in the anai
chy following the fall of Ur. Abda-El made an important alliance by marry in;.'
Ushashum to the daughter of Nur-Ahum, ruler of Eshnunna, In return for thi
alliance, Eshnunna was protected from Amorite raids, ami i ould call on tin
clansmen for military service as allies. At the same time ntbei Annnites are also
I >8
Pound serving as mercenary-allies for Ishbi-Irra of Isin m his wars against the
Elamites. After a victory, Ishbi-Irra instructed his officials to divide the booty from
the Elarmte campaign with the Amorites, giving "890 sheep and goat skins for
wrapping silver as gifts for the Amorites when Elam was defeated" (PH 10) On
the other hand, Amorite soldiers also campaigned on their own accord One text
describes how "the [Amorite] tribe of Hadam has defeated 1500 troops of [Zabazuna
son of] Iddin-Sin" (PH 11), indicating that the Amorites were militarily capable of
raising enough men to defeat an army of 1500 from a Mesonotamian city-state
I his defeat was considered serious enough for the garrison commander of
Eshnunna to be warned to "guard your city!" (PH 11).
Taken together, this evidence indicates that a judicious combination of royal
marriage, mercenary service, increased wealth from plunder, and independent
■ ampaigns allowed Abda-El and other Amorite chiefs to become significant mili-
tary powers in the region. In a sense the Amorites could become arbiter, of the
political balance of power. Those rulers who could draw the Amorites to their side
[ained a significant military advantage. In the end, the funeral of Abda-El was an
■vent of international importance in Mesopotamia. A letter from Eshnunna
describes how "the ambassadors of the whole land are coming for the funeral of
Abda-El and all the Amorites are gathering. Whatever you intend to send [as a gift
for the Amorites] for the funeral of Abda-El, your father, send separately"
(< )BLTA 49; PH 15-16). Presumably this process broadly paralleled the migration
integration, and conquests by Germanic peoples in the later Roman period or
I urkic peoples in the medieval Near East. The ultimate result is that, by the end of
the twentieth century, most Mesopotamian city-states had come under the dom-
ination of Amorite royal dynasties, either through usurpation by Amorite warlords
or conquests by outside tribes. Most of these royal dynasties of Amorite ancestry
became integrated into the Mesopotamian political, cultural, and religious order
ruling in the style of traditional Sumerian or Akkadian kings. The following sec-
tions will examine the fortunes of the most important of these Amorite warlords
and dynasties, culminating with the most successful of them all, Hammurabi of
Uabylon.
The Kingdom of Isin {2017-1794} 8
Ishbi-Irra (Ishbi-Erra) of Isin {2017-1985 f
As the military situation in Mesopotamia worsened under the ineffectual leader-
Inp of Ibbisin of Ur, regional Sumerian governors and commanders were
increasingly left to their own devices for defending their territory against the
fcounnng Amorite and highlander threats. The most important of these was Ishbi-
Irr.. ol Ism [2017-1985}, the most successful Sumerian warlord of the age of the
Imonte invasions. Ishbi-Irra begnn his career as governor of Isin for the faltering
Ibbism. I'he.r deteriorating relations, leading to Ishbi-Irra's decision to declare
' ' pendciK c, have been di\< ussed e.ulier, mi pp. I 17 20.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
In a remarkable letter to one of his rivals, Puzur-Shulgi of Kazallu, Ishbi-ln i
outlined his justifications for usurping the kingship of Mesopotamia, and the
mechanisms by which he planned to assume control:
[The god] Enlil, my king, by his command, has given me [Ishbi-IrraJ th<
kingship of Sumer. Enlil commanded me to bring the cities, gods and peoph
from the bank of the Tigris to the bank of the Euphrates, from the bank of the
Abnunme [canal] to the bank of the Me-Enlila [canal], and from the land o(
Hamasi to the sea of Magan [Persian Gulf], to the presence of Nin-Isina, to set
up Isin as the chief cult place of Enlil, to make it have a reputation, to can \
off spoils, and to conquer cities. Why do you [Puzur-Shulgi] resist me: I
swore by [the god] Dagan, my lord: "Let my hand overwhelm Kazallu!" I <>i
each city of the land which Enlil entrusted to me, [I] will build thrones [l"i
their gods] in Isin, and will celebrate their [divine] monthly festivals. I will
settle my statues, my emblems, my en priests and my gods in their gipam ch.i
pels. Let their citizens utter their prayers before Enlil in [the temple] Ekur and
before Nanna in [the temple] Ekishnugal!. . . [Ishbi-Irra] has taken Nippur, si I
his men as the garrison, and captured Nigugani, the highest priest of Nippm
(PH9)
Here Ishbi-Irra clearly outlined the standard ideological and programmatic pl.m
for conquest in ancient Mesopotamia. First, you must act only at the command o
the gods. Second, the purpose of the conquests is always to insure proper ordrt
and worship and fame of the gods; plunder from the cities is given by the gods
Third, Ishbi-Irra offered his rival Puzur-Shulgi the chance to submit peaceably 1 1
the will of the gods: "Why do you [Puzur-Shulgi] resist me?" Fourth, the statute!
of gods of captured cities and lands were apparently provided thrones in Isin, an<
given proper divine honors. Fifth, the priests of the gods were systematica II \
replaced by priests appointed by Ishbi-Irra, while royal statues and emblems were
set up in the temple precincts, with a garrison to insure compliance. Finally, tin
conquered people were required to perform some type of ritual act of allegiance t<
Ishbi-Irra s new order as part of their temple rituals. Although not all elements ol
this program are always manifest in the surviving sources, these basic elements
continue across most of the Near East throughout antiquity.
His early years as independent king were spent securing his position in centra
Mesopotamia against both Amorite invaders and Sumerian rivals. In 2014 {Y4} ln-
conquered the city of Girtab (IYN 13), probably from an Amorite. An unnamed
city in Amorite hands was defeated in 2010 {Y8} (IYN 13; AUP 93). By this tun
Ishbi-Irra was well on his way to military predominance in central Mesopotamia
An agent of the king of Ur wrote the following report of Ishbi-Irra 's advances t<
his lord Ibbisin:
[Ishbi-Irra] has built the wall of Isin.. . . He has taken Nippm, set his men ,i
the garrison, and captured Nigugani, the Inghi-si pi i> f of Nippur Mr h.i
|r, 1 1
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
made [his general] Idi enter Malgium and plundered Hamasi. He has put
1 1 mum, governor of Subartu, in prison. He has returned Nur-Ahum, gov-
i nor of Eshnunna, Shu-Enlil, governor of Kish, and Puzur-Tut, governor of
Morsippa to their [former] positions [from which Ibbisin had removed them
foi disloyalty?].. . . Ishbi-Irra proceeds at the head of his army. . . He captured
the banks of the Tigris, Euphrates, [and] the Abgal and Me-Enlila canals. He
Mi ought in Idin-Malgium [as an ally]. He quarreled with Girbubu, the gov-
tior of Girkal . . . and took him prisoner. His battle cry lies heavy upon me.
now he has set his eye upon me. I have no ally, no one to go [to battle] with!
v It hough his hand has not yet reached me, should he descend upon me, I
1 1, .11 have to flee. (PH 9; MC 253-68)
the following years Ishbi-Irra focused attention on fortifying his domain,
I in-', a "great wall" to protect his capital Isin, as well as several other fortifica-
i IYN 14-17; OBLTA 25-6). Thereafter he felt secure enough to go on the
i ive. In the meantime the city-states of Mesopotamia were coalescing into
major confederations. The first was under the leadership of Zinnum of Shu-
and included the cities of Nippur, Girkal, Kazallu, and the Elamites. The
>nd was headed by Ishbi-Irra, including Eshnunna, Kish, and Borsippa. Initially
num's confederation seems to have been victorious, capturing Eshnunna, Kish,
I M.id-Ziabba and driving their kings into temporary exile. In year 12 {2006},
i It l.i campaigned northward, decisively defeating the combined army of
1 1 1 1 1 1 of Subartu and Kindattu of Elam, thereby establishing himself as the
ni ■ military power in central Mesopotamia (R3/2:434; PH 6-7). In the vola-
ituation of the collapsing kingdom of Ur, thrones could be quickly won and
based on a single battle, while alliances shifted in favor of the current winner.
successful Ishbi-Irra thus quickly became the champion of Sumerians against
unites, Hurrians, and Amorites.
I ollowing this victory, Ishbi-Irra was able to restore his former allies to their
"Mies as vassals, thereby establishing hegemony the region.
Ishbi Irra took captive Zinnum, lord (ensi) of Subartu, plundered Khamazi
i nd returned Nur-akhum, lord of Eshnunna, Shu-Enlil, lord of Kish, and
Puzur-Tutu, lord of Bad-Ziabba each to his own place (OBLTA 23).
nimbly "returning" each of these rulers to their thrones was not an act of
rlHrss generosity, but a ritual of vassalization (PH 6).
I he Elamites, although part of the coalition defeated by Ishbi-Irra, were by no
M ins decisively crushed. The following year {2005} they besieged and con-
I red Ur, bringing to an end any semblance of the old order. This propelled
Mi 1 1 i.i, now the dc facto protector of Sumerian civilization, into a lengthy war
nli the Klamites. In 2002 |Ylo|, in alliance with Nur-Ahum of Eshnunna,
lira Limn lu'd .in .hi .ii k against I ui" Kindattu of the Rlaniites (IYN 16; PH 7).
ii against I li< I'.laimtrs was piohahh ongoing loi several years, culminating
U.I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
in 1992 {Y26}, when "Ishbi-Irra the king brought down by his mighty weapon
the Elamite who was dwelling in Ur" (IYN 20). His victories over the Elamites
are celebrated in the poem, "Ishbi-Irra and Kindattu" (PH 6). 10 For this campaign
Ishbi-Irra also allied himself with Abda-El, the Chief of the Amorites of central
Mesopotamia; a document describing the dividing of Elamite booty survives, in
which "890 sheep and goat skins for wrapping silver [were given] as gifts for tin
Amorites when Elam was defeated" (PH 10). In the next several years the struggle
against the Elamites continued in southern Mesopotamia, until finally "Ur wa\
made safe in its dwelling place" in 1987 {Y31} (IYN 21). Thus, by the end of his
reign Ishbi-Erra had caused Isin to replace the devastated Ur as the dominant
military power in south-central Mesopotamia and the new champion of Sumerian
civilization. He had forestalled the Amorite advance, driven out the Elamites from
Sumer and avenged the sack of Ur. Ishbi-Irra 's victory, however, was not absolute
Both Elamites and Amorites were still powerful, and much of Sumer was still
independent of Isin (M = CAM 109a).
Successors to Ishbi-Irra {1985-1 787} u
Throughout much of the subsequent Isin-Larsa period our major source ol
information about military affairs is year names. It was the practice in Mesopota
mia to name each year after a major event. Frequently these are religious — a great
festival or the dedication of statue. Year names are also often linked with buildine
programs of temples, canals, or fortresses. Military victories are another majoi
category of events for year names. Furthermore, vassal cities would frequently use
the year names of their overlord; thus, by seeing what city is naming its years by
which king's year name, we can begin to see patterns of dominance and vassalage
It must be emphasized, however, that year names do not record all major events or
military campaigns. Each year has only one name, and if a great military victory
was won and a great temple built, the year may be named after the temple, and the
military victory, however significant, could go completely unrecorded. By care
fully collating the data from year names and royal inscriptions, Douglas Frayne has
analysed the details of the shifting fortunes of the city-states and kingdoms of*
south-central Mesopotamia during the next two centuries. 12
The successors to Ishbi-Irra did not record inscriptions of continued militaix
offensives; most of their year names focus on ritual activities. This is characteristic
of most of Mesopotamia during this period. Although warfare continued una
bated, military affairs cease to be a significant part of ritual activities that were the
focus of royal art and inscriptions. A few elements of Isin's later military history
can be gleaned from the sparse sources. Shu-ilishu {1984—1975} was content to
improve the fortifications of Isin (IYN 23), which continued to be maintained l>
subsequent kings (IYN 29—30, 32, 41). We are aware of one major campaign n
the 1950s, when the city of Nippur was attacked and sacked by an unknown
enemy. Iddin-Dagan {1974-1954} regained control ol die utv, going to gie.ii
expense to rebuild the temples ol this impoitant iinnl i entei liy l n |() Ism
If.'
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
nuance in Sumer was declining (CAM 109b); the northern cities were
red by another Amorite dynasty known as Marad-Kazallu after their twin
while at the same time another Amorite dynasty at Larsa was expanding
• nd (see pp. 163—6). For the most part the kings of Isin were content
1 1 1 retain control of their slowly dwindling kingdom by building fortifica-
IYN 23, 29, 30, 32, 41). Only Erra-imitti of Isin recorded some type of
i nack: around year 1865, when he "destroyed the fortifications of Kazallu"
M diat time was in the hands of Babylon (IYN 32). By 1800 Isin was a
N power in Mesopotamia, flanked by the mighty Babylon to the north and
DO the south; in 1794 it was conquered by its great rival Rim-Sin of Larsa; by
I l.unmurabi absorbed Isin into his expanding empire (see pp. 172-7).
The Kingdom of Larsa {c. 2000-1762}
13
Items to have become independent under the Amorite warlord Naplanum
• I i 2005} during the period of the decline of Ur. We have little information
i lor the next 70 years, during part of which it may have been a vassal of
I irsa's ascent to military eminence began under Gungunum {1932-1906},
hi his early military career securing his south-eastern flank by campaigns
i he Elamite provinces of Bashimi {1930, Y3} and Anshan {1928, Y5}
7). He thereafter turned his attention to the kingdom of Isin, conquering
| of Ur from Isin by 1923 {Y10I, and taking the title "king of Ur"
15) In subsequent years he campaigned up the Kishkattum canal; in 1914
by the order of [the gods] An, Enlil and Nanna, the army of Malgium was
ved by the weapons [of Larsa]" (LYN 9). His ultimate triumph was his
i of the supreme cultic center Nippur from Isin by 1911 {Y22} (R4:114,
10; FSW 21—2), an ideological victory, allowing him to use the title "king of
md Akkad" (R4:115, 118), thereby proclaiming his nominal supremacy in
►otamia. Many of his successors continued to use this title. Gungunum was
i. live iti fortifying his domain, constructing the "great gate of Ur", and walls
i .md Ka-Geshtinanna (LYN 9-10).
u the same time that Larsa was expanding in the south, an Amorite warlord,
Sh.ulum, founded the kingdom of Kazallu (Kazallu-Marad) northwest of Isin
I ..i/allu-Arahtum canal. Although almost no details of this kingdom are
n ii appears that the five Amorite kings of this dynasty conquered all the
"ii the central Euphrates from Kazallu to Marad, which became the twin
it iU o! the state (FSW 23). In roughly this same period a third Amorite warlord
I Manana founded a small kingdom north-east of Isin based on the city-states
ii id Akusum, to which Kish was added by king Halium (R4:660-7).
ough these victories of Larsa, Kazallu, and Manana, the balance of power in
itamia shifted dramatically; the previously predominant Isin was reduced to
I iir-dom.
Ihe military chaos of the period is evocatively described in an inscription of
I In H 1 Hi} 1 ol M.ilsMiim "At thai nine .ill the land in its entirety came down,
IM
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
made a great clamor, and performed an evil deed" (R4:670). The plight of the
petty ruler of a small city-state during this period is movingly expressed in an
inscription by Ashduni-Yarim of Kish.
When the four quarters [of the whole world] became hostile against me, I
made battle for eight years. In the eighth year my adversary was turned to clay
[= died?]. My army was reduced to three hundred men. When the god
Zababa, my lord, made a favorable judgment for me and the goddess Ishtar,
my lady, came to my help, I took some food to eat and went on an expedition
of only a day. But for forty days I made the enemy land bow down to me. I
built anew the wall [of Kish called] Inuh-Ilum. (R4:654— 5)
Many kings of small threatened city-states must have had similar experiences during
these internecine wars.
The death of the expansionist king Gungunum of Larsa {1906} allowed Isin to
launch a temporary counter-offensive under Ur-ninurta {1923-1896}, who
recaptured Nippur and several other cities on the Kishkattum canal. Ur-ninurta s
offensive was finally stopped around the city of Adab by Abisare of Larsa {1905—
1894}, who "defeated the army of Isin with his weapons" in 1896 {Y9} (LYN
13). Thereafter Larsa again took to the offensive against Isin under Sumu-El
{1893-1865}. Expansion against the well fortified heartland of Isin proved diffi-
cult. He claimed victory over the army of Kazallu {1890} and Kish {1883} (LYN
16, 18, 19), but strategically decided to attempt to bypass and surround Isin. His
most innovative strategy was economic. By conquering the small town of Eduru-
Nanna-isa on the canal north of Isin, Sumu-El gained control of Isin's water sup-
ply. However, his construction of a dam in an attempt to cut off the irrigation
water proved unsuccessful (FSW 23-5).
During the reign of Sumu-El two new players emerged on the political scene
in southern Mesopotamia: Uruk and Babylon. It is not certain if Uruk had been ;i
vassal of Larsa during the late 1900s, but by 1889 it is clearly an independent city-state,
which Sumu-El of Larsa claims to have defeated (LYN 14, 16). It may have become
independent some years earlier under its first two Amorite warlords, Alila-haduin
and Sumu-kanasa (R4:439). An exact chronology for the dynasty cannot be
established, but at the height of its power in the 1870s it ruled over Kisurra and
Darum (R4:460), and briefly controlled Nippur. The rise of Babylon had much
greater long-term implications for the future of Mesopotamia, and will be dis
cussed below. Thus, by the mid-nineteenth century, military power in Mesopota
mia was fragmented between half a dozen different Amorite-controlled city-states.
The military history of Larsa during the coming decades is only fragmentarih
recorded in the year names. These were decades of low-level internecine warfare
in which the kings of Larsa claimed several victories, but no major shifts in ili>
balance of power seem to have occurred. Sin-iddinam { 1 848 I S42 ) claimed to ha\<
defeated Babylon in 1845 (LYN 24), and Elam in L843 (1 YN 24). Sm iqisham
{1839—1836} seemed to feel under military pressure, fm In identifier] larsa in
I hi
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
I 837 (LYN 28), after which he claimed to have defeated "Uruk, Kazallu, the army of
the land of Elam and Zambia king of Isin" (LYN 29). Overall, however, Larsa seemed
generally in decline and on the defensive until the usurpation of Kudur-Mabuk.
Kudur-Mabuk {c. 1850-1834} and Warad-Sin {1834-1824}
Kudur-mabuk was an Amorite warlord operating in southern Mesopotamia in the
mid-nineteenth century, probably as an ally or vassal of Larsa. Late in the reign of
■ ili-Adad of Larsa, the king of Kazallu invaded and defeated Larsa. Sili-Adad seems
1 1 > have not been able to offer effective resistance, at which point Kudur-Mabuk
usurped the throne to defeat the invaders and save the city. He "gathered the
M attered [Amorite] people and put in order their disorganized troops, [he] made
the land peaceful, [he] smote the head of its foes . . . [and] smashed all the enemies
[of the Amorite tribes and Larsa]" (R4:220). He not only drove the king of
Kazallu from Larsa but captured and sacked his capital:
Kudur-Mabuk, father of the Amorite land . . . [with Warad-sin, his son] smote
the army of Kazallu and Muti-abal in Larsa and Emutbala, [and] by the decree
of the gods Nanna and Utu seized Kazallu, tore down its wall, and made it
submit. (R4:206-10; LYN 31)
Thereafter he continued his victories in central Mesopotamia:
King Kudur-Mabuk . . . by the supreme decree of the gods Enlil, Ninurta,
Nanna, and Utu, having conquered SiUi-Eshtar [king of Mashkan-shapir] . . .
(brought him] captive in a hand-stock, in the main courtyard of the Gagis-
shua, the temple of the goddess Ninlil, striding with his foot placed on Silli-
Eshtar's head. (R4:266-7)
Kudur-Mabuk thus not only saved Larsa from conquest, but launched Larsa
Into a second period of several decades of expansion and military predominance.
i le was apparently quite old when he became king of Larsa, and he left much of
k actual governing in the hands of his son Warad-Sin {1834-1824}, who served
I CO-ruler. When Warad-Sin ascended the throne in his own right it was as king
I .ill southern Mesopotamia, including "Ur, Larsa, Lagash, and the land of
I. nulla" (R4:202-6). In 1830 Warad-Sin added Zabaiam (LYN 32) and in 1829
Hppur to his domain. In his tenth year Warad-Sin renovated the monumental
• ills of Ur (R4:236-43) and other cities (R4:253). He was succeeded as king of
I arsa by his brother Rim-Sin.
Rim-Sin {1822-1763} 14
H mi Sin's sixty year reign is the longest in Mesopotamia!! history (though it is
ilw.irfeil hy IVpy II of'l^ypts m( mliblc ninety fom w.us J 2300 2206}). Militarily
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
he led Larsa to predominance in southern Mesopotamia, and lived to see the loss
of his entire kingdom to Hammurabi of Babylon (see p. 176). We have little
military information for his early reign, but the supremacy of Larsa was challenged
in 1808 {Y14} by a coalition of most of the major kings of Mesopotamia (LYN
44), which Rim-Sin claims to have defeated. He . . .
smote with weapons the army of Uruk, Isin, Babylon, Rapiqum and Sutium,
seized Irnene, king of Uruk [in that battle,] and put his foot on his [Irnene's]
head as if he were a snake. [He captured] the various cities of the land of
Uruk The booty, as much as there was, of the various cities of the land of
Uruk which I smote, I brought to Larsa. (R4:285)
The defeat of this coalition and the fall of Uruk left him pre-eminent in the
south. In subsequent years he captured a number of small cities, expanding his
power northward: "by the decree of the 'great mountain' [Enlil] he conquered the
city ... the city Bit-Shu-Sin, the city Imgur-Gibil, Durum, Kisurra and Uruk -
their kings and their lands he overthrew, and tore down their walls" (R4:291;
LYN 44-9). In year 20 {1802} he took the important cult center of Nippur, giv-
ing him great religious prestige (R4:270).
There followed a confusing five-year struggle with Babylon for control of Isin
{1797-1792) in which the city seems to have changed hands several times. In 1792
{Y30}, "the true shepherd Rim-Sin with the help of the mighty weapon of An,
Enlil and Enki, had Isin, the royal place, and its inhabitants - whose life he spared -
taken, and he made great his fame" (LYN 60). The city was held only until 1786,
when "Uruk and Isin were conquered" by Hammurabi (ANET 270). At this
point Rim-Sin was probably in his eighties and no longer seems to have been ai i
active campaigner; we have little evidence from the records of Larsa of major
military campaigns, though Larsa appears as a participant in the wars described in
the Mari archive. In the coming decades Larsa took part in the great six-wav
struggle for ascendancy in Mesopotamia (see pp. 173-7), not so much as a serious
contender but as a major ally who could shift the balance of power in favor of one
coalition or the other. In 1763 Hammurabi attacked his former ally, captured Larsa
after a siege of four or five months (L 150-7), and incorporated the country into
his kingdom (see p. 176).
The Old Assyrian Kingdom {2300-1741}
15
The city-state ofAshur before Shamshi-Adad {2300-1 814} 16
The city ofAshur - from which the name Assyria derives - lay in northern Mesop< >
tamia in the land known to the Sumerians in the third millennium as Subartu. 1ml
is known of the military history of Assyria before the rise of Shamshi-Adad. I h
city-state had been founded by at least 2400 (OAC 28). 1 atei traditions, .is ram
ded in the Assyrian King-lists, 17 remember "seventeen I me ■■ lm lived m lent
|M,
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
referring to the traditional Aniorite nomadic ancestors of Shamshi-Adad (AR 1:1).
The names of the first twelve of these kings bear remarkable parallels to the names
of the ancestors of Hammurabi, indicating that the Amorite warlords who took
control of both Assyria and Babylon were probably from related branches of one
Amorite tribe (AR. 1:1; OAC 36-7). These nomads are followed by another list of
1L ten kings whose fathers are known", but whose names are not confirmed by any
mscriptional evidence (AR 1:4); these rulers also seem to be the ancestors of
Sliamshi-Adad, but not early rulers of Assyria (see p. 168).
This archaic section of the Assyrian King-list has no contemporary confirma-
u on. Instead, two inscriptions indicate that, in the late third millennium, Ashur
s as controlled by Akkad under Manishtushu {2269—2255} (Al:8), and later by Ur
1 1 1 under Amar-Sin {2046-2038} (Al:9), and presumably by other southern rulers
■ho did not leave inscriptions. On the other hand, archaic Ashur was not always
lominated by foreign kings. During this period one apparently independent ruler,
liiti, dedicated booty from his victory over Gasur (Nuzi) to the goddess Ishtar
'A 1:7; OAC, 31-2).
Beginning about 2015 a dozen kings - numbers 26 to 38 on the Assyrian King-list -
ne also confirmed from sparse inscriptional evidence (AR 1:5-18, Al:ll— 46).
i he Assyrian kings began marking their independence from Ur III at this time by
proclaiming in their stylized inscriptions, "[the god] Ashur is king, [the mortal
filler] is XXX, vice-regent of [the god] Ashur" (Al:13, 21); the title 'Vice-regent
'i\ik) ofAshur" is used by all Assyrian kings of this period for whom inscriptions
iiivive. Despite their great fame and military power in later times, the original
\ Syrian kingdom was merely one city-state among many in Mesopotamia, with
<< particular military importance.
The rise of Assyria to significance began under Puzzur-Ashur {c. 1970-
' 10} , 18 who founded a dynasty lasting over a century- and-a-half {c. 1970—1 809}
u i ml the usurpation by Shamshi-Adad (ANE 1:82). As is typical of this age, the
I t majority of the inscriptions of this dynasty deal with religious affairs and
tuple building, giving us little military information. The major exception to this
rule is an inscription by Ilu-shumma {c. 1920—1906}, who claims:
I established the freedom of the Akkadians and their children. I purified their
< Opper. I established their freedom from the border of the marshes and Ur and
Nippur, Awal, and Kismar, Der of the god Ishtaran, as far as the city Ashur.
(A 1 :18)
rhis text has been interpreted by some to imply a major military expedition or
feme type of political hegemony over southern Mesopotamia. However, Larsen
1 1 ii crp retetl the "freedom" (addurarum) as referring to economic freedom from
■ nils on the textiles and tin trade in an attempt to establish a monopoly on that
from Mesopotamia to Anatolia (see pp. 290-1). 19
I In shumin.is successor was his son Erishum I {1906-1867}, for whom a
i ol inscriptions survive, again with im fortunately only incidental military
If.'
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
references which provide no information on campaigns. A blessing in a temple
inscription asks that the god Ashur "give [the king] sword, bow and shield",
(Al :21), perhaps indicating the major weapons of an Assyrian warrior of the period.
Erishum also improved the walls of Ashur "from the Sheep Gate to the People's
Gate; I made a wall higher than the wall my father had constructed" (Al:22; AR
1:11; OAC 60-3), indicating ongoing maintenance of fortifications. The military
strength of the terrain of the city of Ashur was praised in a metaphorical descrip-
tion of the god Ashur: "Ashur is like reed swamps that cannot be traversed, terrain
that cannot be trodden upon, canals that cannot be crossed" (Al:21). During this
period the Assyrians were noted as great merchants on the Tin-Road to Kanesh in
Anatolia, where they founded a number of merchant colonies. The military
implications of this are discussed in Chapter Eleven.
Assyrian kings in the nineteenth century {1906-1814}
Assyrian military history in the nineteenth century is only fragmentarily known,
The Assyrian King-list and royal inscriptions (AR 1:16-18; Al:39-46) provides
the names of five kings: Ikunum, Sargon I, Puzur- Ashur II, Naram-Sin, and Eri-
shum II. The precise dates of these rulers are not known because that portion of
the document is damaged, and the royal inscriptions provide no information on
military campaigns.
The rise of Shamshi-Adad {1832/ 1809-11 7 6} 20
The two centuries of fragmentation and anarchy in Mesopotamia following the fall
of Ur culminated in the rise of two great Amorite warlords, both of whom were
nearly successful in reuniting Mesopotamia. These were Shamshi-Adad of Assyria
and Hammurabi of Babylon. These two rulers would lay the foundations for the
fluctuating military and cultural predominance of Assyria or Babylon over Meso-
potamia for the next 1300 years. Shamshi-Adad was not ethnically Assyrian, and
did not begin his reign as ruler of Assyria. Although later Assyrian kings declared
Shamshi-Adad their predecessor (CS 1:464), he was, in fact, an Amorite usurper.
The Assyrian King-list begins with "seventeen kings who lived in tents" - the
Amorite nomadic ancestors of Shamshi-Adad - followed by "ten kings whose
fathers are known", who appear to be Amorites who had infiltrated into Meso
potamia perhaps beginning around the time of the fall of Ur III {2005}. This
portion of the King-list ends with the brother and father of Shamshi-Adad (CS
1:463-4). His grandfather, Yaskur-El (or Yadkur-El) {c. 1850} may have been the
Amorite ruler of the city-state of Zaralulu (Tel al-Dhibai) - one of dozens of such
petty Amorite warlords during this period (PH 62-3).
Shamshi-Adad's father, Ila-kabkabu {c. 1850-1832}, was the Amorite ruler of
the city-state of Terqa 21 on the middle Euphrates, and engaged in ongoing wai
with Mari. Their armies fought at least one major battle in \vhi< h "many soldier.
of [Ila-kabkabu 1 fell and so did those of [king| Yalulim I mi |nl M.ifi|". prolubh
K,s
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
indicating that the battle was a draw (PH 70). Ila-kabkabu, however, was victor-
ious in another battle, conquering the city-state of Suprum, only a day's march
from Mari (PH 66-69). It is in this situation that Shamshi-Adad appears on the
scene in 1832.
The Assyrian King-list provides a laconic description of the rise of Shamshi-
Adad:
Shamshi-Adad [I], son of Ilu-kabkabi: In the time of Naram-Sin [king of
Assyria] he went to Kar-Duniash [i.e. Babylon]. In the eponymy of Ibni-
Adad, Shamshi-Adad marched out from Kar-Duniash [in Babylonia]. He
seized the town of Ekallatum [near Ashur]. He stayed in Ekallatum for three
years. In the eponymy of Atamar-Ishtar, he marched out from Ekallatum. He
removed [the Assyrian king] Erishum [II], son of Naram-Sin, from the throne
[of Ashur]. He seized the throne [of Ashur]. He ruled as king [of Ashur] for
thirty-three years [1809-1776]. (ANE 1:86)
Beyond this, the background to Shamshi-Adad's early life is quite obscure. A
t imnber of different interpretations have been offered.
A crucial problem related to the rise of Shamshi-Adad is the question of whe-
ther there are two separate rulers named Naram-Sin, or only one. The basic pro-
Mem is that a king named Naram-Sin was ruling in both Eshnunna and Ashur at
i lie same time. Is this a single person, or two people with the same name? If it is a
ingle person, did Naram-Sin of Eshnunna conquer Ashur, 22 or did Naram-Sin of
\shur conquer Eshnunna? 23 A third scenario posits two contemporary kings, both
u. imed Naram-Sin, one the ruler of Eshnunna and one of Ashur (PH 80-7).
1 obviously the data is both insufficient and ambiguous, and does not allow a cer-
■ i in reconstruction; I will follow the interpretation that there were two distinct
I ulers named Naram-Sin.
Shamshi-Adad's personal reign did not begin auspiciously. His initial years,
roughly 1832-1814, were spent as a minor prince at Terqa, where he was engaged
in internecine wars with other petty princes. The documentation for this period is
fragmentary, but Shamshi-Adad is mentioned being involved with fighting his
neighbors on several occasions (PH 80), not always successfully. In 1831 he was
defeated by nomadic brigands known as the Lullum, who were considered
i i linmals" (PH 65) and who had been marauding for some time throughout the
ountryside (PH 80), indicative of the anarchy of the age.
Initially a tense peace treaty was formulated between Shamshi-Adad and his
Bios! powerful neighbor, Yahdun-Lim of Mari {1820—1796}, who had earlier
been at war with Shamshi-Adad's father Ila-kabkabu.
Shamshi-Adad . . . and Yahdun-Lim [king of Mari] . . . took a grave oath
between them by the got! jNergalj, and Shamshi-Adad never committed a sin
against Yahdun I im |i v he followed the treaty]. It is Yahdun-Lim who
committed ,i sin .ig.unsi Sh.uusln Ad.ul |by breaking the treaty).... [The god
169
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Nergal] went at the side of Shamshi-Adad and punished [Yahdun-Lim] so that
[Shamshi-Adad's] servants killed [Yahdun-Lim in battle]., [Nergal] decided
to . . . turn over the city of Mari and all the banks of the Euphrates to the
hand [of Shamshi-Adad, who] assigned his son [Yasmah-Addu in 1796] to the
lordship of Mari; thereafter, [Yasmah-Addu] built for [Nergal] an everlasting
temple [at Mari]. (PH 68)
Apparently Yahdun-Lim's "sin against Shamshi-Adad" had been to renew the
war against Shamshi-Adad in alliance with Naram-Sin of Eshnunna. In this war
Shamshi-Adad was defeated and ousted from the throne of Terqa around 1814,
and his former domain was divided between his two enemies (PH 84). Thereafter
Shamshi-Adad fled to his distant Amorite relative Apil-Sin of Babylon, the
grandfather of Hammurabi.
Presumably Shamshi-Adad arrived in Babylon around 1814 with a band of
Amorite warriors who had served with him at Terqa. Always on the lookout for
trained mercenaries, Apil-Sin enlisted this warband, giving them land in the Kar-
Dunaish area of northern Babylonia. Around 1812 some type of crisis left Ekalla-
turn vulnerable, and Shamshi-Adad grasped the opportunity, taking his warband -
either under instructions from his overlord Apil-Sin of Babylon, or perhaps
entirely on his own initiative — and conquered Ekallatum, where he established
himself as an independent ruler. After three years securing his base of power there,
he captured Ashur around 1809.
Shamshi-Adad the Assyrian {1809-1 77 6} 24
With the conquest of Ashur, Shamshi-Adad was in a position to become a serious
military force in Mesopotamia. By this time military power in Mesopotamia was
divided into eight major kingdoms, involved in rapidly shifting alliances and bal
ances of power politics: Ashur, Babylon, Eshnuna, Larsa, Elam, Mari, and Aleppo
and Qatna in Syria. During the next twenty-five years Shamshi-Adad dominated
the military scene in Mesopotamia like a colossus.
Shamshi-Adad's first order of business was to deal with Yahdun-Lim of Mari,
who had been at war with Shamshi-Adad's father, and who had broken a treaty with
Shamshi-Adad himself (PH 68). Yahdun-Lim's kingdom of Mari controlled die
Middle Euphrates and dominated the great nomadic Amorite tribes, giving him a
good source of warlike mercenaries (PH 93—9). Shamshi-Adad began by encroaching
on the territory of Abi-Samar, a vassal of Yahdun-Lim, who pleaded with his
overlord to make peace or come to his assistance (PH 106—7). With twelve vassal
kings by his side, Yahdun-Lim fought a great battle with Shamshi-Adad, but was
disastrously defeated (PH 107); Assyria thereafter overran much of the domain of
Mari. In the midst of the crisis Yahdun-Lim was deposed by his son Sumu-Yama, win >
busied himself fortifying his land against further incursions by Shamshi-Adad. Sun n i
Yama himself was assassinated by one of his own ministers, possibly .it Shamshi
Adad's instigation (PH 109-10); Mari quickly surrendered to Slumshi Ad. id \ 17 ( >f» J
170
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
With the fall of Mari, Shamshi-Adad now ruled northern Mesopotamia from the Tigris
to the Euphrates, and established three provinces. In the center he reigned person-
ally from his new capital at Shubat-Enlil (Tell Leilan, EA 3:341-7) in the Khabur
triangle of north-eastern Syria. His eldest son Ishme-Dagan ruled from the ori-
ginal capital at Ekallatum in Assyria, and was in charge of the frontier with the
lurukkiean Highlanders (who had replaced the Gutians in the Zagros mountains in
vestern Iran), and the rival city-state of Eshnunna. His younger and inexperienced son
Yasmah-Adad {1796-1776} ruled from Mari as viceroy, in charge of Syrian and
\niorite nomadic military affairs. Shamshi-Adad, of course, was in ultimate command
-I the empire, and sent numerous letters to his sons training them and instructing
| hem in imperial strategy; many of these letters survive in the Mari Archive,
fleeting the character of the great warlord, and his imperial policies (ARM 1-6)'
In Syria Shamshi-Adad claims to have marched to the sea and erected a victory
monument in imitation of Sargon (C2/L3), but if so it was a short-lived raid. His
nain strategic problem was Aleppo, where Zimri-Lim, the heir to the throne of
Man, had fled for protection. Shamshi-Adad and his son, the viceroy Yasmah-
\ dad, maneuvered to isolate and destroy Aleppo by a political and marriage alliance
\ ith Qatna, the dominant power in southern Syria. As described on pp. 257-60,
h.iinshi-Adad managed to gather a coalition of Qatna, Carchemish, and Ursha
: n nst an isolated Aleppo, but, for unknown reasons, they failed to take the city. It
may in part be that the Syrian kings realized that Shamshi-Adad was more of a real
breat to them than Aleppo, and only unwillingly participated in the anti- Aleppo
mpaigns. Sumu-Epuh of Aleppo {1810-1780} played the diplomatic game
lasterfully, forming a coalition with Shamshi-Adad's enemies in the south and
lit, including Sutean and Turukkean nomads, to attack him from those directions
'2/1:3; PH 114-47). The final disruption of Shamshi-Adad's hopes m the west,
however, may have come from a plague which ravaged Mari at this time (PH 147-52).'
On the eastern frontier Shamshi-Adad's son and viceroy Ishme-Dagan faced a
■ ies of four enemies: Turukkean highlanders to the north-east, Eshnunna to the
I i, Elam to the south-east, and Babylon and Larsa to the south. Babylon, with
the longest border with Shamshi-Adad, seemed most intimidated by Assyrian
power. Alliances m the east were unstable and opportunistic, with kingdoms
stacking Assyria at one time and allying with it at another. Overall, Shamshi-Adad
tptured Qabra and Arrapha in the north-east (PH 181-5), but was forced to
impaign regularly in the Zagros against both recalcitrant city-states and Tur-
ilkean highlanders; although he was generally victorious, the Turukkeans proved
^tractable in their mountain highlands, and desultory warfare continued on that
'" throughout most of his reign (PH 186-235). At his death, Shamshi-Adad was
■gemon of Mesopotamia, but surrounded by marginally subdued enemies.
Ishme-Dagan of Assyria {1780-1741}
I he death of Shamshi Ad.id engendered an immediate military crisis, as recalci-
trant vassals and barely subdued ninnies lose up almost simultaneously to achieve
171
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
independence and revenge. Although Ishme-Dagan was a competent ruler, he-
lacked the skill and aura of invincibility of his father, and was unable to retain
control of the empire. The most disastrous event was the restoration of Zimri-Lim
to the throne of Mari with the assistance of the king of Aleppo {1776}, resulting
in the loss of the western portion of the empire (see pp. 261-3). Thereafter, all the
surrounding kings made common cause against Ishme-Dagan, and his empire was
whittled away during the coming years by Eshnunna, Mari, and Hammurabi of
Babylon, until he was left with only the enclave around Ashur on the upper Tigris.
The Old Assyrian kingdom had lasted less than two generations.
The Old Babylonian Empire {1894-1595}
Tfie Foundation of the Old Babylonian Empire {1894-1793} 25
In the third millennium, Babylon was a minor city, never playing a major political
role. Its rise to importance occurred in the years of anarchy following the collapse
of Ur III. As with most other cities in Mesopotamia, power in Babylon fell into
the hands of an Amorite clan under the leadership of Sumu-abum {1894-1881}.
Sumu-abum apparently exercised some type of suzerainty over nearby Sippar, 26 as
well as being chief of several surrounding Amorite clans (PH 28-31). His son
Sumu-la II {1880-1845} permanently annexed Sippar and rebuilt its walls, which
may have been damaged in his conquest. The next three successors 27 slowly added
other nearby city-states by diplomacy or conquest until, in 1792, at the ascension
of Hammurabi, Babylon controlled most of central Mesopotamia, including Dil-
bat, Sippar, Kish, and Borsippa (M = CAM 109d). Their most important victory
during this period was the defeat of the rival Amorite kingdom of Marad/Kazal-
lus, which controlled the central Euphrates basin.
Hammurabi {11 '92-11 SO} 28
As one of the great conquerors and cultural figures of ancient Mesopotamia,
Hammurabi of Babylon was the first ruler to reunite Mesopotamia in the almost
250 years since the fall of Ur III in 2005. The military aspects of his reign can be
divided into three periods: early {1792-1776}, middle {1776-1764}, and late
{1763-1750}.
In the first decade of Hammurabi's forty-three-year rule {1792-1781}, Baby-
lon remained a relatively minor player in Mesopotamian international affairs, and
was quite likely a vassal, at least nominally, of Shamshi-Adad of Assyria. There are
three major recorded campaigns of Hammurabi before 1764 {Y29}. The most
important was in 1786 {Y7} when "Uruk and Isin were conquered" at the
expense of Larsa (ANET 270), providing his kingdom with new agricultural lands
to exploit to improve the economic base of his state. His second campaign j 1783
Y10} focused on the Tigris south of Babylon, where "(Ik- .utiiv .mil inhabitants of
Malgia were crushed" (ANET 270). In I lammiiuhi's I'lcu-ntli vr.u [17821 In
I '.?
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
ihb i th M' '^ H ?T ed R , aPlqUm 3nd Shal ' bl " ° n the Eu P hrateS nortl ™t of
Babylon. More details on thus campaign are found m a letter from the Mart
a chive in which Hammurabt claims "Shamshi-Adad forced Rap lqu m out of the
1 afsZt aT? and ^ k t0 me - SmCe ^ ^™ s ^d
toere a Shamshi-Adad s garrison stayed there" (CANE 2:910). It seems then
1 Z lrtT d and H r r rabi M together and took ***** f ™ -^
i I otin 1 782^7' "'^ <**<-* *- as a greater threat than
Babylon in 1 782. Eshnunna s power was thereby curtailed, and Assyria and Babylon
■Wed joint control over the city. Y
Of IhL7-t r^^T*'' rClgn < 1776 - 1764 } be S- af*- the death
••Shamshi-Adad m 1776, at which point Assyria was ruled by his son Ishe-Dagan
who was much less militarily daunting that his father. The military predominance
.'I Assyria was quickly diluted as Hammurabi and other kings were abb- to
undertake increasingly independent foreign policies during the rule of the inef-
fectual Ishe-Dagan. With the death of Shamshi-Adad a new tenuous balance of
m0 1lZU m ^ S ° POt r a betWCen MX nVak IM P lel of ^hnunna
c ^80-1760 , Ishme-Dagan of Assyria {1780-1741 }, Zimri-Lim of Man {1776-
61}, Siwe-paJar-huppakofElam {c. 1770-1750}, Rim-Sm of Larsa {1822-1764}
«nd Hammurabi of Babylon {1792-1750}. In addition the city-staL of Aleppo'
»d Qatna m Syria often played a role m Mesopotamian power politics, especil
n relation to the affairs of Man. This military balance of power of this period I
■i. scribed in a famous letter by Itur-Asdu to the king of Mari:
There is no king who is strong by himself: 10 or 15 kings follow Hammurabi
of Babylon as many follow Rim-Sin of Larsa, Ibalpiel of Eshnunna and
Amutpiel of Qatna, while 20 kings follow Yanm-Lim of Aleppo. (ANE 1:99)
During this early period Hammurabi's main military activities focused on
SSsStss^rrf domam; the waUs of Sippar were particui ^
fortified {1768, Y2o}, and the army was used for part of the labor needs- "By
« supreme nnght which the god Shamash gave to me, with the levy of the army
n,y land, I ^ed the top of the foundation of the wall of Sippar wich earth until
t was like a great mountain. I built that high wall . . . for the god Shamash"
■ ■ II as, :^7 7 TZoT eS ^ eC ° rd rebUlldlng the WaUs ° f M ^ < 1789 > Y4}
SU . { ]] 2 7 '? 2 il\ ^ 7, aS COnstructin g ^ fortresses, one named for the
Dddess Laz {1787, Y6} and the other called Igi-kharsagga {1774, Y19} Most of
other early year names are associated with digging canals to improve economic
productivity or religious rituals (ANET 270).
The Great War [17 65-17 63} 29
^ filiating window on the military and diplomatic world of the eighteenth
, ' ' I'"' ' S >"7< , <" 1 V '— '"»» t'K- Palace archive of Mari. Most of these date
""' ,H ' ' "" l! ' llK ' s '7M. when Mari was c< uered by
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
Hammurabi. 30 This period was marked by remarkably volatile and unstable alliances
as each of the six rival kings jockeyed for position, aiding, betraying, and attacking
each other in dizzying turnabouts of diplomacy (CAH 2/1:178—9). Heimpel has
done a masterful job of correlating and integrating the letters into a coherent pic-
ture of Mesopotamian warfare from 1765-1763. These letters give us our most:
complete understanding of warfare from any period of the ancient Near East; the
military implications of these letters are discussed in detail in Chapters Eight and
Nine, Here I will simply outline the major military events leading to the hege-
mony of Hammurabi.
As noted above, with the death of Shamshi-Adad the hegemony of Assyria in
Mesopotamia collapsed and political order reverted to an eight- way struggle for
power between Elam, Eshnunna, Assyria, Larsa, Babylon, Mari, Aleppo, and
Qatna, In addition to these eight major powers there were nomadic and high-
lander tribes on the fringes of Mesopotamia, including the Hurrians in Anatolia to
the north, Turukkeans in the Zagros mountains to the east, and Amorite tribes in
the Syrian steppe to the west of the Euphrates. Each of these tribal groups took
turns raiding various kingdoms, at times independently and at times as allies of one
or more of the sedentary states. Each of the eight sedentary kingdoms played a
machiavellian game of power-politics, formulating and breaking alliances with
reckless abandon. The chaotic picture of fractious, anarchic warfare reflected in the
Mari letters was probably the norm for military affairs throughout much of
Mesopotamian military history, and gives quite a different picture than the pious
and formulaic royal inscriptions, where the gods decree victory for a king, and it is
so. Reality was always much more messy
The final phase of Hammurabi's military history {1765-1750} begins with a
crisis engendered by the growth of opposing coalitions from among the rival
warlords. The unstable multi-kingdom balance of power of the middle period of
Hammurabi's reign created a time of political uncertainty as alliances were formed
and collapsed based on which king was perceived to be the closest to achieving
hegemony. As soon as one king appeared to be nearing hegemony, everyone allied
against him. In 1769 Mari, Babylon, and Elam allied against the powerful kingdom
of Eshnunna, conquering that state and massacring the family of its king Ibal-pi-EI
II (PAE 171). King Siwe-palar-huppak of Elam rightly viewed himself as the
senior partner in this enterprise. Whereas most of the allied kings called them
selves "brother" — indicating an alliance among equals — they referred to them
selves as the "sons" of Siwe-palar-huppak, the coalition leader. Elam thus obtained
the lion's share of the spoils, including the city of Eshnunna itself (PAE 168-9
L 56-9).
This victory gave the Elamite king 31 the hope of establishing complete hege
mony in Mesopotamia. Hammurabi was thus faced with a crucial decision: should
he submit to de facto vassalization to Siwe-palar-huppak, or risk a major war to
avert the growing power of Elam. Hammurabi recognized that he was unabl<
to risk war with Elam on his own and turned to his long standing ally Zimri-Lim
of Mari, seeking to form an anti-Elamite coalition /mm I mi realized thai
Hammurabi was k. a desperate position, whereas Man, quite distant from Elam
was much more secure. As Zimn-Lim's ambassador's informed him: "Doe, my
lord not know how badly Hammurabi king of Babylon wants to make an alliance
m h my lord?" He therefore drove a hard bargain m the negotiations. Neither side
really trusted the other; as Znnn-Lnn's ambassadors told him, "My lord will surely
come to reahze how exaggerated is [Hammurabi's] information and how full of lies
are his words-'' (CANE 2:909). But, on the other hand, neither king could hope
survive without allies in those perilous times. Hammurabi desperately needed
du. alhance, and m the end he got it. Allied armtes from Mar, Babyin and
f iITt lTv r r m 7 agamSt the Elamte COaKdon m 1764 (Y30} (CAH 2/
.183; L 60-3). In the meantime, Siwe-palar-huppak was not Me. He marshaled
us vassals to meet Hammurabi's advancing coalition. These included contingents
S^SS^^ 1 (Assym) ' Gutium ' the newly vassafeed EsJL <
When Hammurabi occupied the smaller towns of Mank 1S um and Upi in the
former domam of Eshnunna {1764}, the outraged lung of Elam ordered Ham-
murabi to surrender the two cities and terminate his alliance with Zimri-Lim of
r" ^ lmmedlate T aS1 ° n by Ekm - The msis Was impounded when
Elarmte soldiers temporarily conquered Ekallatum, Ishme-Dagans capital ren-
dering him a vassal. Clearly Siwe-palar-huppak was intent on creating hegemony
» Mesopotamia- Hammurabi, mustering as many troops and allies as he could
■net in an indecisive battle with the Elamites at Upi, while the Elanntes tried to
woo Hammurabis old adversary Rim-Sin of Larsa to their side. The Elamites
'-used their attention on the siege of Razama in the upper Tigris basin. The siege
went on for several months until it was finally relieved by the intervention of
mri-Lim as al y of Babylon (L 65-78). This probably represents the height of
unite power , for> a f ter heir fai]ure at Razama ^ ^^ Qther aties g
I lamite coalition with Babylon and Mari.
In 1764 the Elamite army was active against southern Mesopotamia, but was
rongly countered by a Babyloman-Manote army on the opposite bank of the Tigris
t Mankisum m the Diyala region. The Elamites attempted a siege of the strategic
■ v of Hintum near Sippar, but Ishme-Dagan of Assyria joined the Man-Babylon
Ahance and the coaktion's forces broke the Elamite siege (L 95-100). The failure and
» a hdrawal ot the Elamites led to a revolt in Eshnunna, which threw off the Elamite
jssaldom and installed a new independent king (L 108-9). With their imperial
I hns m shambles, peace was made with between Elam and the coalition (L 1 10-1 1)
1 Ins proved to be the decisive campaign for domination of Mesopotamia
lammurabi described it, praising the gods for their assistance but conveniently
Slhng to mention the aid of armies from Mari and Aleppo:
Ibc leader [Hammurabi], after having defeated the army which Elam - from
the frontier of Marhashi, also Subartu, Gutium, Eshnunna, and
raised in masses, through the mid
Malgi - had
,l " 1 ''""ul.itions ..I |[|„. ,-ii,p Ml - ,,|] Sinner and
mighty power of the great gods, re-established
Akkad. (ANHT 270)
I I
I >
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Thus, according to Hammurabi's official propaganda, after his victory over Elam
he re-established the traditional empire of Sumer and Akkad, formally declaring
himself ruler of Mesopotamia.
With the threat removed, the anti-Elamite coalition that once had united most
of the Mesopotamian kingdoms began to break up, with each king pursuing an
independent foreign policy (L 117-50). This renewed regional feuding presented
Hammurabi with an opportunity. Hammurabi first turned on his old rival Rim-
Sin of Tarsa, with the continued assistance of the trusting Zimri-Tim of Mari. In
1763 {Y31} "the great gods called Hammurabi by name [through an oracle]; with
his fetters he tied up the enemy [Rim-Sin], his weapon smote the army that was
hostile to him, in combat he slew the evil land [of Tarsa]" (R4:338-9). His year
name adds additional details:
Encouraged by an oracle given by Anu and Enlil who are advancing in front
of his army, and through the mighty power which the great gods had given to
[Hammurabi], he was a match for the army of Emutbal [= Tarsa] and its king
Rim-Sin . . . thereby forcing [all] Sumer and Akkad to obey his orders.
(ANET 270)
Hammurabi's great victory over Tarsa made him clearly the pre-eminent mili
tary power in Mesopotamia (T 150-7). However, the victory was not without its
cost; it was followed by the rapid creation of an anti-Babylonian coalition, as the
remaining rulers began to see Hammurabi as the 'greatest threat to their indepen
dence. Hammurabi's earlier victory over the Elamites in 1763 had not resulted in
the full annexation or destruction of that defeated kingdom. While Hammurabi
was distracted by his Tarsa campaign in 1762, king Silli-Sin of Eshnunna, th<
Subartu (Assyria), and the Guti highlanders marshaled an army for revenge - Elam
was notably absent from this coalition. In 1761 {Y32} Hammurabi met and
defeated the coalition, defeating Eshnunna and conquering the land of Mankizum
(R4:339-40).
The hero [Hammurabi] who proclaims the triumphs of [the god Mardukf
overthrew in battle with his powerful weapon the army of Eshnunna, Subartu
(Assyria) and Gutium and was a match for the country of Mankizum and the
country along the bank of the Tigris as far as the frontier of the countr\
Subartu. (ANET 270)
During this period of intensive conquest Hammurabi was also active botli in
strengthening the agricultural foundation of his state through irrigation worki
(R4:341), and improving its defenses by fortifications. The walls of Sippar were
reconstructed (R4:335), and the fortress of Dur-Sin-mnballit was built on \w
north-western border; he "raised high a tall fortress with threat heaps of earth
whose tops were like a mountain.... I named thai fortress Mm Sm muhallti
abim-walidiia' [Fort Sin muhallit, father who engrndctrd m< | I' 1 • I ' \)
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
Although we are largely dependent on Zimri-Tim 's archive from Mari to
understand the history of the complex diplomatic relations between Mari and
li.ibylon, it is clear from the overall results that Hammurabi played the machia-
■ llian power-politics game of the age better than any of his rivals. With southern
Mesopotamia conquered, the east subdued, and his domain secured by additional
• \ tifications, Hammurabi turned his attention to the central Euphrates basin,
here his major rival was the kingdom of Mari. It is not clear why Hammurabi
Vent to war with his long-standing ally Zimri-Lim. Perhaps Zimri-Tim, fearing
be rising power of Hammurabi, had broken the alliance. Or perhaps it was simply
the next inevitable step in Hammurabi's move towards full hegemony in Meso-
Otamia. At any rate, in 1761 {Y33} Hammurabi "overthrew Mari and Malgi in
it tie . . . also made several other cities of Subartu, by a friendly agreement, obey
Ins orders" by becoming his vassals (ANET 270). Zimri-Tim apparently remained
OR his throne of Mari as a vassal of Hammurabi, but he remained recalcitrant and
ichelled two years later. Hammurabi suppressed the rebellion of his former ally
ith ruthlessness, and in 1759 {Y35}, "upon the command of the gods Anu and
I nlil", he "destroyed Maris wall, and turned the land into rubble heaps and ruins"
\ NET 270; R4:346).
I he final years of Hammurabi's reign were focused on campaigns in northern
lesopotamia and the upper Tigris valley, where the anti-Babylonian coalition was
nil strong. "By the great power of the god Marduk Hammurabi overthrew the
my of Sutium, Turukku, Kakmu and the country of Subartu" in 1757 {Y37}
V NFT 270). Babylon's old rival Eshnunna was definitively destroyed in 1756
| . &8}, after a flood had destroyed part of the city walls, perhaps intentionally
■ i rated by Hammurabi by diverting water from the canal system (ANET 270)., In
i last recorded campaign {1755, Y39} he again "defeated all his enemies as far as
be country of Subartu" (ANET 270).
The military achievement of Hammurabi was one of the greatest of the Middle
fconze Age. Hammurabi made Babylon the center of culture of Mesopotamia, a
talus which it would retain for over 1500 years. His achievement, however, was also
phemeral. Since his major conquests occurred only late in his reign, he was unable
B G h us much attention on stabilizing his new domain. Within a decade after his death
I ns empire began to break up during the rule of his son Samsu-iluna (see pp. 181-3).
Hammurabi and the ideal of martial kingship
Mi hough Hammurabi's famous law code has naturally been studied mainly for its
-I i,i I ramifications, its introduction also provides important insights into the
martial ideology of Babylonian kings. 33 Hammurabi rules because of the destiny
I- i (amined by the gods; his scepter and crown are bestowed upon him "by the
wise goddess Mama" (EC 78-9). Anu and Enlil "named the city of Babylon", and
i suMishcd "within it eternal kingship whose foundations are as fixed as heaven
mil earth" (1 (' 7S; K 4:334, 341); his dynasty was promised an "eternal seed of
loyalty' (I < 80). "I la i m i n ii i 1m ihr pit his prince, who venerates the gods . . . |was
176
177
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
chosen] to abolish the wicked and evil", which would naturally include conquer-
ing impious rival kings (LC 76). He is thus able to "stride through the four quar-
ters of the world" conquering enemies until he "makes the four quarters
obedient" to Babylon and the gods (LC 77, 80). Although he is a "warrior",
wherever he conquers he is also a restorer and builder. He "restores the [con-
quered] city of Eridu", "shows mercy to the [conquered] city of Larsa", "revita
lizes the [conquered] city of Uruk", "gathers together the scattered peoples of the
[conquered] city of Isin", and "gives life to [the conquered] city of Adab" (LC 77-
8). He not only conquers cities, but protects them; he "shelters the people of the
city of Malgium in the face of annihilation" (LC 79); he "sustains his people in
crisis, [and] secures their foundations in peace in the midst of the city of Babylon
(LC 80). Thus, Hammurabi only conquers at the command of the gods (R4:345,
351—3, 389), and does so only to restore prosperity and order, to "spread his light
over the lands of Sumer and Akkad" (LC 80). Obviously, much of this is sheer
propaganda; this is especially clear in his claim that he "showed mercy to the
[conquered] people of the city of Mari" (LC 80). In reality he sacked the city 7 in
1759 and mercilessly destroyed it.
Of course, Hammurabi never undertook any of his conquests on his own
initiative. He is in all things the servant of the gods. Hammurabi is always "obe
dient to the god Shamash", who is thus his "ally" in all his conquests (LC 77); he
acts only "upon the command" of the gods (ANET 270; R4:332-3). He is the
"leader of the kings [of Mesopotamia], who subdues the settlements along the
Euphrates River [including Mari] by the oracular command of the god Dagan, his
creator" (LC 80).
With peace and prosperity restored to Mesopotamia, Hammurabi becomes ,i
great temple builder "heaping up bountiful produce" and "supplying abundance"
for the gods through donations to their temples from the plunder he has taken
from war (LC 78). The epilogue to his law code summarizes the royal propaganda
of the time:
With the mighty weapons which the gods Zababa and Ishtar bestowed upon
me, with the wisdom which the god Ea allotted to me, with the ability whn 1 1
the god Marduk gave me, I annihilated enemies everywhere, I [thereby] put
an end to [the] wars [that had afflicted Mesopotamia for decades], I enhanced
the well-being of the land, I made the people of all settlements lie in safe
pastures, I did not tolerate anyone intimidating them [through brigandage or
threat of invasion]. The great gods having chosen me, I am. indeed the shep
herd who brings peace, whose scepter is just. My benevolent shade is spread
over my city [Babylon], I held the people of the lands of Sumer and Akkad
safely in my lap. They prospered under my protective spirit, I maintained
them in peace, with my skillful wisdom I sheltered them (LC 133).. . . I lam
murabi, the lord, who is like a father and begetter to his people, submit n d
himself to the command of the god Marduk, Ins lord |to t onquer the world |
and achieved victory for the god Marduk evervw hen Eh i 'Saddened the Ik ai i
178
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
of the god Marduk, his lord, and he secured the eternal wellbeing of the
people and provided just ways for the land. (LC 134-5)
The stylized imprecations at the end of the law code include a number of curses
against anyone impudent enough to challenge Hammurabi by defacing or mod-
ifying his inscriptions, illuminating some of the subliminal fears of military rulers
Oi the age. Hammurabi curses his enemies with the things that all Mesopotamian
I ings feared. The god Enlil is summoned to bring to Hammurabi's enemies "dis-
order that cannot be quelled and a rebellion that will result in obliteration" and
'the supplanting of his dynasty and the blotting out of his name and his memory
in the land" (LC 136-7). The gods likewise pass judgment on the enemies, "pro-
Bouncing the destruction of his land, the obliteration of his people, and the spilling
■i his life force [blood] like water" (LC 137). Ea, the god of wisdom, is summoned
I I deprive Hammurabi's enemies "of all understanding and wisdom" and to "lead
ihem into confusion" (LC 136). Hammurabi summons the sun-god Shamash to
"confuse [his enemy's] path and undermine the morale of his army; when divina-
11,111 is performed for him, may he provide an inauspicious omen portending the
uprooting of the foundation of his kinship" (LC 137-8). The war-gods Zababa,
i I liar, and Nergal are particularly summoned to bring military disaster on Ham-
murabi's enemies:
May the god Zababa, the great warrior . . . who travels on [Hammurabi's]
right side [in battle], smash the weapon [of Hammuarbi's enemy] upon the
field of battle; may [Zababa] turn day into night for him, 34 and make his
enemy triumph over him. May the goddess Ishtar, mistress of battle and war-
fare, who bares [Hammurabi's] weapons [in battle] 35 . . . curse the kingship [of
Hammurabi's enemy] with her angry heart and great fury; may she turn his
auspicious [pre-battle] omens into calamities; may she smash his weapon on
the field of war and battle, plunge him into confusion and rebellion, strike
down his warriors, drench the earth with their blood, make a heap of the
corpses of his soldiers upon the plain [of battle], and may she show his soldiers
no mercy; as for [Hammurabi's enemy], may she deliver hirn into the hand of
his enemies, and may she lead him bound captive into the land of his enemy
May the god Nergal, the mighty one among the gods, the irresistible
onslaught [in battle], who enables me [Hammurabi] to achieve my triumphs,
burn his [Hammurabi's enemy's] people with his [NergaTs] great over-
powering weapon like a raging fire in a reed thicket; may he [Nergal] have
him [the enemy] beaten with [NergaTs] mighty weapon, and shatter his limbs
like those of a clay figure. (LC 138-9)
Mns remarkable curse is essentially an outline of the course of warfare in the Old
Babylonian period: it begins with pre-battle divination and omens, the fight on
ih<- battlefield, the mound of corpses, the merciless treatment of defeated enemies,
then ( .ipuvil v. and the final n innipli oi the king.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
Middle Bronze Mesopotamian martial art
One of the remarkable features of the Middle Bronze Age in Mesopotamia is the
near disappearance of monumental martial art. The reason for this is not clear. It
may be because of changes in the cultic and ritual context in which martial art was
generally produced. Alternatively, it is possible that martial art of this period was
generally done in the form of fresco paintings such as those at the palace of Zimri-
Lim at Mari (SDA 275-83). If so it is likely that little of this art has survived. On
the other hand, when we remember that only nine fragments of martial art survive
from the militant Akkadian period, the relative lack of Middle Bronze Mesopota-
mian martial art may simply be a matter of the failure as yet to discover any sur-
viving remains.
This is not to say that monumental martial art is unknown from this period. 36
The most striking example is a fragment of a stele sometimes attributed, on rather
flimsy grounds, to Shamshi-Adad (AAJVI §204-5; SDA 252). One side shows a
warrior in a long ornate robe with a spear in his left hand and an axe in his right.
He has one foot on the stomach of a fallen enemy; he is thrusting a spear into the
man's chest while simultaneously striking him in the forehead with an axe. The
opposite side of the stele fragment shows a triumph scene with a royal prisoner
with his hands tied behind his back (AAM §205). An interesting feature oft
stele is the simultaneous use of two different weapons in two-handed combat.
The second major martial scene shows a king with an axe in one hand and a
badly worn weapon — which appears to be a sickle-sword — in the other, striding
over the walls of a conquered fortress and a diminutive prostrate enemy (SDA
291c). He is followed by a soldier with a banner. One very important feature oi
this scene is that it is the only artistic depiction of a Middle Bronze fortress. It
shows a city wall with crenellation and a large city gate flanked by two projecting
towers. The gate has a clearly depicted brick arch, quite similar to the Middle
Bronze gate discovered intact at Tell Dan in Israel, which can still be seen at the
site (ALB 208; Figure 7, p. 278).
A third mythic scene shows a god with a long flowing robe and a triangular-
shaped bow and quiver on his back, grasping a monster by the neck and stabbing
him with a large bronze dagger (AAM §211; SDA 291a). Another mythic seem
shows Gilgamesh and Enkidu trampling the prostrate Humbaba while slaying him
with dagger and mace (AFC 482). Both of these may depict typical weapons and
their use during the Middle Bronze period.
Flistorical and mythic scenes from cylinder seals add to our repertoire of martial
art from the Middle Bronze Age. These scenes can be categorized into a numbei
of stylized scenes. The most common shows a god, goddess or king in a victory
stance with either a curved or rectangular sickle-sword in one hand. 37 Sometimes
the figure is trampling a prostrate enemy. 38 The smiting scene shows a king
standing with raised axe, mace or sickle-sword about to smite a cowering enenn
(FI §160, 541, 763). One scene shows the god or king with sickle sword in one
hand and mace in the other (AM §157b), confirming the two handed use ol
weapons shown in the "Shamshi-Adad" stele discussed above. A more dis
Scene comes from Anatolia, showing a king in battle (FI §4). The king has
liaped shield, rather similar to contemporary shields in Canaan and Syr
hand holding the shield also holds the spear, with the head facing down. I
kittle-axe in the other hand, and is standing on a dead enemy; a nearby
uses an underhand thrust of a dagger.
If one were to guess at patterns of Middle Bronze weapons use, based
glyptic art, it would appear that the sickle-sword was the most common v
but, based on archaeology, the sickle-sword is a relatively rare find comp
pears, axes, and daggers, and appears largely in royal contexts (MW 1:142-3,
see pp. 66-71). This again points to the problem of generalizing about the
oi warfare based on mythically and ritually oriented martial art.
Samsu-iluna {1749-1712} 39
I or the first eight years of his reign Samsu-iluna was at peace; his year nanu
Oil economic and religious activities. The new Pax Babylonica brought
temporary prosperity, and Samsu-iluna celebrated his coronation by de
freedom from taxation for Sumer and Akkad" (ANET 271). Samsu-iluna
year {1741} is called "the year of the Kassite army" (ANET 271). The I
Kassu) were tribal highlanders from the Zagros region, successors to the
-utians. Kassites were eventually to succeed the Babylonians after the
Babylon by the Hittites in 1595. They would eventually found a dynas
ould dominate Mesopotamia from 1595-1 155. 40 At this time, howeve
Were still highlanders from the Zagros, migrating in small groups, serving ,
enaries, or seeking opportunities for plunder in the rich cities of the Bak
mpire. No details of this first Kassite raid are known, but Samsu-ilu
ipparently unable to defeat them decisively. This sign of imperial weakne
i< led a catalyst for widespread rebellion against Babylonian rule.
I he instigator of this rebellion was Rim-Sin II of Larsa {1740-1738}, who
overran most of southern Mesopotamia. Samsu-iluna, however, reacted vig»
■ I- pressing the revolt and killing Rim-Sm II in 1738 {Y12} (R4:3I7, 37 ( >
At that time I [Samsu-iluna] defeated with weapons, eight times in the
of one year, the totality of the land of Sumer and Akkad which had b
hostile against me. I turned the cities into rubble heaps and ruins. I n
the roots of the enemies and evil one from the land. I made the entireh
nation dwell according to my decree. (R4: 376-7)
I his campaign is recounted in greater detail, beginning with the in
ku kground in the world of the gods.
Hie god Mnlil, great lord, whose uttei.uiee cannot he (haneed tin ■
that he determines i annul k iltrred looked with his |o\ful lai <
IMI
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE BRONZE MESOPOTAMIA
[warrior] god Zababa, his mighty oldest son, the one who achieves his victory,
and at the [war] goddess Ishtar, his beloved daughter, the lady whose divinity
is not rivaled, and spoke with them happy words: "Samsu-iluna is my mighty
untiring envoy [as king on earth] who knows how to carry out the desire of
my heart. May you be his shining light. May your good omen occur for him.
Kill his enemies and deliver into his hands his foes that he might build the
wall of Kish, make it greater than it had been previously and make you dwell
in a happy abode."
The god Zababa and goddess Ishtar . . . raised their faces of life brightly
towards Samsu-iluna, the mighty king [of Babylon], the valiant shepherd, the
creation of their hands, and joyfully spoke with him: "O Samsu-iluna, eternal
seed of the gods, one befitting kingship — Enlil has made your destiny very
great. He has laid a commission on us to act as your guardians for your well-
being. We will go at your right side [in battle], kill your enemies, and deliver
your foes into your hands. As for Kish, our fear-inspiring cult city, build its
wall, make it greater than it was previously," (R4: 385-6)
This type of language presumably represents oracular pronouncements and
omens from court priests and prophets. Having received a divine mandate from
the gods, Samsu-iluna marched to defeat the rebels in southern Mesopotamia and
restore the sacred city of Kish to Babylonian rule:
Samsu-iluna, the capable king, the one who listens to the [oracles of the] great
gods, was greatly encouraged by the words which the god Zababa and the
goddess Ishtar spoke to him [through an oracle]. He made ready his weapons
in order to kill his enemies and set out on an expedition to slaughter his foes.
The year was not half over when he killed [the rebel king] Rim-Sin [II of
Larsa], who had caused [southern Mesopotamia] to rebel, and who had been
elevated to the kingship of Larsa. In the land of Kish [Samsu-iluna] heaped
up a burial mound over him. Twenty-six rebel kings, his foes, he killed; he
destroyed all of them. He defeated Iluni, the king of Eshnunna, one who had
not heeded his decrees, led him off in a neck-stock, and had his throat cut. He
made the totality of the land of Sumer and Akkad at peace, made the four
quarters abide by his decree. At that time, Samsu-iluna, the mighty, by means
of the force of his army built the city of Kish [in 1726 {Y24}]. He dug its
canal, surrounded it with a moat, and with a great deal of earth made its
foundations firm as a mountain. He formed its bricks and built its wall. In the
course of one year he made its head rise up more than it had been before.
(R4:387-8)
Thus, Samsu-iluna portrays his acts as enforcing the decree of the gods by restor-
ing order to Mesopotamia and rebuilding the gods' sacred city of Kish. Although
ultimately defeated, the revolt revealed the serious potential weakness of the
Babylonian empire.
The suppression of the rebellion in the south was followed by a threat from the
i lortheast Eshnunna and the highlander Kassites constantly chaffed under Babylonian
domination, and in 1730 {Y20} Samsu-iluna . . .
subjugated the land of Idamaraz from the border of Gutium to the border of Elam
with his mighty weapon; he conquered the numerous people of the land of
Idamaraz and demolished all the various fortresses of the land of Warum who had
resisted him; he achieved his victory and made his strength apparent. After two
months had passed, having set free and given life to the people of the land of
Idamaraz who he had taken captive, and the troops of Eshnunna, as many prisoners
as he had taken, he rebuilt the various fortresses of the land of Warum which
he had destroyed and regathered and resettled its scattered people. (R4:389-90)
Samsu-iluna's triumph, however, was short-lived. Within a few years his con-
trol over southern Mesopotamia was again threatened. In 1721 {Y29} he lost
ontrol over Nippur (R4:425), and by 1712 {Y38} the south was permanently lost
to the rising power of Iluma-Ilum {c. 1735-1710}, king of the "Sealand" (or
■ ) istal) dynasty from the coastal marshes of southern Mesopotamia. Iluma-Ilum
managed to fend off three offensives from Babylon during his reign (C2/l:222); in
he end the kings of Babylon were forced to acquiesce to his independence. Little
I known of the Sealand dynasty; it ruled much of the Mesopotamia!! coastland
under eleven known kings for two-and-a-half centuries {c. 1735-1460}, but few
inscriptions or records survive, and almost nothing is known of its military history
\! 243; C2/l:222, 442-3).
Late Old Babylonian Kingdom {1712-1595}
Mi hough the dynasty founded by Hammurabi would endure for another century,
for all practical purposes the Babylonian empire had been reduced to central
Iteopotarnia by the death of Samsu-iluna. Following the death of Samsu-iluna,
Be deeds of later Old Babylonian kings are only sparsely recorded in inscriptions.
I I is clear that the military power of Babylon was increasingly restricted during the
- vrnteenth century. The year names of Abi-eshuh {1711-1684} mention several
defensive campaigns against the Kassite invaders from the mountains, but no major
i< lories in the south. Arnmi-ditana {1683-1646} was also apparently on the
1 fcnsive, focusing on fortifications. He repaired the walls of Babylon (R4:412),
m<l built Fort Ammi-ditana (R4:413). A fragmentary inscription by Ammi-saduqa
I 1646-1626} claims that Babylonian power was temporarily restored in Nippur,
• here a cult figure of the goddess Ishtar was installed (R4:426). Samsu-ditana
! 1625-1595} was the last king of Hammurabi's dynasty. Although the details were
m known, he was killed during the Hittite conquest of Babylon in 1595, bring-
ing ,m end to I lammnrabi's dynasty (sec p. 301).
riu- four centuries between the fall of Ur {2005} and the fall of Babylon
! !v;> ! ne < lui.u in i/.vi In ,i irnur k.ihlc political and military instability in
Is '
\H\
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Mesopotamia. A number of quite successful warlords rose to power during this
age - Ishbi-Irra of Ism {2017-1985}, Shamshi-Adad of Ashur {1809-1776}, and
Hammurabi of Babylon {1792-1750} - but each of their empires rapidly collapsed
under less talented successors. In contrast to Egypt, which emerged united and
powerful under the New Kingdom in the Late Bronze Age, this long-term inter
nal instability left Mesopotamia consistently vulnerable to outside invasions during
subsequent centuries, including attacks by Elamites, Kassites, Hurrians, Amorites,
and Hittites. Only in the ninth century under the great Assyrian warlords would
political unity and military strength be restored to Mesopotamia.
1 8 I
CHAPTER SEVEN
Warfare in the age of 'Man
Mk- most detailed textual sources we have for warfare in the Middle Bronze Age is
extraordinary archive from Mari, which contains more than 20,000 cuneiform
ll <lets, many of which are military dispatches from field and garrison commanders
die king of Mari, Zimri Lim {1776-1761 }. 1 Remarkably for the ancient Near
I ist, the military letters from Mari give us the words of actual commanders writ-
1 1 within days or even hours of the events they are describing. Nothing is filtered
>u >ugh the royal propaganda machines. We are, in a sense, transported into the
lidst of Middle Bronze Age battles.
I 'here are, however, a number of historiographical limitations and problems
■ uh the Mari archive. First, chronologically the tablets come largely from the
i ,n of Zimri-Lim, king of Mari, and hence cover only a narrow period of
1 -sopotamian history. None the less, that period was one of the most militarily
iportant and active, covering the rise of Hammurabi of Babylon {1792—1750} to
! n]KTial predominance in Mesopotamia. Indeed, the destruction of Mari, which
ponically preserved the clay tablets, occurred two years after Hammurabi con-
i nnvd Mari {1759}. The archive also presents us only with the Mari perspective;
.ire left with limited information concerning the views of their enemies. The
hive also includes only letters to king Zimri-Tim; unfortunately his responses to
■b commanders are included only incidentally in quotations within the letters.
I ikewise the words of other kings, such as Hammurabi, are occasionally indirectly
lOted in the Mari letters.
( )ur second problem in interpreting the Mari archive is that some of the texts
broken or damaged, leaving lacunae — gaps created by lost text. Tablets can be
broken in a number of different ways, losing the top, bottom or one or other side
If a particular missive; other lacunae are created by a gash in the middle. The net
nil is that many of the letters are obscure and difficult to interpret. To the pro-
i in of lacunae is added philological difficulties relating to uncertain grammar or
n< aning of words. The result is that the exact meaning of many texts is often
urn ertain. This is especially a problem in relation to technical terminology.
Finally, we have the problem of historical contextualization. Many of the letters
in undated, meaning we don't know whether the events in one particular letter
milliard before m .iliei the events in another. The letters also often contain
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
numerous references to unknown people and places. The result is that, although
we know what happened, we frequently are uncertain about when it happened,
where it happened, or who was doing what to whom.
Trying to reconstruct military history from the Mari archive is thus rather like
trying to reconstruct the events of the Napoleonic wars from a disorganized pile of
often damaged and semi-legible dispatches of Napoleon's commanders to Napo-
leon, but none of his responses. Remaining with the analogy, it is unclear if the
battle of Waterloo occurred before or after the invasion or Russia, or if Austerlitz
is in Germany, France, or Spain. It is also uncertain if Wellington is an ally or an
enemy of Napoleon. Nor do we have a French dictionary — we have to make up
our own as we go along. Fortunately, great strides have been made in recent years
through painstaking study of the Mari letters. The recent publication of Wolfgang
Heimpels Letters to the King of Mari has given us both a historical framework and a
translation of many of the letters. 2
Battle divination and martial ideology 3
Ancient Near Eastern armies operated in a world in which belief in the super-
natural power of the gods was an omnipresent assumption. Battles were fought and
won by the will of the gods. The prophet of one god promised Zimri-Lim "O
Zimri-Lim, swear that you will not neglect me, and I shall hover over you and
deliver your enemies into your power" (ARM 10.8; MK 138). Whereas Napoleon
claimed that "God is on the side with the big guns", the ancient Mesopotamians
would have countered "God is on the side with the big temples". To insure that a
king, general, or army "were operating in accordance with the will of the gods,
Mesopotamian rulers employed diviners and prophets who would interpret the
will of the gods. A wide range of methods were used to accomplish this. Few kings
dared go to war without the explicit approval of the gods.
In the Mari texts, the most important form of martial divination was extispicy
(terturn), the ritual examination of the liver of a sacrificed animal for patterns and
markings which were interpreted according to a complex set of rules. 4 Man
commanders invariably consulted the diviners (barurn) before undertaking any
major military operation; special martial diviners were assigned to accompany
military units on campaign (L 225, 463; ASD 176—9). They were obviously
important officers, since one is described as riding in a chariot like the generals oi
the army (L 225). One barum seems to have been the independent commander of a
force of several hundred men:
Ilushu-nasir, the barum-pviest ... leads the forces of my lord. A Babylonian
barum-priest goes with the Babylonian forces. These 600 troops are now in
Shabazim. The bamtn-priests are now gathering omens. (ARM 2.22; WM 1 30)
Frequently the letters give no details about divination, mentioning only that th
omens were favorable or unfavorable (L 210 11, "Ml 1>) ( Mhei times, mm.
precise questions were asked and specific detailed prophecies were given; examples
of oracular responses to divination include:
• "The king's hand will catch territory that is not his" (L 175);
• "My lord will seize the city [he is besieging] in a hard battle" (L 221);
• "The enemy will attack and carry off livestock" (L 175);
"The enemy will not make an incursion [into the king's land]" (L 229);
"Those extispicies were bad. Rebellion [in the city] was repeatedly indicated.
I have put the [guards] of the city gates on notice about the citizens" (L 230);
"When [the allied Babylonian soldiers] enter Mari, they will not cause rebel-
lion to be committed and seize the city of Mari" (L 235-6);
"This month the enemy will not move against you with his troops and his
allies, and he will not besiege you" (L 239);
"Zimri-Lim, do not go on the road [on campaign]! Stay in Mari!" (L 268)..
Sometimes, alternative plans were made depending on the forthcoming results
-I the extispicy. One commander ordered: "Make an extispicy, and if that [rebel]
Milage still holds out at the end of the month, leave the fifty men behind [to
I -lockade it], and depart! If the extispicies are bad, [capture the city] and take down
his fortifications]" (L 236). On other occasions double extispicies might be taken,
king the same question in two different ways to get confirmation, or perhaps to
- t the answer one wanted.
I made extispicies as follows: I asked, "If [king] Zimri-Lim cedes [the city of]
Id to the king of Babylon, will [king] Zimri-Lim be well? ..." I made
[extispicies] on two more lambs as follows: "If Zimri-Lim cedes Id to the king
of Babylon, will Zimri-Lim be well? ..." My extispicies were not sound
| indicating a negative answer]. I did [extispicy again] as follows: "If Zimri-
Lim [does not] cede Id to the king of Babylon, will Zimri-Lim be well?" My
extispicies were sound [indicating a positive answer]. (L 237)
Battle could not be undertaken without favorable omens. One priest reported
(he results of his pre-battle extispicy. He first listed the question asked, and then
the answer derived from his divination:
Should Sumu-Dabi, with troops few or many, however many he can readily
equip, draw up in battle formation against Zimri-Lim, should he do battle
with him, and be safe, defeat him, be victorious? . . . [The result of the extis-
picy was that] he must not do battle. (L 240)
When the result of the extispicy was favorable, the commander would carry out his
•I in "I had extispicies done for the well-being of the troops of my lord ... and the
r\tispi( us were sound, and the troops may move from their position" (L 216, 242).
X " ,,ll,rI "HH^r reported "We ,uc having extispicies done now. If the god answers,
186
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
we will do what the god says to us. May the god of our lord go by our side [into battle]!"
(L 329) . If unfavorable omens occurred, however, the plans were generally put on
hold. In such a situation, the commander could wait a while, and consult the
oracles again, hoping for a better result. "I made extispicies for the well-being of
the messengers, and they were bad, [so I did not send them]. I will make [extispicies j
for them again, and when the extispicies have come out sound, I will dispatch
them" (L 210). Some oracles were given as a conditional warning; an ecstatic prophet
proclaimed, "If you do not make that [new] city gate, there will be a corpse heap [of
the soldiers killed in battle at the gate when the city is sacked by the enemy] " (L 263) .
When the omens were bad the king or his priests sometimes had to intervene
ritually, by making special offerings to re-establish good relations with the gods.
Impurity or other types of sin that could antagonize the gods had to be ritually
purified to insure success in battle: "There is a taboo [of sin or impurity] among
you. The [exorcists and purifiers] must wash off the taboo" (L 199). The king was
required to expiate for sins and impurities; according to one oracle: "If my lord
stays for seven days outside the walls [of the city] when he does his ablutions [then
the gods will grant] well-being" (L 261, 177). In such situations, if the king per-
sonally made sacrifice, cosmic order could be restored. One minister advised: "...
our lord [Zimri-Lim] must come to Hanat to meet the troops, and our lord must
perform an offering before [the goddess of] Hanat. And he must see the troops
whom we moved and calm their hearts, which are frightened" (L 196). Bad omens
could be changed to good omens by the king making an offering in expiation and
taking another extispicy: "I have obtained the [sacrificial] offering that my lord
[king Zimri-Lim] offered and whose extispicies he sent, and the god accepted the
offering of my lord [and the omens are favorable]" (L 212).
In addition to divination by extispicy, natural phenomena were sometimes seen
as ominous. An eclipse of the moon caused panic among the troops (L 209).
Eclipses were often, but not universally, associated with disaster, but it was not
always clear for whom. In different months an eclipse might presage that "a city
loses its population", "many troops fall", or "a defeat of the other king will hap-
pen" (L 271). A prodigious birth of a deformed lamb was seen as ominous,
requiring careful study by the diviners (L 510). Dreams were often thought of as
prophetic: "Yasim-Dagan had a dream before his eyes. The dream is serious and is
raising concern [among the soldiers]. I had an extispicy of his dream done.. . . [The
meaning of the dream is that] my lord must give strict orders to guard the
strongholds" (L 209). Another oracular dreamer wrote: "In my dream the allies of
Zimri-Lim defeated Elam" (L 264).
Oracular prophecy is also described in the Mari letters in which ecstatic pro-
phets spoke the words of the gods from trance-like states. Sometimes such pro
phecies were highly metaphorical and enigmatic. For example, does the prophecy
"a wind rises against the land" (L 255) refer to a desert sandstorm or an enemy
invasion? Others used simile prophecies: an ecstatic prophet ate a lamb alive, then
pronounced, "A devouring will occur" (L 256), possibly an .illusion to an invading
army consuming a land.
The gods frequently requested specific offerings or behavior from the king.
The prophet of the god Shamash told Zimri-Lim:
I [the god Shamash] am the lord of the land. I requested from you [as votive
offerings] a great throne as seat of my plenitude and your daughter [to serve as
a priestess in Shamash's temple] - let them be rushed quickly to Sippir, city of
life. Herewith I deliver into your hand the kings who stood against you [in
battle]. (L249)
( )ther prophets made independent prophecies not requested by the king:
One "shock-head" (qammatum: an ecstatic spirit-possessed prophetess with
disheveled hair) of [the god] Dagan of Terqa came and spoke to me as follows.
She said: "The peace offers of the Eshnunakeans are deceit.. . . I will collect
him [the king of Eshnuna] in the net that I knot. I will erase his city. And his
wealth, which is from old, I will cause to be utterly defiled." (L 251)
Ys it turned out, Eshnuna was in the end defeated by Hammurabi.
Some oracles were very detailed, promising that the gods themselves would
fight on the side of the king:
I [asked the prophets]: "Will my lord [Zimri-Lim] come close to battle?"
They [the prophets replied]: "Battle will not be done. As of the arrival [of
Zimri-Lim] his [Ishme-Dagan's, son of Shamshi-Adad, king of Assyria] allies
will scatter. And they will cut off the head of Ishme-Dagan, and they will
place it under the foot of my lord [Zimri-Lim], saying, 'the troops of Ishme-
Dagan were many. And although his troops were many, his allies scattered. My
[Zimri-Lim's] allies are [the gods] Dagan, Shamash, Itur-Mer, and Belet-
Ekallim and Addu, lord of determination; they [these gods] go at the side of
my lord [into battle].' " (L 257)
I in like the mortal allies of Ishme-Dagan, who will desert him, Zimri-Lim's
lilies are the gods, who will stay by his side and lead him to victory. Another
prophet agreed, repeatedly shouting his prophecy by the palace gate: "Ishme-
I >agan [son of Shamshi-Adad] will not escape the hand of [the god] Marduk"
I \2S). As it happened, Ishme-Dagan died and lost his kingdom (L 145-6).
When a king wanted to go to war, he had to consult the gods, both to increase
m morale of his troops, but also because a favorable oracle from the gods was
I msidered a justification for war. Hammurabi, when he attacked his erstwhile ally
! arsa, proclaimed:
"I now requested [an oracle about going to war with Larsa from the gods]
Shamash and Marduk and they answered me with yes. I would not have risen
to this nlfriiMvi |.i!\nu\i I n i| without consulting a god [first]." To his troops
IKH
I M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF A4ARI
he spoke as follows: "Go [to Larsa], may the god go in front of you [into
battle]!" (L 333)
It is possible that Hammurabi had no desire to attack Tarsa before the oracle
from the gods, but more often kings were simply seeking divine permission to do
what they had already determined to do.
Sometimes a commander or a king ignored the omens, though they were
repeatedly advised by the diviners not to do so. One commander was adamant:
"Only go out [on campaign] upon sound extispicies!" (L 458). Another oracle
declared: "I am afraid the king [Zimri-Lim] will commit himself to [peace with]
the Eshnunakean [king] without asking a god.. . . He must not commit himself
without asking the god" (L 253). One priest complained that the commander was
considering acting against the omens:
The enemy are enlisting border guards from the elite troops and enlisting
additional troops [in preparation for war] but my lord must [wait] and keep
catering to the wishes of [the gods] Dagan, Shamash, and Addu about these
things.. . . My lord must not hurry into battle, and my lord must not [attack]
the enemy. . . When Dagan, Shamash, and Addu, these gods, have answered
you with yes and your extispicies are sound, then my lord must do battle!
(L 243)
In general, however, the omens and prophecies were ignored at great peril. Bad
omens and military misfortunes were blamed on the inscrutable will of the gods:
"have I done anything that does not please [the sun-god] Shamash so that he has
done this to me? . . . Why has the god treated me this way?" (PH 33). Although
most of us today are rather dubious that the will of God can be found in the
blotches on the liver of a sheep, we should never doubt that the ancient soldiers
had absolute belief in the efficacy of extispicy and prophecy. If a commander
operated against the omens, the morale of his army suffered drastically. Omens
changed the course of battle not because they were real, but because the Meso
potamian soldiers believed they were real, and behaved in rational response to that
belief Although generals might miss important military opportunities by refusing
to march when the omens were bad, campaigning with bad omens could bring
disaster because of the devastating psychological impact on the morale of the
troops. 5 All successful ancient commanders instinctively acted upon this, whether
they themselves actually believed in the gods and the omens or not.
Middle Bronze generals well understood the importance of maintaining high
morale among their soldiers, as is reflected in this dispatch:
The last of the Hana [nomad auxiliaries] have arrived here.. . . No one is sick
No one! There are no losses.. . . When I observed all | previous] expedition
there were many worries; but in this expedition I observe no sorrow or am
thing of that kind, only laughter and joking. |The soldi • i s| ne as happy as h
they were living at home. The hearts of my lord's servants think [only] of the
endeavor of fighting battles and defeating the enemy. Rejoice m V lord'
(WM 101-2)
Bad battle omens were one sure way to destroy this type of good morale.
Modern disbelievers in ancient prophetic techniques might naturally expect a
high rate of inaccuracy from ancient omens and prophecies. And, indeed, manv of
the oracles are manifestly false. One prophet, for example, proclaimed: "kingship,
< epter, throne, reign, the upper [land of Syria] and lower land [of Mesopotamia]
ire given to Zimri-Lim" (L 267). In fact, it was Zimri-Lim's erstwhile ally Ham-
murabi of Babylon who became universal king of Mesopotamia, by sacking Mari
1 1 id killing Zimri-Lim. This naturally leads us to wonder: if the omens and pro-
phecies were frequently inaccurate, why didn't military commanders simply
ibandon their use altogether? To answer this question we must remember that
•men interpretation was an art, not a science, and there was a great deal of "wig-
gle-room" possible in extispicy, allowing a range of possible interpretation by the
-viner. We must also remember that the diviner-priests were among the most
ducated men of their day. They were well-informed high courtiers with close
iociations with the power elites of the kingdom. Julius Caesar, for all his great-
ness as a commander, also occasionally served Rome as a diviner, as pontifex
maximus and auger. 6 Like Caesar, Mesopotamian diviners led troops in battle
\KM 2.22). They frequently served as spies, sending detailed reports on poll-
i( al and military matters back to the king (L 94-5). Whether intentionally or
ubconsciously, the interpretation of omens and extispicies could be manipulated
I'v the diviners. The results of oracles and divination were thus not merely
Miidom, but were informed interpretations of omens made with knowledge of
I" major military and political issues facing the commander. Court and regi-
nental diviner-priests were undoubtedly often wrong, but overall they were
probably not much more inaccurate than modern political pundits and intelligence
> -vices. When a modern intelligence service fails, we blame human error. We
may try to change the personnel or fix the system, but we don't abandon it.
I hen ancient oracles failed, it was likeyvise seen as a mistake made by the diviner
-at her than evidence that the overall system itself was faulty. A particular
diviner-priest may have been dismissed from court, but the practice of divination
I ontinued.
I nidly enough, battle-divination was one of the most pervasive and long-lasting
military practices of ancient Mesopotamia. Long after chariots and slings were
Kndoned, battle divination continued. Divine sanction for Saul's reign over Israel
- withdrawn when he disobeyed his diviner-priest, the prophet Samuel (1
llinud 13). Likewise there was a dispute between Ahab of Israel and the prophet
1" aiah over battle divination (1 Kings 22). A thousand years later, Greek and
.nun generals were still practicing essentially the same type of battle-divination
"tuals The last pagan Roman battle divination was requested by Julian the
A f 1,,sutr m * M (I ,|m vcats aftei the writing of the Man letters. 8 Medieval
I'M,
191
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Christians had their own forms of pre -battle divination, beginning with
Constantine's vision at the battle of Milvian Bridge in 312 CE. 9 Indeed, in its core
feature pre-battle divination has continued in use to the present, for when a mili-
tary commander today prays for God's help in the planning and execution of his
battle and for the protection of his troops, he is, in essence, engaging in the same
practice as the ancient Mesopotamian diviners.
Military organization
There are few texts in the Mari archive which explicitly discuss military organi-
zation (L 498-500, 507-8). However, there are a number of incidental allusions to
such matters which give us a fairly detailed view of how a Mesopotamian Middle
Bronze army was organized and functioned (MK 141-5; MM).
Conscription and records
(MM 7-11; MK 141-5; WM 66-88)
In order to know the proper duties owed by each community, Mesopotamian
rulers are known to have instituted censuses. The most detailed account we have is
the census of Zimri-Lim of Mari (MK 142-3). The census was called a tebibtum,
which literally means purification, probably related to religious rituals associated
with the census. The people were required to gather to be counted. The common
people were understandably wary of a census that would be used to determine
both their financial obligations to the state and the number of men they would
have to provide for military and labor drafts, and the. records of Zimri-Lim's census
show that many tried to avoid being counted (ARM 14.64). 10 One official sug-
gests parading the severed head of an executed prisoner as an inducement to those
villagers who refused to be counted (ARM 2.48).
Troops were recruited for military service in three broad categories: profes-
sional soldiers, militias and mercenaries. Recruitment (puhrum) procedures were
run by a sophisticated military bureaucracy led by the "secretary of the army"
(dub.sar mar.tu) (ASD 106-9). Each regiment had a scribe attached to it who
received the pay equivalent of a lieutenant (L 500; MM 9, 12-13). These military
scribes kept detailed complete lists of the names and hometowns of all of the sol-
diers, from which were derived lists of casualties and deserters, a frequently men-
tioned problem (MM 45-7; WM 72). Each village mayor (suqaqum) was required
to oversee the recruitment in his village, and to make sure his village's quota was
fulfilled. The recruits were required to "swear an oath [of loyalty] by Dagan" or
some other god, after which their names were recorded on clay tablets; a copy was
kept by the regimental scribe and another sent to the central archive (L 461, 482;
WM 73-5). When called up, new recruits were inspected and those unfit for
duty - the sick and old - were sent home (L 483). None the less, unfit soldiers
could be found in the ranks; one general complained: "Reliable troops are nol at
hand" (L 400). Another echoed this sentiment: "Win iln sou u I. i .< leli.iMe mm
I'i '
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
[from service] and then replace them unnecessarily with [inexperienced] little
children?" (L 330).
In times of peace soldiers are frequently described as being on furlough (patuum)
(L 224; WM 75-6). Specific lists of furloughed soldiers were recorded and forwarded
to the central government (L 194). One commander reported to king Zimri-Lim:
My lord wrote me about dead and runaway troops. My lord said: "Write
down a name-list and send it to me!" Because I watch the troops closely over
here, I have sent for the soldiers on furlough twenty days ago. Let the soldiers
on furlough arrive here, and I shall inspect the name-list on the tablet and see
who are the troops on hand and the runaway troops, and I will send a com-
plete report to my lord. (L 297)
A commander forwarded to the king the "name lists of the men on hand, the
troops of the garrisons, the soldiers on furlough, the deserters, and the dead, place
by place, on tablets" (L 348, 462). One such furlough tablet survives, listing indi-
\ ldual soldiers by their regiment, personal name, and home town (L 464). One
iext mentions that sixteen out of fifty soldiers were on furlough (L 224); another
unit had twenty-five on furlough and only twenty-two on duty (L 312). When
war breaks out, these furloughed troops are immediately called back to service (L
! 13). Sometimes a commander was not able to muster the requisite number of
i loops; one officer was reprimanded for having only 800 men instead of the
required 1000 (L 487).
As in any army, officers and soldiers grew weary of extended duty away from
home. One city commander wrote to the king, complaining: "I have been staying
in | the city of] Han-Sura [on duty] in the garrison for five years. Now, if it pleases
ii iy lord, let my lord dispatch an alternate for me!" (L. 310). Ordinary soldiers also
BCpected to rotate after a certain term of service. "My lord instructed us as follows:
(Jo and stay three months'.. . . Now we have fulfilled three months.. . . If my lord
ill dispatch to me a replacement for these troops, let those troops go!" (L 312).
When conditions of service became bad enough, the troops became mutinous.
1 iliy men deserted when there was insufficient food (L 213), and others threatened
i<> do so as well (L 314). One commander reported growing dissatisfaction in the
i.uiks, with his soldiers complaining:
Why did we go on campaign, and why did we not return to our lord at the
end [of the campaign]? . . . [The soldiers] hearts are angry, and they will rise
| and desert] and depart for somewhere else.... [The king] must give them
(lour. He must replace these troops! (L 313—14)
Soldiers also complained of serving in winter, apparently expecting military
erviee to be seasonal (I 185, 192-3). Punishment for disobedient or cowardly
soldiers ( ould be harsh, including being stripped naked, bound, beaten, and para-
di il before the troops to be mo< ked (I 463).
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
Nomad mercenaries
Mercenaries were frequently recruited from the nomads (L 222—3; WM 67), and
the Kassite and Elamite highlanders (ASD 88—9). Most prominent sources of
nomad mercenaries for the king of Mari were the Hana tribe of the Sim'al tribal
confederation. 11 Another major tribal confederation, which seems to have been
less willing to serve in the armies of Mari, was the Banu-Yamina (Yaminites,
Benjaminites) to the north-east around the Khabur River (WM 95). These groups
were divided into a number of clans, each ruled by a sugagum — a chief or shaykh.
In the Mari archives they make frequent appearance both as raiders attacking the
kingdom and its caravans, and as mercenaries in the service of the king. Under the
right conditions, the nomadic tribes could muster sizable forces in service of a
kingdom. Zimri-Lim mobilized some 7000 nomads for one of his campaigns:
"Two thousand [soldiers from the] Hana [nomad tribe] were assembled in Qattu-
nan, and they keep assembling as scheduled.. . . Five thousand Numha and
Yamutbal troops are assembled together. They go to [military service for] my lord"
(L 416). The nomads needed both monetary and verbal inducements to join the
king's campaign. One commander reported: "the Hana [nomads], all of them, are
assembled now and I delivered the instruction of my lord [king Zimri-Lim] . I
caused them relief with words; and they arose and proclaimed favorable words and
greetings to my lord" (L 200). There was a downside to using nomad mercenaries.
The passage of nomad troops, often together with their families and herds, could
cause problems for farmers in the campaign area. "There were masses of Numh;i
and Yumutbal [nomads], together with their little boys and girls, slaves, maids,
oxen, and donkeys. After they use up the grain, they will destroy the sedge and
reed of the bank of the Euphrates" (L 204).
Organization 12
Reports of the payment of some Mariote regiments in Babylonian service provide
us with a basic outline of both military organization and pay rates (L 498-500,
507—8). Compensation for military service took a number of forms, including land
grants (L 446), clothing (L 507-8), food (ASD 88), weapons (see section on
logistics on p. 21), silver wages (L 498-500, 507-8), and slaves (L 225, 349). One-
tablet records the daily grain distribution to soldiers: high officers received two
thirds of a liter (qa) of barley per day, lower officers half a liter, and ordinary sol
diers about a third of a liter (WM 140); there were also occasional distributions of
vegetables, beer, and mutton (WM 14).
Land (sibtu) was given to a soldier's family in return for military service, and was
governed by strict laws in Hammurabi's Law Code (LC §26—38 = ANET 166— H
ASD 96-101; L 446). Land was distributed in varying amounts to different ranks;
one general was given a huge estate of 190 hectares of land (MAS 26), while
common soldiers were given small, single-family plots. II" tin- soldier failed to
report for duty or sent an unauthorized substitute, he vv.is to In- r\o utrd (I (Mj.?(>)
( )n occasion, however, soldiers were permitted to send substitutes (takhkhu) to
fulfill family military obligations (ASD 91-3). Soldiers who were taken prisoner
m war were to have their land protected, and passed to a son who was to assume his
i.ither's military responsibilities (LC §27-9); land with a military obligation
attached to it could not be sold (LC §36). Officers were forbidden upon pain of
death to take the goods of a soldier, to hire the soldier out for labor, or appropriate
Ins land grant (LC §34). Soldiers were also forbidden to sell the provisions given
fom by the state (LC §37).
Plunder (sallatum) (WM 76-9) was an important element in the soldiers pay; a
portion of all booty was kept by the king, but soldiers expected their share:
Let your troops seize booty and they will bless you. These three towns are not
heavily fortified. In a day we shall be able to take them. Quickly come up and let
us capture these towns and let your troops seize booty. (ARM 5.16; WM 77)
The documents mention soldiers who stole booty from the kings share, and
ilso officers who kept booty that should have been given to the soldiers. One
• ommander complained that some of his officers . . .
have stolen the soldier's booty! I put an oath of the king into my mouth
not to rob the booty of a soldier. Not ten days had passed after my decree
when a tablet , . . arrived, saying "Whoever has taken away the soldiers' booty
has committed a sacrilege against me." (ARM 2.13; WM 78-9)
In Table 7.1, I give very rough hypothetical equivalents to modern military
■ .inks.. The fundamental military leader was the general (gal.martu, rab Amurrim),
Inn-ally the "great man of the Amorites". Generals are mentioned as commanding
giments of sizes ranging from 500-2000 men (L 581, index; MM 12),
"i perhaps ideally standardized at 1000 (MK 142). At Sippar the rank was not
rmanent; rather it rotated among different officials every one to three years
AND 93-6), perhaps to prevent officers from gaining a permanent independent
m »wer base.
Mention is also made of two colonels (sapiru sabim) as assistants to the general (L
8). Under the generals were captains {rab pirsim, gal.ku), who commanded a
Each captain was assisted by two lieutenants
■ i.mcia
rdized company of 100.
kputtum or nubanda). 14 There is also mention of 50 "standard bearers" (mubab-
Ulum) in a regiment of 1000 men (L 597, index). This would make five "standard
fctrers" assigned to each 100 men. They may have been something like a sergeant,
Wlimanding twenty men each (L 508). Finally, there is the corporal (ugula io
n \ wakil 10 awilum, literally, "overseer often men"), who commanded ten
' n (L 499, 581 index). A quasi-military commander was the mayor of a royal
{sug&gum). These served as citadel-commanders and were responsible for
quipping and feeding troops, and sometimes leading troops in battle (L 587,
index; MM 13).
I'M
I'i
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
That these were somewhat standardized ranks rather than merely vague titles is
indicated by the proportional pay scale associated with each rank. The following
chart (Table 7.1) shows the scale of pay.
In interpreting these figures, it must be emphasized that the shekels mentioned
here are measures of weight, not coins. The Middle Bronze Mesopotamian shekel
weighed about eight grams, but the actual weight of a shekel could vary from
region to region and time to time. Broadly speaking, a talent was the load a man
could carry - roughly 30 kilograms. This was divided into 60 rnina: roughly 500
grams or 1.1 pound. The mina was further divided into 60 shekels, of about 8
grams each (L xiv).
To complicate matters, the Mesopotamians in this period indulged in the time
honored practice of devaluing their currency. The texts speak of, for example,
"silver rings of five shekels nominal value, their [real] weight four shekels" (L 500).
It seems that the Babylonians were either adding 20 percent copper to their silver,
or trying to pass off shekels that were in reality only 80 percent of their supposed
weight. On the other hand this discrepancy might reflect a distinction between
different weights of a shekel in different regions. The silver was not in the form
of coins, but in the form of jewelry, cups, or plates, though these could have
a standardized weight. The texts mention rings, cups, disks, and collars (T 498-
500, 508).
Table 7. 1 Pay
scales associated with military ranks
Ancient rank
Modern parallel
Payment
L 498-9
Payment
L 500a
Payment
L500b
Payment
L508
rab Amurrim
general
8G
30 S
3 garment
—
20 G
1 garment
1 shirt
sapiru sabim
colonel
5 G
10 S
1 garment
10 G
1 garment
1 shirt
10 G
8S
2 garment
2 shirts
rab pirsim
captain
7S
1 garment
'
20 S
1 garment
1 shirt
20 S
1 shirt
laputtum
lieutenant
5S
1 garment
1 shirt
7S
1 garment
1 shirt
10 S
1 garment
1 shirt
11 S
1 garment
1 shirt
muhabbilum
"standard bearer"
= sergeant
-
p
1 shirt
6S
1 shirt
6S
1 shirt
wakil
"overseer often"
= corporal
10 soldiers
2 S 1 shirt
2S =
0.2 S /man
2S =
0.2 S /man
3S =
0.3 S /man
3 S =
0.3 S /man
Abbreviations: G = gold shekel; S = silver shekel; a shekel \\c\y)
•My S
To give a sense of the economy of scale, we can look at other prices mentioned
in the Mari archive. The price of a boat ranged from 10-30 shekels depending on
i/e and quality (L 407). A slave cost 10 shekels, while three sheep could be bought
'.<>r two shekels (MM 13). Six (large?) jars of wine cost one shekel (L 407), as did
twenty arrows. Men who brought back a prisoner of war were given two shekels
I silver and a new shirt (T 467). A horse, on the other hand, cost five minas (300
hekels), fifteen times the wages of a captain.
One can see from this chart that payment was proportionally relatively stable,
'though the specific amounts varied. The variation in pay is probably because of
inferences in the period of time which the soldiers served; was this payment for a
month, two months, or a full campaign season? The pay may have been campaign
ay rather than monthly or annual pay; an army of 650 was paid two shekels per
u men, and their leader eight shekels and a shirt for a short campaign (L 467),
-ughly the same as indicated in Table 7.1. Some of the payments were also given
l allied troops or nomad mercenaries, who may have been paid at a different scale
!i an the kings own professional troops.
Mesopotamian armies were also divided into categories based on equipment,
uning and experience (MM 17-25). The precise meaning of many of the terms
c ussed here is unknown, and must be inferred from the context. It is also
u lear if some terms designate a specific assignment or function given to soldiers on
ii ad hoc basis, rather than indicating separate permanently organized regiments.
I ne normal term for a simple soldier is be'rum or erin (MM 22—3); generically,
oldiers or troops are sabum while an army is ummanatum (T 598—601, index). The
mi sabum is used with all sorts of qualifiers indicating specific assignments for
roops. Mesopotamian armies clearly understood the importance of reconnoiter-
ftg before battle. Scouts (sakbum) are mentioned frequently (L 594, index), as are
irmishers or reconnoiterers (baddum) (L 592; MM 16—17). Armies were some-
mirs divided into different columns, marching ahead or behind each other. The
Milliard (rasum) seems to have been composed of elite troops who could march
I i iter than ordinary soldiers, and were sent ahead of the main body (MM 18).
I hey were more than just scouts; one letter mentions that a commander "led the
mguard of 1000 men and reached Qatunnan. The rest of the troops will come
.liter me in battle formation to Qatunnan. The [total] force of 3000 men . . . will
e gathered" (ARM 3.14). According to contemporary itineraries, armies gen-
■ rally made 25 kilometers (15 miles) per day, but could march 35 (21 miles) on a
forced march. 15
There were also different classes of troops serving as guards and garrisons for
• uses. The border guards (bazahatum) (L 573, index) seem to be small outpost and
itrol units which were stationed away from the main city and who watched the
border and reported to the commander on the movement of troops, nomads,
Ii 1 1 hants, messengers, or any other significant groups of people. Garrison troops
birtum), on the other hand, were assigned to defend cities (L 581, index; WM 98;
AM > S7 S). Massitrttwi or guards may be a different term for a similar function;
thr\ air mainly lies* i iU,l ,is :'u.uJm:' i itirs (1 582, index).
I'M,
199
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
There are also classifications of troops which seem to apply to their state oi
readiness. The regulars (pihrum) seem to be permanent professional troops (L 592,
index). They are mentioned as receiving tracts of land in return for their military
service; whether they were to farm these lands or receive the produce or revenues
is unclear., They received "five dike plots", whereas ordinary farmers had only
"three dike plots" (L 446). Another category were the reservists (diriga), who were
called up only in times of war (L 593, index). This category may be related to
"replacement" troops (ruddum) (MM 19). Archers are rarely mentioned as a sepa
rate category of soldier in the Mari texts (MK 63), though there is some evidence
for a low level of military archery. It may simply be that archers are assumed to
have been included in the broader categories of troops mentioned above, but it
may be that archery was not widely used in Middle Bronze Mesopotamian armies.
In conditions of extreme emergency the entire population could be mobilized for
military and labor in the service of the state (L 319, 386).
A strange category of troops are the "fishermen" {ba'irum) (ASD 101-2). The
have sometimes been interpreted as being enlisted to fish for the army on cam
paign, or for using their nets to entangle the enemy (WM 93-4). A more likely
explanation is that the "fishermen" were more generically simply boatmen, who
were enlisted to run the boats servicing the army, and probably to act as marines
fighting from boats. One Mari text shows that they were clearly expected to fight:
"When you hear this tablet send me the ba'irum who are with you, all who are
present. They can carry their axes and equipment" (ARM 1.31; WM 94). In the
contemporary Law Code of Hammurabi the military obligations of the ba'irum are
precisely the same as those of the ordinary soldier (redum). 16 In the military context
I would suggest that marine might be a broadly analogous modern term.
Troops were also classified by their arms (see pp. 252-6) and function. Light
troops (qallatum) are frequently mentioned in association with ambushing enemies
(L 474; MM 17-18, 43-4). Elite or heavy troops (kibitum) seem to be more heavily
armed and better trained than ordinary soldiers, but also to move more slowly. '
Rulers, governors, commanders, and kings were frequently served by personal
retainers (sut resim), who were presumably the most experienced and skilled war
riors they could find (L 591, index). The king's personal retainers formed the
Royal Bodyguards (kisrum; girsequ), who accompanied the king wherever he went
(MM 18-19). The royal bodyguard of Shamshi-Adad numbered 200-400 men (ARM
2.1; WM 99). Charioteers were undoubtedly also elite warriors (see pp. 145-53)
Numbers
(MM 1-9; L 599-601 index)
A wide range of numbers are given for military forces in the Mari tablets, from ,i
few dozen to tens of thousands. The figures provided in the sources are sometime
based on propaganda, attempting to inflate the glory of a king either by mcre.isin
the strength of his army, or that of a defeated enemy. Othei faulty figures he
quently derive from ignorance, and were no more than wild imesses. I lowev< i
l'»:
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
u.tny numbers provided by the sources are derived from internal archives, which
■ ere intended for day-to-day operation of the state. These figures are probably
quite reliable (MK 141-2; MM 7-8).
The largest force mentioned during this period is a claim of 120,000 men by
he king of Eshununa. The king claimed "he inspected my troops at the gate of
l'..ib-Kikurrim and now from my 600,000 troops I will send [as an allied con-
tingent] 120,000 good troops" (PH 79). Given the demographic and logistical
ie.ilities of the day these figures are undoubtedly sheer hyperbolistic propaganda
I 599, index). Other extraordinarily large armies include one of 60,000 (MM 8;
I 599), 40,000 (L 329), and 30,000 (L 418, 459, 460; ARM 2.69). Six armies of
10,000 are mentioned and another four of 10,000. 18
However, such large armies were certainly exceptional and in some ways the
umbers are problematic. One of the letters in the Mari archive contains a
markable statement of intentional disinformation by Hammurabi: "When I dis-
> itch 100 troops the one who hears it will quote it as 1000. And when [I dispatch]
000 troops, he will emote it as 10,000." It seems here that Hammurabi was wor-
d about enemy spies hearing about the number of his soldiers, or capturing the
nessenger and reading the dispatches from the clay tablets. Thus, in at least some
1 his correspondence and communication, Hammurabi used a simple code:
multiply his real troop strengths by ten. Thus, if the enemy somehow intercepted
be message, they would be confused by how many men Hammurabi really had,
linking he had more men than he did and hopefully causing confusion and hes-
i.i lion, perhaps even forestalling an attack altogether. The problem is that, though
! I.immurabi wanted to confuse the enemy, he may also have succeeded in con-
i ling later scholars. Was this a permanent policy on the part of Hammurabi, or
• is it used only for a limited period of time in a particular campaign? Which of
he numbers for Hammurabi s army found on the clay tablets are accurate, and
Inch should be divided by ten? Did other rulers also use similar codes for the
ui.il numbers of troops? Or did other rulers use a different code system: should
he numbers given for Zimri-Lim's Mariote armies be divided by two, or four, or ten?
'i should they be read as the actual numbers? Unfortunately, we can't be sure.
Based on archaeological evidence we can obtain good information on city size,
i id from that, a range of population for cities based on an assumption of potential
population density per hectare. 19 Unfortunately, even here we are left with esti-
mates. How many floors did a building have? How many people slept in a room?
We cannot be certain. But the overall population of the largest Mesopotamian
■ tties was probably around 50,000 people. If there were armies of 20,000— 60,000
gularly operating in Middle Bronze Mesopotamia, these forces undoubtedly
luded large numbers of militia conscripts, and even laborers to build siege
I imps. \^uc to logistical limitations such huge armies would be able to stay in the
field tor only limited periods of time.
( >u the other hand, as discussed above, Mesopotamian military scribes kept
detailed censuses with tablets recording the name of each individual soldier. It is
ileai that kings had i»(inil mlonn.it urn on then- potential and actual manpower.
199
I ' I \IM IN ! i II , ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
in In Ail. ul 1 I (SO*) 1776} wrote a letter to his son Yasmah-Adad, who hail
I Miii installed as king of Mari {1796-1776} before being ousted by Zimri-Lim n
1776. This letter explains how Shamshi-Adad planned to raise an army of 20,0(MI
men for his campaign.
[One of my officials] has inspected the Hana [nomad mercenaries] of th
encampment and I have fixed at 2000 men those who are to go on a cam
paign with Yasmah-Adad [king of Mari]. All of these men are now inscribed
by name on a tablet.. . . [These men] will march with you, plus 3000 met
[you will mobilize from Mari].. . . All those people who go with you shoulil
be inscribed, by name, on a tablet.. . . Collect 1000 men between the two
[nomad tribes?], 1000 men among the Hana [nomads], 600 men from amour
the Uprapu, Yarihu, and Amnanu [clans of the Yaminite nomad confedera
tion]. Pick up here and there two or three hundred men according to th
circumstances and collect 500. With your [own personal military] attendants,
1000 men will suffice. Then you will have assembled 6000 men. As for me, 1
will send you 10,000 men of the land [of Assyria] They will be a strong
and well-equipped contingent. I have also written to [our allied kingdom of]
Eshnunna. Six thousand men will come up from Eshnuna. These [added]
upon those [troops you will raise will total] 20,000 men, a strong army. (MM
8-9; WM 66-7)
Shamshi-Adad seems to have had a little trouble with math; his numbers an
confusing, but I interpret his figures as follows. The first part of the letter describes
2000 nomad mercenaries and 3000 regular troops from Mari. The next mention
of 1000 men from a clan whose name is lost and the 1000 Hana nomads, I belie v i
repeats the original number of 2000 nomads, but breaks the total down into
smaller clans. To these are added 600 men from smaller nomad clans, creating i
total of 2600 nomads, plus 500 men recruited from odd sources to bring the total
up to over 3000. This figure is then added to the 3000 men mobilized from l /
mentioned in the first half of the letter, of whom 1000 are the personal attendant \
or elite troops of Yasmah-Adad. The two groups added together make up the 60()< >
men Shamshi-Adad expected from Mari, to which he adds the 10,000 men he will
send from his forces in Assyria and 6000 Eshnuna allies, giving the grand total ot
20,000 (actually 22,000) he wants for the campaign. The numbers are obvioush
vague estimates, but indicate that Shamshi-Adad, an experienced warrior, believed
it was realistic for an alliance of three of the most powerful kingdoms of the age to
raise an army of 20,000. He also states, however, that this is "a strong army",
implying that most armies were smaller than 20,000.
In extreme emergency a general mobilization of the entire population con Id
occur, as happened when the Elamites invaded Babylon:
The conscripts of Hammurabi have positioned themselves for battle.. . .
Hammurabi has ordered a total mobilization in his l.md I It- < ailed up troops
'no
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
of all merchants, all males, including releasing slaves [from slavery if they serve
1 1 1 the army] , and they are ready. And he sent high-ranking servants to Rim-
Sin [king of Larsa] asking for [allied] troops. (L 319, 386)
1 1 is thus likely that figures mentioning armies larger than 20,000 men were
-it her disinformation, included a large number of laborers, or represent a tem-
I n y total mobilization for a state emergency. Generally, most armies mentioned
the Mari tablets ranged in the hundreds and low thousands, even in major
. :()
Logistics (MM 34-6)
pending on the circumstances, the state frequently provided soldiers with
i pons, clothing, and food. An official known as the abi sabi was a type of
i .ucal officer (ASD 102-5). Troops going on campaign are often said to have
n given provisions for a certain number of days (L 361—4, 368), ranging from
ii (L 458, 507) to forty days (L 383). Delays in campaigning were often caused by
iculties in collecting enough supplies: "he is staying in Manuhatan and secures
ii travel provisions" (L 191-2, 487—8). Requests for supplies are frequent in the
tters, including oil (L 193). Sometimes troops show up without weapons and
\ tvr to be equipped by the state (L 516). Weapons were stored in government
rials, and were issued to troops as they were mobilized: a commander ordered
mi his men "open the storehouse, provide a spear [for each soldier], and add
n.ivel provisions for forty days." 21 Weapons mentioned in texts from the Old
[Uhylonian period include the standard Middle Bronze panoply.
Itate storehouses also contained thousands of bushels of grain (L 409), but
tting these supplies to the troops in the field was frequently a problem. Com-
mders often complained of lack of supplies (L 213, 262); one officer, exasperated
such grumbling, responded, "Stop griping! Accept those provisions [we sent]!"
I l()4). A bad harvest or a plundered crop could send a city-state into crisis.
hen armies were in the field, there were sometimes not enough men to collect
Ii* harvest (L 421-2); soldiers might therefore be temporarily assigned to aid with
V harvest (L 457). One officer says his soldiers could not be mobilized until after
K harvest is over (L 520). Armies sometimes confiscated local carts and boats for
nilitary transport, with the result that the harvest could not be collected for sto-
and rotted in the fields (L 413). Good boots are always in short supply in war.
'iic commander asked his friend, "Send me good boots!", to which his friend
plied, "Send me an impression of your feet and I shall have good boots made"
1 H)8).
As warfare continued, supplies could dwindle; people were sometimes reduced
m eating the seed-crop for next year, insuring ongoing grain shortages (L 419).
Ishme IXigaifs crops were destroyed in war, leaving "no grain whatsoever in his
l.md" ( I -102); lie was (on ck\ to send his sons as hostages along with boats and eight
[ il< ins df silvci .is tribute, to lui\ "inn from his enemy (I. 38°, 396, 403), In the
101
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
end he sold 400 "little boys and girls" into slavery to buy grain (L 390). As famine
spread, the poor were forced to move in search of food, spreading the crisis: "Any
strong man who has grain is staying [in the city] . Any weak commoner who has
no gram departed for the [Euphrates] River [in search of food]" (L 419, 420). As
in any other war, the supplies were not always in the same place as the soldiers:
"The troops are hungry They have not received provisions" (ARM 13.33, WM
141).
Natural disaster, drought, or bad harvest could exacerbate food shortages.
Locust attacks wiped out one harvest (L 420-2), causing a commander to recall an
army:
My lord must dispatch troops, and they must save the grain of the palace, ami
[come] over here for harvesting. These commoners - they suffered last yeai
They now saw the hand of the locust and said, "If the locusts [eat] the grain
plantations, we will not stay on [but will leave in search of food]." (L 422)
The problems of garrisoning troops are discussed in some of the letters. One
letter mentions a plan to move a force of "two thousand strong spearmen.. . . [Bin
if you evacuate the troops, their [total] population is ten thousand [including the |
men and [their] women [and children] If we evacuate a population often
thousand and also leave their grain behind, it will be a heavy burden for the palace
to feed them.. . . Boats and pack asses, indeed carts [will be needed to move
them]" (L 195). Keeping an army stationed in one region for too long could put a
strain on local food resources, since the land where the troops were stationed was
expected to provide half of the supplies for the army each month (ARM 1.60;
WM 142). One commander complained: "The load [of feeding the army] has
become great. The garrison troops, all of them, consume [our] grain rations" (I
417). In another city, the commoners rioted because too much of the city grain
supply was being taken by the army (L 521).
Corruption and war-profiteering were problems four thousand years ago as
well as today. One disheartened quartermaster was shocked at the disarray of the
grain supplies for the soldiers in one city:
I came down and found the earlier troops [who had been quartered in a city |
have sold [the army's] grain for silver. The later troops came and wasted grain.
Now there are fifty donkey-loads of grain Not that they gave grain rations
to anybody - and five hundred measures of grain are gone from the granary
for no reason whatsoever! (L 271)
When soldiers were serving on campaign with an allied king, the ally was
expected to provide their supplies (L 281, 438), though he didn't always fulfill his
responsibilities properly (L 215). Some allied logistic services were better orga
nized, with precise amounts of provisions prepared for a spe< ifi< number oi sol
diers, who were also provided with quarters by the allied t on in undei (I ">23)
MP
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
Transport
Supplies, equipment, and men needed to be transported to the war zone, and
ii. my of the Mari letters deal with the problems of military transportation. Ancient
"inmanders recognized that the type of transport used was in some ways deter-
mined by ecology and terrain. Hammurabi made the following observation: "The
[leans [of transportation] of your land [the city of Mari in Syria] is donkeys and
ii ts; the means [of transportation] of this land [Babylon] is boats" (L 379),
As Hammurabi noted, the transportation of supplies in ancient Mesopotamia
as done by human porter (L 178), donkey (L 271), cart (L 223), or boat (maturrum)
WM 143-4). One caravan included 300 men and 300 donkeys; another thirty
ten and 60 donkeys (L 365). A commander received a shipment of flour, but
mplained: "sixty donkey-loads of flour . . . are not enough. They must provide
with 100 donkey-loads of flour" (L 454). Was the failure to send 100 donkey-
loads because of a lack of flour, or of donkeys? Lack of transport was a frequent
iroblem. One commander complained that "the baggage of my lord has been left
hind in Saggaratum . . . because of the lack of porters" (L 178). If he was relying
ii human porters he obviously had no pack animals or carts. Heavy baggage was
I rcquently left behind or taken on different routes to allow the army to move faster
\KM 1.35; WM 142-3).
lioats were frequently used to transport both men and supplies by river (L 184, 223,
►24). One quartermaster sent this order: "Load onto ships 3125 bushels of barley,
I > bushels of flour and 313 bushels of billitum, at the rate of 156 bushels [per boat]
ii nl send it downstream.. . . This grain is the regular barley ration for the fortress
i ihliya" (ARM 13.33, WM 141). Boats were often simply requisitioned from the
. aJ population (L 505): "he must seize ten small-boats on the right bank [of the
t [ver] and ten small-boats on the left bank upstream from Dir and collect for me as
n any boats as there are, be it from the palace or be it from the commoners" (L 203).
Mother general "gathered together as many boats and small-boats as there were
tvailable to bring up grain" (L 309). Soldiers would disrupt the river traffic of their
nemies to prevent shipment of supplies (L 278). When moving upstream against
he i urrent or wind, boats would sometimes be pulled by men on the shore (L 185).
1 i unbat from boats is not mentioned in the letters, but presumably did occur.
fairly large forces could be moved by ship; 6000 men are mentioned with
I ups, but it is likely that many of these walked on shore alongside the fleet in the
i iver (L 320),. Another force of 5000 men was accompanied by 600 "small-boats"
I 58 1 , 514; ARM 6.68), about eight men per boat; clearly more or less the entire
M i iv could have been moved by river in a fleet that size. On the other hand,
mother army of 5000 men had only 120 "small-boats" (L 384) - about forty-two
mm n per boat. This force seems to have marched by foot and had the boats bring
their supplies and equipment (L 383). Troops are described as crossing rivers,
presumably by boat (L 323), An army of Hammurabi, which was covering an
i neniy army besieging the city of Upi, withdrew by boat (L 324). Boats were also
used to transport sick and wounded soldiers (L 2S1).
KU
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Boats could be expensive, and prices fluctuated wildly as war brought soaring
demand for a limited number of ships. Depending on the size and circumstances, a
boat could cost from 10 to 30 shekels of silver (L 407). 22 Furthermore, the price oi
a boat varied, depending on whether one was going up or down stream, One
commander complained: "Once I buy a boat here for ten shekels of silver, will it
then not be worth [only] one shekel in Mari?" (L 407). Carts were likewise-
sometimes in short supply, especially at harvest time when everyone needed as
many carts as possible (L 413).
Trips could be slowed by lack of supplies and logistical difficulties. One coin
mander reported on the logistics of his operation:
On the third day of the month of Kinunum . . . we started out from [the city
of] Rapiqum and went to [the city of] Harbe [in one day] . We stayed five days
in Harbe [fourth through ninth of Kinunum], until the troops had secured
their travel provisions. We started out from Harbe and reached Yabliya in on
day. The tenth [day] of the month of Kinunum was in progress when we set
to fortifying Yabliya.. . . We brought the grain, belongings, and gear that wc
shipped [by boat] upstream from Rapiqum into Harbe. (L 383)
Here a journey of less than two days actually took seven days to complete becausi
the troops had to wait for extra supplies. The army seems to have marched on foot
while the supplies and equipment were brought by boat. It is not clear if the five-
day delay at Harbe was because the soldiers were collecting supplies from the
countryside or were waiting for the river fleet to catch up with them.
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
•pies and informers would frequently report on the movement and plans of
my kings (L 291, 303, 503), but despite such efforts the fog of war is every-
hcre apparent in the Man military dispatches (L 364). Agents were frequently
lied the king's "eyes" and "ears", while enemy informers were called "tongues"
VM 116). One report states that "[the enemy] general La-Awil-Addu went out
in Shubat-Enlil together with three thousand Eshnunakena troops. Perhaps he is
ided for Ashnakkum, perhaps for Shuruzum. Who would know?" (L 313).
>i her report claims La-Awil-Addu had 5000 men instead of 3000, but still
Wiot say where he is bound (L 313). Yet another report is similar: "I do not
low whether those [enemy] troops are headed for laying siege to Andarig or else
Karana. I will [make] a determination of [where] they are headed [and report
r]" (L 336). Mesopotamian commanders recognized the problem of uncertain
iligence, and refused to commit themselves to battle without proper informa-
i tL Within five days we will see a [more] complete report. And in view of that
on that we see, we will consult and act. As long as we do not understand the
lils of the situation, I will not dispatch any troops!" (L 475, 477).
Enemy spies naturally tried to infiltrate an army, and could undermine the plans of
neral. One report mentions the discovery of men at the court of Zimri-Lim who
• I been sending information to the enemy (L 295). An allied force of 2000 Mariote
' 100 Babylonian troops went on campaign against Eshnuna, but were thwarted
luse a spy revealed their plans to the enemy: "A secret agent went out [from
enemy], and the enemy got hold of the news about them, and the troops returned
" M tneir campaign] empty-handed Flow can 5000 troops return empty-
ruied to camp?" (L 458). One captured enemy spy was kept bound in prison (L 319).
The army on campaign
There are no detailed narrative accounts of Mesopotamian armies on campaigi
(harranum). A coherent picture must be cobbled together from scattered bits oi
information in the military dispatches. There is none the less enough informal inn
to give us a broad picture of life on campaign.
Scouting and spies (MM 37=42; WM 116-18)
Scouts are frequently mentioned as both spying on the enemy and openly obs< i
ving enemy movements. When enemy troops were seen operating in a hostil'
fashion, a king might send a letter of ultimatum: "Withdraw your troops thai
with Atamrum and withdraw your encampment that is settled in my district!" (L
338). But even in the course of such ultimatums military vigilance was ih \
relaxed: "The scouts must stay on the right bank [of the river] from Appan
Niattum-Burtum, and anyone who is headed toward ... an [enemy | cncampm< n
[the scouts] must arrest" for interrogation (L 198-9). Armies operatinj' i
unknown areas used local people for scouts and guides (I 391, V)7, 470) Spi
were sent into enemy camps during sieges in diseovei enemy plans (I vV'i
Raids
I are frequently mentioned in the Mari letters (L 332-3). The purpose of
I i aids was simply plunder. Capturing enemy livestock was common, 23 as well
iking human prisoners for slaves (L 309, 349). Grain was also plundered (L 362);
l*r, since it was bulky and difficult to move rapidly it might simply be
m (L 458, 511). Orchards were also cut down (L 479). Thus, in addition to
rider, raids were intended to undermine the enemy's will and capacity to resist.
hen enemy armies attacked, it caused a cessation of both communication and
umerce between cities: "The land is stirred up [by the enemy invasion] and the
) m\' cut" (L 410); this would naturally disrupt economic exchange. When a
irauding enemy was raiding the countryside, the people would flee to the
«urcst fortress city for protection (L 361).
Borders were closely guarded against raids and incursions (L 233). King Zimri-
n instructed one of his commanders:
I ><> not neglect guarding the district and guarding against expeditions of the
runny As |<>i the I lanean (nomad < hid] Yahsih Hi, together with his troops -
mplo\ them forthi ighth |m < s< \ui\yy\ toi gram, and let them strengthen the
Mil
201
WAR! Mil, IN TI IB ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
[boundary defenses] of the district. Let the border guards depart [the city for
duty at their outposts]. They must not let the enemy pass freely through the
interior of the land. (L 229)
Some raids were small affairs, capturing only thirty people (L 384) or "two
Sutean women and three donkeys" (L 385). Another raid "captured thirty men
and women [and] fifty head of cattle. They killed two men and one woman. ... A
rescue detachment of seventy troops of the city of Nusar went in pursuit. The
enemy killed twenty troops from among them" (L 397).
Other raids could be much larger and more destructive (L 399). A successful
raid netted "forty men and women, 100 cattle and 2000 sheep" (L 398, 511).
Another large-scale raid brought widespread devastation:
[Sasiya, the king of] the Turukkean [highlanders] raided the land of Ekallatum
on the other [east] side of the [Tigris] river and went [all the way] to Kur-
dishatum. They took the sheep of [the king] Ishme-Dagan, all of them. There
was nothing left for miles. They carried off [the inhabitants] of four of his
cities [as slaves] and defeated 500 soldiers [of the king]. (L 362)
He was encroaching on my land. And I wrote you for troops but you did not
give me troops. Yet you gave troops to another place. (L 332)
Expeditions were sent out from cities to try to rescue captured slaves or animals
(L 384, 387, 458, 467); presumably a raiding party would move slowly when
herding captured sheep and could be more easily ambushed. On the other hand, many
rescue expeditions failed (L 398). In such cases war-slaves could be ransomed; a
family paid twenty-three shekels (184 grams) of silver to ransom their captured
brother (L 360). On the other hand, there could be haggling for the ransom price.
A man offered 67 shekels of silver for his son, but the captor demanded 100. The
father couldn't raise the additional money, and in the end the son was tortured to
death (L 366). Sometimes prisoners managed to escape, showing up at their home
town naked and starving (L 487). The Law Code of Hammurabi has an interesting',
clause relating to the ransoming of captured soldiers:
If a merchant has ransomed either a private soldier (redum) or a marinr
(ba'irum), who was captured in a campaign of the king, and has enabled him to
reach his [home] city, if there is sufficient to [repay the merchant the] ransom
in his house, he himself shall ransom himself; if there is not sufficient to ran-
som him in his house, he shall be ransomed from the [temple] estate of his
city-god; if there is not sufficient to ransom him in the estate of his city-god,
the state shall ransom him, since his own field, orchard and house may not In-
ceded for his ransom. (LC 87)
Thus the state had the ultimate obligation to ransom pi mmh-is ni war.
•oi
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
As in all other times in history the devastation caused by raids and plunder,
"long with the disruption of the agricultural cycle and the displacement of popu-
1 1 dons, frequently brought famine in the wake of war. Hungry people were seen
tendering the countryside in search of food (L 309). There was sometimes little
Inference between planned, government-sponsored raids and mere marauding and
B igandage by soldiers. Hungry soldiers and nomads might simply take to mur-
dering the peasants, pillaging the countryside, and alienating the people, though
inch practices were usually counterproductive: "The Turukku [highlanders] could
I lardly have taken along food for even five days.. . . They sacked [a village], and this
I ii id, which had [once] been sympathetic to them, is hardened and become hostile
to them. Now the Turukku are constantly hungry" (MM 11).
Battle
rhe importance of strategy and battle tactics was emphasized in a letter from
hamshi-Adad to his son, "You think up stratagems to beat the enemy and to
maneuver for position against him. But the enemy will likewise try to think up
' i atagems and to maneuver for position against you, just as two wrestlers use tricks
igainst each other" (ARM 1.5; MM 43; WM 171). Unfortunately, detailed
Inscriptions of field battles are relatively rare in the Mari letters. Often we are
imply given a terse report: "The troops of the land of Mutiabal, all of them
fcew up in battle formation. Hammurabi gave battle and defeated them" (L 321).
\ utory in battle was always attributed to the gods: "Today the god of my lord
rent in front of the army of my lord, and the spear of fiend and foe has been
broken!" (L 334).
( renerally speaking, when facing a stronger enemy, an army would withdraw to
fortified city or camp rather than engage in open battle (L 329). When battles are
I scribed, they are sometimes an attempt to drive off a besieging army. In this
use it may be that Middle Bronze warfare in Mesopotamia was broadly parallel to
I He medieval warfare in western Europe, where raids, sieges, and attempts to res-
Lie besieged cities were more frequent than efforts to defeat an enemy field army
1 open battle.
One Mari commander, Yanuh-Samar, reported the following engagement,
showing how armies maneuvered back and forth before battle.
I [Yanuh-Samar, general of Mari] equipped 500 troops of Huziran and dis-
patched them to [fight the enemy at] Mariyatum. On the second day a rescue
detachment [of the enemy] came from Kahat.. . . Seven hundred Kahatean
troops came to the rescue.. . . [But later they] retreated [back] to their city. As
the Kahateans [retreated] on the road to Kahat, [I sent] 100 troops of [com-
manderl Ishhi-Addu [from Mari] and 150 troops of Huziran [a vassal of Mari],
250 troops [total] with Ishhi-Addu at their head with the order: "Go! Lay an
ambush for the (retreating Kahatean| troops toward [the city of] Pardu." They
(t)ok !•> ll -" k route| and i.mie mil toward Pardu to meet the Kahateans and
01
WAR I AK .!-. IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
ii- In, and the servants of my lord pushed the Kahateans back, and [the
Kahateans] abandoned six corpses. All of them [the soldiers allied with Mari]
seized one [prisoner of war] alive. And the troops are back alive. Of the 200
[of our troops in the battle] - they were not more numerous than that - not
one was missing. The Kahateans were defeated good. The Servants of my lord
were victorious. (L 315)
Here a battle is described in which 250 soldiers of Mari ambushed and defeated
700 enemy soldiers. There are a number of uncertainties in this narrative. Yanuh-
Samar claimed his force suffered no casualties, but reports that 250 soldiers
attacked and 200 returned safely; is this bad math, or a tacit admission of fifty
casualties? The enemy left "six corpses" on the field; does this imply that only six
men were killed, or that they managed safely to carry away the rest of their dead
and wounded? 24 He also reports that "all" the soldiers of Mari took one prisoner,
apparently meaning that each soldier took one prisoner, making 200-250 total
prisoners. Despite these ambiguities, one gets a feel from this report for both the
chaos of war, and the possibility of an officer exaggerating the extent of his victory.
As in any age, the panic of troops with low morale or who were surprised could
cause a quick collapse of resistance (L 346). A defeated enemy might abandon their
shields and heavy equipment on the battlefield in order to flee more quickly.
"Those troops [of ours] got going [in battle] and [the enemy was] pushed aside.
They [the enemy Ekallateans] left their gear behind and their shields lying on the
ground. [The enemy king] Ishme-Dagan got away by a hair" (L 481).
Campaigns did not always conclude with battle. One army of 5000 marched off
to battle, but returned without ever encountering the enemy, to the dismay of the
king, who protested, "how can 5000 troops return empty handed to the camp?"
He gave them two days rest then ordered them back to battle (L 458). Armies
faced each other across a major river to prevent the enemy from crossing (L 500);
this could create a stand-off where enemies camped on opposite sides of a river
neither force willing to cross and engage in battle at a disadvantage (L 474, 478)
Kings might also mobilize their armies, come face-to-face with the enemy, bin
make peace before the fighting actually began (L 478).
Prisoners
War prisoners were invariably enslaved and often shared among troops as booty (I
225, 349), or purchased from the captors by the king (L 467). After one battle,
each soldier was said to have had one prisoner (L 315). Torture, mutilation, am
other atrocities were sometimes inflicted upon prisoners in order to terrori
enemies. Some prisoners had their throats cut or heads severed (ARM 2.33, 48)
others were impaled on stakes (ARM 13.108). Corpses might be ritually abused
with heads or other body parts being sent to the king, paraded through town'
hung on walls of temples in triumph (ARM 2.33, 48), like the fate that befell kn
Saul and his son Jonathan at Beth-Shan (I Samuel H H 1 M line command* i
'.is
ordered his men to "take along two Hanean [nomads] to the border alive and
mutilate them at the border. Let them go alive to the [nomad confederation of the]
oris of Yamina and tell how my lord seized the city of Mishlan by force" (L 283).
\nother man was tortured to death in a most gruesome manner to terrorize the
nemy:
He [a commander] pierced his [a prisoner's] nose and placed a nose-rope in it.
He opened [wounds] in both thighs, skinned his rib-cage, cut off his ears.
[The prisoner] passed through agonies. Thirty times they took him [the pris-
oner] around the city [to terrorize the people in the city, and then killed
him].. . . His [the prisoner's] father was present. (L 366)
Important prisoners were frequently executed when captured: "Let him hand
! he enemy prisoner] Ashkur-Addu over to me, and then I shall cut off his
ad.. . . Now, let a god hand two or three of my enemies over to me and I shall
hi off their heads" (L 298). Heads of executed kings or nobles were sent to the
l< torious king as trophies (L 479). The king of the Turukkean highlanders "cut
i! the head [of one of Ishme-Dagan 's generals] and sent it to Ishme-Dagan, say-
it",: 'Herewith the head of one who relied on you' " (L 396).
Of course the fate of all prisoners was not so gruesome. Though commoners
re generally enslaved, the elites could hope for prisoner exchange or ransom,
i isoners were occasionally released and resettled on their lands, as described by
imsu-iluna of Babylon after his conquest of Eshnunna:
After two months had passed, having set free and given life to the people of
the land of Idamaraz who he had taken captive, and the troops of Eshnunna,
as many prisoners as he had taken, he rebuilt the various fortresses of the land
of Warum which he had destroyed and regathered and resettled its scattered
people. (R4:389-90)
Priests, priestesses, and other religious personnel were sometimes treated with
rial dignity so as to not offend the gods. In a letter, King Zimri-lim of Mari wrote:
Indeed, the god Adad of Kulmish must have organized this disruption for the
sake of his priestesses! On the tablet of captives that I have sent to you the
priestesses of Kulmish and the priestesses of other gods are listed separately on
,i different tablet.. . . Give them clothes to wear (ARM 10.123; MK 145).
When peace was finally established between rival kingdoms, the peace treaties
mild include not only the large-scale strategic issues, but a number of details
Concerning prisoners and refugees. A treaty between Shadlash and Neribtum (PH
■ f'l) from the mid nineteenth century makes special provision for refugees -
whoevei fled from the war 1 ' to he allowed to return and be restored to their lost
I md and property (1*1 I V>) I ikew ise an e\< hans-e of prisoners was mandated (PH 55).
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Diplomacy (MK 150-4)
The Old Babylonian period was an age of complicated diplomatic intrigue ii
which kings needed to win diplomatic victories to prepare the way for military
victory. In many ways Hammurabi was victorious in the overall power struggle not
so much because he was the superior soldier, but because of his diplomatic finesse
Although details are often lacking, it is clear from surviving diplomatic archives
such as that of Mari that diplomacy in the ancient Near East was highly sophist i
cated. Many kings kept permanent ambassadors at rival courts; as today, these men
often served as spies as well, occasionally distributing judicious bribes. King Zimri
Lim of Mari kept two ambassador-spies at the court of Hammurabi, Ibalpiel and
Ibalel (CAH 2/1:180-1). Such spies were used to gather intelligence, both abom
the general policies and goals of an enemy, and about the specifics of their military
plans and dispositions (HTO 239-42). Their correspondence with their king
demonstrates a detailed knowledge of and wide range of interests in all militai \
matters.
Council meetings between allied princes or their diplomats were summoned t< i
deal with mutual dangers (PH 27-8). Some used thinly veiled intimidation to
coerce unwilling allies, along with occasional overt threats of war (PH 28-9).
Weak rulers groveled to more powerful allies, begging assistance. One weak
prince, Iluma, wrote to two of his allies: "Apart from you two, I have no broth ei
[ally] . . . Save me!" (PH 29); "I have taken refuge under you in my fear" 7 (PH 33).
Yet in another letter he attempts to arrange a secret meeting with only one of tin-
two (PH 30-1). Diplomats frequently ask each other for intelligence and gossip
about other rulers, and tell each other of the plans and activities of various rivaK
(PH 32, 36).
As with modern diplomacy, the personalities of the rulers and their repre-
sentatives were often an important factor in the success or failure of negotiations
One prince in the nineteenth century complained that: he was not being treat e< I
with the honor he felt was due to him:
Is the prince who sent you superior to me? Does he have troops superior to
mine? Or does he rule a land superior to mine? As he rules in his city, I rule in
my city. As he is the king ofEshnunna, I am the king of the land of Urshitum
In what way is he superior to me and why does he always send his envoys
here to take tribute? (PH 79)
Of course, the very fact that such questions needed to be asked is a reflection of
the relative unimportance of the king of Urshitum.
Vassal kings
Sometimes, when a city was conquered, its former king was replaced by .i govei
nor of the conqueror (L 482). On other occasions Imu. \.i i kim», who w.i
'In
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
1 ieated or forced to submit was allowed to retain his throne, but became a vassal
4 i he conqueror. These vassals were required to take the "oath of god" that they
would be loyal to their new overlord, and were expected to provide soldiers, tri-
bute, and other services to their new master. Kings also had an obligation to pro-
ide assistance to a vassal who was under attack (WM 48); vassalage to a stronger
mi Km- could thus be a favorable option when facing an aggressive enemy bent on
. >vrr thro wing a weak king. This naturally had the potential for creating an unstable
to ilitical situation, where vassals chafing at the bit of their overlords might seize any
opportunity for mischief-making or rebellion. Kings might also try to undermine
4 rival king's vassals by supporting revolts (L 511).
A major victory in battle could cause cities to shift allegiance rapidly. One
'inniander reported to Zimri-Lim:
I kept pulling in city after city [into our alliance], and I was making each
declare a sacred oath [of loyalty to Zimri-Lim] Now, I caused the land to
change sides to my lord. May my lord be happy! And may my lord not be late
| in arriving to take control]. If my lord is late, he must dispatch me troops [in
his stead], any that may be dispatched, and I shall cause the land of Idamaras
[and] the upper land to reject the Elamites. (L 501)
I i a Middle Bronze version of public opinion polling, the commander continued:
I keep pulling in [information] on the opinion of the commoners of the land,
and they fall down [in reverence] before my lord [Zimri-Lim].. . . My lord
must dispatch me 1000 or 2000 troops, and we shall pacify this land.
Otherwise . . . they will bring up the gods and bind the land up to the [enemy
king of] Zalmaqum with an oath. I am afraid the land will swear [allegiance]
in its fear [of Zalmaqum], and matters will become troublesome. My lord
must dispatch troops quickly. (L 501-2)
It is important to note that the volatile public opinion of the commoners, with
mixed loyalties, religious oaths, alternating fear of attack from different kings,
played an important part in the realistic ability of a king to subjugate new lands or
maintain control over conquered lands.
Smaller cities were often treated as feudal property, to be exchanged between
oilers and given to followers and vassals (L 294, 337). Frequently the citizens of a
n v were unhappy with new rulers, and sometimes took matters into their own
i mi ids. When the city of Kahat was conquered by king Haya-Sumu, he installed
-nc of his soldiers, Attaya, on the throne. There was unhappiness with this move,
however, requiring that "twenty troops . . . attend him [to protect him from pos~
.ihle a ttacks by the citizens].. . . Until things calm down, those troops must attend
him" (I 299 300, 440). It was always possible that rebellion was simmering
henc.ith the surface of a v.iss.il c ity. When a vassal king was ready for succession, he
hail t<> write to his ou-iltud lm pri mission: "lie does not ascend the throne
'I I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
without [permission from] my lord [king Zimri-Lim]. Write to my lord! A servant
of my lord must come and let him ascend [the throne]" (L 311, 317).
In times of crisis, a new king might be installed by a military coup. The city of
Eshnuna was captured and looted by the Elamites, who did not feel strong enough
to hold the city and thus withdrew. Thereafter, the surviving army of Eshnuna
raised one of their commanders to the throne: "The Eshnunakean troops have
installed a king of their own. The man who was installed to be their king, that man
is a commoner.. . . His name is Silli-Sim He [had previously] exercised the rank of
company captain (galku)" (T 328, 506),
Alliances
A diplomat of the Mari period summarized the political realities of his age thus:
"There is no king who is strong by himself: 10 or 15 kings follow Hammurabi of
Babylon, as many follow Rim-Sin of Larsa, Ibalpiel of Eshnunna and Amutpiel of
Qatna, while twenty kings follow Yarim-Lim [king] of Aleppo" (ANE 1:99; L
290). Political power in the Mari period was based on having as many vassals and
allies as possible: "The spear of Zimri-Lim and [his nomad allies] the Hana is
strong over all the land, all of it!" (L 290).
Military treaties were frequently established between rival kings, either to end a
war or to create a new military alliance. Representatives of the kings would meet
and discuss the terms, which were often spelled out in great detail. Terms might
include trade agreements, rights of passage for merchants or armies, extradition
clauses, mutual defense agreements for allied military operations, and distribution
of booty after an allied victory Then, as now, different rulers could use different
interpretations of ambiguous language in order to attempt to manipulate treaties to
their advantage. Rim-Sin of Larsa, for example, wrote a letter making excuses as
to why he failed to provide the promised troops for a military operation with his
ally Hammurabi (CAH 2/1:179). Treaties invariably involved an invocation of the
gods to witness the oaths. A special religious ceremony was undertaken, usually
involving a sacrifice, after which both parties swore the "oath of the gods". Each
party to the treaty received a duplicate copy of the particulars, which were
deposited in temples for safekeeping (MK 126-7, 140-1).
Allies were independent kings who were treated as equals, or "brothers" in
Middle Bronze diplomatic parlance. Many of the Mari tablets center on diploma tit
negotiations and requests between the allies Zimri-Lim of Mari and Hammurabi
of Babylon. Though allies were not required to provide each other with troops or
tribute, there was a strong expectation that they would support one another in
times of crisis. Allies were expected to honor requests for troops. As Hammurabi
put it: "when [an allied king] requests troops from me, I will give troops to him to
let him accomplish his objective. [An ally] who does not dispatch me his troops
[when I request it], I will give him no troops when he writes to me for troops"
(L 334, 479). Having an alliance, however, did not preclude the need for hard
nosed negotiations (L 374, 379—81). It also often me, mi p.ivnu 1 lot u le.ist pari ol
'I '
WARFARE IN THE AGE OF MARI
the food and wages of allied troops. The king of Eshnunna, for example, expected
to be given thirty talents of silver in return for sending troops to assist his ally
(PH 78).
Alliances and treaties were always reinforced by a shared sacrifice and mutual
"oath of the gods" (MK 140-1). We have the text of an alliance treaty between
I lammurabi and Zimri-Lim, illustrative of the diplomatic mentality of the age:
[By the sun god] Shamash of the sky, lord of the land, [by the storm god]
Adad of the sky, lord of determination - by these gods Hammurabi, son of
Sin-Muballit, king of Babylon [swore]: "From this day, as long as I live, I will
be an enemy of Siwa-Palar-Huhpak [king of Elam]. I will not [assist him and]
I will not write to him. Without [the agreement of] Zimri-Lim, king of
Mari ... I will not make peace with Siwa-Palar-Huhpak" (L 512-13)
Military cooperation was a key element in a successful alliance. Many of the
letters discuss plans for different allied units to meet at specified times and places (L
190). Sometimes, of course, units missed their rendezvous, causing problems and
■ onfusion: "I waited three days in Terqa and no [allied] troops whatsoever were
issembled . . . Where are the troops?" (L 191). When an enemy army approached
Babylon, Hammurabi of Babylon and his then ally Rim-Sin of Larsa made a
oordinated plan for mutual defense: "My troops are assembled in my land, let
Our troops be assembled in your land. If the enemy heads for you, my troops and
mall-boats will get there [to help you]. And if the enemy heads for me, your
roops and your small-boats must get here" (L 322). In addition to sending troops,
lilies might send money and grain to support the war effort; Hammurabi sent
i wo talents of silver [60 kilograms] and 70 bushels [21,000 liters] of grain" to aid
-lie of his allies (L 327).
On occasion, however, allies failed to observe the terms of the alliance. When
he king of Elam invaded Mesopotamia, one of his ministers reported:
My lord [the King of Elam] wrote me: "Right now Zimri-Lim will go against
you. And he will stir up the land. Write the Turukkean [highlanders] , and the
Turukkean will come down to you. [Then] do battle with Zimri-Lim." And
he wrote to the Turukkeans, and they did not come to him [to help fight
Zimri-Lim] . (L 294)
Peace treaties
W.s! was frequently declared and peace negotiated in the letters. As in all political
■ stems, there often existed among ancient Mesopotamians real causes and justifi-
■ .n urns for war which were shrouded in various more or less transparent pretexts.
! he political order of Mesopotamia was guaranteed by taking oaths by the gods to
insure proper fulfillment of treaty obligations. Violation of treaties was described in
'I \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
terms of violation of the oath to the gods, which was considered justification I
warfare. Around 1800. "Ila-kabkabu [king of Terqa] and Yagid-Lim [king of Man
took a grave oath by the god [Nergal] between them and Ila-kabkabu nev<
committed a sin against Yagid-Lim. [i.e. he never violated the provisions of tl
treaty]. It is Yagid-Lim who committed a sin against Ila-kabkabu" which led U
war (PH 68). Thereafter, because of the violation of the oath to Nergal, the g
"decided to punish [Yagid-Lim] and went to the side of Ila-kabkabu ... [who
destroyed [Yagid-Lim's] city and defeated his son Yahdum-Lim" in battle (PH 61
Treaty or covenant violations are thus viewed as violations of oaths and comim
ments to the gods, who punish the violators by granting military victory to il
other party of the oath and covenant.
Peacemaking was accompanied by a shared equid sacrifice and oath- taking,
shall kill a stallion of peace between me and [the enemy king] Mutebal" (L 19
Peace was made through diplomatic councils (L 344), exchange of cities or land I
337), sacred oath taking (L 337, 345), a ritual equid sacrifice (L 344, 351, 36 I
and sharing food and drink at a feast (L 345). Oaths and divination were requiu i
to accompany all treaties and alliances; bad omens from extispicy could at lea
temporarily derail agreements; as one diviner advised: "the sign is not right; wail
for one month" (PH 31—2). Peacemaking could include an exchange of prison ei
and captured plunder: "I will release to you your losses [of prisoners, booty, am
captured land] that I am keeping . . . and you will release my losses" (L 351 , 361
The specific details of one peace treaty were recorded, requiring a mutu.i
renunciation of feuding. The defenders required of the attackers: "Do not hunt u
[for slaves], do not kill us, and do not deport us to another land!" In return the
people of the city, under the new king installed by their conquerors, were similai l\
required: "Do not hunt him [the new king], do not kill him, and do not brim
your former king back!" (L 350). These peace oaths were often taken very sei
iously. One allied commander refused to fight with the troops of the ally of an
enemy because of a sacred peace oath sworn by his own king with the ally of tin
enemy king (L 346). Such circumstances could obviously very quickly becorri(
complicated: "Let eternal peace be established between us!" one treaty proclaim*. I
(L 374) — a peace to end all wars. Unfortunately, like the rest of the world, such
peace efforts were always temporary in Middle Bronze Mesopotamia.
M I
CHAPTER EIGHT
Mesopotamian siegecraft
I h a-eas battle narratives are relatively rare, sieges (lawitum) were quite common :
opotamia and are discussed in some detail in the Mari archive, allowing us
rly good understanding of Mesopotamian siegecraft. 1 Fortification existed :
opotamia from at least 6000, when Tell al-Sawwan near modern Samar
fortified with a thick brick wall and a three-meter-wide moat (EA 4:472
gecraft undoubtedly began when wail building began. By the third millenniu:
ry major city in Mesopotamia had massive walls. With a large number .
M.iied towns and cities closely packed into the river valleys, sieges, rather th;
,» battles, became the normal mode of warfare. If one seeks the face of batt
t Middle Bronze Mesopotamia, it is not to be found in the open fields
mbat, but in the long, tiresome, dangerous, desperate, hungry and dirty soldie
in sieges.
Pre-Dynastic {3500-3000}
I he first artistic evidence we have of siegecraft comes from the Pre-Dynasl
,,od in Mesopotamia {3500-3000}, from the art of the so-called Priest-kii
- pp. 37-9). Two different cylinder seals show the Priest-king with a drawn be
1 1 noting at a besieged city. In one scene the defenders are outside the wall in
lortie, punctured by arrows as they flee (Figure 5a, p. 218). The other scene shev
the Priest-king with five bound captives, kneeling outside the wall of the city. O
man on the wall is fighting, while another falls from the ramparts, apparently a:
result of the archery of the Priest-king (AFC 24, PAE 68/1-2, 70, FI §74.
A third Pre-Dynastic scene, from Elam, shows a siege with four defenders oi
three storied rampart wall throwing rocks, or perhaps sling-stones, at besiegi
lolders on the ground below (FI §748). Archaeological evidence from destruet.
levels .it some sites provides confirmation that sieges occurred, and that the rest
of defeat could be devastating. Although the seals show us that sieges occurn
unfortunately show us little about how sieges were actually conducted I
I111)M . information we aie reamed to wail a number oi centuries until the mai
M i i iptions oi the All uii n
III
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Early Dynastic and Akkadian siegecraft {2500-2200}
For the last half of the Early Bronze Age we have two cylinder seals which prob-
ably depict sieges, as well as a number of incidental references to sieges in
inscriptional sources. Overall, the data is slim, but sufficient for a basic outline of
early Mesopotamian siegecraft.
Later texts from the Old Babylonian period {1800-1600} describe two major
types of siege engines, the battering ram (yassabum or asubum) (CAD 1/2:428-9)
and the siege tower (dimtum) (CAD 3:144-7), which will be discussed in detail on
pp. 229—30; they are generally mentioned together in most Old Babylonian siege
descriptions. Ironically, although our earliest texts about sieges do not mention
these siege engines, two cylinder seals depict sieges using what are very probably
the ram and tower.
The first seal, from the late Early Dynastic period, is unfortunately badly worn
(Figure 5f, p. 21 9). 2 In the center a tower or city wall is under siege, with two men
on the ramparts, one facing right and one facing left. The building is shown with at
least two stories. If the proportional heights of the men to the wall is accurate, the
wall would be about 20-25 feet tall. To the right of the wall stands a large siege
tower (dimtum). It rests on a base roughly the size of a four-wheeled war-cart. The top
of the tower overtops the wall slightly. A man on the top of the tower is attacking a
man on the wall. Two other men appear in the tower on two different stories,
indicating the tower has a base level on the vehicle, a middle level, and a top
platform. To the right of the tower five men are shown; although a ladder is not
clearly visible, I interpret these men as climbing up ladders which are resting
against the back of the siege tower. The tower protects the men from missiles shot
from the city and allows the men rapidly to ascend the tower for an assault on the
wall. To the left of the city wall we see the same type of four-wheeled vehicle, but
this one is without a tower. Three men may be standing in the vehicle, while a
fourth stands behind it. There are no equids pulling the vehicle and its front rests
near the wall. There appears to be a knob projecting from the vehicle against the
walL I interpret this to be a ram (yassabum) smashing into the side of the wall. Above
this vehicle two men, seeming to float in the air, are probably ascending ladders to
assault the wall. If one compares this ram with similar, more detailed renderings
from the Assyrian period, it appears they are quite similar in form (AW 2:401).
Recently-published cylinder seals from Tell Beydar (Nabada) {c. 2400—2250]
in north-eastern Syria show another very early depiction of the siege tower and
battering ram (Figure 5g, p. 219; EEH 116 §10-11). Here we again see a four-
wheeled vehicle with a three-storied tower upon it: the base, resting on the
wheels, a middle level, and an upper platform on which stand two men. Behind
the tower stands another four-wheeled vehicle with some type of protective cover
on it and a large projecting beam. This second vehicle is again similar in general
form to later Assyrian siege rams (AW 2:388, 391, 407-8, 413, 422-5).
Another seal (EEH 116 §10) shows two four-wheeled vehicles with square
boxes on them. They are not in the standard shape of eliai ints. .unl have no equids
•h,
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
iilling them. Instead each has a long rope in front, perhaps used by men to pull it.
I be scene is a martial one, for there are two dead bodies and men with long hafted
| u es. One of the vehicles is empty, but the other has three men standing it, with
uly their chests and heads protruding above the walls of the vehicle. These are
.haps wheeled heavy shield platforms that could be used as a portable wall. The
hides could be pulled into position and the wooden walls of the vehicle would
I vc as a shield wall, behind which the soldiers could shoot missiles, undermine a
mfication, or throw baskets of dirt to make a ramp. This vehicle may be the
nigmatic samukanum (CAD 15:132), occasionally mentioned along with the ram
lower as a siege device: "even if the Amorites should make war for ten years
iul bring ten battering rams ([y]asubum), ten siege towers (dimtum) and twenty
mukanu, I will remain strong in my city" (OBLTA 14, 46-7). The Epic ofGilgamesh
cribes "a battering ram that destroys the walls of the enemy" (EOG 49), but we
- not know how far back that element of the tale originates.
When a city faced the imminent threat of a siege, special precautions were
J en. Walls are described as being strengthened and repaired in the face of ene-
iii. s (LKA 329). Special guards were mounted on the wall when the city was
mder threat: a garrison at Eshnunna was informed that the Amorite warlord
ikhada has taken two thousand Amorites and they are marching against you. It
urgent. Do not do any work [in the fields outside the city]. Night and day the
uard should not come down from the wall" (OBLTA 44).
hi such circumstances the assistance of the gods was always invoked. A garrison
i ..nmander assured the king of Eshnunna that "the city is safe. The omen report
■ tticerning my lord is strong. My lord should not worry" (OBLTA 46). Religious
.»ns and standards were placed on city walls and gates to assure divine protection.
|The god Ningirsu's weapon] "Slaughterer-of-a-myriad" he drove in [the
wall] as a huge banner at Lagash; he had it placed at [the gate] Shugalam, the
dreadful site. He let terror emanate from it; from the dais of Girnun, where
judgment is issued, the provider of Lagash [Ningirsu] lifted horns like a
mighty bull. (R3/l:83)
We have a few incidental references to siegecraft in Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian
ir.nptions. The most important method described in the texts is undermining
pilshum), when the attackers simply dug through the mud brick wall. Shulgi's armies
are described as "ripping out the brickwork of the foundations of the walls
|ol l)er|" (R3/2:103; R2:135; LKA 123-5). The fact that most fortifications in
Mesopotamia were built from sun-dried bricks meant that undermining the walls
amounted essentially to digging through dry clay. Although specifically describing
the building of a temple, an inscription from Ur-Bau of Lagash gives us an idea of the
I his! ruction procedures: "I excavated a large building plot [x] cubits deep; its earth
I shifted like gems . . . This earth I then returned from there. I piled up the foundation.
< )ver it I built a retaining wall, 10 cubits (5 meters) high, and over the sustaining wall I
built the Eninnu |temple| ... U) cubits (15 meters) high" (R3/l:19, cf. R2:80-2).
'I
(^
(b)
(c)
(d)
Figure 5: Archery and siege techniques (drawings by Michael Lyon)
(?)
The early Mesopotamian "Priest-king" shooting his enemies with a bow
during a siege of a city, {32— 31C}; cylinder seal from Susa, Iran; see FI §743
(b) Craftsmen making bows and javelins {32— 31C}; cylinder seal from Uruk,
Iraq; see FI §742.
Incised plaque depicting spearman with shield protecting an archer; Man,
Syria {26-23C} (Museum of Deir ez-Zor, Syria 11233); see AFC 158 §99.
d) Naram-Sin, king of Akkad, striding forward in victory with bow and axe oi
mace; victory relief of Naram-Sin from Darband-i Gawr, Iran {23C}; sec
AAMS157.
(c)
*C7
^
f
(e)
(g)
(e) Akkadian archer with quiver and drawn bow; fragment of stele attributed to
the period of Rimush {2278-2270} (from Telloh, Iraq; Louvre AO 2678)-
see AFC 201 §129a.
(£) Badly worn cylinder seal depicting a Mesopotamian siege tower (dimtum) and
ram (yassabum) assaulting a city; southern Mesopotamia {mid-third millen-
nium} (Antiquity Department of the Royal Museums of Art and History,
Brussels, O 437); see FI §749.
(g) Akkadian siege tower and ram; cylinder seal from Nabada (Tell Beydar, Syria)
{24-23C}; see EEH 116 §11.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
The walls were massive, and the difficulty of undermining would be increased
by the enemy harassing the diggers from the walls with missiles, sling stones, and
rocks, but there were no fundamentally insurmountable engineering problems.
Given sufficient manpower, it was essentially a matter of time until an attacking
force could undermine the walls, create a breach, and assault through the breach.
Armies would on occasion march near a city, challenging the garrison to fight
in open combat, hoping to avoid a lengthy siege (R2: 105-6). The defenders might
come out and fight to prevent their land from being devastated by the besiegers.
Gilgamesh marched outside the walls to defeat Agga who was besieging Uruk
(EOG 145-8). Likewise, Naram-Sin marched out from the protection of the city
walls to drive off Iphur-Kish, who was besieging his capital (R2: 104-6).
For the most part we have few descriptions of actual sieges; the scribes are content
merely to state that a city was taken (R2:14, 41). Akkadian inscriptions include
numerous references to the destruction of the walls of conquered cities, a frequent
practice for defeated cities (R2:14, 28, 41, 52-5; R4:149). It is not clear from the
evidence precisely what the destruction of these walls entailed; it seems most likely
that it was the destruction of key sections of walls and city gates rather than the
complete leveling of the walls, which would have been a massive undertaking.
The most detailed account of a siege from this early period comes from an
inscription of Nararn-Sin's siege of Armanum (Aleppo).
When the god Dagan determined the verdict [of battle in favor of] Naram
Sin, the mighty [the god Dagan] delivered into his hands Rid-Adad, king ol
Armanum, and [Naram-Sin] personally captured him in the midst of his [city
or palace?] gateway. . . From the fortification wall [of Armanum- Aleppo J to
the great wall: 130 cubits [c. 65 meters] is the height of the hill [and] 44 cubi
[22 meters] is the height of the wall. From the quay wall to the fortification
wall: 180 cubits [c. 90 meters] is the height of the hill [and] 30 cubits is the
height of the wall. Total: 404 cubits [c. 200 meters] in height, from ground
[level] to the top of the [highest part of the] wall [of the citadel] . He under
mined the city [wall] Armanum [causing a breach which allowed the city to
betaken]. (R2: 132-5)
The figures given here for Armanum, which may be exaggerated, seem to repre
sent the overall height of the earlier levels of the tell, an outer wall, and then an
inner citadel wall on top of the acropolis. Naram-Sin says he took the city by
undermining the wall, which presumably created a breach into which the Akka
dian army attacked.
Part of the later literary legend of Sargon describes an assault through a breach:
Sargon undermined [the walls of] the city, broadened the Gate of the Princes,
[he made a breach] two iku [110 meters] wide. He cast it down; in the highest
part of its wall he made a breach; he smote all c^f his wine intoxicated men
Sargon placed his throne before the gate. Sargon open', his mouth, speaking to
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
his warriors, he declares, "Come on! Nur-Daggal [the enemy king] . . . Let
him stir himself] Let him humble himself! Let me behold [him surrender]."
(LKA 123-5)
However, siegecraft was not always successful, and sieges often turned into
blockades which could last for months. A siege of Kullab by the army of Uruk is
described in the Epic of Lugalbanda:
Like a snake traversing a grain pile, [the army] crossed over the foothills
But when they were but one double-mile from the city,
[The soldiers of] both Uruk and Kullab threw themselves down prone
In Aratta's field watchtowers and dikes,
For from the city darts rained like rain
And from Aratta's walls clay slingstones came clattering
As hailstones come in spring.
Days passed, the months lengthened, the year returned to its mother.
A yellowed harvest was about to grow up under heaven . . .
But no man knew how to go to the city,
Was able to push through to go to Kullab. (HTO 336-7)
With the siege in a stalemate, Lugalbanda seeks an oracle from Inanna, who tells
him to fell a certain tamarisk tree and make a sacrifice of sacred fish from the
i anals before Inanna's battle standard A'ankara (HTO 341-4). Although the end of
i he epic is lost, it is clear that the divination and sacrifice is successful and the city
is taken. Whatever one may think of the intercession of Inanna in the siege,
Mesopotamians frequently used divination, oracles, and magic as mechanisms to
revitalize flagging morale. A favorable sign from the gods could encourage men to
"lie last effort to break a stalemate. Bad omens might be sufficient to break a siege.
Thus, although the details are generally not known, it is clear from both tex-
1 1 ml, artistic, and archaeological evidence that the Akkadians were masters at sie-
v craft. It was this skill, more than any other, that allowed them to create their
mpire. Indeed, it could be argued that the Akkadian military revolution was one
-I siegecraft; they discovered the right balance of technologies and methods that
permitted them to take cities faster and with fewer resources than had been pos-
ible before. This created a sort of force multiplier that allowed their army to
a< complish more in a given year than other armies could. The basic principles of
\l kadian siegecraft - towers, rams, and undermining - would remain the standard
trsenal of weapons against cities throughout the Middle Bronze Age, a period for
which we have much greater source materials on siegecraft.
Siegecraft in the Old Babylonian period {1800-1600}
i hanks to the Mari an hive (ARM), we are better informed about siegecraft in the
< >U Babylonian period than about any other time in the Harly or Middle Bronze
' Ml
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
ages. Although we have no artistic representations of sieges for this period, our
textual information gives us an excellent understanding of siege craft in the age of
Hammurabi.
Fortifications
The nature of siegecraft in any age is based upon the nature of fortifications.
Defense of cities was a primary concern of Mesopotamian kings (WM 158-60).
The basic defense pattern of cities is described in one report: "The inner city wall
is surrounded by an outer wall, and the palace [citadel] by an outer wall and a
moat" (ARM 6.29; WM 158). Some of the larger cities had concentric fortifica-
tions, with outer walls (durum) around the main city as well as inner fortifications
(salhum) for the citadel which could be defended separately, and to which the
population could retreat if the outer city fell (MM 4; MK 145; Figure 6, p. 267).
When city walls were destroyed by old age, natural disaster, or enemy attacks,
soldiers were used as labor crews to repair them (L 231, 497; MM 4). Royal
inscriptions frequently describe the fortifications built by the king; Gudea of
Lagash, for example, built fortifications (E3/l:lll, 128) and restored a city gate
(E3/ 1:147, 161). Babylonian kings also describe "levying of the army of my land"
for military construction projects (R4:335, 377). In a sense, soldiers were a form
of labor conscription, and, like later Roman legionaries, could be used as ordinary
laborers.
On the other hand, repairs were often put off until the enemy was at the gates:
The city where our lord is staying is not in good repair. Already before an
alarm of the coming [of enemy] troops is heard, our lord must give strict
orders to guards and border guards outside. They must not be negligent.. . .
He must not neglect the guard of the wall. Here, we are very concerned
about the guard of the wall and the city gates. (L 242)
Brick walls required regular repair, and numerous inscriptions describe the
building or refurbishing of city walls. Shu-ilishu {1984—1975} rebuilt the walls of
his capital Isin (R4:19). A century later, Enlil-bani of Isin{ 1860-1837} found it
necessary to "build anew the wall of Isin which had become dilapidated" (R4:80).
A letter requests bricks to repair a "wall (L 376). In reality, the -walls of major cities
probably required frequent if not constant upkeep. 3 In 1733 Samsu-iluma repaired
six forts which "in their old age had fallen into ruin of their own accord"
(R4:381-2). Repair projects usually took several months (R4:382, 390). Nur-
Adad of Larsa {1865-1850} lists the daily wages of each worker on his walls, giv
ing a sense of the expense of such repairs. 4
Warad-sin {1834—1823} describes his monumental rebuilding of the walls of Ur:
[At the] fine base [of the walls of Ur] the [Sumerian] people multiply ami art-
able to save their lives. The god Nanna entrusted m< Hi. building of |Ur\|
wall. In the course of that year five months had not passed when I baked its
backs. I finished the great wall and raised up its parapet. Like a verdant
mountain I caused it to grow up in a pure place. I made its height surpassing,
had it release its terrifying aura. I raised its head commensurate with its name
and greatness. I caused it to shine forth splendidly to the wonder of the
nation. I chose the place for my royal foundation inscription in its foundation
and raised the head of its gate there. I made its fosse strong, circled it with
bricks, and dug its moat. I built for him [the god Nanna] the great wall, [the
top of] which like a mountain raised high cannot be touched.. . . I surrounded
his [Nanna's] city. The name of that wall is "The god Nanna makes the
foundation of the land firm". 5
Samsu-iluna, son of Hammurabi, also has a detailed description of the city walls
-I Kish: "by means of the labor of his army [Samsu-iluna] built the city of Kish
I le dug its canal, surrounded it with a moat, and with a great deal of earth made its
Foundations firm as a mountain. He formed its bricks and built its wall. In the
ourse of one year he made its head rise up more than it had been before"
1-4:385-8).
Many walls had water-filled moats surrounding them (LKA 329; MM 4). Abi-
are of Larsa describes digging "the canal of the wall of Larsa" (LYN 13). Anam of
I folk in the nineteenth century provides more details: he "restored the wall of
l folk - the ancient work of divine Gilgamesh ... in baked bricks in order that the
jWter might roar in [the wall's] surrounding [moat]" (R4:474-5). Hammurabi
..used the head of the wall of Sippar with earth like a great mountain. I encircled
I with a swamp" (R4:348), probably referring to a moat (ASD 15). Likewise
Samsu-iluna of Babylon "surrounded Nippur with a moat. He dug the Euphrates
md made the wall reach the bank of the Euphrates" (R4:374, 390). The moat was
quently simply the quarry pit from which the earth was taken to build the wall
Samsu-iluna claims that "in the course of two months, on the bank of the Turul
! iver, he built Fort Samsu-iluna. He dug its surrounding moat, piled up its earth
lliere, formed its bricks, and built its wall. He raised its head like a mountain"
I' 1:390-1).
( rates (abullum) of the city were often massive; up to six meters hio-h and built of
".-ported cedar wood (ARM 3.10; MM 4), with bronze reinforcing and bolts
KA 199, 215). An artist's depiction of a Middle Bronze gate survives in a small
pbque (SDA 291c). It shows high brick walls with crenellations, and a large gate-
• .v with a brick arch and projecting towers. A similar surviving arched gate and
tretch of wall can be seen at Tell Dan in Israel (ALB 208; Figure 7, p. 278). Like
..Ik gates needed to be regularly repaired: one city ordered the construction of a
|«f City gate (L 263). City gates were frequently named after gods. In Sippar two
gtes were named after the gods Nungal and Shamash, while a third was named
"Stairway Gate", presumably because it included a stair leading to the ramparts
I iiy -.Hi. ials included the ( u.ekeeper (.„■/,„ abiillim), who was in charge of security,
"•'•h. control, and dnl\ . i>llr. tinn i ASI > |, Id. 85; cl". IITO 175)
i > i
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Preparations for a siege
When a city faced imminent threat, special precautions were taken. Walls arc
described as being strengthened and repaired in the face of enemies (LKA 32*> )
Border guards (bazahatum) manned outposts and patrolled the land, watching foi
enemy raiders and troop movements (L 573, 382, 393; MM 5, 7). Such patrol
were reported to have ranged fifty kilometers from their bases (L 482). This type
of duty was considered onerous: "the guarding of a city is a hard [duty]; and the i *
are few troops available" (L 449). When there was fear of approaching eneim
troops, the scouts, outposts, and city-guards were increased: "Because an alarm
[caused by the enemy's approach] might be heard, we ordered a herald [to be
ready] to call it out over the town.. . . Our lord must give strict orders to keep th<
guards of the wall and outposts at the ready by night and siesta" (L 239—40).
During wartime, officers inside cities were required to report daily to the corn
mander at the main city gate-fortress to receive their orders (L 462). Beacon fires
were lit to alert the surrounding regions of approaching enemies (L 398; MM 10;
WM 119-21), as described in a dispatch:
I departed from Mari, and spent the night at Zuruban. All the Banu-Yamina
[nomad confederacy] raised fire signals. From Samanum to Ilum-Muluk, from
Ilum-Muluk to Mishlan, all the cities of the Banu-Yamina of the Terqa distrii i
raised fire signals in response, and so far I have not ascertained the meaning oi
those signals. Now I shall determine the meaning, and I shall write to my Ion I
whether it is thus or not. Let the guard of the city of Mari be strengthened
and let my lord not go outside the gate! (ANET 482a)
Fire signals could thus inform a ruler of a danger and perhaps the direction the
danger was coming from, but additional information had to be obtained by field
officers and reported in dispatches.
As an enemy army approached, sheep and other livestock were collected into
safe areas (L 394); the king would "gather before him [in his city] oxen, sheep, and
his population that were loyal to him" (PH 78). Border guards also went on patrol
to capture enemy agents or stragglers, and sent dispatches with reports of enemy
troop movements back to the commanders (L 383). When a major enemy army
approached, the border guards alerted the regiment in the city, but were unable to
offer more than nominal resistance, as one report indicated: "the [advancing]
enemy has pushed the border guards out of the way" (L 243).
Standing orders were given to move people and troops into the city upon the
approach of the enemy: "when the enemy comes, let those seeking refuge enter
the strongholds" (L 398, 247, 315, 361; MM 6). Supplies and provisions were also
gathered into the city in preparation for a siege. Cattle and sheep were brought
into the city for protection and kept in the peoples' houses (L 466). As an Elamitr
army approached Babylon, Hammurabi ordered: "[The enemy| will soon cross tin
border. Collect cattle and grain, straw, small boys, |sm.tl1 -nl ill oi thcin| ami
' ' I
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
ting them into Babylon!" (L 320). Panic might spread among the population as
nemy pillaged their land and surrounded their city (L 317).
Offensive first moves
in first approaching a city an army often tried to make a surprise attack, cap-
ing the city before it could prepare a proper defense (L 314). On occasion, a
that was surprised could fall to a conqueror in a single day. "During that same
In, troops [of king Haya-Sumu] went to [the city of] Kahat and, upon their
1 1, seized the city of Kahat and caught [its king] Kapiya. Attaya, who is with
i Sumu, ascended [the former Kapiya s] throne on that early morning" (L
The potential of surprise attack necessitated constant vigilance by both
N kers and defenders. During time of war soldiers were constantly admonished
be on the alert: "I am afraid [that the enemy king] Ishme-Dagan may be
ibled, through some negligence [of the soldiers], to do harm in the encamp-
nt" (L359).
II .i surprise attack failed, cities were frequently given a chance to surrender
►re the siege formally commenced. One surrendered three days after a siege
hi (L 350). Most cities, however, seemed to have rejected these initial overtures
I I I lender, preferring instead to make at least nominal resistance. For example,
>ne siege, "after he [the enemy king] laid siege to the city, he offered it peace
II kept his troops in place. And he requested [the surrender of the besieged city's]
rhey [the city] did not give [their king] to him [the enemy king]" (L 399). If
ii y surrendered on terms, it was spared looting; if it fought on and was taken by
lull, it could be plundered and destroyed, and its population taken as slaves
MM 48). Hammurabi instructed his commanders of his policy towards Mashkan-
npir, a major city in the kingdom of Larsa in southern Mesopotamia:
II you succeed [in negotiating a surrender], and if the city opens [its gates] in
front of you, accept its peace! Even if he [the commander] violates the oath by
[the gods] Shamash and Marduk, [do not plunder] that city! If the city does
not open [its gates, besiege it] and send for me [for reinforcements]! (L 333)
In s policy created a psychological crisis for the defenders of the town as they saw
C siege ramp daily progressing towards their walls (L 352). As it turned out in this
the city of Mashkan-Shapir did not immediately surrender, but as the siege
rngrcssed, the besieged army began to lose heart as they saw Hammurabi's siege
imp, ladders, towers, and rams moving closer. Hammurabi's commander reported:
I hey | the army of Larsa] are dreading an assault [by the Babylonians].. . . Sin-
Muballit, the brother of Rim-Sin [king of Larsa] ... is surrounded [by the
liabylonian .umy] in the city of Mashkan Shapir. And the land of Larsa dreads
m assault and he |Sm Miilul!n| is about to change side's. |Then] the city of
M.i'. hk. in Si l.i p 1 1 will opi n it-, lutes liner <n loin days from now. (L 334)
• >,
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
It is not clear if the city eventually surrendered or was taken by assault, but Ham-
murabi was victorious and moved on to capture the capital Larsa and annex the
entire kingdom.
Sometimes an attacker would give the defender an ultimatum, allowing him a
few days to surrender a city before the battle began in earnest. This was potentially
dangerous, however, since it gave the defenders an opportunity to receive rein-
forcements. One Mario te commander, Buqaqum, reported:
Five thousand men [of Marij are fortifying the city of Yabliya. And [the
enemy general] Shallurum is strengthening Harbe together with 15,000
men.. . . Shallurum spoke ... as follows: "I will wait five days for you [to
withdraw from the city], then [if you do not] I will commence fighting." A
rescue detachment [from Mari] must get here soon [or the city will surren-
der]. (T 383, 384)
If a relief army came they might camp near the camp of the attackers, hoping to
force the enemy to withdraw. When facing an enemy relief force, the commander
of one siege hoped he could lure the enemy out to an open battle: "when I lay
siege to the city, and he [the enemy relief army] quits his camp and sets himself in
motion toward me, at that time I will do battle" (T 418).
Assault
If a city refused to surrender, the next alternative was assault, which could be dif
ficult and costly to both sides. Whenever Mesopotamian soldiers campaigned in
close proximity to the enemy they built fortified encampments (nawum) (L 193
319, 320, 328), especially when besieging an enemy city (L 457). Such camps were
often built by the gates of a city to prevent the besieged people from leaving,
communicating, or receiving reinforcements (L 301, 346). One fortified camp is
mentioned as being about three kilometers from the city under siege (T 400). II
the armies remained in encampments for a long period of time they built houses
and towers (L 468). When two allied armies besieged the same city, they built
separate encampments for each army (L 275, 346). If enough troops were available
the city would be completely surrounded (L 309).
Attackers would generally plunder the countryside for food and attempt to
ambush and capture anyone coming in or out of the city (L 316). If possible they
would attack at harvest time, harvesting the fields to feed the besieging army while
the enemy watched hungrily from their city (L 324, 396). Besieging armies natu-
rally had their own problems with supplies. One group complained that "the)
transport water to the troops day and night from five kilometers away. Who from
among the two to three thousand [enemy troops in the besieged city] might attack the
water carriers?" (L 497). Night operations were also sometimes undertaken (L 358)
The size of armies besieging cities could vary greatly, depending on the si,
the city being attacked. Vast forces were not neccssai \\\ n<< T J I i\, hundred men
V*,
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECKAFT
captured the small town of Tilla (L 455). The siege of Shehna was undertaken by
2000 men (L 301), while the same number took Urgish (L 455). A major city,
however, like Shubat-Enlil, required at least 4000 men to besiege it (L 455), and
ometimes more (L 383). The size of defending armies also varied. Royal garrisons
of towns were often very small: 20 (L 299), 50 (L 312), and 100 (L 314) men are
mentioned, though those numbers would swell dramatically when war began, by
reinforcements and conscription of the city militia into service. One city was
strongly defended by a garrison of 300 (L 352). The city of Ashihum was defended
by "1000 good troops", which allowed that commander to make numerous sorties
(L 346).
Once a city was blockaded and defensive camps constructed, the attacker had to
decide on the best approach to assault the city. One method was to attempt to
undermine (pilsum) the walls causing them to collapse (ARM 1.35; WM 171).
Ishme-Dagan successfully took the city of Qirhadat with this technique: "As soon
is I had approached the town of Qirhadat I set up siege towers. By sapping I
I uised its walls to collapse. On the eighth day I seized the city of Qirhadat.
Rejoice!" (ARM 1.135; WM 172).
The preferred technique for besiegers, however, was to construct siege equip-
ment and a siege ramp (epirum) (L 321, 328, 331, 356; WM 171). The purpose of
be siege ramp was to provide access to the upper wall for ladders, mobile siege
towers and rams, as exemplified in a siege by Ishme-Dagan:
The town of Nilimrnar that Ishme-Dagan besieged, Ishme-Dagan has [now]
taken. As long as the siege-ramps did not reach to the heights of the top of the
city [wall], he could not seize the town. As soon as the siege-ramps reached
the top of the city [wall], he gained mastery over this town. (ARM 1.4; WM 173)
lake Roman legionnaires, soldiers of Bronze Age Mesopotamia were fre-
quently used in military engineering, building fortified camps and siege ramps, as
II as defensive engineering activities. Although a relatively small army could
besiege a town, the construction of a siege ramp was a major operation requiring a
great deal of labor. While the soldiers certainly provided manual labor for siege
ngineering, they were frequently helped by corvee laborers (L 318-19).
Mesopotamian engineers had turned siegecraft into a science, creating mathe-
i m.i Meal exercises that allowed them to calculate the volume of earth, number of
men, and time it would take to construct a siege ramp reaching a given height. 6
According to one problem, the engineers had to build a ramp to assault a wall 22
meters high. The ramp began 240 meters from the city wall, and was 36 meters
ide. The ramp progressed slowly towards the wall, leaving an ever decreasing gap
i ween the unfinished end of the ramp and the wall. This was presumably done
i li.it as much of the work on the ramp could be done as far away from the city
■ ill is possible. The reason that siege ramps were preferable to undermining the
• ill is probably thai all ol ihe operation of undermining had to occur directly
imilei the wall, anil therefore was more vulnerable to enemy attacks.
> i |
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
The rampart and wall of the besieged city in this mathematical problem was 22
meters high; 7 the total height of the ramp at 48 meters from the wall was said to be
only 18 meters. It is unclear if the end of the ramp was intended to reach a total
height of 22 meters, or if it leveled off at 18 meters high for the last part of ramp.
A gap of 4 meters (13 feet) between the top of the wall and the end of the ramp
could be bridged by siege towers and ladders. There would be no need to con-
struct rams, ladders, and siege towers, which were always used on the ramps, if the
end of the ramp reached the height of the wall. If this interpretation is correct, it
gives us a good sense that a Mesopotamian siege tower was about five meters tall,
which corresponds with our artistic evidence discussed elsewhere (see pp. 216—7).
Wooden planks ( GI ^.arammum) were laid down to form a more solid pathway up
which the towers and rams could be pushed (WM 180 nl6).
According to this hypothetical mathematical problem, it would take 9500 men,
each carrying two cubic meters of earth per day, only five days to build a siege
ramp to the top of the wall. This number, however, was derived from a hypothe-
tical mathematical exercise assuming ideal conditions. It does not take into account
the number of men who would have to blockade the city or protect the camp. It
does not consider that some of the men would be required to gather and prepare
supplies for food, or that some men would be sick or injured. Most importantly, it
doesn't deal with the reality of building the ramp in the face of enemy missiles and
sorties, requiring men with shields to defend the workers, slowing the work and
creating casualties. In reality it probably took several weeks to build such a siege
ramp, even with 10,000 men. Most importantly, however, this hypothetical mili-
tary engineering exercise does not match the reality of the size of actual besieging
armies in the Middle Bronze, which seldom numbered 10,000 men. None the
less, given the right men and circumstances, towns could fall to an assiduous
attacker in a week. Ishme-Dagan, son of Shamshi-Adad, reported, "I set up a
tower and a battering ram against [the town of Hurara] , and in seven days I cap-
tured that town" (ARM 1.131); and on another occasion "As soon as I had
approached the town of Qirdahat, I set up a tower and made its wall fall down by
tunneling, and in eight days I captured the town" (ARM 1.135; cf. 1.138).
No artistic depictions of siege ramps, ladders, rams, or siege towers exist from
the Middle Bronze period, but they were probably broadly similar to the Early
Bronze representations discussed on pp. 216—7 (Figure 5£-g, p. 219), and to the
Assyrian practices of a thousand years later as depicted in the much later Assyrian
martial murals (AW 2:406-49). Siege ramps and other siege earthworks were gen-
erally taken down after a siege (T 459), meaning that they survive archaeologically
only if the city was captured, destroyed, and never reinhabited. An Assyrian ramp,
from the siege of Lachish in Judea, was discovered during the excavations of
Tachish. 8 Indeed, most of the elements found in later Assyrian siegecraft of the
early first millennium seem to have been developed by the Middle Bronze Age.
While the siege ramp was being constructed, special craftsmen were busy
building the ladders, siege towers, and battering rains fur use in .iss.mlting the wall
when the ramp was completed/' They were gcnrr.illx in d miiiuIi innuisly in .in
08
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
assault; frequently the attacker is said to have only a single ram and tower (ARM
1.131, 135), or sometimes only two (L 457). The construction of these devices
was difficult, requiring skilled craftsmen and special materials (ARM 6 65) The
precise details of these siege engines are not know, but their basic function seems
clear.
Ladders {simmiltum) (L 205) were obviously devices that allowed the soldier* to
scale the last part of a wall once the S1 ege ramp had reached it. A large number
were used m sieges, and were stored after siege for reuse and transported to the
lege by boat or cart. Commanders felt an assault on a city wall could not be
undertaken without sufficient ladders:
About the [siege] ladders that Ibal-Pi-El brought into [the city of] Rapiqum -
they are being kept inside Rapiqum. And there are no boats inside Rapiqum
for bringing them upstream to Hurban [the city that is being besieged]. We
lack ladders. If it pleases our lord, we must not have a lack of ladders. (L 393)
Battering rams {yaskbum) were used to break down walls or gates 10 They were
I- used from the top of siege ramps. Battering rams were sometimes used to
reak down revetment walls supporting earthworks; it was possible that when the
utment walls collapsed, the slumping earthworks would bury the ram (L 479)
liege towers (dimtum) do not seem to have been extraordinarily tall - perhaps
out five to six meters." They were essentially strengthened and protected lad-
rs allowing the soldiers to assault the top of the wall from the sieg^ ramp
BOther siege device which seems to have been part of the tower is the "leaner"
•Mftt] I (L 205-6, 393); it is either some type of ladder, or a gangplank that was
■red by ropes from the top of the siege tower onto the top of the wall The
ival of 500 reinforcements with a siege tower caused consternation for a
teged garrison commander, but he vowed to continue the fight: "[even] if he
mies with a [siege] tower, I will not permit him to enter the city" (L 305)
bwers could be disassembled, moved, and used in another siege (L 470).'
< )u some occasions the siege equipment was constructed at a distance and
imported to the site of the siege, either by boat (ARM 2.107 2 110 14 45) or by
I heeled vehicles (ARM 2.7, 2.15). Shamshi-Adad ordered the transport of siege
qu.pment by river and land: "as soon as they have brought the siege towers and
battering ram upstream to Man they should load them on wagons" In th^
itter case, it is not clear if the disassembled parts of the tower and ram were
DSported by cart, or if the tower and ram were built on wheels and moved on
U own. The latter option is probably indicated by the siege representations of
I Early Bronze period, discussed on p. 216, which show siege towers and rams
Wheels. As m the Middle Ages, siege engines were given special names by the
diers; one was called haradan - wild donkey (ARM 6.63; CAD 6:88) which
''"''"y- '" a Latln for "> ""•«"•. was used by the Romans fora type of catapult'
'' ° ,Ikt l, '" u1 - su W equipmcnl was often built at the site of the siege The
V "' l "' ! ' 1, 'l' ul,U lni,Ml "!' "'' 'Im.uglH,, ,s. „f ,| U . Mesopotamian
'•1111(1*
'\UT(
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
floodplain caused difficulties for sieges, requiring that either siege equipment 01
good timber be shipped to the site of the siege. One general asked the king to ship
in special wood for building siege equipment.
About cutting trees for xattassi 12 and axletrees for a battering ram and towers,
of which my lord wrote - [we need] straight stems which are suitable fot
xattassi, and axletrees do not exist on the bank of the Habur [River, a tribu-
tary of the Euphrates], and cornel wood, straight stems, do not exist. (L 414)
Another commander had put his assault on hold while waiting for good
building timber to build thirty ladders for a siege.
Load on one boat those pines from the dry pines that are with you, that is, 40
pines of two reeds length for ladders, 20 pines for short ladders (kammu), 2
pines for "leaners" (hu-mu-da~ia), and provide silver for buying travel provi
sions for the haulers [of the equipment]; those pieces of wood must arrive
tomorrow. Do not neglect this letter of mine! Further: send a blade of one
pound [of bronze] for the battering ram! The assault [on the city of Mishlan has
been] on hold for nine days [because of this lack of siege equipment]. (L 205-0 1
Archers were also used during sieges, but again apparently in rather small
numbers. A small plaque from Mari shows an archer, behind another man holdin
a large shield, shooting upward, apparently at enemies on a wall during a siegi
(Figure 5c, p. 218). 13 One letter from the commander of a besieging arm
requested more ammunition:
Have made 50 bronze arrowheads of 5 shekels weight (40 grams) each, 5
arrowheads of 3 shekels weight each, 100 arrowheads of 2 shekels weigh'
each, and 200 arrowheads of 1 shekel weight each. Make it a priority, so thai
it is finished quickly. It looks as if the siege of Andarik may be prolonged, an. I
that is why I am writing to you. (ARM 18.5; MK 63)
The total number of arrows requested was only 400, enough to arm only twenl
archers with twenty arrows each. The urgency of the letter seems to imply that th<
commander felt that these 400 arrows were important, possibly reflecting d
overall small levels of archery used in Middle Bronze Mesopotamia. Thirty men
with javelins are also described as harassing the city walls (T 497).
Defensipe operations
One standard response of a besieged city was to make sorties to disrupt tli.
attackers (T 400). An active defense could include many sorties. One defending
commander had "1000 good troops" in his garrison, allowing him to "constant!'
keep coming out [of the city] to do battle" with ihr b« m< run- .iimv (1 34(0 \
MM
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
■II -timed sortie could break a siege: "Two hundred troops and [commander]
viggar-Abum went out from Kurda, and he defeated 500 Eshnunakean troops. He
rove them from their [fortified] camp" (T 417).
\ series of contemporary dispatches to king Zimri-Lim of Mari from his city
u inlander named Zimri-Addu give a vivid description of the course of the siege
I hritum by the Elamites in 1764 (L 103-5). The city was defended by both
1 ii lote and Babylonian allied soldiers (L 459). The Elamites had surrounded the
built a fortified camp, and constructed a ramp that was nearing the walls of
city. In response Zimri-Addu undertook active defensive tactics.
To my lord [king Zimri-Lim] speak! Your servant Zimri-Addu says: "The
troops of my lord [in the city of Hiritum] are well. Some time ago I wrote my
lord that [we set] fire to the tower [standing on] the lower fringe [of the Ela-
mite siege ramp], and that the enemy [are seeking materials] for obtaining
.mother tower. Now, that method [was successful in destroying] one tower,
| but one tower] remained standing. And the work within the city against
the tower of the enemy and his earthworks [continues]; a counter-ramp 14 that
| we defenders] made was two ropes wide, earthworks for two ropes. And the
1 1 Babylonian] servants of [the allied king] Hammurabi were talking as
lollows. They said: 'We will make these earthworks higher toward our [. ... .]
< ounter-ramp, and do battle from their top [against the enemy attack from
i heir siege ramp]. The enemy will not be able to do anything to this city!' "
(L 457-8)
defenders seem to have been building a counter-ramp inside the city, with
1 1 1 lent walls and earthworks allowing them to make the overall height of their
M higher, forcing the enemy to increase the height of their siege ramp.
/nnri-Addu continued the narrative in a subsequent dispatch written on the
eve of the battle he is describing. Some unfortunate lacunae leave part of the
unclear:
lb my lord [king Zimri-Lim] speak! Your servant Zimri-Addu says: "The
tioops of my lord [in the city of Hiritum] are well. The day I sent this tablet to
my lord, the troops of my lord and [the allied] Babylonian troops were posi-
tioned against the enemy in front of the [enemy siege] tower and the earth-
works [of the enemy]; [our soldiers] fought and drove [the enemy] from, his
[siege ramp] earthworks.. . . In the morning [the enemy] returned ... to the
top of his earthworks [and] was coming out toward the [gate]. One of the
li'.uHTs' | siege gangplank] and [. . . the siege tower?] gave way [and collapsed].
\iul I heard the following: 'There is no [siege] tower left to [the enemy], and
he | is waiting for more materials] to obtain a [new] tower.' This I heard. The day
when the battle was fought, Dagan-Mushteshir distinguished himself very much.
| fire [was ht| and was kepi burning in front of the |enemy siege] tower.
\nd of the troops of m\ Imd, m.m\ tumps distinguished themselves." (L 459)
Ml
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
In the aftermath of their failure to break into Hiritum and the loss of their siege
towers, the Elamite army withdrew (L 460), as Zimri-Addu describes in his next
dispatch:
The troops [of Mari] are staying in the camp of Hiritum. The Babyloniai i
troops took down the [temporary fortifications of] the city of Hiritum
[including] the counter-ramp that they had built. They are spreading the
earthworks [of the siege ramp] that the enemy had heaped up.. . . Now the
enemy has crossed to Kakkulatum. He has regrouped.. . . The enemy has
released the work detail [which had been conscripted to build the earthworks
and siege ramp] to [return] to his land. (L 459)
Another siege for which we have some detailed narratives is the siege of
Razama by the Elamites (L 65—9). It began when Atamrum, king of Allahad and
ally of the Elamites, with an army of 700 Elamites and 600 Eshnunakeans (L 496)
made an attack on the city. Zimri-Lim of Mari was overlord of the city, but he
was engaged in the north, and needed time to return to Mari, refurbish his army
and relieve Razama (L 496). The city was thus required to hold out on its own foi
nearly a month. The king of Razama, Sharraya, a loyal vassal of Zimri
Lim, strongly resisted the siege. As Atamrum made siege ramps against the walls
and prepared rams and siege towers for the final assault, Sharraya led sorties to
disrupt the besiegers' efforts, specifically targeting the craftsmen making siege*
engines.
The city of Razama is under siege, and [its commander] Sharraya is staying
inside his city [to defend it]. He put up a fight. He went out and felled 500
troops from among the [enemy] troops. [He also killed] two leatherworkeis
and battering-ram makers [in the sortie] . (E 489)
The ramp had progressed well, and a siege tower and ladders were ready for their
final placement when Sharraya 's soldiers made another impressive sortie.
Sharraya placed lumps of pitch opposite a tower and then lit a fire under the
lumps of pitch, and the tower collapsed. And the fire consumed the "leaners"
[siege tower gangplanks].. . . [Thereafter] Atamrum wrote to Sharraya [offer
ing to withdraw on terms, saying]: "Give me tribute! And release to me the
troops that you [captured in battle] and brought inside [the city]!" But he did
not give him tribute.. . . And the city is strong. I am afraid Atamrum and lit
troops will quit [the siege] before the arrival of my lord [with reinforcement ,|
(L 300)
At this point the attacking commander Atamrum considered negotiating, and
wrote to his Elamite overlord, explaining: "I put a chokchold on the cit\
[of Razama]. Write to me if you want me to quit, and I shall in five the tribute <
> \ »
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
the city and quit. Otherwise [I shall take down] the fortifications of the city"
I 495-6). The townspeople seemed willing to accept an offer and pay tribute, but
by this time the situation had changed; Atamrum 's confidence had been restored
I I id he broke off negotiations.
They [the attackers] took a break for ten days, and then the elders [of the
city] came out to Atamrum and told him the following. They said: "We are
for making peace. The [besieging] troops must withdraw five kilometers from
his camp, and I shall supply silver [as tribute]." And he [Atamrum] answered
them as follows. He said: "You really have decided the following: 'We shall
deceive him with words. Let him withdraw from his camp, and we shall
[thereby] put a stop to the exertions [of the siege].. . .' If you are for making
peace, why does Sharraya [the king of Razama] not come out to me
[personally to negotiate]? Go, put up a fight, strengthen your city [for the
coming attack]!" And the townspeople answer him as follows: "The city is
Zimri-Lim's, and his regular army went behind him [to Aleppo]. Stay [and
fight] until the lord of the city [Zimri-Lim] comes to [attack] you!"
[Thus king Sharraya] made his decision, strengthened the city, and started
coming out regularly [in sorties], and he was beating the Eshnunakean
troops. And he [Atamrum] was heaping up earthworks going toward the city.
(L 496)
\ the siege ramp advanced toward the city wall, an urgent message was sent to
iiuri-Lim requesting immediate assistance.
Atamrum is besieging Razama. [His siege ramp] is astride the lower city
| wall]. The troops of the city are doing battle all the time. If the city of
Razama does not stop him, the whole land of Idamaras might change sides to
him, judging by what I keep hearing from those [local citizens] around me.
The eyes of Yamutbal and its entire land are fixed entirely on [what] my lord
| Zimri-Lim will do to respond to this siege]. (L 454)
' hale waiting for the relief army from Zimri-Lim, Sharraya redoubled his efforts
II resistance with a secret assault on the attackers.
I he front of the earthworks [of Atamrum s army] reached the parapet of the
wall of the lower town, and the townspeople . . . made two tunnels [through
I lie wall], right and left toward the front of the [enemy's approaching] earth-
works. At night they [the troops of Razama] entered [the tunnels] at the front
of the [enemy] earthworks, and in the early morning the troops of the city
I .une out [in a surprise attack] and beat half of the troops [of Atamrum]. They
Blade them drop their bronze spears and their shields [in flight] and brought
[the discarded weapons | inside the city [as booty]. The townspeople keep
invoking the name of m\ lord |/.iinri I im in vielory|. (I 496)
> \ \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MESOPOTAMIAN SIEGECRAFT
At this point Atamrum was reduced to attempting a rather feeble stratagem of
his own.
He supplied bronze javelins to thirty imposters [who pretended to be soldiers
from Mari], and they hassled the city, saying: "Why do you keep invoking the
name of [king] Zimri-Lim? Do not his troops besiege you right now?" And
the townspeople answered them as follows: "You [Atamrum] equipped
impostors and let them approach [the city wall]. Yes, in five days, the troops
who are with Zimri-Lim will arrive for you. You will see." (L 497)
The morale of the besiegers continued to deteriorate as that of the besieged
improved with the news of the immanent approach of Zimri-Lim s relief army.
The alarm of the coming of [the relief army] of my lord [king Zimri-Lim] has
been sounded for the [besieging] troops [of Atamrum], and in the course ol
the night the troops in camp are being woken up twice Those from inside
the city will come out and they will kill many [enemy] troops! And those
troops in that [enemy] camp are sleepless. They keep being apprehensive*
about [the arrival of the army of] my lord. My lord must do what is necessan
to come here and save the city. (L 497)
The end of the siege is not recorded, but it appears that Zimri-Lim's army did
arrive and save the city. These examples show that an active defense - with
counter-ramp, sorties and fire, and hope for a relief army - could defeat a detei
mined besieging army.
Climax of the siege
On the other hand, when an enemy siege was nearing success the morale of (Ik
defenders played an increasingly important role. In some situations, the soldi ci
began to panic and even mutiny. Sleeplessness and exhaustion contributed to
deteriorating morale (L 347, 400, 466). At the siege of Shehna, the city coin
mander "said to the herald, 'Get the troops up on the wall [to defend against th
coming assault]!' [One of the officers] Ushtashni-El rose and said, 'My troopei
will not go up on the wall.' The herald said, 'My commander sent me.' He [Ush
tashni-El] acted maliciously and shoved the herald" (L 302). On the other hand
many commanders and soldiers were willing to fight to the death for their km
one defender of a besieged garrison proclaimed: "I will not open the city to am
body. If a rescue detachment of my lord arrives, I will have lived. Otherwise I will
have been killed [in the fall of the city]" (L 304).
As the situation became more desperate, cities under siege usually requested
relief army to march to their rescue (L 298, 299). "A rescue detachment urn
arrive like one man on the day we hear the alarm of |the enemy| < oming nut |i
attack our city]" (L 239). Sometimes reinforcements arrived |usi in the nu k
me to save a city: "Had the troops of my lord been one day late, the city of Karan
Blight have long since been seized [by the enemy]" (L 352). City commanders
omplained when they didn't get the reinforcements they thought they needed;
king, of course, wanted them to make do with the men they had: ''One time,
times, and three times I made my request before Zimri-Lim, and still he did
KM give anything to me" (L 262). Another commander echoed the same concern:
Use city was left to itself. Now, my lord must dispatch troops, and they must take
'in ml of [the city of] Nahur. That city must; not slip from the hand of my lord!"
i simple reply — "There are no troops" (L 311) — has been echoed throughout
1 1 try
I he exasperation of the defending city commander is reflected in his refusal to
responsibility for defeat if he is not given sufficient resources:
i le [the king] disregards our word! We wrote to our lord once, twice, about
troops entering Mishlan, and our lord [responded], "Whom do you fear that
you keep writing me for troops?" ... If our lord does not dispatch us the
troops, he cannot blame us [if we are defeated] in the future. We guard the
wall and the city gates. We are afraid about [enemy devastation of] the flanks
of the cultivated zone [around our city] . If there were one thousand or two
thousand troops staying with us, one-half we would leave on the wall [to
protect the city] and one-half we would send out on rescue missions [against
the enemy pillaging the countryside]. (L 241)
As a siege progressed, starvation for the garrison and citizens became a real
ssibility (L 465). One commander wrote asking for assistance against a besieging
\, claiming: "There is no grain in the city. My lord must do what is necessary
hung grain to the city" (L 311, 304, 309; ARM 2.50). With a deteriorating
nation the loyalty of some besieged towns could be dubious as a growing por-
ii of the population came to believe that a negotiated surrender was preferable
ruslavement and the destruction of their town. The king of Mari had 100 sol-
■■.II i isoning the city of Qatara (L 404) that was besieged by an enemy general,
kkutanum, who managed to instigate a revolt of the citizens:
He | Kukkutanuni] caused the opinion of the commoners to turn against
|M.ni|.... And the commoners turned to the side of Kukkutanuni. They
started seizing Qattara. If it had not been for the troops of my lord [from
Mari, who were garrisoning the town], they [the rebel citizens] would have
i eti Qattara. (L 354)
\ hen ,i besieging army took the lower city, they faced the reality of an entirely
siege to conquer the citadel. One besieging army "took shelter in [the cap-
.1 lowei ( ity ol] Kiyatan. I le fixed up the lower city for use as his camp.. . . The
id< I <>( the ( ity is strong. The townspeople entered it and are holding the cita-
\nd 1 1 In- enemy] is ou njn ine the lowei ( it v I lis elite troops are in his camp"
•■.I
.m,
WAR IA11H IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
(L 362). When the lower city fell, it was plundered: "the soldiers looted the lower
part of that city, but the citadel is untouched" (L 368). Often, however, when the
lower city fell the citizens decided to take the last chance to surrender the citadel
on terms (L 365).
Thus the entire range of siege techniques of the ancient Near East - siege
towers, battering rams, undermining, ramps, protective shelters, siege shields, and
ladders - were all in place by at least the eighteenth century, and probably several
centuries earlier. Although there were many subsequent important technical
improvements, the basic elements of siegecraft had all been developed by the
Middle Bronze Age. The only siege devices unattested in the Bronze Age Near
East are the large, projectile throwing devices which developed in three phases: basic
torsion devises beginning in the fourth century BCE; counterweight trebuchets in
the twelfth century CE, and gunpowder in the late fourteenth century CE.
Despite these significant advances, the essence of siegecraft was an invention of the
Bronze Age.
236
CHAPTER NINE
Syria and Lebanon
Hie two core zones of civilization in the ancient Near East, Mesopotamia and Egypt,
• no surrounded by peripheral regions which had their own cultures, but which
■ ere tied in various cultural, political, and economic ways to the great agricultural
ivct valleys. One of the most important of these, with the closest cultural and
olitical ties to Mesopotamia, was Syria, 1 which, for the purposes of this study,
ill be defined as the modern countries of Syria and Lebanon,, The geography and
>>logy of this region is quite complex, ranging from narrow coastal plains to high
rested mountains, rain-fed agricultural highland valleys, the upper Euphrates
fur basin, steppe, desert, and oases, all interlocking in complex patterns creating a
1 1 nber of separate micro-environments with distinctly different agricultural or
i oral potential (M = EDS 35).
Practically speaking, this area is geographically divided into four zones:
(he coastal plains, or Phoenician zone;
the inland valleys;
the middle Euphrates basin; and
i he steppe and desert fringe to the south and east.
Each of these zones created different styles of human social organization. Each
I the first three zones was home to city-states. The Phoenician coastal zone was
ii ionally home to the world's first great maritime civilization, best documented
i he Early and Middle Bronze ages at Byblos and Ugarit. The fourth zone, the
ilcppc and desert, was generally inhabited by nomadic and semi-nomadic pastor-
li\ts, who often played an important military role in Syrian and Mesopotamian
it) states, either as raiders or as allies of sedentary armies.
I he archaeological periodization of Syria (Table 9.1) 2 is not as precisely defined
I thai of Egypt or Mesopotamia. In broad terms Syrian archaeological periods
irallel those of Canaan, but there are important distinctions, and different scho-
Luh interpreters arrange things differently.
I he earliest written texts from Syria appear at Ebla around 2500. Before that
are dependent for our knowledge of Syrian military history solely upon
lurolutw oi incidental references to Syria in Mesopotamian sources. The mili-
Ur\ Inst or v ol Syria in the Neohthn pet lot 1 has been discussed in Chapter Cue.
1)7
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Table 9.1 Simplified archaeological chronology of Syria
Period
Phase
Date
Alternate names
Epi-Paleolithic/
16,000-10,000
Mesolithic
Early "Pre-Pottery"
Neolithic
10,000-8700
8700-6800
Pre-Pottery Neolithic A
Pre-Pottery Neolithic 15
Neolithic
6800-6500
Early Pottery
Neolithic
Late Neolithic
6500-5900
5900-5200
Pre-Halaf
Halaf
5200-4000
Ubaid
Chalcolithic
Protohistoric
4400-3500
3500-3000
Uruk
Early Bronze
3000-2000
Middle Bronze
Middle Bronze I
2000-1800
Old Syrian
Middle Bronze II
1800-1600
Period
Late Bronze
1600-1200
Middle Syrian Period
Chalcolithic {440G-3000} 3
The Chalcolithic period in Syria is characterized by the rise and spread of copper
working for ornamentation, statues, tools, and weapons. City fortifications also
make their first appearance in Syria during the Chalcolithic. Culturally, another
significant development is the closer cultural and economic integration of Syria
with southern Mesopotamia, with Syria increasingly sharing forms of pottery,
cylinder seals, architecture, writing, and cultural institutions; this phenomenon is
sometimes called the "Uruk expansion" (AS 181-4, 190-7; HE1 14-18), which
naturally included an exchange of military technologies and practices - most
apparent in fortifications and weapons.
While all archaeologists agree that there are significant parallels in materia]
culture between Syria and Mesopotamia during this "Uruk expansion", they dis
agree as to the extent to which this integration came about by actual migration and
colonization of eastern and central Syria by people from southern Mesopotamia as
opposed to the influence of merchant colonies or indirect influence. 4 Tin
Sumerian perspective of this phenomenon has been discussed in Chapter Three.
Here we will look at the issue from the perspective of the Syrians.
The Sumerians seem to have tried to create a chain of towns and markets to
connect them with areas containing resources crucial to tin- new forms of urban
social organization that were developing in Mesopotamia mm h .is metal, buildiin-
i rc
SYRIA AND LEBANON
1 1 nber, stone, and precious stones such as lapis lazuli. In Syria, the major trade
DUte passed up the middle Euphrates, thence branching into western Syria, the
Mediterranean and Anatolia. A major Sumerian colony in Syria was Habuba
dura (Tell Qannas, Jebel Aruda) {c. 3500—3200}, which was protected by three-
neter-thick mud-brick walls with numerous projecting square towers and at least
two fortified gates. The city had strong cultural links with southern Mesopotamia,
Mill is frequently described as a Sumerian colony (AS 190—7; EDS 81-6; EA
' 146—8; DANE 135—6). Many surrounding sites also exhibit, to a greater or lesser
legree, close parallels in their material culture to the Sumerian city-states over
jeveral centuries (AS 195-7). Smaller Sumerian outposts, such as the fortress at
nshnaqa, have also been discovered (AS 200-1). The fact that the Sumerian
-lonies in Syria have some of the first major fortifications known in Syria points
' i i wo important military facts. First, the colonies were not entirely peaceful and
onomic in nature, but felt sufficiently threatened by surrounding non-Sumerian
Oples that they needed to fortify their cities. Second, the process of
JUmerian colonization necessarily included a transfer of military technology and
i hniques from the Sumerians to the Syrians.
The occupation of Habuba lasted less than 200 years, after which it was aban-
ued. The precise reason for the disappearance of Habuba and related sites is
inknown. The city was not destroyed, but there could certainly have been a sig-
lificant military threat contributing to the decision of the Sumerian colonists to
t '.melon the city. Phocnican city-states were also involved in the rising militarism
-I the late fourth millennium; city walls have been found at Dakermann in Leba-
K>n (MW 1:187). Weapon burials in elite graves at Byblos indicate the beginning
rf the rise of a military elite (MW 1:187).
I he precise political and military relationship between the northern Mesopo-
iniian "colonies" and the Sumerian city-states of the south is unclear. Given the
ii rent evidence, it is probably premature to speak of an empire, where southern
UK's had direct control over their colonies in the north. Rather, it is more
ipropriate to think of the relationship between Greek city-states and their colo-
m the sixth century BC, where close cultural, economic, political, and mili-
'ii v lies existed, but without direct control by the mother city (AS 204—5). Some
' . like Habuba Kabira, seem to have been entirely new foundations created by
Sumerian colonists. Others, like Tell Brak, show a mixture of indigenous Syrian
i iirrial culture with significant Sumerian influences (AS 185-90; EDS 86-9; DANE
9). Such sites may represent Sumerian elites ruling local peoples, or local Syr-
ian elites allying themselves with the Sumerians and adopting Sumerian culture.
What is clear, however, is that the period of the spread of the "Uruk world
t< m" also witnessed the spread of militarism; military threat increased during
mid to-late fourth millennium, leading to the beginning of fortification in
mi derived from models originating earlier in Mesopotamia. Unfortunately,
1 .it k ol texts from this period prevent us from understanding any of the details of
w it l.i i e dm in; 1 , i lie late I Jruk .\\\i\ but H is presumed that competition for resources
1 1 id i ontiol ol trade routes was an nupoi taut factoi
2M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
SYRIA AND LEBANON
Whatever the nature of the military component of the "Umk expansion" ,
came to a relatively abrupt halt around 3000. Some of the Uruk sites such' ,
Habuba Kabira, were simply abandoned with few signs of military conflict o
destruction. Other Sumerian sites, however, such as Jebel Aruda and Sheikh Has
san, do have destruction layers probably caused by war (AS 208). Still other site-
continued in use, but without the distinctive Uruk-style pottery and artifacts It ,
assumed that the Sumerian "colonists" either were driven from these sites oi
withdrew on their own accord under some type of pressure. Many Sumerian
colonists probably merged with the local Syrian population, losing their distinctive
identity, at least in terms of material culture identifiable to archaeologists We are
uncertain as to the causes of the collapse of the "Uruk expansion"; there wen
Probably a number of contributing factors, and a military component should noi
be excluded.
The Early Bronze Age in Syria {3000-2100} 5
After the decline of the initial impulse of city building m Syria during the UruJ
expansion {3400-3000}, Syria experienced a decrease m the scale and complexity
of urbanization for several centuries {3000-2600}. Although small towns and vil
lages remained widespread in Syria, there is little evidence of large-scale urban,
zation until the twenty-sixth century (AS 233-5, 268-7). Thereafter a number oi
sites give evidence of rapid expansion in size and population. The largest of thest
reached up to 100 hectares in size, with populations possibly approaching 30 000
probably representing the maximum potential population of an ancient Syrian cih
given the ecologual, agricultural, technological and transportation limitations ol
the age. For the military historian, two developments of the Early Bronze Age an
most important: increased use of copper and later bronze for weapons - tin-bronz,
becoming common only during the late third millennium; and the nearly uni
versal spread of fortifications for cities, after the halting beginnings during the
Uruk expansion m the late Chalcolithic (AS 250-1, 268-9). Martial themes also
begin to appear in royal art. This triple combination of weapons, fortification and
martial art is a sure sign of the crossing of the warfare threshold.
As with southern Mesopotamia and Egypt, the most striking military feature . ,1
Early Bronze Age Syria is the widespread appearance of massive mud-brick c,u
fortifications at a number of sites, probably based on earlier southern Mesopot,
mian models and technologies. Major fortified cities of Early Bronze Age Syr, ,
include: . Ebla, Man, Qatna (Tel Mishnfe), Hama (ancient Amad), Aleppo (ancient
Yamkhad), Ugarit (Ras Shamra), and Damascus. 6 Each seems to have been the
center of a major independent city-state (AS 244-6). In north-eastern Syria in ,
region known as the "Khabur triangle" encompassing the tributaries of the Kha
bur River, there were three main strongly fortified city-states by the middle of th.
third millennium (AS 259-62): Nagar (Tell Brak; EA 1:355 6) Urkesh (Tell
Mozan; EA 4:60-3) and Shekhna (Tell Leilan; EA 3: U I 7). «•.„ I, ,,, whi( |,
trolled surrounding towns and villages. Nag.u seems n, I,,,, |,„ ,, ,|„. ( | ()lllm ml
>|i,
ule in the region. The surviving fortifications of Shekhna (Leilan) are parti-
rly impressive, with two concentric brick walls, the largest ten meters wide
hlieen meters high, with a circumference of 3.5 kilometers (AS 262; EDS
North-east Syria also contained a unique form of fortification consisting of
< ircular mud-brick walls and ditches known as kranzhugel ("wreath-
i uls") by archaeologists; the outer city walls were often supplemented by inner
''■ I fortifications around the temple and palace complexes on the acropolis
156-9).
Ebla (Tell Mardikh) {c. 2550-2300} 1
two major city-states of Early Bronze Age Syria were Ebla and Mari, both of
1 1 were culturally integrated in many ways with Sumerian civilization in
I hern Mesopotamia. The remarkable discovery of a huge archive of 17,000 clay
ts at Ebla in 1974—76 has made it the best-documented city in Early Bronze
i with the earliest extensive written corpus in any Semitic language (AS 239).
m innately for the military historian, the vast majority of the texts at Ebla were
nttcn by its extensive and highly centralized economic and administrative
me racy. None the less, enough military information can be extracted to pro-
US with an important glimpse into military affairs in the twenty- fourth cen-
Before the discovery of the Ebla archive, "no inscriptions prior to the second
irter of the second millennium were found in any of the north Syrian archae-
'■'u .il sites" (HE1 3; AS 235); until this discovery it had been presumed that
riting was unknown in Early Bronze Age Syria. This provides an important
ionary tale: our understanding of ancient Near Eastern military history is
ways tentative and subject to sometimes radical reorientation by new discoveries.
I.bla was first settled around 3500. In the following centuries it grew in size,
coming the predominant town in the region, supported by numerous sur-
inding satellite agricultural villages. Ebla's significance was in part linked to its
as an entrepot of growing international trade, probably beginning with
m rcased demand for wool in Sumer. At its height, Ebla reached a size of 60
i tares, and a population of from 10,000 to 20,000. Archaeological and textual
• vidence shows Ebla as a nexus of trade eastward with Mesopotamia and south-
tward with Bybios, and hence indirectly with Egypt,
Mi hough for the most part details are not known, a tentative list of rulers
iumerian: en; Akkadian malikum) of Ebla up until the destruction of the city-state
i Sargon (?) in c. 2300 8 can be reconstructed from the texts (HE1 19-26; SHP
CANE 2:1222). These, include, with very rough chronological estimates
i urning .i 20 year generation:
Rnmanu (c. 2740}
N.im.mii |< 11 >()J
Da |. . .|{< !7(K)|
i i lni |< 2(»sii|
.Ml
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Dane'um {c. 2660}
Ibbini-Lim {c. 2640}
Ishrut-Damu {c. 2620}
Isidu {c. 2600}
Isrut-Halam {c. 2580}
Iksud {c. 2560}
Talda-Lim {c. 2540}
Abur-Lim {c. 2520}
Agur-Lim {c. 2500}
Ibbi-Damu {c.2480}
Baga-Damu {c.2460}
Enar-Damu {c. 2440}
Ishar-Malik {c. 2420}
Kum-Damu {c. 2400}
Adub-Damu {c. 2380}
Igrish-Halam {c. 2360}
Irkab-Damu {c. 2340}
Ish'ar-Damu {c. 2320}
This list implies that the beginning of the dynasty coincided with the building of
the first royal palace (G2) on the acropolis at about 2700, with the dynasty lasting
until the destruction of that palace complex around 2300; it was through this
destruction that the Ebla archive was inadvertently preserved. However, most of
the Ebla tablets come from the period of the last three rulers on this list - roughly
the late twenty -fourth century; the earlier rulers are little more than mere names.
Based on a careful study of the political implications of economic and admin-
istrative texts, Ebla should probably be seen as a hegemonic state, the major eco-
nomic and military power in inland Syria during the Early Bronze Age (HE1 51-
69). At its greatest extent the kingdom occupied an area roughly half the size of
the modern state of Syria. Ebla ruled over two dozen or so large cities, and many
other towns and villages. About half of the kingdom of Ebla was under the direct
rule of the king, administered by governors (lugal); the other half of the cities were
vassal states which retained their own kings (en), who provided tribute, supplies,
military equipment, troop levees, and work crews to Ebla. 9 Smaller towns and
villages were ruled by overseers (ugula) who were appointed by the king (HE1 34).
The king also sent agents (mashkim), collectors (ur) and messengers (has) to oversee
royal affairs and interests (HE1 51-2). Members of the extended royal family often
served in major positions of power or as rulers of subsidiary cities, while daughters
of the king were made high priestesses (datn-dingir, "wife of the god") in temples
in different cities (HE1 53). Some of these client kings had their own sub-client
rulers; the king of Burman, for example, was a vassal of Ebla, but was himself
overlord of his own vassals in the towns of Shada and Arisum (1 IK I 33). Many of
the smaller towns and villages were treated as property, which was tr.ided between
kings, client-kings, vassals, governors, nobles, and trmplr hin.miues (HH1 V|,
242
SYRIA AND LEBANON
15—9). With variations in detail, this basic pattern of political organization would
continue in Syria for the next thousand years.
The royal administration included departments for the collection and distribu-
tion of metals (e-am, "house of metal"), textiles (e-siki, "house of textiles"), and
chariots and draft animals (e-gigir, "house of chariots") (HE1 53). Ebla could be
tidied a tribute-state, whose power was based on wealth derived from tribute
collected from vassals and allies. At the height of its power the king of Ebla
icceived annually an average of 357 kg of silver, 10 kg of gold, and 490 kg of
topper, with a royal flock totaling 670,000 sheep (CANE 2:1125—6). Vassal cities
were also required to supply the army of Ebla with weapons, including spearheads,
ii rows, and daggers.
Supplies for soldiers were also part of the vassal tribute system, including
1 1 o thing, animals, wine and food, and men for labor or combat (HE1 40-1, 45—6);
the small town of Armi, for example, provided 120 soldiers, while the town of
\hatum mobilized 180 (HE1 44). At full mobilization the army of Ebla was thus a
omposite force of each of its vassal city-states; nomadic clients of the king of Ebla
w ere also required to send troops and supplies. The Ebla texts also describe brisk
nver traffic on the Euphrates, including wooden and reed boats (HE1 60-1); a
number of different types of boats are described, including: boats (ma), large boats
iiui-gat), and deep draft cargo boats (ma-gur) (HE1 60-2); these boats were pre-
■ u m ably commandeered and used during military campaigns to provide logistical
1 1 ui transportation support for armies marching up and down the Euphrates.
Some city-states in the region were Eblaite allies, bound together by mutual
interest and marriage. Diplomatically, Irkab-Damu {c. 2340} sealed an alliance
irith the vassal city of Emar, through the marriage of his daughter to the king of
I mar (SHP 28-9). Although the details are lacking, it is clear that there was
ongoing intrigue and tension between Ebla and rival city states, creating frequently
unstable and shifting patterns of alliances. Diplomatic intrigue focused on the
ongoing struggle between the two main military powers of Syria in the middle
Euphrates, Mari and Ebla, for hegemony over the city-states lying between them.
I he ruler of a city-state called Adu was lured away by Mari, apparently under
Ome duress, from its former alliance with Ebla: "the friendship [alliance] of Ebla is
BO! good, better to establish good friendship with Mari" (SHP 29). Tactics in this
truggle included marriage alliances and diplomatic intrigue, as well as outright
1 1 two of the year-names in the Ebla texts mention defeat of the armies of
Mari (SHP 29; HE1 43).
The most important military texts describe a struggle between Ebla and its
■ir.it est rival, Mari, which lasted off and on for nearly a century. 10 Our informa-
[on comes in the form of a rather laconic and formulaic combat report from the
I hi. ute general Enna-Dagan to an unnamed king of Ebla, perhaps Irkab-Damu
1 ' 10 j, describing a sequence of campaigns over the course of three genera-
ii I lere is an example of the combat report formula: "Iblul-Il [king of Mari]
itcd Shada, Addalini, and Arisum, | vassal] countries of Burman at Sugurum,
.tin] raised a |butial| mound |o\u a pile of enemy corpses!'' (IIH1 29-30).
I \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
It appears that for three generations Mari had been incrementally encroaching
up the Euphrates until it had reached the Eblaite vassal city-state of Emar at the
great bend, forcing Ebla to pay tribute (HE1 38-9) totaling 1000 kg of silver and
60 kg of gold over the course of perhaps forty years (CANE 2:1226). At that point
Ebla dispatched an army under general Enna-Dagan, who launched a triumphant
counterattack. The specifics are vague, but the overall picture is clear. Enna-Dagan
■was victorious, retaking the cities on the middle Euphrates that had been captured
by Mari. The scale of the conflict is reflected in reports of 3600 dead at a battle at
Darashum and another 3200 dead at Badanu and Masanu - though it is not clear if
these numbers included civilian and military casualties (HE1 43). Enna-Dagan
then proceeded south-east down the Euphrates, defeating the armies of Mari and
its allies several more times, culminating in the capture of Mari itself, after which
general Enna-Dagan was established as the new king (en) of Mari; it is not certain
if he had been a vassal of the king of Ebla, but he seems to have become essentially
independent. Thereafter the boundary between Ebla was established at Halabit,
with that important fortress in Ebla's hands (HE1 49-50).
Early Bronze Age Mari (Tell Hariri) {2600-2300} 11
The remarkable archaeological discovers at Ebla, and our consequent knowledge
of that site, overshadow the achievements of Early Bronze Mari. However, mosi
evidence points to Mari rather than Ebla as the dominant city-state on the middle
Euphrates. It was nearly twice as large as Ebla (100-plus hectares versus 60 hec-
tares), and contained from 20,000 to 30,000 people (AS 263). Its double circular
mud-brick fortifications measured 1920 meters in diameter, with gates protected
by large projecting towers (EA 3:414; AFC 135). As noted above, Mari also
seemed to be militarily predominant over Ebla during much of the twenty-fourth
century, until the great victories of the Eblaite general Enna-Dagan {c. 2340}.
We are able to reconstruct a king-list for the Early Bronze Age Mari, which
unfortunately is little more than names, with very rough dates for their rule. 12
1. Ilshu {c. 2550-2520}
2. Lamgi-Mari {c. 2520-2503}
3. Ikun-Shamash {c. 2503-2473}
4. Ikun Shamagan {c. 2473-2453}
5. Ishqi-Mari {c. 2453-2423}
6. Anubu {c. 2423-2416}
Sa'umu {c. 2416-2400}
Ishtup-Ishar {c. 2400}
Iblul-Il {c. 2380}
Nizi {c. 2360}
Enna-Dagan (conqueror from Mari) {c. 2340}
Ikun-Ishar {c. 2320}
Hida'ar {c. 2300}
'! I
SYRIA AND LEBANON
Maris predominance was brought to an end by the campaigns of general Enna-
I >aga of Ebla, as we have seen, who defeated the armies of Mari and captured the
ity, installing himself as king (HE1 26—51). Little is known of Enna-Dagan 's suc-
I i\ssors, and by around 2300 the city was conquered by Sargon of Akkad,
Terqa (EA 5:188-90; AS 267)
Another powerful Early Bronze Age city-state on the middle Euphrates was Terqa
I ell Ashara), with some of the most massive brick fortifications of the period —
three concentric walls totaling twenty meters in thickness. The first of the three
ills was built about 2900, and the next two at roughly hundred-year intervals.
i he walls were maintained and repaired over the course of the next thousand
/ears, indicating an early perception of increasing military threat throughout most
■ I the Early Bronze. It seems likely that Terqa was politically dependant on Mari in
ome way and served as a major bastion for the defense of that kingdom.
Warriors of Early Bronze Syria
\w analysis of archaeological and artistic evidence gives us a fair idea of the
iimament of the Syrian warrior of the Early Bronze Age. It is important to
mphasize that the term "Early Bronze" in reference to the weapons technology
the third millennium is something of a misnomer. For example, although
ronze arrowheads are known, most Early Bronze arrowheads continued to be
Hide of flint (AS 272); in general, flint or obsidian weapons remained common.
I \ en when metal weapons were used, throughout the first half of the Early Bronze
V'.r most weapons were actually cast from arsenic-copper. True tin-bronze was
l.ihvely rare because of the scarcity of tin sources in the Near East. Tin, along
iih lapis lazuli, was imported over 3000 miles from Afghanistan; city-state
ireaucracies tried carefully to control the importation and distribution of tin.
( »nly in the later Early Bronze Age had tin supplies become large and reliable
in mgh to allow tin-bronze to become the predominant metal for weapon mak-
ing. The term "Early Bronze Age" refers to the first appearance of tin-bronze
tpons, not to the period of their universal adoption. Thus, Early Bronze Age
Hreapons industries were dependent on access to the scarce resource of tin; the
ili with the best and most reliable access to tin could arm more soldiers more
heavily with bronze weapons.
Perhaps the earliest martial art from Syria was erected by an unknown Early
Bronze king near Jebelet el-Beidha, showing a bearded king wearing a (sheep-
vkin?) kilt and sash on his left shoulder, holding a mace in his right hand. One of
H two followers holds an axe; the weapon of the other is lost (AS 273). This stele
was erected on a prominent plateau as some sort of victory monument, pointing to
the rise of royal martial ideology. Other details are uncertain.
\ inajoi source for Syrian warrior armament is armed god figurines.
I hroui'Jiout the levant .in.l Syria during l-.irly Bronze III {2300-2000} and the
M .
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Middle Bronze Age {2000—1600}, a religious tradition developed centered on il
offering of copper or bronze votive statuettes to temples. Hundreds of these su
tuettes have been preserved. Many of them represent armed warrior gods, an<
hence provide for us an invaluable record of the changing dress and armament
Bronze Age Syrian and Canaanite warriors. 13 It must be emphasized that tin
figures are intended to represent divinities, and hence their weapons tend to refit
the weapons of the elite warriors rather than the common soldiers, but this
generally true of all Bronze Age martial art.
Several EB III {2300-2000} figurines were found at Tell el-Judeideh (SAF I
These depict bearded nude warriors wearing an eight-inch wide leather b
around the waist, armed with a short thrusting spear or javelin and a round-he, u I
mace. They wear a torque around the neck, and have a conical helmet, eithci
copper or leather (SAF §1-2). Since other contemporary art shows warriors :•
erally wearing kilts, the lack of clothing on several of these figures in this ai
subsequent periods may reflect religious concerns related to fertility, or an attempt
to indicate if the votive figure is a god or goddess, rather than an actual tradition
fighting in the nude, though that cannot be discounted (SAF 133-4),
Another major collection of bronze figurines comes from the mountains <>
Lebanon and dates to roughly the end of the Early Bronze Age {2100—1900} (SAI
15). These depict the warrior-god wearing a knee-length kilt and an eight-im h
wide leather belt at the waist; some have long braided ropes hanging from the 1 1
or wear a torque or necklace. The figures have full beards and shoulder-leu;
braided hair. Unfortunately the weapons for these figures were cast separately .in.
are missing from most of the figures, but those remaining include a man-lenj
broad-headed thrusting spear and a mace or club (SAF §3—9). The helmets woi
by the earlier Early Bronze III figures from Tell el-Judeideh are not present. Tin
two sources point to the mace and thrusting spear as the standard Early Bronze 1 1 1
armament in Syria.
Our understanding of the arms and armor of Syria during the Ebla age (
2500—2300} is greatly enhanced by fragments from military murals from the p.il.i
ces of the kings of Ebla (AFC 175-7) and Mari (AFC 157-60), which compl.
ment related martial art from contemporary Mesopotamia in Early Dynastic III
{2650-2300} from Girsu (AFC 190-1) and Ur (AFC 97-9), which was discus;
on pp. 59—60. Fragments of a palace military mural from Ebla, sometimes known
as the "Standard of Ebla", give us a good view of Syrian warriors of the twent\
fourth century (AFC 175—7). Most of the surviving fragments of the main
murals from the palace at Ebla seem to be post-combat scenes related to prison ei
The first shows a soldier from Ebla wearing a leather cape as armor, typical oi thi
Early Dynastic period found on the Standard of Ur. This warrior also has a helmcl
probably of leather, and carries a short javelin which he is thrusting into the neel
of a prostrate captured enemy lying bound at his feet (AFC 176). The second
shows a soldier in a leather (or sheepskin) kilt, which is cut into strips at the km >
to facilitate movement; this soldier has no helmet. I le lus ,i pole on Ins shonhli i
from which hangs something which looks like fain u . ,iini has h. • n mtei pieted as
Mf.
SYRIA AND LEBANON
liner, a battle net, or a pouch to carry equipment or booty. The pole may in fact
,n axe or a javelin - there are other scenes showing weapons carried on
illlders from which other equipment or banners are hung. 14 In his right hand he
fries two severed enemy heads, perhaps hoping to obtain a bounty from the king
\\ < : 176). The third vignette shows a man dressed precisely like the warrior in
second, but here he is grappling with a naked enemy prisoner (AFC 177). The
,1 scene shows a man in the same type of kilt also grappling with an enemy. The
I , .or has a large bronze dagger in his right hand, with a "distinctive crescent-
| ed pommel and ridged blade", which he is thrusting into the eye of a fallen
my The enemy lies on his back, holding his attacker by the knees with his
hi hand, using his left hand trying to hold back the dagger (AFC 177). Other
i nents from the mural show an archer and a bound prisoner being escorted by a
Ik i (AS 241). A contemporary statue of a king of Ebla shows him holding the
u al Sumerian Early Dynastic narrow-bladed axe (AFC 171).
rhe martial art from Early Bronze Age Mari 15 shows very close parallels to that
! bla and Ur, indicating there was essentially a single shared military system
nding from Sumer up the middle Euphrates into eastern Syria - or alter-
ively that they shared the same art style and craftsmen. Weapons depicted
lude the narrow-headed axe (AS 264; AW 1:137-9), javelin (AFC 157), spear
I ( ' 158; AW 1:138), and bow (AFC 158). Most of the soldiers wear leather (or
I l) helmets, fastened by a strap under the chin (AFC 158); some have beret-
C raps (AS 264; AW 1:139). One of the warriors carries aloft a tall pole topped
, hull-emblem - presumably a regimental standard (AW 1:138). Most of the
Jdiers wear knee or ankle-length kilts with fringed hems. Most also have a long,
\ hie sash over their right shoulders, extending down to their knees in both front
id hack; it is marked by two rows of evenly spaced circles (AFC 157-8; AW
I MS); this sash seems to be unique to soldiers from Man from this period. It has
pen interpreted as a leopard skin - though the circles seem far too evenly spaced -
I itudded leather (AFC 157); it may simply be a colored fabric sash used at Man
some type of heraldic uniform. Prisoners are shown with their arms tied to their
waists and pinioned behind their backs at the elbows (AFC 157; AS 264; AW
MS). The standard Early Bronze Sumerian-style war-cart - four solid wheels,
,lt.,w n by equids, with a driver and warrior with multiple javelins - is found in the
Mari murals (AFC 159-60; AW 1:139). A detailed discussion of the Sumerian
U cart is found in Chapter Five, but here it should be noted that war-cart
i hnology had spread to the middle Euphrates by at least the twenty-fourth
V-
Militarily the most interesting scene at Mari is a shell plaque depicting two
in typical Man military dress and a sprawling dead enemy (Figure 5c, p. 219).
irsl soldier holds a long thrusting spear underhand in his left hand. His right
I upports a huge reed shield, with the reeds bound in leather in four evenly
s V mvi\ places. The shield appears to be about two meters tall, and is strongly
.itched backward in its uppei portion; it seems too big and bulky to be maneuvered
,, lM K m battle liehnul iln- shu-ld beam is au archer, shooting an arrow upward
147
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
over the top of the curved shield. It is difficult to resist the interpretation i
scene represents a siege, in which one warrior holds a large shield for thi
tion of the archer. The fact that the shield is curved backward indicates I
of missiles from above - this could occur either from missiles shot from
from high trajectory arrows or sling stones shot from the ground. Thi
shooting his arrow upward indicates a probable target on a wall. The bull
the shield would make it unwieldy in mobile combat, but it is an ideal 1 1
tification for static siege combat. In broad terms this shield is similar to th
body-shields of Sumerian warriors discussed in pages 55—9; the same type of sit
remained in use in Mesopotamia until Assyrian times {930-612} (AW 2
418-19, 424, 435).
Archaeologically, weapon finds from tombs confirm the standard Early I
Age panoply found in Syria, including spears, javelins, maces, axes, arrow I
and daggers (MW; AS 270-1). The most important sites of weapon finds ii
Qatna (south of modern Hama), where over 100 copper/bronze weapon
discovered in tombs (MW; EA 4:35-6; AS 245); Til-Barsib (Tell Ahmar), whei i
three dozen weapons were found in local tombs (MW; EA 5:209—10; A
and the tombs at Jerablus Tahtani, near Carchemish (MW; EA 1:423—4; AS
These weapons are mainly of arsenic-copper, with tin-bronze appearing I
end of the Early Bronze Age. Surviving weapons include narrow-bladed axes
spearheads, javelin heads, arrowheads, thin daggers, and broad, leaf-shaped dagt 1
In summary, complementary evidence from written, artistic, and archaeoli
sources give us a fairly good picture of Syrian warriors of the Early Bronze p.
There were two overlapping military traditions in Syria. The first could be
the indigenous Syrian system, with warriors in kilts and broad leather belts an
with a combination of spear, javelin, mace, axe, and bronze dagger, probablx
plemented by the bow. The second Syrian military system, found at Mari I
and probably other major cities on the middle Euphrates, could probably be
sidered an extension or variation on the contemporary Sumerian military syst
The basic dress is a leather (or sheepskin?) kilt extending from the waist n<
knees. The leather is cut into strips for about six inches above the knees to I >
itate movement. This basic gear is often supplemented by heavy infantry eijiiij
ment consisting of a long leather cape or cloak extending from the shoukln
below the knees, and a leather or metal helmet. The weapons shown include I
standard Early Bronze bow javelin, spear, large dagger, and axe. Other than h
mets, no metal armor has been found from the Early Bronze Age; it is likely tl
almost all armor depicted in the martial art was leather. Metal helmets have l>
found in the Royal Tombs of Ur, indicating that they were used at least by the
warrior elites. 18
Akkadian Empire in Syria {c. 2300-2200} 19
The long-lasting, bi-polar military struggle between Ebla and Mari on the inn Ml
Euphrates was overthrown by the intervention of the Akkadians around 23< M). I'h
248
SYRIA AND LEBANON
! truction layers at many Early Bronze sites in Syria are generally
to the Akkadian conquest (AS 277-82). The major campaigns of the
est Akkadian warlords Sargon {2334-2279} and Naram-Sin {2255-
lu-on discussed in Chapter Three. Among the claimed conquests of
Mai i, Yarmuti, and Ebla, then westward to the Mediterranean (R 2:12,
We hive no precise chronology for Sargon's reign, but this campaign
. m ( urred rather late in his reign after he had firmly secured Mesopo-
rhaps around 2300. His army, presumably supported by a river fleet,
ip the Euphrates to the city-state Tuttal, which submitted. There Sargon
| the oracle of the god Dagon, "who gave him, from that time on, the
,,.,11 v [of Syria, including the city-states ol] Mari, Yarmuti, and Ebla, as
I orest of Cedars [Lebanon] and the [Taurus] Mountain of Silver" (CI/
- nh the godDagon's approval, Sargon continued his march north-west-
king Man, and reaching the Mediterranean Sea. Sargon's motive for his
i clear; he was seeking direct access to the "Forest of Cedars and the
.m i of Silver" - in other words, he was searching for building timber and
OCh of which were in short supply in Mesopotamia itself. Archaeology
thai Man was destroyed about this time, a destruction generally attrib-
iargon. Many other sites in Syria show destruction layers datable to this
\S 278). Some were rebuilt and continued as urban centers under Akka-
,!, . others were never reinhabited, initiating the urban decline in Syria
,uld reach crisis proportions from 2200 to 2000 (AS 281-7).
interpretation of the archaeological evidence for direct Akkadian dom-
„ oi Syria is somewhat controversial (AS 278-9). Maximalists argue for a
| oi direct Akkadian control of Syria in the twenty-second century, inter-
d with rebellions and a period of independence between Sargon and Nararn-
quiring a strong campaign to reassert Akkadian authority by Naram-Sin (R
0. They point to the Akkadian palaces of Naram-Sin at Nagar (Tell Brak)
Shekhna (Tell Leilan) as exemplars of Akkadian direct rule (EA 3:343-4; AS
HI). Minimalists see the claims of the Akkadian warlords as exaggerated and
• Jnnnmon limited. Some type of hegemony must have been exercised by the
uluns; after his conquests Naram-sm was able to install two of his daughters as
at Mari, and to build a palace with bricks stamped with his name; an
ription of Runush was also found at Man (Cl/2:331-2). In either case,
Lkadian intervention m Syria created a major power shift in the old political
J t -t of Hariy Bronze Syrian city-states. Ebla was also destroyed by the Akkadians;
i I, it was quickly rebuilt and remained an important economic center in
, queii! centuries as attested by references to it in trading texts - it never
. ,,„ H T ,amcd its earlier role of regional military predominance.
20
Crisis at the end of the Early Bronze Age {2200-2000}
il( |mmi , ( | ul . ulmstu oi tin- end ol the b.arlv liron'/e Age is a region-wide
, ted in wulrsnie.ul n uU'.ual drt ,i\, dynast n collapse, urban disintegration,
' l'i
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
and tribal migration. Similar patterns of crisis are found in Egypt, Canaan, Syria,
Cyprus, Anatolia, the Aegean, Mesopotamia, and Iran during this same period.
Since similar patterns of decline have been discovered throughout the Near East,
some scholars have searched for region- wide factors contributing to this crisis.
One theory posits that increasing aridity initiated a crisis for both farmers and
herders. An extended drought reduced both annual crop yields and the overall
carrying capacity of nomadic grazing grounds. An alternative, or perhaps com
plementary theory posits human-caused environmental deterioration through
over-grazing, soil depletion, salinization, deforestation, and other forms of ecolo-
gical degradation. The impact of either or both of these developments was
decreasing productivity, increasing social stress, competition for resources, and
population displacement through migration and war. Given that the legitimation
of most Early Bronze dynasties was intimately connected to temple ideologies of
divinely sanctioned kingship and promises of fertility from the gods, drought and
decreasing productivity with subsequent famine, war, and chaos would have served
to undermine the legitimacy of reigning dynasts, contributing to the collapse of
their power and authority. The cumulative result was a period of political disin
tegration, war, anarchy, social upheaval, and migration.
Although the precise cause of the urban collapse at the end of the Bronze Age is
uncertain, the results are clear in both the archaeological and the historical record.
The major centers of urban civilization and military power in both Mesopotamia
and Egypt underwent serious decline and even collapse, resulting in the fragmen-
tation of power and a sequence of wars. At the same time, nomadic or semi
nomadic peoples from the periphery of the urbanized regions - Amorites,
Canaanites, Hurrians and Gutians - migrated from their pastoral homelands, eithei
under ecological pressure or because military weakness of the collapsing central
authority in the great urban centers created an inviting target. These peoples
migrated first into the fringes of the urban areas, eventually usurping power in the
major city-states throughout much of the Near East. In Egypt this infiltration of
Canaanite semi-nomads occurred mainly in the eastern delta, but the internal
fragmentation of Egypt in the First Intermediate Period occurred throughout the
entire Nile Valley. The specific military results of this region- wide transformation
will be examined in the chapters associated with each region.
The two centuries following the collapse of the Akkadian empire {2200-2000 |
are very poorly documented in Syria. In addition to the resurrected Ebla, the
major city-states of the twenty-second and twenty-first centuries included Aleppo,
Alalakh, Urshu, Tuttul, Byblos, Carchemish, and Qatna; 21 there were, of course,
numerous smaller towns and unfortified farming villages which were generally
dependent on the larger city-states. By the twenty-first century the city-state of
Ebla ruled a mere skeleton of its former empire (HE2 101-33). If Astour's recon
struction of events and synchronisms are correct, Ebla was destroyed by Human
invaders around 2030 (HE2 133-71). Unfortunately, we have almost no eon
temporary indigenous records describing the military rel.it tons between the city-states
during this period. The only other textual example we have oi post Akkadian
250
SYRIA AND LEBANON
iesopotamian military intervention into Syria comes from the reign of Shusin of
1 k {2037-2029}, who campaigned up the Euphrates to the "land where cedars
e cut" (R 3/2:191; SHP 36). On the other hand, archaeological excavations
■ -Hen discover "burn layers" which indicate destruction by fire, frequently assumed
I > have been caused by war: "an unchronicled episode in the never-ending drama
warfare between neighbours that was characteristic of Syria's early history"
< 1/2:339). Such burn layers can only be roughly dated by stratigraphy; further-
ftore, it is impossible to know for certain who destroyed the city, or why. But their
■stence does point to ongoing serious wars resulting in frequent sieges, capture,
-ml the destruction of cities.
AttiGvites in Syria 22
1 I 1 Syria the late Early Bronze crisis witnessed widespread urban collapse, popula-
lon decline, decentralization, and devastation (HE2 164-71). Some sites, like
i ari under the shakkanakku (descendants of the Akkadian installed "governors")
' 150-1900}, survived the crisis relatively unscathed, and indeed, seem to have
>spered (AS 286-7). Many sites were destroyed and never reinhabited. Others,
ike Ebla, were burned and "reduced to minuscule, short-lived villages" (AS 283)
ii habited by impoverished squatters (AS 294). Some cities, however, like Nagar
f II Brak) and Urkesh (Tell Mozan) managed to survive the crisis, though often
iih reduced population, wealth, and power. Overall twenty major cities in Syria
r< known to have been destroyed during this period (HE2 164-71).
Many cities which survived in one form or another experienced major dynastic
hilis, with new Amorite elites rising to power. Thus, by the twentieth century
\i norite warlords had come to power in most of the major city-states in Syria.
I hey were rivaled in the Khabur triangle in north-eastern Syria by Hurrians,
migrants from Anatolia who slowly became the dominant ethnic group (see
■p 303-7). The shift from the Early to the Middle Bronze in Syria is clearly
n nked in the material culture of ceramics, figurines, and house and town plan-
ning (AS 291).
Middle Bronze Age Syria {2000-160G} 23
B the twentieth century the crisis which had resulted in the decline of urban
ivilization in the Near East had largely played itself out. Changing ecological,
" Lai, and political conditions apparently again favored urbanization; major city-
i lies reappeared, while older surviving sites grew in size and power. The transi-
tii hi from Early to Middle Bronze is characterized by many new archaeological
I ".logics, including pottery styles, other forms of material culture, weapons,
fortification styles, art, and language. The Middle Bronze Age is a period of the
revival of urban life; one way in which this is manifest is by increasing military
i unpel ition between e\p.unlmi» < it v states. Though still woefully fragmentary and
in.uletju.ite, [he i.mj'e ijiuntin .mil ijuality of our sources for military history
m
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
improve dramatically in Middle Bronze II (SHP 39-40, 44-9), especially in rein
tionship to the late Middle Bronze archive at Mari.
Nearly all of the known names of Syrian rulers in the Middle Bronze period arc
linguistically Amorite; the exceptions are those of north-eastern Syria, which arc
predominantly Hurrian (see Chapter Eleven). Amorite-dominated dynasties wen
established in most major cities by the beginning of the Middle Bronze period
Some of these dynasties, such as Byblos and Ugarit, proved quite stable and long
lasting, in contrast to the political anarchy and dynastic instability character izi in-,
the end of the Early Bronze Age. Most of the city-states of Syria shared a relate* I
military system which can be reconstructed in broad strokes from surviving artistit
and archaeological sources.
Warriors of Middle Bronze Age Syria (MM 25-31; MK 148-50)
As with most of the ancient Near East, our major source of information for arms
and armor in Middle Bronze Age Syria comes from archaeology and art, supple
mented by important scattered references to weapons in the Mari archive aixl
other texts. Archaeologically, we are fortunate that the massive collections oi
votive objects found at the temples at Byblos included a large number of actual
weapons, which allows us to make a precise one-to-one correlation between tin
weapons seen in art and those found in the temple- offering hordes (SAF §120-30.
MW; AW 1:174-5; WM 153-6). These include dagger blades (patrum, MM 30),
javelin and spearheads, both socketed and riveted, the "duckbill" and "eye" axes
and narrow socketed axes with chisel-like heads. 24 Bronze spears (sinnum) are the
most commonly mentioned weapon in the Mari archive (L 195, 239, 383, 446,
516); some of them were poisoned (L 385). One force consisted of 2000 spearmei
(L 195). Javelins are also mentioned at Mari (L 467, 497, 516). Some of these wen
ornamental weapons of pure gold designed for ceremonies rather than fight in
(AW 1:170—1). Such ornamental weapons were presumably for officers, elite sol
diers, or troops on parade. One text from Mari mentions "ten gold-plated bron/t
spears, forty silver-plated bronze spears and 250 bronze spears" (L 324).
There are several significant transitions from the Early to Middle Bronze agi
such as shields, axes, socketed weapons and sickle-swords. In the Middle Bron:
Age, although the mace (kakkum) continued in use for ceremonial purposes, sin I
as the example found at Ebla (EDS 236, 239-40), the mace as a practical weap<
essentially disappeared, being replaced by the axe (hassinnum) (MM 28-9; MW,
AFC 76). Increasingly weapons were made with a socket which into which tl
wooden haft was inserted. This permitted the head of the weapon to be mm
more securely fastened to the haft, thereby decreasing breakage.
The tradition of making figurines of armed warrior-gods that began in tii
Early Bronze Age continued throughout the Middle Bronze as well. One collei
tion comes from northern Syria around the beginning of the Middle Bronze A.
{2100-1900} (SAF 15, §10-18). Each figure in this style once held two weapon
one in each hand. Unfortunately many of the we.ip< nw ■ >l the Ihmii mes are missm
W
SYRIA AND LEBANON
i the forty-one figures from this period, all but ten lack weapons. The early fig-
nes in this collection are very crudely done, with the quality of the later figures
i (proving. Many figures are nude, but others wear the standard Syrian-Canaanite
ill with a broad leather belt. The most frequent weapon is the javelin or short
in listing spear. Six figures have a type of baldric around their right shoulders with
bronze daggers attached, which hang about halfway down the front of the chest;
others have daggers on their belts. Three figures hold what seem to be early
u kle-swords, which were probably elite weapons. Two figurines from Ugarit have
irques, and are armed with maces (SAF §18).
I he figures associated with the Orontes Valley from Syria are found throughout
he Middle Bronze Age {2000-1600} (SAF 15, §19-27), and contain a number of
ilitary innovations which might be associated with the Amorites. There are,
'■ »ne the less, a number of points of continuity with earlier warriors. The standard
■ess continues to be a knee-length kilt with a broad leather belt. However, the
1 1 Mic of the kilt is often ornamented with lines and patterns. Headdress also
i omes ostentatious, with tall, pointed conical hats (divine crowns), and some-
nes fan-like flourishes which may be feathers (SAF §24-5). Several figures also
I e torques around their necks. The dagger becomes more prominent, again
nerally hung in mid-chest from a shoulder baldric (SAF §19), though sometimes
i. i-d in the belt (SAF §21). Most figures have two other weapons in addition to
ii sheathed dagger. The spear, dagger, mace combination of the Early Bronze
is replaced by spear, dagger and one of two types of axe: the "eye" or the
"duck-bill" axe (SAF §19; AW 1:166-8).
\nother innovation of this period is the shield and axe combination (SAF §94,
98). Shields are mentioned in the Mari texts (L 239). From the figurines they
in to be of typical Canaanite style, shown in several Egyptian depictions of
■ .unite warriors (see Chapter Seventeen). The Canaanite shield is rectangular
hape with small triangles cut out of the top and bottom; they appear to be
I hie from animal skins with the pointed projections on the four corners being the
• in shoulders. If proportional, the shields held by the Orontes figurines are quite
i ill almost bucklers - perhaps 35 cm long and 20 cm wide. Egyptian depictions
•I the same Canaanite shields show them much larger, capable of protecting most
1 the upper torso. Seeden believes that the sculpters were forced to make unu-
u.illy small shields for the figurines due to the limitations of the casting process
SAF 144); it is likely that the actual size of the shield depicted by the Egyptians is
limit' accurate.
1 he Litest and largest archaeological find of armed god figurines comes from
Ivblos, where several hundred have been found, again covering the entire Middle
nze period. Most of these are small, poorly made, and with no surviving
■ apons; they seem to have been mass produced as inexpensively and quickly as
ible. Some, however, preserve a number of military details. Some have a long,
I headed thrusting spear in the left hand, a long-hafted semi-circular axe in
i I'lu , and a dagi.u*i tin list in the broad belt (SAF ft 195, 774, 1 107). The axe is
( prominent amour Mit\i\mi» weapons f S A I //22H, 231). Another has a
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
small shield, axe and dagger thrust: in his belt (SAF #281). The Early Bron/
baldric has disappeared; the daggers of the Byblos figurines are invariably tucked n
the broad belt, either at the front or the left side (SAF #769-73). Though tix
weapons are usually missing, by comparing poses and the empty sockets of weap
onless figurines with similar figures whose weapons remain, it is possible to
extrapolate that the spear-axe or shield— axe combinations are by far the mosi
common (SAF §34, #307, 511—16). The widespread use of the dagger-axe-spe.u
javelin combination is confirmed by both archaeological and Egyptian artist i<
sources. A few figures are armed with two spears, perhaps one a javelin fm
throwing and the other a thrusting spear, or, alternatively, two javelins (SAF #73. 1
4, 1502). Many of the figures seem to have tall conical hats which are probably
divine crowns; some, however, may be helmets (SAF #1129-30). Helmets (qui
pissum) (L 205) are occasionally mentioned in the Mari texts, but body armoi i
rare. 25 One warrior may have a bow, though this may simply be a bent spear oi
even a walking stick (SAF #1406); other than this one possibility, none of thi
Middle Bronze figurines carries a bow though this may be because of the te( h
nical difficulties of casting such a weapon (SAF 144).
A ritual votive basin from nineteenth-century Ebla is ornamented with I
number of warriors; all of them are bearded, with no headdress, wearing should n
to-knee robes with patterns and fringes (AANE §448-53; AS 303; EDS 242). I
one panel three soldiers flanking an enthroned king all carry broad-headed
thrusting spears overhand, and sickle-swords in their left hand (AANE §448). In
another panel an enthroned king is guarded by warriors with man-size spin
held upright and resting on the floor (AANE §450). A hunting scene show
one man with an axe on his shoulder and another with a bow and quiv( i
(AANE §451).
Archery is relatively rare in Middle Bronze Syrian and Mesopotamia!! an
archaeology and texts. There are two types of bows mentioned in the M.in
archive: the tilpanum and the qastum. The tilpanum was once thought to have hern
a "thro wing-stick", but recent research has confirmed it is probably the composite
bow (MK 148; MM 25); qastum is a more generic term for bow. These bows ai
mentioned occasionally in Mari texts (ARM 2.116, 7.24, 10.19), but in relatively
small numbers. Zimri-Lim ordered six tilpanum (ARM 18.21); another texl
describes thirty being sent to the palace (ARM 9.102). Arrows (ussum) are orden
in greater quantity, but still in relatively small numbers. Shamshi-Adad orderec
10,000 bronze arrowheads (samrutum) of six shekels each (about 50 grams), bill w.i
forced to reduce his order to 5000 because of lack of tin to make the bronze. At
twenty arrows per archer, 10,000 arrows could equip 500 archers; the 5000 arrov
he actually got would only equip 250 archers. Another order of arrowhead
included a number of different weights, presumably for different types of arclu'i \
"Have made 50 bronze arrowheads of 5 shekels weight (40 grams) each, S(t
arrowheads of 3 shekels weight each, 100 arrowheads of 2 shekels weight each, and
200 arrowheads of 1 shekel weight each" (ARM IS. 5; MK 63). The lightei
arrowheads, with greater range but less pcmn iint" |mwri ,md also I
1 >l
SYRIA AND LEBANON
nsive - were more popular. Even so a total of 400 arrows ordered for a siege
M only equip twenty archers with twenty arrows each.
I he price was one silver shekel for twenty arrowheads; it is not clear if this is
• the price of the arrowhead, or if it includes the wood, feathers, and labor cost
I the arrow as well (ARM 1.38; MM 26). When we remember that ten ordinary
Uiiers were paid 2-3 shekels for campaign service (one month? three months?)
I<)9_500; pp. 196-7), we begin to see how expensive arrowheads were.
iimng the highest pay for the lowest period of service, we get a third of a
I per soldier per month, which would equate to the value of six or seven
Jieads. 26 The third of a shekel per soldier does not represent his entire
.; lie received food, housing, equipment, and booty as well. Nonetheless, in
idern terms, an arrowhead would probably cost the equivalent of one or two
idred dollars. One possible reason for the relative lack of archery is simply the
use of bronze arrowheads. At the same period an axehead required 650 grams
lonze, the equivalent in weight of seven arrowheads. But the axe could be
i over and over again, while there was a good likelihood that a bronze arrow-
■ I would be lost once shot. Bronze arrow ammunition was simply too expen-
iii the Middle Bronze Age. This expense may have contributed to the
ularity of the sling {waspum), of which 500 are mentioned in one text (MM 26;
I IS).
! he royal palace of Middle Bronze Mari was sacked by Hammurabi in 1759,
I icrving a unique set of color frescoes on the palace wall, some of which have
miliary aspects. The overall theme of the murals is the ceremonial investiture of
e king before the gods, who are sometimes armed. I am here assuming that the
ip «>ns of the gods reflect the actual weapons used by Mari soldiers from the
mod - an assumption generally confirmed by archaeology and other artistic
uirces. The largest mural shows the war-goddess Ishtar investing king Zimri-Lim
pith royal authority. Ishtar holds a proto-sickle-sword in her right hand, and has a
Umber of other weapons (axe and mace?) in a quiver on her back (SDA 279). The
/capons in the back quiver are more clearly depicted in another scene showing a
ml seated on a throne receiving offerings. Here again the weapons, which pro-
ucle at an angle over the left shoulder (presumably held in a quiver on the back),
c the axe, mace, and proto-sickle-sword (SDA 282-3). Two common soldiers are
bo depicted in the murals (SDA 275, 282). Both warriors are bare-chested,
raring white knee-length kilts with elaborate fringes. Both have yellow, knee-
Dgth rapes tied on their shoulders with a white sash. One is beardless, with a
lute unban-like hat that is wrapped under his chin; a sculpted head of a soldier
Uo shows this same head-gear. 27 This warrior seerns to have two arrows or jave-
protruding from his back or side; perhaps they are lodged in his cape. Despite
. wounds he is brandishing a javelin in his right hand, ready to throw. Much of
liming is destroyed, but the warrior seems to be leaning slightly backward
his left arm extended forward at waist level. My impression is that he might
hnldmgon to a < hat lot I rune will) his left hand, and leaning backward to throw
| m | u | im j | I1MI • ul, I,, neht hand The other warrior is bearded, without
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
head-gear, and is carrying a bundle over his shoulder on an axe or javelin (SDA
275, 282).
A final artistic source for Syrian Middle Bronze warfare is martial scenes in
glyptic art (cylinder seals). Many scenes show the king (or hero, or god) armec
with a mace (FI §220, 790), or double-armed with mace and dagger (FI §545,
789) and possibly mace and axe (FI §220). One warrior is shown carrying what
seems to be an axe, accompanied by another with a bow (FI §686). Another
weapon which appears occasionally in glyptic art is the sickle-sword (FI §872; see
pp. 66-71). The warriors are generally depicted wearing kilts and turbans, or some
type of horned helmet which is generally associated with mythic depictions of the
gods (FI §220, 545, 789, 790).
Two late Middle Bronze cylinder seals from Syria are some of our earliest
examples of the war-chariot, depicting the light, two-wheeled, horse-drawn
chariot with spoked wheels riding over defeated enemies (Figure 4e, p. 133). 28
One warrior has a quiver on his back, indicating the use of the bow from the
chariot; he is also followed by four infantry "runners" or support troops for the chariot
(FI §729). Another Middle Bronze scene shows people riding what seems to be a
two -hump ed Bactrian camel (FI §738), the earliest extant depiction of camel-riding,
which, in the long run, would create a military revolution in the Near East and
northern Africa, ultimately facilitating the rise of the medieval Islamic world
empire and West African Berber empires. In the Middle Bronze Age, howevei
there is no evidence for the military use of the camel, though nomads wen
probably beginning to use it for transport and logistics in the desert fringes of the
Near East (EA 1:407-8).
Maritime power 29
Unfortunately, due to very limited artistic, textual, and archaeological data, little
can be said about maritime warfare in the Bronze Age Levant. Only in the Late
Bronze does the evidence become sufficient to provide details. The two most
important Early and Middle Bronze maritime cities were Ugarit and Byblos,
though there were half-a-dozen other major Early Bronze maritime city-states, 30 a
number that expanded to nearly two dozen during the Middle Bronze. 31 All oi
these sites were heavily fortified during the Middle Bronze Age. Archaeological
evidence makes it clear that during the Middle Bronze Age maritime trade was
occurring between Syria and Egypt, Cyprus, and the Aegean. It can be assumed
that competition for trade routes would have led to some type of conflict, if only
piracy, but no specifics are known.
The Great city-states of Syria in Middle Bronze II
{1800-1600}
Syria during the Middle Bronze Age was divided into about a dozen major city
states, often engaged in fierce military competition I In iiu|t>i Middle Mron/e
256
SYRIA AND LEBANON
1 1. in city-states included Alalakh, Aleppo (Yamkhad), Byblos, Carchemish,
Damascus, Ebla, Hama (Amad), Khana (Terqa, Tell Ashara), Mari, Nagar (Tell
Wc), Qatna (Tel Mishrife), Shekhna (Tell Leilan), Ugarit (Ras Shamra), and
Mesh (Tell Mozan). 32 In addition, the city-states of Hazor (EA 3:1-5) and
I ",iddo (EA 3:460-9) in northern Canaan were in many ways part of the city-
iie military system of Middle Bronze Syria. Generally speaking, political and
iliiary power in Syria during the Middle Bronze Age was divided among these
states in a rather unstable system of balance of power, shifting alliances, and
mpts at hegemonic domination. Overall, Aleppo was the predominant military
>wer of Syria, with Mari a close second.
From the fragmentary textual and archaeological evidence we can establish a
letal history of these city-states and their military interrelationships. Middle
onze I {2000-1800} is rather poorly documented (SHP 39-40), but after 1800
archival cuneiform sources from Alalakh, Hattusis, Shekhna (Leilan), and
pccially Mari become quite rich by Bronze Age standards (SHP 44-9). The
e dominant city-states in Syria during Middle Bronze II were Aleppo, Mari,
1 Qatna. After the destruction of Mari by Hammurabi {1759} - a destruction
hich ironically preserved the greatest surviving archive of the age, a crucial
urce for military history — Aleppo remained the predominant power for a cen-
ii v and-a-half until defeated and destroyed by the Hittites around 1600. The
1 1 campaigns of Mursili in Syria and Babylon {1600-1595}, discussed in
■ li.ipter Eleven, brought an end to the Middle Bronze period, inaugurating the
I I sequent three-way struggle for control of Syria between the Hittites, Mitanni,
K I Egyptians during the Late Bronze Age {1600-1200}. Our information for the
lilitary history of each of the major Middle Bronze Syrian city-states is rather
lited, but a skeletal outline of military history can be obtained.
Aleppo (Yamkhad, Halpa, Halab) 33
Mthough Aleppo was the most powerful Syrian kingdom during the Middle
POnze period, it has yielded only limited archaeological data and no textual
1 I nve because of modern occupation over the ancient site. Enough data survives
i« II us that, like most other Middle Bronze city-states, Aleppo was defended by
louble wall - an outer earthen rampart surrounding the entire city, with large
■i tified chambered gateways and circular towers. There was also an inner citadel,
low covered by the magnificent medieval Islamic citadel (AS 303). Because of the
I of texts from Aleppo, we are left largely with incidental references to Aleppo
ii the records of rival states to reconstruct its military history.
I hiring much of Middle Bronze II Aleppo was one of the greatest powers of
tflC Near East. According to the Itur-Asdu letter {c. 1775}: "There is no king
ho is strong by himself: 10 or 15 kings follow Hammurabi of Babylon, as many
nllow Kim Sin of Larsa, Ibalpiel of Eshnunna and Amutpiel of Qatna, while
vcntN kings follow Yarim 1 mi |kinrj of Aleppo" (ANE 1:99). In other words, of
i i ■-. majot powers m Mescipot.miu and Syria around 1775 Mari, Babylon,
£7
WAR I M' I IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
SYRIA AND LEBANON
Larsa, Eshnunna, Qatna, and Aleppo — Aleppo was the most powerful. The "twenu
kings" who were allies and vassals of states of AJeppo included, at various times,
the rulers of the major city-states of Emar, Alalakh, Ugarit, and Carchemish. They
also maintained an on— off vassal relationship with two nomadic tribes in Syria, the
Rabbeans and Ubrabeans (SHP 52), who sometimes served as mercenary allies oi
Aleppo. In the late seventeenth century Hittite rulers referred to the king ol
Aleppo as a "great king", hence he was the diplomatic equal of the Hittite king.
From various historical sources we can reconstruct a king-list for imperial
Aleppo, up to the time of the Hittite conquest in c. 1600, with approximate dates
of the rulers (CANE 2:1202):
Sumu-Epuh {1810-1780} (SHP 51-4)
Yarim-Lim I {1780-1764} (SHP 54-8)
Hammu-rabi I {1764-1750} (SHP 58-9)
Abba'el I {1750-1720} (SHP 60-1)
Yarim-Lim II {1720-1700} (SHP 62)
Niqmepukh {c. 1700-1675} (SHP 62)
Irkabtum {c. 1675-1650} (SHP 63)
Yarim-Lim III {c. 1650-1625} (SHP 63-4)
Hammu-rabi II {c. 1625-1600} (SHP 64)
The written military history of Aleppo begins around 1805 with a campaign by
Yahdun-Lim, king of Mari {1820-1798}, who marched from the Euphrates to the
Mediterranean in search of cedar and other building timber; he claims to have
subdued the peoples of the area, forcing them to pay tribute. As a result of this
invasion Sumu-Epuh of Aleppo {1810-1790}, in alliance with a number of sur-
rounding city-states and nomadic tribes, marched against Yahdun-Lim, who
claims to have defeated the coalition (SHP 50). Shortly thereafter, however, Yahdun
Lim was attacked from the east by Ilakabkabu, father of Shamshi-Adad; Mari
entered a life-or-death struggle with the rising power of Shamshi-Adad (see pp. 168-
71), culminating in the fall of Mari around 1796. In the last few years before the
fall of Mari, its king Sumu-Yamam {1800-1796} attempted to organize an alliance
with his former enemy of Aleppo against the rising Assyrians, but failed to save his
city (SHP 52). On the other hand, Sumu-Epah of AJeppo seems to have welcomed
the refugee dynasts of Mari — some would say legitimate kings — to Aleppo,
invoking the ire of Shamshi-Adad.
The subsequent power vacuum in Syria was ultimately filled by Sumu-Epuh of
Aleppo {1810-1780}, who in the two decades following the fall of Mari rose to
prominence in the region, becoming a major enemy of the rising Shamshi-Adad
of Assyria. During the last years of Sumu-Epuh of Aleppo, Shamshi-Adad and his
son Yasmah-Adad {1796-1776}, who had been installed as client king of Mari
upon its conquest by the Assyrians, allied with Qatna, the major Syrian kingdom
on Aleppo's southern border, sealing the alliance with a dynastic marriage. The
smaller independent city-states to the north - Carchemish and Urshu both
258
H the anti- Aleppo alliance, leaving Sumu-Epuh surrounded and basically
unit allies (ARM 1.24; SHP 53-4). Unfortunately, no surviving text describes
• nit tome of this contest, but somehow Sumu-Epuh managed to forestall con-
I by Shamshi-Adad, probably by allegiance with Shamshi-Adad's enemies in
Nopotamia.
I 1 1 is military crisis was inherited by Sumu-Epuh's son and successor Yarim-Lim I
1 ' 1 764} (SHP 54-8), who during his reign engineered a dramatic reversal of
i iu\ He overcame the crisis by a deft alliance with Shamshi-Adad's other
lies Ibalpi-el of Eshnunna {1779—1765} and Elammurabi of Babylon {1792—
; Shamshi-Adad was thus surrounded by enemies on the east, south, and
I hiring this alliance Yarim-Lim is credited with having "saved the city of
Ion" (SHP 55), presumably by attacking the Assyrians in the rear while they
engaged in one of their attacks against Babylon.
n-Lim also had at his court a political wild-card, Zimri-Lim, grandson of
i Yamam, former king of Mari (L 42), whom many at Mari would have
idered the legitimate heir to the throne of Mari instead of the usurper and
n.ui imperialist Yasmah-Adad, son of the warlord Shamshi-Adad (SHP 55).
I Ins protege Zimri-Lim, Yarim-Lim captured the strategic fortress-city of
nil on the confluence of the Balikh and the Euphrates in 1777, where Zirnri-
i was installed as king (L 41). Fortuitously, Shamshi-Adad died the next year
f» } , creating succession tensions which were exploited by Yarim-Lim
Zimri-Lim who marched on Mari, defeating and ousting Yasmah-Addu and
oring Zimri-Lim to the throne of his ancestors as an ally- vassal of Aleppo
H 2). Yarim-Lim cemented the alliance by the marriage of his daughter Shibtu
/nnn-Lim, insuring that his grandsons would rule Mari (SHP 56). The tri-
iphant wedding was attended by the "kings of the whole land" (ARM 26.11).
Lit ions with Mari remained strong until the city fell to Hammurabi in 1761., In
last years of his reign Yarim-Lim consolidated his hold on Syria, bringing a
iiubcr of city-states and kings into alliance or vassalage. The important and rich
ding city of LTgarit was probably a vassal of Aleppo in this period (SHP 56—7).
his death in 1764, Yarim-Lim, with his twenty vassals and allied kings (ANE
I I was the mightiest ruler in the Near East outside of Egypt.
I he reign of Yarim-Lim's son Hammu-rabi I {1764-1750} (SHP 58-9) was
ncrally peaceful, with Aleppo maintaining good relations with most of its
ir.hliois. The city of Carchemish seems to have come under Aleppan dornina-
"ii iluring this period (SHP 59). An expeditionary force was sent from Aleppo to
I Babylon, including both regular Aleppan troops and Yamanite tribal con-
sents (SI II* 59). His reign coincided with the last phase of Hammurabi of
tbylon's imperialism and the sack of his brother-in-law's city of Mari, but
I 1 1 ! 1 1 1 1 1 1 i ,i hi of Aleppo seemed unwilling to be drawn into the war with Babylon.
\bba el ! 1750 1720} (SHP 60-1) also ruled over a fairly peaceful period for
Ji ppo. maintaining good relations with I lammurabi's successors in Babylon. The
i.i|<u inoiilrtl military event ol his reign was a rebellion ofZitraddu, governor
It f it li and sonic othri vassals m nppei Mesopotamia:
• ,<)
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Zitraddu, the governor of Irridi, revolted against Yarim-Lim [brother oi
Abba-el, king of Aleppo] and led robber bands and brought them to Irridi, hi
city. He incited the whole land to rebel against Abba-el [the king of Aleppo |
The mighty weapon [of the gods, which was decorated] with silver, gold, lapis
lazuli, [and] the great weapon of the Storm God [were raised against the rebeh
by the king of Aleppo]. As for Abba-el, he seized Irridi and captured tin
enemy [robber] bands. To Aleppo he returned in peace. (CS 2:369—70)
The rebellion was thus suppressed and the rebel city was destroyed. Yarim-Liin,
Abba-els brother, who had been client-king of Irridi before its rebellion, was
given the city of Alalakh as compensation, where his descendants ruled as client
allies of Aleppo for the next century (see pp. 264-5) (SHP 61).
The reigns of the subsequent kings of Aleppo are only sparsely documented in
military affairs. Niqmepukh {c. 1700-1630} conquered the city of Arazik ne.n
Carchemish (AT §7; SHP 62). Irkabtum {c. 1680-1660} campaigned in the
region of Nashtarbi, east of the Euphrates (AT §33), probably against the expand
ing power of Hurrian princes in north-eastern Syria (SHP 63). Yarim-Lim III {<
1660—1640} fought a war against Qatna to the south (SHP 63). Unfortunately, no
details are known of any of these events.
Under Hammu-rabi II {c. 1640—1620}, Aleppo faced its greatest militai \
challenge since the war with Shamshi-Adad 150 years earlier. This threat came
from a new unexpected direction, the rising Hittite kingdom to the north unclei
Hattusilis I {1650-1620} (SHP 64). Although we have no Aleppan records of this
war, it is clear that Hammu-rabi II was outmatched by the Hittites. Nonetheless,
through an alliance with the Hurrians, Hammu-rabi II was able to resist ongoinr
Hittite aggression for over two decades, at one point apparently killing the son of
Hattusilis and heir to the throne in a victorious battle (KH 102). A few text-,
mention an Aleppan general Zukrasi, "overseer of the army", who commando I
the resistance to the Hittite invaders (KH 76; CS 2:369b). In the end, however,
Mursilis I {c. 1620—1590} crushed the Aleppan army, sacking the capital and
destroying the kingdom around 1600 (see Chapter Eleven).
Mari
34
From the perspective of military history Mari is the most important city-state 1 1 1
ancient Syria. This is in part because of its important role as a major political and
military power of the day, but more because of the huge archive of 20,000 cunei
form tablets discovered at its palace, which contain hundreds of letters describing
military affairs. The military system described in the Mari letters has been dis
cussed in detail in Chapter Seven. Here I will outline the basic political history of
Mari during the early Middle Bronze Age.
Geographically Mari is located on the Euphrates river at a strategic juiictim
between four ecological, cultural, and political zones: Main Ion .md Sinner to I In
south-east, Asshur to the north-east, Syria to the imiili i md tin- nom.ulh
>(.!>
SYRIA AND LEBANON
ppe and desert to the south-west. Its strategic location was both a blessing and
urse; it brought wealth as a trading center, but also frequent invasion as a
'-sroad between Mesopotamia and Syria. In classical times the strategic
I economic functions of Mari were transferred to the nearby Roman city of
• na-Europos, which served as a major Roman frontier fortress against the
lans until it was destroyed by a siege of the Sasanid king Shapur in 256 CE
\ 2:173-8).
As noted above, Mari had been conquered by the Akkadians, where they
1 1 led a military governor. As Akkadian power collapsed, the governors of Mari,
iwn as the shakkanakku, siezed virtual independence and formed a dynasty.
iionghout the Ur III period Mari was governed by seven rulers, although little is
I now about their military activities (R3/2:439— 50). Under the fifth ruler, Puzur-
luar, a contemporary of Amarsin of Ur {2046-2038}, Mari apparently became
I' pendent, with its subsequent two rulers taking the title of king. Sometime
ound 2000, however, it was conquered by Amorites, who thereafter ruled the
.is a new dynasty.
I it tie is known of the kings of Mari in the early twentieth century. For the
neteenth century, however, we are much better informed. The precise details of
i ise of Yagid-Lim {c 1830-1820} to power in Mari are obscure; he may have
md as ruler of nearby Suprum. At some point he gained power over Mari and
laimed himself independent king. His son Yahdun-Lim {c. 1820-1800} was
"i ) temporary of the great warlord Shamshi-Adad of Assyria, He undertook a
rssful military career, transforming Mari into a significant military power in
opotamia, and a major rival of Assyria. His two martial inscriptions provide
1 sting details of his campaigns. After securing Mari he campaigned down the
iphrates, conquering the regions to the south-west.
Vahdun-Lim, son of Yaggid-Tim, king of Mari, Tuttul, and the land of Khana
| on the Euphrates south-east of Mari], mighty king, who controls the banks
of the Euphrates - the god Dagan proclaimed my kingship and gave to me a
mighty weapon that fells my royal enemies. Seven kings, leaders of Khana
who had fought against me, I defeated. I annexed their lands., . . I built the
wall of Mari and dug its moat. I built the wall of [the conquered city of] Terqa
and dug its moat. Now in a waste, a land of thirst, in which from days of old
mo king had built a city, I took pleasure in building a city. I dug its moat and
railed it Dur- Yahdun-Lim ["Fortress of Yahdun-Lim"].. . . I enlarged my
I md, established the foundations of Mari and my land, and established my
fame until distant days. (E4: 602-3)
1 hese victories brought Mari into contact with both Babylon to the south-east
nl Assyria to the north-east, inaugurating a decades-long struggle for supremacy
■ Mesopotamia that would he concluded fifty years later under Hammurabi.
Y.iIuImm I mi next turned his attention westward, towards Syria and the Medi-
161
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
When the god Shamash agreed t:o his supplications and listened to his [Yahdui
Lims] words; the god Shamash quickly came and went at the side of Yahdun-I m
[in battle]. From distant days when the god El built Mari, no king resident
Mari reached the sea, reached the mountains of cedar and boxwood, the grej
mountains, and cut down their trees, [but] Yahdun-Lim, son of Yaggid-Ln
powerful king, wild bull of kings, by means of his strength and. overpower!
might went to the shore of the [Mediterranean] sea, and made a great offering
[befitting] his kingship to the Sea. His troops bathed themselves in the Sea.. .
He made that land on the shore of the Sea submit, made it subject to In
decree, and made it follow him [as vassals]. Having imposed a perman* i
tribute on them, they now bring their tribute to him. (E4: 605-6)
The details of this campaign are a bit obscure - no specific city-names .11
mentioned — and his supremacy in Syria was certainly not unchallenged bi
Aleppo. It is likely that Aleppo ruled northern Syria, JVlari had vassals in the
middle, and Qatna dominated the south.
As with all Mesopotamian warlords, Yahdun-Lims victories did not \
unchallenged. His invasion of Syria was a cause for concern for Sumu-Epuh, kin
of .Aleppo, who orchestrated a revolt against Mari:
In that same year [as the campaign to the Mediterranean Sea] - Laum, King <
Samanum and the land of the Ubrabium, Bahlukullim, king of Tuttul and the
land of the Amnanum, Aialum, king of Abattum and the land of the Rabbuni
these [three] kings rebelled against [Yahdun-Lim]. The troops of Sumu
Epukh of the land of Aleppo came as auxiliary troops [to aid the rebel king! |
and in the city of Samanum the tribes gathered together against [Yahdun
Lim], But by means of [his] mighty weapon he defeated these three [rebel]
kings. [. . .] He vanquished their troops and their [Aleppan] auxiliaries ami
inflicted a defeat on them. He heaped up their dead bodies. He tore down th(
walls [of their cities] and made them into mounds of rubble. The city (it
Khaman, of the [nomad] tribe of Haneans, which all the leaders of [the tribe
of] Hana had built, he destroyed and made into mounds of rubble. Now, he
defeated their king, Kasuri-Khala. Having taken away their population [Yahdui i
Lim] controlled the banks of the Euphrates.. . . May the god Shamash, who
lives in that temple, grant to Yahdun-Lim, the builder of his temple, the kin;'
beloved of his heart, a mighty weapon which overwhelms the enemies (and) a
long reign of happiness and years of joyous abundance, forever.. . . [Conclud
ing curse on enemies:] May the god Nergal, the lord of the weapon, smash In
[Yahdun-Lim s enemy's] weapon in order that he not [be able to] confront
[the] warriors [of Mari].. . . May the god Bunene, the great vizier of the god
Shamash, cut the throat [of Yahdun-Lim s enemies]. (E4: 607-8)
Yahdun-Lim's victories in Syria, however, were occurring under the shadow ol
the rising power of Shamshi-Adad in Assyria, who soon < .une into eonflit 1 with
SYRIA AND LEBANON
M „ , Yahdun-Lim's son and successor Sumu-Yamam {1800-1796} was ^unable to
■U.ntain his father's military success against the power of Ass, «. . ^Man
conquered by Shamshi-Adad, who made the city a vassal kingdom under his
'Zh-Adad, who ruled Man from 1796-1776 (E4:615-22). At the death of
^Adad, Zimri-Lim, probably a grandson of the former king Sumu-
,„n, was able to retake the city with the help of the king of Meppo During h,
, fifteen-year reign {1776-1761} he brought Man to the hafr ■ of cuke n.
. and political power as the staunchest ally of Hammurabi of Babylon, m the
, However, relations broke down between the two allies leading to war nd
,„natmg in the conquest of Man by Hammurabi m 1761 {YoB}. Tw ye-
I -1759} the city was sacked and utterly destroyea, and left essentwly
inhabited (ANET 270b). The military details of these events are discussed m
Thereafter the geopolitical role of Man as the major city of the middle
retas taken by Terqa (Teh Ashara) (EDS 217-22), the capital of the
I,';;: 5 olKhana. Terqa reLned a vassal kingdom of the B-j£«££
, (C ntury and a half until the fall of Babylon to the Hittites in 1595. Thereafter
.iasty of Human kings was installed, who were integrated into the emptre of
litanni sometime during the sixteenth century.
Qatna (Tell Mishrife near Hatna) i5
itna
ionj
,>ul
i hi
, was the third most powerful state in Middle Bronze Syria, and often a major
, al rival to Aleppo. The city covered about 100 hectares, with a possible
Eon of 25,000. As with most Middle Bronze Syrian cities it was defended
, huge earth n rampart, 15 meters high, with at least four chambered gate,
, „,, served as a major emporium for trade routes from Mesopotamra through
lari to the Mediterranean, Canaan and, indirect^ Egypt
, he first known ruler of Qatna was Ishhi-Adad {c. 1795-1775} *****
, „ a serious military rivalry existed between Aleppo and the house of Shatnsht-
. ,., of Assyria. Qatna was therefore cultivated as an ally by Shamshi-Adai an
"marriage was arranged between his son Yasmah-Adad, viceroy of Man,
cltL daughter of Ishhi-Adad (ARM 1.46, 77; SHP 65). This alliance was
Ifded to'ctafe a military coalition against Aleppo, which had been raiding the
1 and flocks of Qatna (ARM 5.17). Assyria and Man sent troops to Qa na to
SEe a unified attack, but the results are unknown (SHP 54, 66) since Akppo
,;;; Z and expanded after the death of Shamshi-Adad, it is clear that the alliance
was ultimately unsuccessful. .
Wpfel {c. 1775-1755} succeeded his father to the throne; the Man
Z, "describe him as the equal of Hammurabi of Babylon an d Rini^Sin of
, ,„h kiimlnvimr "ten or fifteen [vassal and allied] kings who follow
'. ' (ANP \ Z sllP 68), Following the death of Shamshi-Adad {1776} and the
p , „, A.,v,;,„ -„„..,, ,1, ere was reconciliation between Akppo and
SHP,-, u ..Hv involved in se„d,ng auxiliary allied troops
.'(,.'
'(. \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
to aid Mari (ARM 14.69), and was known for breeding fine horses (ARM 14.88)
With the end of the Mari archive {1761} our knowledge of the military history ol
Qatna essentially ends, other than the notice of a war between Qatna and Aleppo
{c. 1640?} (AT §6; SHP 60).
Alalakh 36
Alalakh was a second-tier military power, generally the vassal of Aleppo. Tin
excavations of the site have discovered signs of the standard rampart, fortified gates
and citadel of Middle Bronze Syrian defensive architecture (EA 1:57).
In Middle Bronze II it was ruled by a subsidiary line of the Aleppan royal family
after Abba-el of Aleppo {c. 1750-1720} installed his brother Yarim-Lim as vassal
king of Alalakh.
When the allies [of the vassal city-state of Irridi] rebelled against Abba i
[king of Aleppo], their [rightful] lord, Abba-el, the king, with the help of the
gods Hadad, Khepat, and the spear of Ishtar, went to [the city of] Irridi, cap
tured Irridi, and defeated its troops. At that time Abba-el, in exchange foi
Irridi which his father had granted [to his brother] , gave Alalakh of his o\\ 1 1
free will [to his brother Yarim-Lim]. (R4:799; AT 2; CS 2:329, 369-70)
The text describing the transfer of the city to Yarim-Lim includes a vassal oath
indicative of the obligations and ritual curses associated with vassalage.
Abba-el [the king of Aleppo] swore the oath [to give the city of Alalakh | 1 1
Yarim-Lim, saying: "If I take back [the city] that I have given you, may I be
cursed." If ever in the future Yarim-Lim sins against Abba-el, or if he gi\>
away Abba-el's secrets to another king, or if he lets go of the hem of Abba I
el's garment [as a ritual gesture of vassalage] and grasps the hem of anot li-
king's garments [thus becoming the vassal of the other king], his towns anc
lands he shall forfeit. (CS 2:370)
This branch of the Aleppan royal family ruled Alalakh as vassal-allies of Aleppo
for the next several generations, including Yarim-Lim {c. 1740—1720}, his son
Ammri-taqumma {1720—1700}, and his grandson Irkabtum {1700—1680}. Ii i
occasionally mentioned in the affairs of state of .Aleppo. Alalakh is noted for thi
preservation of roughly 175 tablets from the eighteenth century (level VII) .in. I
another 300 from the fifteenth century (level IV) (AT; EA 1:59-61), which high
light a few military matters of the period (AT §2). Alalakh was destroyed dm in
the wars of Hattusilis the Hittite around 1640, but later rebuilt.
During the reign of Irkabtum {1700-1680}, the king was said to have "mad
peace with [the warlord] Shemuba and his Habiru [-warriors]" (AT §58). Tin
Habiru (Hapiru, Apiru) were "fugitive" bauds ofnom.uk, mercenaries, briivmd
outlaws, or robbers; similar robber hands have internum nth infested parts of ih<
'M
SYRIA AND LEBANON
ar East throughout its history, most recently in the form of insurgents in Iraq.
I hey are occasionally mentioned as serving as mercenaries in armies in the Mari
" 7 The Habiru became quite widespread in the Late Bronze Age, when they
re frequently mentioned both as mercenaries and as independent raiders. 38 An
ample of Habiru activities is found in the fifteenth- century story of Idrimi, a
• bin Hood-like dispossessed citizen of Aleppo who fled to the wilderness and
i a me a Habiru, eventually returning to capture Alalakh and become its king (CS
1/9-80).
Ugarit (Ras Shatura) 39
irit, an important Early Bronze kingdom, was destroyed in the twenty-second
iitury in the anarchy at the end of the Early Bronze period. It was rebuilt around
000 by Amorite warlords, whose martial tombs contain an important collection
copper/bronze duckbill axeheads, socketed spearheads, daggers, and torques —
l< standard axe-spear-dagger Middle Bronze armament (AS 296; MW). Molds
'"i easting bronze weapons were also found in the city. A stele from Ugarit of the
■ >i m/war-god Baal from the end of the Middle Bronze reflects the armament of
H age. Baal, with flowing shoulder-length hair and beard, wearing a kilt and
lietal?) helmet, is armed with a mace, a dagger, and a long, broad-headed
ii listing spear (AANE §74; EA 5:261). The city was strongly fortified by a mas-
C rampart wall with a remarkable surviving gate complex including a stone
1 it is, narrow stone gate, hidden entry ramp, large square stone tower and postern
ite (EA 5:258-9).
I Fgarit, along with Byblos, was one of the most important Levantine maritime
I '\vers of the age, maintaining extensive trade connections with Cyprus, the
I moans of Crete, the Aegean, and Egypt. They were especially noted for their
I of transshipping tin across the Mediterranean (SHP 77). Unfortunately, unlike
I ate Bronze period when Ugarit 's archive is one of our most important his-
n i< al sources (EA 5:262-6), the Middle Bronze period at Ugarit is poorly
■ umented. An incomplete ancestral king-list of Ugarit mentions fourteen
In Kile Bronze kings with Amorite names, beginning with Yaqaru, the presumed
inder of the Amorite dynasty at Ugarit around 2000. 40 The kings of Ugarit
re either vassals or close allies of Aleppo during most of Middle Bronze II. No
Mils of their military history are known.
Byblos (Gubla, Gebal, Jubayl) 41
1 In Phoenician coast lacked the great agricultural resources of Mesopotamia and
I j'.vpt, hut was instead blessed with access to huge forests of cedar and other hard
woods, some metal resources, and, most importantly, a long coastline with several
natural harbors. One oi the most ancient and important coastal settlements was Byblos,
• I in Ii dm Hi!-, the Ikon/e Ayr was (he i-iratest trading and maritime city in the Levant.
H\ bins h.nl I Mci i sen lei I in th« Wnlnlm pel lod hv .it least the fifth millennium, as
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
a small village near a perennial spring, slowly developing into a fall city. The earliesi
cultural influences, like those of all Syrian and Lebanese cities, came from Meso
potamia, but by at least the reign of Khasekhemwy {2714—2687} of Egypt, Egyptian
trade and cultural influences began steadily to grow. By the Middle Kingdom, Bybl< i
was a large and fantasticaUy wealthy city with strong and friendly ties to Egypt.
Byblos was destroyed by war in around 2800, after which it was rebuilt with .1
magnificent fortification system including massive stone walls, two known gates
and a glacis. The city was again destroyed sometime around 2300-2100 by an
Amorite invasion; Amorite princes ruled Byblos in the subsequent centum
including the kings buried in the nine royal sarcophagi. In the fourth millennium
the primary weapon found in burials is the pear-shaped macehead, common al <
in Mesopotamia and Egypt (Cl/2:344). This gave way in the Early Bronze Age i<
the standard Bronze Age arsenal of large spearheads, daggers, and axes of several
different styles (MW). Some were highly ornamented ceremonial weapons, such .in
a gold dagger sheath (AANE §72).
As with so much of the Near East outside of Mesopotamia and Egypt, the la< \
of surviving historical, records does not permit the reconstruction of the military
history of Byblos. 42 The names of a number of the Amorite kings of Byblos ha\.
been discovered, largely from the Middle Bronze period, allowing us to recon
struct a tentative king-list. 43 The name of the first known Middle Bronze I king o!
Byblos, Ibdadi {c. 2000}, is linguistically Amorite (LMB 103; SHP 40); he is ofti n
thought to be the founder of the new Amorite dynasty there.
Cavchemish (Karkamish; Jerablus) 44
Militarily Carchemish was a second-level city-state. Its importance lay in its stra
tegic location on the upper Euphrates for the trade routes to Anatolia; the strategit
resource tin came from Mari to Carchemish in exchange for wine and Anatolian
horses — another strategic commodity for the rising importance of chariots in
warfare (SHP 72). A Mari letter from around 1765 describes some of the Anato
lian horse trade of the king of Carchemish:
I [the merchant ambassador from Mari] spoke to him [the king of Carchem
ish] in the matter of the white horses, and he said: "No white chariot horse
are available. I will give orders that they lead white horses to me where they
are available. In the meantime, I will have them bring some red Harsamna
horses." (EEH 121a; L 406)
The mention of specific breeds and colors of horses indicates that horse breeding \va
already fairly developed by this time { 1 765 } , and the search for a matched set of w hiti
horses, presumably for the king, points to the importance of pageantry in chariot i
Like most Middle Bronze cities, Carchemish was defended by outer walls and
an inner citadel. Little is known of its Middle Bronze history except for a U
references in the Mari Archive in the early eighteenth iciiiutv three km
266
SYRIA AND LEBANON
ft hemish are known from this period: Aplahanda {1786-1766} (SHP 54, 70-2),
,1 Ins sons Yatar'ami {1766-1764} and Yahdul-Lim {1764-1745} (SHP 73-4).
blahanda was a strong ally of Shamshi-Adad in his unsuccessful war against
tl< ppo (SHP 71), but after his death the city seems to have become a client or
n a vassal to the kings of Aleppo (SHP 72). Upon the death of Aplahanda he
| briefly succeeded by his son Yatar'ami {1766-1764}, who may have been a
il of Mari. He was followed by Yahdul-Lim {1764-1745}, who seems to have
irned to the fold of the Aleppan alliance after the fall of Mari to Hammurabi
'61}. Thereafter the military history of Carchemish is unknown other than its
ih ipation as an ally-vassal of Aleppo in the defense of the city of Ursha against a
p by Hattusilis in the 1620s (SHP 74-7; see pp. 298-300).
Ebla (Tel Mardikh IIIA and IIIB) 45
ring the Middle Bronze period Ebla never achieved its former greatness or
ional predominance, and little is known of its military history. The best-docu-
nrnted ruler was Mekum, the king (ensi) of Ebla, whose name is mentioned in an
i iption of one of his governors, Ibbit-Lim (c. 2030}. 46
As with many other cities in Syria, Ebla was conquered and destroyed at the
. ml of the Early Bronze Age {c. 2000}, but was re-established as a major military
■rf\ "*
hyjur 6: Ramparts of Middle Bronze Age Ebla, Syria {c. 2000-1800}. These earthen
ramparts were ot initially surmounted by mud-brick walls and towers which have
collapsed ami einilr.l
uv: IMioUuuaph In \\ ilium I I miWm
A \K I ARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
'.";', l :\ aiC ' 0nq ^Z S ' Wh ° Were C,ther Am0ntes or Huma ™ (HE 2:142 ,
tons om! ^ n) - "^ "T^ " Ebk bUlk a ™ e «^ of forth,,
"' S ° m * ° f ; he most spectacular of the period, with an earthen rampar, '
meters h lg h and 45 meters dud, supported by a stone foundation and Z ,
Small six-roomed tower-forts were built at regular interval, along the rl™ '
s~rri d : a : d paiace comp i ex were *° ^^ «* ^ be s
eparately. A fine gate survives on the south-west of Ebla with angular entrv m,
Me chambers faced with large stone slabs (orthostats) (AS 295, 2 S-9 EDS 2 T
Few military details are known of the history of Ebla during this period El,
tzzvt i ly ^ Me Bronze seems to w ded - ed * b -~
o Aleppo in the wake of the imperialism of Shamshi-Adad {1776} after whi< I,
SiTTi^ m H Nea ; Eastern mlitary affairs - we k — °f - inditi •'
;™; t i^r m of " eppo by Ms * ■* iate — - —
CHAPTER TEN
Canaan
he term "Canaan" I will refer to the region occupied by the modern states of
I Palestine, and Jordan. Unfortunately, textual and artistic evidence is limited
non-existent from Canaan during most of the Early and Middle Bronze ages. 1
ire therefore largely dependent on archaeological evidence, along with occa-
1 notices from the texts of Mesopotamia and Egypt, for our understanding of
indent military history of Canaan. Although archaeology can provide evi-
ice that war existed, it cannot provide us with a full military history. The fol-
ing chart (Table 10.1) outlines the basic chronological periods of Canaan, 2
I rough comparisons with contemporary periods in Egypt.
Chalcolithic {4300-3300} 3
I he Neolithic background to warfare in Canaan has been discussed in Chapter
toe (pp. 29—30). Two major innovations relating to military history occurred
iring the Canaanite Chalcolithic period: the introduction of metallurgy and the rise
i political units known by anthropologists as chiefdoms. The term Chalcolithic
l.ihlc 10.1 Simplified archaeological chronology of Canaan
Ptriod
Phase
Date
Egyptian periods
l l'i Paleolithic
(Mesolithic)
Natufian
10,500-8500
olithic
Pre-Pottery
A
8500-7500
Pre-Pottery
B
7500-6000
Pottery A
6000-5000
Pottery B
5000-4300
' lialeolithic
Ghassulian
4300-3300
1 ii lv Bronze
I
3300-3050
Pre-Dynastic
I!
3050-2700
Early Dynastic
Ill
2700-2300
Old Kingdom
Middle liron/c
1
2300-2000
First Intermediate
II A
2000 1750
Middle Kingdom
im <
1750-1550
Second Intermediate
268
!f,«j
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
means "copper-stone" and refers to the development of early copper metallurgy
which was introduced from Syria, and originally from Anatolia (see pp. 19—23).
The period is often called Ghassulian, based on the largest and best-excavated site
at Teleilat Ghassul (EA 5:161-3; DANE 127-8). Although copper working was
known in Canaan and Jordan during the fourth millennium, it should be empha
sized that most tools and weapons continued to be made of stone. Copper should
be seen more like a valuable commodity such as gold, rather than a day-to-day
metal for use by ordinary people.
There are a large number of Chalcolithic settlements in Canaan, indicating
rising population density from the earlier Neolithic period. Many of these settle
ments are rather small villages, often clustering around a larger central location;
this characteristic has led some archaeologists to posit the existence of chiefdoms,
where a larger central city-state dominated smaller surrounding villages. It is sig-
nificant to note that most Chalcolithic sites were not fortified; this does not mean
that there was no military conflict during the Chalcolithic period, but probably
implies that, to the extent there was warfare, it was generally of low intensity. Two
temples from this period at Ein Gedi (ALB 66-8) and Teleilat el-Ghassul (EA
5:161—3) had enclosure walls which could have served as a citadel of last resort in
time of war, and as a model for fortress building. At any rate, these sites demon
strate the capacity of Chalcolithic peoples to have built fortifications had they been
needed.
From the military perspective the most important characteristic of the Chal
colithic period was the development of copper weapons. As noted in Chap to i
One, metal-working originated in Anatolia, with the earliest-known metal
weapon in the world being a copper macehead dating to c. 5000 from Can Hasan
in southern Anatolia (ET 125). By the fourth millennium copper- working and
mace-making technology had spread to Canaan. Signs of copper- working,
including copper maceheads and axeheads, have been found in the Beer Sheba
region and at Teleilat Ghassul (ALB 72-3; AW 1:120), but the largest find oi
copper objects is from the "Cave of Treasure" in Nahal Mishmar, between Ein
Gedi and Masada, south-west of the Dead Sea. 4 The weapons were cast with a
sophisticated "lost wax" technique, and the copper has trace elements that show it
originated in north-eastern Turkey, pointing to long-distance trade either in ore,
or perhaps in the finished weapons themselves. Among 436 copper objects there
are 99 mace-like objects of various types (COT 52—89; THL 74). These maces
have long hollow copper shafts, ranging in length from a few centimeters to a third
of a meter, ending in a metal ball and frequently with a flared disk at the top.
Many have spiral or horizontal grooves. Some have rather blunt, spike-like pro-
jections (COT 53, 57, 61, 64, 83-5; THL 83); others have numerous serrated
knobs (COT 89), or a flared disk alone (COT 94—7). Some scholars view these as
ritual objects; others see them as weapons - of course, they may have been both.
More certainly weapons are the 249 maceheads, which lack the long coppei
shaft of the other mace-like objects (COT 116—31; TI II 84). These maces are .ill
smooth and polished, averaging about 5 cm high -"id v id. reueially eithei
270
CANAAN
herical or pear-shaped. The vast majority are of cast copper, though some are of
niatite or stone. Similar maceheads have been found at other Canaanite sites
■ I )T 116). A few axes and spiked mace-like heads were also found (COT 98-9,
I >; AW 1:126). Additionally the cave contained a number of copper standards
Inch were placed on wooden or reed poles and carried in procession (COT 40-
I 100-3). It is not clear if the standards were designed for religious purposes or
i e a type of clan totem carried in battle, such as were found among the Pre-
Miastic Egyptians as depicted on the Narmer Palette (TEM 27, 37, 40). The
rcsence of nearly 250 maceheads along with another hundred mace-like objects
nplies a strong militant component in Chalcolithic culture. According to
proportion of archaeological finds, the mace remained the primary melee
eapon during the Chalcolithic and Early Bronze I periods, after which it
ipidly decreased in importance (MW 1:173-4), being replaced by daggers, spears,
ud axes.
The Ghassulian Chalcolithic Age ended rather abruptly around 3300. Many of
he most important sites were abandoned and remained unoccupied. It is often
I teculated that the large copper hoard found at the Cave of Treasure was originally
om the Ein Gedi temple, which, it is assumed, served as a religious pilgrimage
ite for southern Canaan (ALB 66-8; EA 2:222-3). The treasure was removed
from the temple in the face of some threat, and carefully buried in the cave in
fahal Mishmar, where it remained until discovered by archaeologists five thou-
ii id years later. The assumption here is that the treasure was hidden in the hope of
bringing it back to the temple; but the temple was abandoned and the treasure
never returned. There is certainly a strong possibility that there was a military
factor in the collapse of the Ghassulian Age, although there is little archaeological
\idence for fire or other violence at the abandoned sites (ALB 88-9). Some
holars speculate about the possibility of the migration of new peoples into
I anaan, again with military elements in the migration, bringing with them new
ultural patterns.
Early Bronze Age {3300-2300} 5
Archaeological evidence for large-scale endemic warfare in Canaan begins in the
rarly Bronze Age. Bronze Age Canaan is distinguished from the earlier Chalco-
lithic period by a number of characteristics: new styles of pottery, use of cylinder
seals, changing settlement patterns, intensification of agriculture, increasing
population, shifting trade patterns, and, of course, the use of bronze. Many of
these developments had military significance. Intensification of agriculture and
increasing population created larger cities, capable of building bigger fortifications
mk\ fielding larger armies. Broader trade connections brought cultural and tech-
nological exchange, and hence the transfer of military technology
For the military historian, however, two characteristics are especially important.
1 list, we see not onl\ the spread ol the use of copper in weapon making, but the
development <>l n. - w , i|u >n t\pes, including the axe, tanged daggers, and spear
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
,n ni javelin points. 6 The most important archaeological find of Canaanite arsem
copper weapons comes from Kefar Monash, dating to around 2700, which rex i
the standard weapons of the Early Bronze Canaanite warrior: spear and da; 1
(ALB 134; AW 1:42; MW). However, not all burials uniformly contain each <
these weapons. Some contain only one or the other, while others contain both
few examples of axes begin to appear as well. The dagger alone seems to be 1 1
weapon of choice for burial (MW 1:164-5). It must be emphasized that, althouel
such arsenic-copper weapons existed, flint knives and projectile points were si
widely used, indeed, probably more widely than copper (ALB 103), with copp
weapons remaining "either rare or very expensive" (ABL 134). With the dev«
opment of the arsenic-copper fighting axe during this period, we also see 1 1 1
decline in use of the copper mace, which had been the most widespread meli
weapon of the Canaanite Chalcolithic (MW 1:173-4).
The second development of the Early Bronze Age is the rapid spread .m
improvement of fortifications (ALB 119-25; 0/2:214-18). Jericho's earli
Neolithic stone walls and tower were almost unique in Neolithic Canaan; the \ i
majority of pre-Early Bronze sites in Canaan were unfortified. This would impl
that whatever military threat Jericho faced was intense, but local. By the E.uls
Bronze Age military threat had become universal and constant. Although smalli I
villages remained unfortified, all major cities had massive stone or brick fortifn I
tions. The building of these fortifications came in two phases. The first phase i
the fortification process began in Early Bronze I {3300—3050} and II {305(1
2700}, when cities built defenses of simple stone walls generally 3—4 meters thi< I
By Early Bronze III {2700-2300}, these walls had doubled in thickness to 2
average of 7-8 meters, and were reinforced by semi-circular or rectangular town
bastions, and fortified gates. Some of the towers were huge, reaching 10 me
thick and nearly 30 meters long. Glacis are found at many of the cities, both t<
strengthen the foundation of the walls and to prevent ladders and other sir
equipment from being placed near the walls. The largest surviving fortifications 1 1
Early Bronze Age Canaan are found at the city of Tel Yarmut, with walls made < >i
huge uncut stones surviving to nearly eight meters high; the original walls w< I
even higher (ALB 119-23; EA 5:369-72). The foundations of the Early Bron
walls at Arad have also been fully excavated, including numerous projecting tow< I
(EA 1:169-74).
Although the cities of Early Bronze Age Canaan shared a single materia] cut
ture, it seems that they were politically divided into about two dozen rival en
states. 7 The largest Early Bronze Age cities of Canaan ranged in size from 8 to 2
acres, with populations probably ranging from 2000 to 5000 people per city (A I I'-
ll 1-13). This would give a maximum fighting force of between 500 and 10(X
men per city-state. However, most cities seem to have been supported by a niini
ber of surrounding farming villages, which could double or even triple the ovcr.il
population, and hence the potential military force, of any given city-state. Rim
listically the Canaanite city-states probably seldom fielded armies of more than
1000 men. Most armies were probably numbered in the hundreds
272
CANAAN
hile the existence of fortifications in Canaan clearly indicates the presence of
[ i it does not tell us who was involved in the conflict. A destruction layer at
I ,n tell us there was a war, but not who attacked. The phenomenon of the
,ve fortification of Early Bronze Age city-states has been attributed to a
.nation of three factors: inter-city military rivalry, invasion by Egyptians, and
idic raids Due to the nearly complete lack of indigenous Canaanite written
i , or martial art during the Early Bronze Age, the military history of the
, mite city-states cannot be fully known. A number of assumptions, however,
[ten made. First, it is assumed that each city-state was independent, broadly
the lines of the Greek city-state system in the fifth century BC, and in
v Age Syria and Mesopotamia. This would imply complex shifting patterns
li inces and confederations, with one city-state occasionally rising to tempor-
uonal hegemony. A confederation of eight of the two dozen city-states of
, in could possibly field armies of at most 3000-6000 men, a force large
ugh to threaten and conquer enemy cities,
I he second source of military conflict in Canaan was military intervention
, Egypt, which can be documented in a fragmentary way (ALB 105-8; ECI
8)- "these military operations will be discussed later (see Chapters Twelve,
rteen and Sixteen for Egyptian sources discussed here). Some scholars posit a
ible struggle over control of the copper resources of Sinai and southern
, m The earliest Egyptian kings of the First Dynasty have brief notices of
npaigns against Easterners (EDE 71-4). Archaeologically, Egyptian artifacts have
,, found in a number of southern Canaanite towns, but these could have been
, ,duced through trade or invasions. At Tel Eram, the largest Early Bronze site in
ith western Canaan, Egyptian artifacts predominate, probably indicating per-
cent Egyptian occupation of the city for a century or so under Narmer and his
l i essors {c. 3025-2915} (ALB 106-7). This city would have served as a military
, c for further raids and attacks, such as those carried out by king Den {2965-
! , | The Canaanite reaction to the ongoing military intervention of the First
• nasty Egyptian kings into Early Bronze I Canaan was probably a key factor in
i ipid militarization and fortification of Canaan.
I he military threat from Egypt decreased, but did not entirely disappear, in the
ibsequent centuries. The large Canaanite city of Arad was sacked and burned in
,und 2800, 8 possibly by Egyptian invaders. Arad's connection with the copper
lources of southern Canaan and the Sinai may have made it a magnet for attack
\| B 1 J4). The Egyptian king Peribsen {2734-2714} claims to have been the
conqueror of Canaan (inw Sit)" and "conqueror of foreign lands (inw h3stf'
\NET 228a == EDE 89-90), indicating military intervention in that region.
i ndei Khasekhemwy {2714-2687}, Egyptian trade with Canaan seems to have
,<vim to shift to sea-routes through Byblos, bringing declining interest and mili-
urv intervention in southern Canaan. 9 None the less, massive fortification of
( mimiu . , [tics , onnnU( ,l throughout Early Bronze III {2700-2300}; ifEgyptian
im |,l.„ x m ,c> venuon de< lined tin. me, tins period, there remained other significant
itnlit.itx threats leiiimmr < nutmued tnmtuation and vigilance.
173
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Throughout its history Canaan has been a land of mixed ecological zones wit I
sedentary and pastoral populations. Even today, a few miles west of Jerusalem o
the road to Jericho, you can find Palestinian nomads herding sheep. The E;ul\
Bronze Age was no different. While there were numerous possible sham
interests - kinship, religion, economic - between nomad and farmer which might
lead to cooperation, there was also stress and competition that could lead to con
fhct, such as competition over water or other limited resources. While it is qmt<
certain that there were struggles between the city-dwellers and the nomads, it ii
likely that this rarely took the form of all the nomads uniting against all the cit)
dwellers. Rather, based on anthropological analogy, we can assume that nomad 1.
clans were often related by descent, marriage, or shared interests with nearby cii\
dwellers; wars more probably were often fought between one city-state and n
nomad kinsmen and allies, and a rival city-state and its nomad confederate
Nomadic warfare would be characterized by plundering raids; generally speakin;
nomads would not besiege and assault the massive city walls of the period on theii
own. None the less, nomads would have been a constant and sometimes decisive
element in Canaanite warfare.
Middle Bronze Age I (or Early Bronze IV) {2300-2000}
ic
Although we still have found no contemporary written records and few artist u
sources from Canaan during the Middle Bronze Age, we do have increased writ
ten sources from Egypt, and, for the first time, Egyptian artistic depictions ol
Canaanite warriors. We are thus able to have a fuller understanding of Middle
Bronze warfare.
The most striking characteristic of the shift from the Early to the Middl<
Bronze Age is the massive destruction and abandonment of the Early Bronze Age
cities. Those large cities that were not entirely abandoned were only inhabited In-
scattered squatters rather than the former dense urban populations of the Early
Bronze period. Most of the population of Canaan early Middle Bronze I seems to
have consisted of semi-nomadic herders. There were three factors which con
tributed to the collapse of urban life in the early Middle Bronze Age: ecologic.il
degradation, tribal migration, and Egyptian invasion. The exact balance and
interrelationship between these three factors cannot be determined, but each
played a significant role. As discussed elsewhere (pp. 249-51), from an ecologic.il
point of view the twenty-third and twenty-second centuries seem to have been
periods of serious crisis and drought in the Near East. This was perhaps com
pounded by deforestation and over-utilization of limited resources by Early Bronze
cities. Cities facing decreasing productivity would be hard pressed not to attack
their neighbors to resolve their crisis. Extended drought would have not only
created a struggle for increasingly limited resources between cities, but would luu
compelled the nomads to increasing militancy as they sought for depleted wat< I
and grazing lands, culminating in tribal migration from the marginal ecologicall
stricken steppe country into the farmland. As nomads plundnrd weakly defendt d
274
CANAAN
uining villages, the already stressed food resources of the city-states would be
«her depleted. Such cities might be willing to submit to a rising nomadic warlord
Id his confederate clans, and, in predatory fashion, join the attack on the next city-
Be. Some scholars see widespread nomadic migrations throughout the Near East
Juring this period, and have associated events in Canaan with the contemporary
I to power of Amorite princes in Mesopotamia and Syria, 11 broadly paralleling
k h later Near Eastern migrations of nomadic Arabs, Turks, and Mongols.
The third factor in the collapse of Early Bronze urbanism was Egyptian inva-
n. The most striking examples of these are the five campaigns of Weni, under-
sell in the late Sixth Dynasty {c. 2340}, which are discussed in detail on pp. 336-
\ Unfortunately, we are not told the precise chronology or the motivation for
be attacks. Weni simply tells us he invaded Canaan at the head of an army of
my tens of thousands from all of Upper Egypt" along with Nubian mercen-
bs. This number is presumably hyperbole, but none the less Weni was probably
I i he head of an army which was virtually unstoppable by the Canaanite city-
The devastation wrought by Weni is vividly described in his triumph poem:
This army returned in safety,
It had ravaged the Sand-dwellers' land.
This army returned in safety,
It had flattened the Sand-dwellers' land.
This army returned in safety,
It had sacked its strongholds.
I his army returned in safety,
It had cut down its figs, its vines.
' This army returned in safety,
It had thrown fire in all its [dwellings].
I his army returned in safety,
It had slain its troops by many ten-thousands.
This army returned in safety,
[It had carried] off many [troops] as captives. (AEL 1:20)
The fundamental problem in interpreting this text is to decide if Weni is
Dgaged in vainglorious hyperbole, or an accurate description of the actual cam-
ign. Weni describes destroying the agricultural infrastructure, fortresses, cities,
nl houses, and killing or enslaving thousands. Furthermore, he engaged in five
mpaigns:
1 lis majesty sent me to lead this army five times, to attack the land of the
Sand-dwellers as often as they rebelled, with these troops. I acted so that his
majesty praised me [for it beyond anything]. (AEL 1:20)
It ra< h of Weill's live i ampai
lull t i| tin- land w»miM lu\r
ns conquered and sacked two Canaanite city-
ncen left desolate. And, in fact, archaeologically,
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
CANAAN
that is precisely what we see; all Early Bronze Age Canaanite cities are destroyed 01
abandoned within a generation or two. It is quite tempting to see Weni
campaigns - and perhaps other similar unrecorded campaigns — as a crucial factor
the collapse of Canaanite urbanism at the end of the Early Bronze Age (ECI 63-9)
The long-term result of the combination of climatic change, environmental
degradation, intense competition between rival city-states, nomadic migration,
and Egyptian invasions was the collapse of urban life for several centuries. On tin-
other hand, several sites in modern Jordan - such as Iktanu (EA 3:143-4), Khirbei
Iskander (EA 3:188-9), and Aroer (Ara'ir) (EA 1:177-8) - seem to have escaped
this collapse. These cities show continuity in urban life between the Early Bron/r
and Middle Bronze Ages, with continuation of the Early Bronze tradition oi
massive fortification building (ATB 158). For the most part, however, fortification
building disappears during the early Middle Bronze period.
This is not to say that warfare disappeared; only that it changed from city-state
to nomadic clan warfare. The development of pastoralism and small village subsisteru i
agriculture as the predominant form of social and economic organization in
Canaan for several centuries was not accompanied by a loss of metallurgical skills
(AW 156—7). Whether acquired by trade or indigenous manufacture, copper and
bronze weapons remained important in Canaan, probably used in ongoing clan warfan
between rival nomadic groups. Indeed, true tin-copper bronze alloying becomes
widespread only in the Middle Bronze period. Metalworking seems to have been a
specialty among some nomadic clans, one of which is depicted as migrating n>
Egypt to sell their metalwork (ALB 166; AW 1:166-7, 59; EWP 124). Some early
Middle Bronze burial sites include copper or bronze weapons with the grave
goods (MW; ALB 160, 165—6). These generally include daggers and/or spearheads
precisely the same weapons found in the panoply of Early Bronze warriors, demon
strating the continuing importance of the warrior in early Middle Bronze Canaan
In his manual of political advice for his son Merikare, king Akhtoy of Egypt
{c. 2090-2070?} gave a description of these warlike nomadic Canaanites oi
Middle Bronze I:
But now, these things are said about the barbarian [nomadic] bowmen: the
vile Easterner is wretched because of the place where he is - lacking in water,
barren of trees, whose roads are painful because of the mountains. He h;i\
never settled in any one place, lack of food makes him wander about on foot!
He has been fighting since the [mythical] Time of Horus [at the beginning oi
the world]. He cannot conquer; he cannot be conquered. He does not
announce the day of battle, but sneaks about like a gang of thieves.. . . Do not
worry about him! The Easterner is a crocodile on its riverbank that can snatch
[his victim] from a lonely road but cannot take from the quay of a populous
town. (TS 223-4 = ECI 67 = AEL 1:103-4)
Even v/hen the cultural bias of this Egyptian view of ( '.m.i.miie nomads is taken
into consideration, this text none the less gives us .in mipnit.ini msu;hl into tin
omadic warriors of Middle Bronze I: migration through barren terrain; constant
ids and counter-raids, stealthy tactics in search of plunder, and the unwillingness
come to decisive battle.
In one sense, the collapse of the Early Bronze city-states strengthened the
lit.iry position of the Canaanites relative to Egypt. The Early Bronze city-states
i )anaan represented an ideal target for Egyptian military intervention. They
re small enough that they could not single-handedly resist the overwhelming
ilitary force of an Egyptian invading army such as Weni's. On the other hand,
K v were large enough to provide enough potential plunder to make military
ion attractive to the Egyptians. The nomads of the early Middle Bronze period,
the other hand, did not have sufficient wealth to economically justify a major
ptian attack. The costs of such a campaign to the Egyptians would outweigh
potential economic benefit from plunder. Furthermore, when faced with an
ading Egyptian army, the nomads would simply practice their traditional strat-
of withdrawal and dispersal, waiting for the Egyptian army to depart, after
iu h they would return to their grazing grounds. Added to this was the problem
iat, during Middle Bronze I, Egypt was fragmented politically into several rival
rcgdoms; there were therefore no major Egyptian military expeditions during this
i iod. Rather, as discussed on pp. 379-81, there are a number of indications that
naanite and Sinai nomads migrated into the north-eastern delta during this
iod, whether as mercenaries, traders, or raiders, or simply to graze their flocks
I I Egyptian pastures. Rather than conquering and plundering cities in Canaan, as
' in had in the late Old Kingdom, Akhtoy III was found fighting Canaanite
mads m the delta of Egypt {c. 2025} (TS 223-4 = AEL 1:104).
Middle Bronze Age II {2000-1550}
13
1 1 1 i the coming of the Middle Bronze II period we find a much richer set of
1 1 u es for the military history of Canaan, with archaeology supplemented by texts
id martial art, both indigenous Canaanite and Egyptian. Middle Bronze II was an
i of "almost total revolution in all aspects of material culture: settlement pattern,
rbanism, architecture, pottery, metallurgy, and burial customs" (ALB 175). The
me is true for warfare. The most striking difference between Middle Bronze I
fid II is the re-emergence of a number of large cities with massive fortifications
I B 176-81, 197-208; AW 1:65-9). 14 While most small rural farming settle-
K ins remained unprotected, nearly all large cities were strongly fortified. Most of
new fortification techniques found in Canaan seem to have been introduced
BfOm Syria, from which colonists migrated into northern Canaan and down the
nasi (ALB 178—9). A spreading feature of Middle Bronze II fortifications is the
wilding of massive earthen ramparts in addition to city walls. 15 These seem to
been designed largely to prevent siege equipment from being placed against
the walls, hut also to raise the overall height and size of the fortifications. Other
Mies hmli large gla< is to attempt to perforin a similar function with less expendi-
ng <i| KM . u 1 1 1 <■■, i'\lll 'n 1 H MnMIc llioii/e Canaanite fortresses were built
m
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
from stone or brick, usually with massive towers and bastions at key position
Walls ranged from 3 to 10 meters thick and up to 10 meters high. Some sites, HI
Hazor, had fortified citadel and palace complexes on higher ground which con
be defended independently in the event of the fall of the main city. Hazor was 1 1
largest Canaanite city-state during this period, covering an area of 80 hectan
with a potential population of 20,000. One of Hazors kings, Ibni-Adad (c. 177<
is known from northern Syrian texts to have been involved in international affai
there (SHP 54). City gates were strongly fortified, with long narrow hallu a
chambers for guards, and huge wooden gates. A remarkable arched brick gatev
survives at Dan (Figure 7; ALB 207; THL 93). By the late Middle Bronze II
standardized fortified gate begins to appear; surviving examples are found •
Gezer, Hazor, Yavneh-Yam, and Shechem. 16 These new gates, sometimes c.il
"Solomonic", were flanked by two huge towers, with guardrooms, and sin
allowing ascent to upper levels. The gatehouse was divided by pilasters into t>
inner chambers and had two huge wooden gates, allowing a double defense ag.m
any assault (ALB 205-8). These massive fortification programs indicate
Middle Bronze II was an age of serious and sustained military threat.
Archaeologists have discovered a number of well preserved bronze wen
from Middle Bronze II which give us a good understanding of the basic Cana.n
panoply of this period (MW 1:168-70; ALB 184-5, 218-19; AW 1:166-75).
addition to the spear and dagger of earlier times, the axe becomes increasin
Figure 7 Middle Bronze Age gate at Tel Dan, Israel {c. 2000 1800}. Tins ^.in-
stone foundations, a brick arch over the gateway, thick high walls, and p
towers flanking the gate.
Source: Photograph by William I lamhlin.
J78
CANAAN
prominent, as it does in late Old Kingdom and Middle Kingdom Egypt (Figure
l 1, p. 69). This spear-axe-dagger weapon combination in tombs is not, however,
Universal. Some burials have only one, while others have a combination of only
o of the three (MW 1:168-70). Another striking characteristic of the archae-
ological record is that, although the bow appears as an important Canaanite
tpon in numerous Egyptian textual and artistic sources from the Middle King-
bm, arrowheads are rarely found in Middle Bronze tombs in comparison to other
ipon-types (MW 1:144-6). This should alert us to the fact that weapons asse-
nted with burial practices are more concerned with social status and religious
itual than with the actual practical military usage of the living (MW 1:149-61).
i ewise, perishable weapons, such as bows, will be inherently under-represented
archaeology when compared to bronze weapons.
Another development in weapons technology in Middle Bronze II is the
ippearance of the curved sickle-sword, or scimitar (Egyptian hps) (AW 1:60—1).
I he origins of this weapon in twenty-first century Mesopotamia are discussed
where (see pp. 66-71; Figure 2a— f, p. 67). In Palestine a single example is
lown from Shechem, although three such weapons were found at the royal
mbs of Byblos (MA 1:142-3, 2:514; AW 1:172). Syrian or Canaanite sickle-
>ids may also be mentioned as plunder taken in an Egyptian raid in Syria during
reign of Amenemhet II {1929-1895} (ECI 79 n49). They are also depicted as
»li vine weapons in contemporary Mesopotamian art (AW 1:173). Their association
1 1 1 1 royal tombs and gods has led Graham to suggest that they may have been
« i al or even uniquely royal weapons (MW 1:170—1). A final new weapon to
ippear in Middle Bronze II is the almost spike-like narrow-bladed axe (Figure 2g,
I 69; AW 1:60, 174; MW 2: figs 1-4, 8, 57). Yadin suggests it originated in
Mesopotamia, where it was specially designed to pierce helmets or armor (AW
I 60; MW 1:176-7); it was later traded or copied in Canaan, even though there is
evidence of armor in either Egypt or Canaan during the Middle Bronze.
I ; •, vptian artistic sources confirm and supplement our archaeological inforrna-
■II about Middle Bronze Canaanite dress and weapons. 17 The most famous of
icse is the tomb of Khnumhotep at Beni Hasan (Tomb 3), with its splendid color
unials depicting the arrival in Egypt of an armed Canaanite caravan under the
i hicftain Abisha (AW 1:166, OHAE 192). Canaanites in Egyptian art are generally
imvn dressed in multi-colored kilts and tunics, but none are shown with armor
1 helmets. Canaanite warriors are armed with all types of Middle Bronze weap-
including bows (AW 1:166-7; EWW 38), javelins (AW 1:166-9), fighting
iuks (BH 2 §15b; AW 1:159, 166-7), slings (BH 2 §5b, §15b; AW 1:159), axes
[lit I 2 §5b, §15b; AW 1:59, 169), large curved axes (BH1 §16; AW 1:166-9), and
on/e daggers (BH 2 §5c). Many Canaanite warriors were double-armed with
i i missile and a melee weapon, or with two melee weapons. These include
K itlv every possible combination of weapons:
• axe and iiphnnp sin \ lot slmp, ; 1 (HI I 2 fj 1 5b)
• Ihiw ami simp, mi liphtmp mi, 1 i (111 I ' ijSr, I fj47)
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
• bow and bronze dagger (BH 2 §5c)
• sling and bronze dagger (BH 1 §47)
® bow and axe (BH 2 §5c, 1 §47; AAK 2/1.8)
• large curved axe and javelin (AW 1:169; AAK 2/1.7)
• large curved axe and axe (AW 1:169)
® bronze dagger and large curved axe (TEM 150-1)
Although no Canaanites have armor or helmets, some are shown carry m
distinctive rectangular shield with triangular indentations on the top and bun.
(BH 2 §15b; EWW 38; AAK 2/1.9); only one Canaanite is shown with
Egyptian-style shield (BH 2 §5b). All Canaanites with shields are armed with a
Egyptian martial art depicting Canaanite warriors can be supplemented I
indigenous Canaanite art from scattered scarabs, seals, and religious artifacts, m
of which is stylistically strongly influenced by Egyptian, Syrian, and Mesop<
mian iconography (ALB 222-3). From the military perspective, these sou.,
often depict gods or heroic figures armed with contemporary weapons I
weapons depicted include knives (GG §7-8), bronze daggers (GG §39e 18 ),
(GG §29), and long-handled "duckbill" axes (GG §35). Some warrior-god
double-armed with mace and axe (GG §30) or mace and sickle-sword (GG § I
Highly abstracted and stylized depictions of the Canaanite weather-god sh<
him standing in the traditional pharaomc smiting pose; the weapon held b\ i
god, if any, is unclear, but would presumably be an axe or mace (G( J
These few examples of Middle Bronze Canaanite martial art confirm the an h,
ological and Egyptian data reflecting the military importance of daggers and a
To these can be added an eighteenth century vase painting showing two Can., i , i
warriors in a duel with daggers (AW 1:72). Both the overall quantity and detail
art and the prevalence of martial themes greatly increase in the Late Bronze \
(GG 49-132).
Indigenous contemporary Canaanite written sources appear for the first dm.
the Middle Bronze Age. Unfortunately, these amount to half a dozen texts froi
Hazor and Gezer written in Akkadian on clay tablets, none of which contain i
nificant military information (ALB 224). The other major possible Middle Broi
text is the Abraham tradition m the Bible. However, the use of the Bible <
historical source for the Middle Bronze Age is fraught with controversy. In,,
pretations range from fundamentalist views that every detail of the biblii
narrative is not only historical, but merrant, to minimalist views that nothing
the biblical accounts can be accepted as authentic history unless confirmed I
non-biblical sources. 19 In many ways such debates are more about theology tli „
history, often thinly masking a much deeper debate about the overall spiritu.l
authenticity and authority of the Bible. None the less, similar debates In
occurred in classical studies, concerning for instance the historicity of I Jo,,,, ,
account of the Trojan War, or late Greek traditions about much earlier (ho
history. The fundamental question is: how much historic..] c redence should h
placed in a late text purportedly descrihm r ,-wui ,| M , IHlllll( ,| {( , [h|M
! '
CANAAN
icr? This is linked to related questions concerning the reliability and durability
i il traditions. The answer is, of course, that some parts of oral traditions pre-
• authentic ancient information, while other parts represent later mis-
it (standings, accretions, conflations, or outright fabrications. The problem
nines determining which parts of the ancient tradition are authentic and which
I are inaccurate. Thus, although the biblical Abraham tradition should be
i ( >ached with caution as a source for Middle Bronze warfare, it should not be
nred.
I rom the perspective of military history, the most interesting Abraham tradition
I lenesis 14, which describes a war between rival city states in Canaan (M =
M H A §24). The story is apparently a very old one, since the author of the text feels
need to repeatedly explain things to his contemporary readers (i.e. Iron Age
lues), such as the current names for a number of the ancient place-names he
(Genesis 14.3, 6, 7, 15, 17). Attempts to identify the kings mentioned in the
i v through other contemporary records have failed. In military terms the story
of a coalition of four kings from the north (14.1), who forced a coalition of
kings of Canaan to "serve" them as tributaries for twelve years. After this, the
ii hern Canaanite kings rebelled (14.2—4), bringing swift reprisal by way of an
ion from the army of the northern coalition. The story describes a patch-
I of ethnic groups in Canaan — Rephaim, Zuzim, Emim, Horites, Amalekites,
i Amorites (14.5-7) - each of whom inhabited small independent enclaves in
inaan and Transjordan, and were defeated in turn by the northern coalition. The
«i ul of Canaan is inhabited by numerous tribal groups and city-states, each ruled
in independent king (melek), which form into rival coalitions competing for
■'inony. Defeated enemies flee and are ruthlessly hunted down (14,10);
li feated cities are plundered and their inhabitants enslaved (14.11). A wealthy
I | h (werful nomad, Abraham, whose semi-urbanized kinsman Lot is swept up in
i riaos of war (14.12), calls upon his allied tribal chiefs (14.13), while mus-
tring men from among his own tribal warriors (hamk: "trained" or "dedicated"?)
14.14) to rescue his captured kinsman. Abraham's tribal army of 318 men was
I I laps matched by similar numbers from his three allied Amorite nomadic chiefs
M unrc, Eshkol, and Aner; this would give the nomads an army of 1000—1200
Ben, a force which was apparently strong enough to ambush and defeat the
ombined field armies of the four enemy kings (14.15) and free his kinsman Lot
tin! all the other captives (14.16). A sacrifice of thanksgiving for victory in
Ittle, along with a tenth of all the plunder, is piously offered to Melchizedek, the
Miest of the god El Shaddai ("God Most High"), who then blesses Abraham
MIS] 9) . Thereafter some of the remaining spoil is returned to its rightful
• in as and punctiliously divided among the nomads (14.21-24). The story makes
i .11 military sense when compared with all the other fragmentary con-
tnporary Middle Bronze evidence that we have. This does not, of course, prove
dial the story is historical n may simply be a fictional legend with historical
verisimilitude, hut this obsimvs the real point for our purpose here; as we
have seen elsew hen-, an. h mi iuiht.n\ In tion often tells us more about the realities
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
CANAAN
of ancient warfare than the often tendentious contemporary royal propaganda
inscriptions.
Biblical traditions also provide us with possible ethnographic and geography
information on the Middle Bronze Age, in the form of traditions about ancient
inhabitants of Canaan who preceded the rise of Israel. These people are known .1
Nephalim (Numbers 13.33), Anakim (Numbers 13; Joshua 14-15), Rephaini,
Emim and Horites (Deuteronomy 2:10-12). They are described as ancient, wai
like, and fearsome people of great strength and size (Numbers 13.32-3). Such
descriptions are believed to represent Israelite recollections of the warlike pre
Israelite peoples from perhaps the late Middle Bronze through the Late Bronze
Age who built the huge ancient ruined fortresses the Israelites saw — it must be
remembered that, by the time of the Israelite kingdom, some of the ruined Bronze
Age cities were already well over a thousand years old. 20
Egyptian military intervention in Middle Bronze Canaan will be discussed in
detail in Chapter Sixteen. These Egyptian sources contain several strikine
descriptions of the warfare of Middle Bronze II Canaanites. The historicity of tin-
Egyptian "Story of Sinuhe", like the tale of Abraham's war with the four kings, is
disputed. None the less, the tale of Sinuhe is certainly contemporary with the Middle
Bronze Age, and thus provides a crucial snapshot of contemporary Canaaniti
warfare. The broader context of the story will be discussed later (pp. 430-3); hen-
we will only review Sinuhe's description of Canaanite arms and warfare. Sinuhe
describes the military life of Amorite pastoralists in the nineteenth century:
When the Canaanite [rulers of the city-states] conspired to attack the [nomad |
rulers of the Hill-Countries, I opposed their movements. For this ruler of
Canaan [Amunenshi, the tribal chief and Sinuhe's father-in-law] made tin
carry out numerous missions as commander of his troops. Every hill tribe
against "which I marched I vanquished, so that it was driven from the pasture
of its wells. I plundered its cattle, carried off its families, seized their food, and
killed people by my strong arm., by my bow, by my [tactical] movements and
my skillful plans. (AEL 1:227)
Sinuhe also provides us with the most detailed narrative description of the arms
and combat methods of an unnamed Middle Bronze Canaanite warrior, with
whom Sinuhe engages in single combat; "Easterner" is an Egyptian term for
Canaanites, who lived to the north-east of Egypt.
He [Sinuhe's Canaanite enemy] raised his battle-axe [tninb] and shield, win It
his armful of javelins [nywy] flew toward me. When I made his [missile |
weapons attack me, I let his arrows pass me by without effect, one followim-
the other. Then, [when he was out of missiles], he charged me, and I shot
him, my arrow sticking in his neck. He screamed and fell on Ins face; I slew
him with his [own] axe. I gave my war cry, standing on Ins ba< k. vvhili
Easterner [in my tribe | bellowed |in triumph | (Al I
Complementing both the archaeological and artistic data discussed above
inuhe's Canaanite enemy is armed with shield, axe, and multiple javelins. Th
urior first engages in an exchange of missiles, after which he charges for a mele
ith his axe.
Another Egyptian warrior, Sebek-khu, described an undated campaign c
Senwosretlll {1378-1843} against Palestine:
[After the Nubian campaign] his majesty traveled downstream [northward] t<
overthrow the Bedouin of Canaan. His majesty arrived at a foreign lane
Shechem [skrnm] by name.. . . Then Shechem fell, together with the vil
Retjenu [Canaanites], while I acted as the rearguard [for the army on it
return march to Egypt], Then the soldiers joined in to fight with the East
erners [who attacked the rear of the column]. Thereupon I [personally] cap
tured an Easterner. Then I had his weapons seized by two soldiers. There wa
no turning back from the fray, but my face was [always] to the fore [of th
battle]. I did not show my back to the Easterner [in retreat]. (AI 120 = ARJ
1 :304-5)
I I ere we see an army from Egypt invading Canaan and sacking one of the city
tates. As in the story of Abraham's war, other Canaanites wait until the Egyptian
my is marching homeward, slowed down by plunder and women and childrei
laves. The Canaanites then ambush the Egyptians, but, unlike Abraham, thei
tttack is thwarted by Sebek-khu s firm defense.
Like the Early Bronze Age, Middle Bronze Canaan was organized into abou
two dozen major city-states, each ruled by its own independent king (melek), an<
dominating the surrounding satellite agricultural villages. These city-states forme<
various coalitions, with shifting patterns of dominance and submission punctuate*
by warfare between rivals as well as battles with Syrian, Egyptian, and nomadr
nernies. The names of most of these city-states, kings, and wars are lost to histor)
None the less, a very broad pattern can be discerned through the Egyptian Exe
M.iiion Texts, ritual magic designed to curse the enemies of Egypt. 21 Scholar
p nerally think that the early Execration Texts (the Mirgissa and Berlin collections
;< 1950} (CS 1:50—2) describe a different political situation in Canaan than thi
I Hi 1 Execration Texts (Brussels collection) {c. 1800}. The earlier texts appear t<
describe regions and tribes rather than towns. The later texts focus more on spe
< if ic towns and individual rulers following more organized itineraries. This has Ie<
1 holars to speculate that we are seeing a military transformation in these text
horn domination of the region by semi-nomadic clans and their chiefs represent
mi", the type of political situation in Middle Bronze I, to the world of Canaanih
M states and kings of Middle Bronze II. This seems to confirm the evidence o
,111 haeology concerning the domination of Canaan by nomads during Middh
Hion/e I ami the restoration ol uib.ui life at the beginning ol Middle Bronze II
li ii is 1 le.n is th.it ( .in. 1. in is ,1 1 unl fragmented into numerous < l.ms .nui < it\
stairs, .nui 1I1 1 1I1 I I li ih. ii< < d to 1 in si- the lot of them: "then shonj
282
ita
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
men, their messengers, their confederates, their allies, the tribesmen in Canaan,
who will rebel, who will plot, who will fight, who will say that they will fight,
who will say that they will rebel in this entire land" (CS 1:52). Unfortunately, the
texts amount to little more than a list of place, tribal and personal names, providing
no specific information about alliances or ongoing feuds. None the less, we get .1
quick glimpse at the complexity of Canaanite political order, with dozens of cities,
kings, and tribal chiefs.
Middle Bronze IIB Canaan {1750-1550} belongs to a new phase in ancient
Near Eastern military history. This period was the most dynamic in ancient
Canaanite military history, in which the introduction of the chariot, composite
bow and metal armor from Anatolia and Syria (see Chapter Five) revolutionized
warfare, both in Canaan and throughout the Near East. During this period
Canaanites first emigrated into and later invaded the Egyptian delta, creating the
most powerful Canaanite military confederation of the late Middle Bronze known
to the Egyptians as the "foreign rulers" or Hyksos. 22 This will hopefully be tin-
subject of a future study.
'Si
CHAPTER ELEVEN
Anatolia
For the purposes of this study I will use the term Anatolia to describe the regie
(lore or less coterminous with the modern country of Turkey (into which Turl
irst migrated in the eleventh century CE). Background on Neolithic Anatolia ca
found on pp. 24-7. The following chart (Table 11. 1) 1 outlines the majc
urhaeological and historical periods of ancient Anatolia.
Chalcolithic Anatolia {5500-3000} 2
1 >\erall the evidence for military activity in Chalcolithic Anatolia is certain'
ketchy, but does fit a basically consistent pattern. The transition from the Nee
i lik to the Chalcolithic period in Anatolia is not only defined by the appearanc
il 1 opper casting of large objects, but also by the spread of militarism. The numbi
nd size of settlements expands, as does trade and other forms of contact betwee
1 uy-states. Competition develops between these small city-states, culminating i
die building of increasingly sophisticated fortifications, along with an increasin
frequency of arsenic-copper -weapons. A number of sites show evidence <
lestruction in war, sometimes repeatedly. Cities that are destroyed in war ai
Table 11.1 Simplified archaeological chronology of Anatolia
Period
Phase
Date
Historical
olithic
Early Neolithic (Pre
Late Neolithic
-pottery)
1 1 ,000-6500
6500-5500
I kilt olithic
Early
Middle
Late
5500-5000
5000-4500
4500-3000
i u U Bronze
Early Bronze I
Early Bronze II
Earl) Bronze MI
3000-2700
2700-2300
2300-2000
Middle Bronze
Middle Itmn/e 1
Mi, Ml. limn/. II
2000 1800
1800 1(>00
( )Id 1 lit tit <
I 1 1 . linm
I (,(!(> 1 '(in
New 1 Inn
WAR I ARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
rebuilt, generally with larger fortifications, indicating a perception of increasing
military thrc.it.
A number of specific sites and finds point to spreading militarism. Fortification
building expands, with the best-preserved Chalcolithic Anatolian fortress at Mer-
sin, which was strongly fortified with a wall, gate, and glacis, dating from about
4500. Storerooms near the gate had piles of sling stones ready for use by defenders
of the walls, with quarters for a garrison. The fortress was destroyed in war in
about 4300. 3 Arslantepe was another major site in southern Anatolia during the
late Chalcolithic (EA 1:212—15). From 3300 to 3000 it seems to have been part of
the Uruk expansion from Sumer, and may have been colonized in part by the
Sumerians; twenty-one copper spears and daggers were found at this site. The city 7
was violently destroyed in 3000 by a group from eastern Anatolia who rebuilt a
fortified city on the ruins. A "warrior" burial at late Chalcolithic Korucutepe
{3500-3000} included a copper dagger and a mace made of iron ore (ET 137).
A royal tomb from about 2900 included metal weapons, with royal retainers
buried alongside as human sacrifices. Thus, although a true military history of
Chalcolithic Anatolia cannot be written, the evidence hints that Anatolia may
have crossed the warfare threshold by the fifth millennium, and was possibly the
first region in the world to do so. If so, military history can be said to begin in
Anatolia.
Early Bronze Age Anatolia {3000-2000} 4
The Early Bronze Age was a period of significant change in Anatolia. As a major
source of copper and silver for the Near East, Anatolian city-states became
increasingly wealthy; the famous treasures of Troy are a striking example. 5 The
lack of almost any military art or written records from the Early Bronze Age makes
a detailed reconstruction of a specific military history impossible, but broad gen-
eral trends are clear. All major Anatolian cities of the Early Bronze Age were
strongly fortified, generally with high, thick, citadel-like stone walls. This, along
with arsenic-copper and eventually bronze weapons, shows the perception of ser-
ious military threat.
By the middle of the Early Bronze Age a number of city-states had risen to
positions of prominence in Anatolia, including Troy (Willusa; Hisarlik) (DANE
302-3; CANE 2:1121-34) in the north-east and Beycesultan (DANE 51-2) in the
south-east. Troy {level II, 2500—2300} was well fortified by a stone wall with brick
superstructure, where sixteen rich treasure troves were found in Schliemann's
famous excavations. Schliemann mistakenly identified this level of the city as
Homer's Troy. Troy II was destroyed in war around 2300, perhaps by the invasion
of the Luwians (see p. 289). Related Early Bronze fortresses were found at
Poliochni on Lemnos and Emporio on Chios (Cl/2:374), fleshing out our
understanding of fortifications of the period, which included narrow tower
flanked gates and arrow slits (Cl/2:374). In some ways these fortresses should be
conceived more as palace-fortress complexes designed lm tin- I irsuleiu e ot'.i
286
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
dynasty ruling over a more rural population. The size and population of these sites
tends to be limited, often measuring from 100 to 250 meters in diameter
(Cl/2:387). In central Anatolia Hattusas (Bogazkoy) (EA 1:333-5) - destined later
to become the capital of the Hittite empire - was a major city-state in the Early
Bronze period, ruled by an ethnic group known as the Hattians. Other city-states
which have been excavated include Alisar (Amkuwa), Zalpa, and Kanesh (Nesha;
Kultepe) (EA 3:266-8) in south central Anatolia. Demirci Hoyuk is an Early
Bronze fortress city built in a circle 70 meters in diameter. The wall is of mud
brick with a stone foundation, defensive ditch, fortified gates, and projecting
round towers (ET 164). Overall, Anatolian Early Bronze II {2700-2300} is char-
acterized by opulent war-like dynasties ruling strongly fortified citadels.
Weapons in Anatolia include the standard Early Bronze arsenal of dagger,
spear, and axe, supplemented by stone maces (C 1/2:377— 8). One set of con-
troversial artifacts, has sometimes been associated with this period. In 1 959 James
Mellaart claims to have been shown the so-called "Dorak Treasure", a collection
of weapons that were said to have been taken from a royal grave in northern
Anatolia (DANE 94-5). The weapons included the standard axes, maces, and
daggers, but also included iron weapons, and short swords about 60 cm long.
Mellaart produced drawings of these weapons, but the actual weapons were nevei
photographed, nor were they ever seen again. Although Mellaart claimed they
were authentic, 6 most scholars now believe the artifacts either never existed or
were forgeries which the forger was planning to sell, but eventually panicked and
withdrew from the market.
Early Bronze Age III {2300-2000}
The Indo-European invasions {2 3 00-2 2 00} 7
The twenty-third century witnessed widespread destruction in western and
southern Anatolia. Three-quarters of the Early Bronze II sites were destroyed and
abandoned (Cl/2:406— 10). Of those sites that survived, many were greatly
reduced in size, and were inhabited by peoples with new types of pottery and
other material culture. Although the lack and ambiguity of evidence makes cer-
tainty impossible, many scholars associate this devastation with the migration of
Indo-European peoples into Anatolia (KH 10—11). The designation "Indo-
European" is a linguistic concept based on the fact that many languages spoken
in India, Iran, Central Asia, and throughout most of Europe are all linguistically
interrelated. It is assumed that all these languages developed from an archaic Proto-
Indo-European language, and that the ancestors came from a single "homeland"
generally placed north or east of the Black Sea in the fifth millennium. From there,
the Indo-Europeans are thought to have migrated in all directions. In the ancient
Near East Indo-European languages are found in Anatolia ami Iran. There arc
two fundamental methodological problems relating to tin- stiuK oi these an hair
Indo-European migrations solely from non written anhaenlurai.il evident e I it.!
188
ANATOLIA
language and ethnicity cannot be determined by material culture - that is to
we cannot tell the language a person spoke by the type of pot or tool
used. Second, language and material culture are not coterminous - people u
the same type of pot or tool may speak different languages, while people sp(
ing the same language may use different types of pots or tools (DANE 153;
3:149-58).
Thus, although it is clear that there was widespread warfare and devastatioi
Anatolia in the twenty-third century, in the absence of written records we car
determine with certainty the ethnicity of the peoples involved. 8 Here I will assi
the theory that there was a major migration of Indo-European-speaking peo
into Anatolia in the mid-to-late third millennium. Two possible routes c
twenty-third-century Indo-European invasion are posited. One is from the 1
kans into western Anatolia; this group is generally called the Luwians, assun
they are the ancestors of the Luwian ethnic group inhabiting western Anatoli
the Middle Bronze Age. Another possible route was over the Caucasus Mount
into northern Anatolia, which may have been the path of migration for
ancestors of the Hittites, who will be discussed on p. 292. From the vague <
denee we have it appears that the Indo-Europeans were warlike, bronze-us
cattle-breeding peoples formed into loose tribal confederations.
From the military perspective, it is clear that there was widespi
devastation in Anatolia in the late Early Bronze period, resulting in the dissolut
of the old political and military order. When we begin to have the first wri
records in Anatolia of the Middle Bronze Age, the names of the peoples of A
tolia and the languages they speak are largely Indo-European, divided into tl
•'.roups: the Luwians in the south and west, the Palaians in the north, and
Nesites in the central area around the city-state of Nesha (Kanesh), of whom
I littites were a part (KH 10-20). In addition, the Hurrians, a non-Indo-Europ
ethnic group, appear to have originated in eastern Anatolia. They are first in
uoned in the Akkadian period {2334-2190}, when they are seen migrai
oiithward out of Anatolia into northern Mesopotamia and Syria, quite poss
under military pressure from Indo-European migrants further to the north
pp. 303-4).
At roughly the same time that Indo-European tribesmen were devastai
mini) of Anatolia, the southern regions of Anatolia bordering on Syria
Mesopotamia faced invasion by the Akkadian empire. Late Mesopotamian tr;
nous remember Sargon {2334—2279} defeating Nur-Dagan, the Anatolian kin:
I'm nshanda. Later Naram-Sin {2254—2218} fought against a rebellions eoalit
o| seventeen kings; the list of rebel kings included Zipani, king of Kanesh
I'amba, king of Hatti, both Anatolian rulers (KH 9, 24 5). The nature of Akkai
rule m south central Anatolia is unclear, but it appears that the Akkadians
established some type ol hegemony over those regions probably <o insure a<
to si! vet and othei metal tesmm es Hie overall result of I lie combination ol In
[•.urope.in initiation lluttiaii munalion, and Akkadian uulilai ran ■ i
1 -ail hi n i military tfUirCIv '' > mm h<- I an- i Ini < I ii i ill> an linn i
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Though the Indo-European invaders devastated much of Anatolia, they did not
completely destroy urban civilization. Though many sites were abandoned, other
cities were burnt but rebuilt. The Indo-European-speaking peoples intermarried
with local conquered peoples, and adopted many beliefs and practices from them,
laying the foundation for the revival of large city-states and the rise of empire in
the Middle Bronze period. Overall the basic pattern of scattered regional inde-
pendent city-states continued.
Middle Bronze Age Anatolia {2000-1600}
By the beginning of the Middle Bronze Age a number of new city-states in central
Anatolia were rising to importance, among them Nesha, Zalpa, Purushanda,
Wahsusana (Nigde), Mama, and Kussara. Writing makes its first appearance in the
form of an archive of Old Assyrian merchants at the city of Nesha. The key to the
success of the new central Anatolian kingdoms was the two-way tin-silver trade
with Mesopotamia, Anatolia was rich in silver and copper, but lacked tin, the key
ingredient in bronze-making. The most reliable source of tin in that period was
Afghanistan, Mesopotarnian merchants, whose homeland lacked copper, silver,
and tin, acted as middle-men in the tin trade, creating a "Tin Road" stretching
from Afghanistan to central Anatolia. Those kings who participated in the silver-
tin trade were able to receive more tin at a cheaper price. They could thereby
create more bronze weapons and equip larger and better-armed armies, giving
them military predominance in the region. Initially the city of Nesha controlled
this trade, making it the predominant power in central Anatolia. However, the
city-state destined to transform the military history of Anatolia and the Near East
was Hattusas, capital of the newly rising Hittites.
Nesha (Kanesh) {2000-1750} 9
The military history of Middle Bronze Anatolia is illuminated to some degree by
the discovery of an Old Assyrian colonial archive at Nesha (Kanesh, modern
Kultepe) in Anatolia. Although most of the 15,000 tablets from this archive are
legal and commercial, there are a number of important military implications of this
remarkable colony. In the wake of the collapse of the Ur III political order in
Mesopotamia, merchants from the newly independent Assyria gained control of
the rich tin trade to Anatolia, founding a merchant colony at Nesha which flour-
ished from roughly 2000 to 1750. Twenty-one Assyrian merchant settlements are
mentioned in the texts. Some, known as karum v were large trading colonies, while
others, the wabartum, were apparently military garrisons assigned to secure the
trade routes. These Assyrian colonies did not represent an actual military conquest
by armies from Assyria, but a network of alliances and power-sharing with local
Anatolian city-states, who benefited greatly by being the recipients of the Assyrian
tin trade. The system was perhaps broadly analogous to the early luiropcan coin
nies in south Asia in the sixteenth ami seventeenth centuries
590
ANATOLIA
, Wrian merchants traded tin (ultimately transshipped from Afghanista
Assyrian and Babylonian textiles for the gold and silver of Anatolia. The tta,
Undertaken by donkey caravans, taking three months for the journey fro
, to Ashur Over the fifty years described by the archive, 80 tons of tin *
rted to Anatolia, enough to make 800 tons of bronze (KH 27); certainly n
,, this was devoted to bronze weapon making, but the large quantity ol t
orts permitted the development of true bronze-armed armies. It is a Ion
King principle of military history that, where merchants travel, armies ;
m Illy able to follow As we shall see, Hittite armies would eventually mar
,1ns "Tin Road" opened by Assyrian merchants and their caravans, culn
iiu in the sack of Babylon in 1595.
i he city of Nesha {level II, 1920-1850} was strongly fortified with a wall 2
.meters long, one of "the largest in the Near East" at that time (EA 3:26
Assyrian colonies nourished during the period covering the reign of Ensht
,| ol Assyria through his great-grandson Puzur-Ashur II, but was destroyed arou
(, by the rival Uhna, king of the city-state of Zalpuwa (Zalpa) to the nor
, may have been assisted by allies from Hattusas (CS 1:183a; KH 34). Alter tl
, ity was abandoned by the Assyrians for a number of decade^
fhe merchant colony was re-established {level lb, 1810-1750} during I
n of Shamshi-Adad {1813-1781}; the control of this tin and textile trade
Itolia may have provided an important supply of gold and silver which heir
.mshi-Adad in his remarkable conquests (see pp. 168-71). A few of the mil*
ities of the kingdom of Nesha can be reconstructed from hints m the Assyr
n bant letters (KH 34-9). There were two kings of Nesha at this time wb
imC s we know: Inar {c. 1810-1790} and his son Warsanra {c. 1790-1775 ,
„ (nar established predominance in the region, making a number ^of rulers
ds, and besieging the city of Harsamma for nine years (KH 36). Tnerea
irsama had tense relations with a rival king, Anum-hirbi of Mama, who
himself as Warsama's equal: both are described as "kings' who ruled over dog,
th, ii vassals (KH 35). These vassal kings would often raid each others lands
ltdc and other plunder. One such occasion caused Anum-hirbi to complan
, sama of Nesha that one of Warsama's vassals had perfidiously attacked Anum-t
* hile he was engaged in warfare on another front:
When my enemy [invaded my country and] conquered me, the Man |v
kind of |the city of] Taisama invaded my country and destroyed twelve ol
towns and earned away their cattle and sheep . . - Did my people invade j
land |as provocation for this attack], and did they kill a single [oi your] o
sheep? (KM 35 6)
IV ki.irs neeolutrd ami agreed to "take an oath" of peace in onle,
Vio.unia du- ail nnpnn.rn.nn and doth ir.uic from Asslun (Kll •■
llln , tlu-H-ath-,, W.n, u.r. ..wiihmun k at, mvasmn h ilu- kme ul u
iht- .mteMi.il hmnrland <>l ill- I t'"" 1 '■
291
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 lit
The early Hittites {2300-1600} n
Origin of the Hittites {2300-1900}
The basin of the Halys River (Kizil Irmak) in north-central Anatoli,
to the ancients as Hatti-land, from the name of the early non-Ind.. I
inhabitants, the Hattians (M = CAM 139). The Haitians, although the) •
name to the land and later empire of the Hittites, were not, in fact, the
ancestors of the Hittites. Rather, sometime around 2300, Indo-Europi
men migrated into the Halys River basin, settling among and eventual , ■
dominate, intermarry with and eventually assimilate the local non-Indo I
Hattian peoples. In the process the new invaders adopted the name "the \m ■
the land of Hatti", or Hittites (KH 16-20).
The most important kingdom of north-central Anatolia in Early Bron
not the eventual Hittite capital of Hattusas, but the nearby city-state <
Hoyuk (DANE 9-10), which flourished in the last centuries of the thud i
nium {2300-2100}. The royal dynasty of the city was buried in thirti
graves containing splendid treasure and numerous weapons. Finds at Ala< i
include standards with bulls, stags, and lions; these were possibly religious, bin
have been military clan or regimental standards (AH 2, 17-23, §1-12).
scholars view Alaca Hoyuk, and related sites such as Horoztepe and Mahnutl
Indo-European centers of power which had newly come to dominate ih
(KH 12).
The conquests ofPithana and Anitta
{1775-1750} (KH 36-43)
The original homeland of the Hittite royal dynasty, however, was Kussara, a nt\
the south-east of their later capital at Hattusas. Our major source for this p, i ,
the Anitta inscription (CS 1:182-4; MHT 24-7), describes the rise to pour, ,
Pithana {c. 1790-1770}, king of Kussara, and his son Anitta {c. 1770 I ,i
rough contemporaries of Shamshi-Adad of Assyria and Hammurabi of B.ilnU
(KH 36-43). Kussara, the Hittite ancestral home, was a city to the south-east of
Nesha on the Tin Road to Ashur. Around the year 1775, probably in an attemp
to gain more control of the tin trade, Pithana . . .
the king of Kussara came down out of the city [of Kussar| with large muni
[of soldiers] and took Nesha during the night by storm. He raptured tin
king of Nesha [Warsama] but did no harm to any of the citizens oi Nesl, ,
He treated them [with mercy as if they were his| mothers and fathct
(CS 1:182)
By protecting the city and the Assyrian merchant class, Pith.m.i guaranteed (h,i
the valuable tin trade would continue unabated. Inn with tin- pmhts m his hand
,,, ,
ANATOLIA
moved his capital to Nesha, where his son Anitta built a great palac
I in An inscription on a dagger (MHT 22).
Pithana died a few years later {c. 1770} while still in the process <
in g his new conquests, a revolt broke out in a number of his vassal citi
son Anitta ruthlessly crushed. The major rebel cities were "devoted" t
god, and were left completely desolate and depopulated, with a cur:
mi anyone who would rebuild them (CS 1:183a). Thereafter Anit
himself to transforming his kingdom into an empire. His first campais
ud against the alliance of Zalpuwa and Hattusas in the basin of tr
ni.ik river, which had earlier sacked Nesha around 1850. It appears th
i victorious, making "the sea of Zalpuwa [Black Sea] my boundary [t
rth)" (CS 183a) {c. 1765?}.
not a decisive victory, however, for Huzziya king of Zalpuwa, an
I mg of Hattusas, remained on their thrones as Anitta's vassals, and quick'
I against him. Anitta marched north again and met the army of Piyushti <
ii nl his vassals, forcing them to flee into Hattusas and fortify it for a sieg
i was captured and sacked, after which Anitta blockaded Hattusas. u Sul
ntly, when [Hattusas] became most acutely beset with famine, the godde
i nit gave it over to me, and I took it at night by storm." Anitta s reveng
i i ins rebel vassal was again ruthless; Hattusas was sacked and sown wit
and perpetually cursed: "Whoever after me becomes king and resetti
i let the Stormgod of the Sky strike him!" (CS 1:183b). Ironically, the cil
entually become capital of the Hittite empire.
[Hi the north secure, Anitta turned westward against Salatiwara, whose am
\uitta in the field and was defeated and made vassal; he celebrated his triump
i great hunt of wild boar, lions, and leopards (CS 1:183—4). With the plund<
i his campaigns Anitta naturally dedicated wealth to the gods and built gre
i it Ins capital of Nesha. He also strongly fortified the city, which bet. in
Oi the great fortresses of the age (EA 3:266). Anitta's triumph was short live.
ii a revolted and marshaled his army on the Hulanna River. Anitta evadt
army, and "came around behind him [the king of Salatiwara | and |captnrt
i lire to his city." Seeing their city in flames, the army of the king of Sa!
i apparently escaped with "1400 infantry and 40 teams of horses |fm < h.i
| ii nl |his| silver and gold" (MHT 27). This incidental reference gives ns tl
i ing figure of 1400 men and forty chariots as the potential size of an anus
. Middle Bronze Age Anatolian city-state, or about thirty-five infantrymen p
luriot; it further implies that chariot warfare was a part of the Anatolian niiln.i
in in the mill eighteenth century, an issue that was discussed in Chaptci hv
Where did the king of Salatiwara go? Anitta does not say, hut it is possible th
lli d in Ins ,il!v the king ol Purnshauda, a west central Anatolian < it y state ne
I ike In/, since Annus nest campaign was .\i) attack against thai kin;', I he king
I'utushanda however. i]iii< kl\ sent tokens of submission and vassalage an "in
tin one and s( rptei " to Anitta Ion I all me a m.ijoi ( ontrontation (( 'S I 1 S Ihi I
I < -f hi i i ii in ill of i en li al \natoha
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
ANATOLIA
A period of anarchy {1750-1670} (KH 64-65)
Anitta's empire was not to last, however; around the time of his death {c. 1750?}
his erstwhile vassals unanimously rose in successful rebellion. Nesha was destroyed
by fire around the time of Anitta's death, and his empire collapsed, with the poli-
tical order of Anatolia returning to feuding city-states. The last of the Assyrian
merchant letters bemoan the toll taken on their trade by the unsettled conditions
in Anatolia (KH 42), and at some point the tin trade ceased, adding economic
problems to political anarchy. Hurrian peoples migrated into the south-eastern
fringes of central Anatolia, while the warlike Kaska mountain tribesmen, who
would later repeatedly raid and invade the Hittite empire, make their first
appearance on the north-eastern frontier; the Luwians dominated the south-west.
The gap of about 80 years between the death of Anitta and the rise of Labarna is
essentially a blank in terms of specific military history. It seems, however, that
during this period Anitta's dynasty lost control over its original city-state of Kus-
sara, which passed into the hands of either a collateral branch of the royal family or
a rival Hittite clan whose dynasty would found the Hittite empire. Kussara
remained one of many petty city-states in central Anatolia until the reign of
Labarna, the founder of the Hittite empire.
Labarna (Tabama) {c. U70-1650} 12
When Labarna came to the throne, he was only the ruler of the city-state of
Kussara, whose "land was smalT\ During the course of his reign, Labarna claimed
to have conquered seven rival city-states south of the Halys (JVlarrassantiya) river to
the Mediterranean Sea, establishing his sons as kings in these cities (CS 1:194a). It
appears that he also campaigned to the north-east of Kussara, capturing the city-
state of Sanahuitta, w r here he also installed one of his sons as king. As he neared his
death Labarna attempted to secure the succession to his throne for a son, also
called Labarna, who was governor of Sanahuitta. However, a large faction at court
supported a rival son, Papahdilmah, who seized the throne in a coup (CS 2:81a;
KH 70-1). The details of the factional fighting or even civil war are not known,
but it appears the state was split in two, with one faction ruling from Sanahuitta
and the other ruling Kussara and the southern domains. This was the political
situation at the succession of Hattusilis I, said to be the grandson of the first
Labarna.
Hattusilis I {c. 1650-1620Y 3
Hattusilis described himself as "son of the brother of [the] Tawananna [Queen
Mother]" (KH 73). 14 He also implied that he was the grandson of Labarna. The
exact genealogical relationship of the Hittite royal family at this time is muddled
(MHT 57). In the Wars of the Roses-style political crisis following the coup
attempt by Papahdilmah, Hattusilis somehow became the prime < .mdidate l<n one
branch of the family, and ascended to the throne at Kussara, while a rival branch
the family under Papahdilmah (or his successor) ruled at Sanahuitta.
The military historian is fortunate to have two fairly detailed records from i
court of Hattusilis — his Annals and his Testament — though, as is not unusual w
ancient Near Eastern historical documents, they often create more questions tr
they answer. Early in his reign, perhaps in his first year, Hattusilis moved his cap
from the traditional Hittite homeland in Kussara to the ancient ruined city
Hattusas (Bogazkoy), which had been destroyed and ritually cursed by Anitt
century earlier (KH 73). This city was to become the imperial capital of the E
tites for the next four centuries, and would eventually become one of the gr
cities of the ancient Near East, whose ruins still awe visitors today. 15 Hattus
.ipparently took his throne-name at this time from the name of the city he rm
his new capital. The "land of the Hatti", from which is derived the dynastic nai
of the Hittites, occupied the region around the city of Hattusas. It is not cert
why Hattusilis moved his capital It may have been initially planned as a tempor;
move to be closer to the rival dynasty at Sanahuitta; on the other hand, his o 1
hold on the throne was probably still dubious, and he may have moved to esa
from the powerbase of rival political factions at the old capital of Kussara.
The first order of business upon his enthronement was to deal with the ri
I littite faction to the north.
He [Hattusilis] marched against Sanahuitta. He did not destroy it, but its la
he did destroy. I left my troops in two places as a garrison. I gave whate 1
sheep folds were there to my garrison troops. (MHT 50)
Although unable to conquer his rival at Sanahuitta, Hattusilis plundered the t>
i itory, leaving the city blockaded by two garrisons and hoping to starve it it
uhimssion. His reason for not undertaking a more rigorous siege of the city v
ipparently a threat from the king of Zalpuwa (Zalpa) to the north, the rival oft
nlier proto-Hittite king Anitta. Hattusilis destroyed and plundered Zalpu\
taking the statues of its gods and three divine chariots captive to his royal temple
ins new capital of Hattusas (MHT 50-1).
With the north secure, Hattusilis turned his attention to Syria - the first-kno^
nine a major Anatolia military power intervened outside Anatolia. At this peri
northern Syria was ruled by the powerful kingdom of Aleppo (Yamkhad, I lal;
I e pp. 257-60). No reason is given by Hattusilis for his invasion of Syria, a
perhaps none was needed. It may be, however, that Aleppo had been allied
i Littusilis' rivals for the Hittite throne, or to another of his enemies. On the oil
hand, he may have simply needed a new source of plunder to keep his soldiers a
supporters satisfied. Whatever the motivation, the Syrian war would inaugurati
half < entury <>f I littite military adventurism in Syria which would culminate in I
sack ol Aleppo (c. If>()(l| ami Babylon | I 5 ( )5 J by I iattusilis' grandson Mini
\i his point, howevet, Mniuiii immediate goal was more modest lie sack
mi. n| Aleppo's v.r.s.il \l i! ,1 I) I, II \i, h.in.i; I A I ^ '' I >WI III I i |, i
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
a precious cache of cuneiform tablets in the ruins (AT) — and plundered the sur-
rounding countryside (MHT 51; KH 75-7).
Hattusilis' third campaign was against Arzawa, the land of the Luwians in south-
western Anatolia. There, as he was plundering the countryside, he received
shocking news. The king of the Hurrians, an ally of Aleppo which Hattusilis had
attacked the previous year, had invaded central Anatolia from the south-east.
Hittite vassal city-states in that region, whose loyalty was nominal at best, seized
the opportunity to rise in rebellion, and most of the region south of the Halys
river was swiftly lost. Hattusilis retired at speed to his capital of Hattusas, where he
regrouped and launched a counter-attack against the rebel cities (MHT 51).
The Sun Goddess of Arinna put me in her lap and took me by the hand and
went before me in battle. And I marched in battle against Ninassa [which had
rebelled], and when the men of Ninassa saw me before them, they opened the
gate of the city [and surrendered without a fight]. (MHT 51)
He subsequently attacked the cities of Ulma (Ullarnma) and Sallahsuwa:
Thereupon I marched in battle against the Land of Ulma, and the men of
Ulma came twice in battle against me, and twice I overthrew them. And I
destroyed the Land of Ulma and sowed weeds [as a ritual symbol of a divine
curse]. I brought the [statues of the] seven gods [of Ulma as symbolic prison-
ers] to the temple of the Sun Goddess of Arinna. ... I marched against the
Land of Sallahsuwa . . . and on its own it delivered itself by fire. (MHT 51-2)
The act of the city of Sallahsuwa "delivering itself by fire" apparently has
reference to burning the city gates as an act of submission, thereby rendering the
city indefensible (HW2 67).
By this swift response Hattusilis prevented the complete collapse of his king-
dom, but his situation was still far from fully stabilized. His dynastic rival still
controlled the city of Sanahuitta, which Hattusilis had blockaded four years earlier.
He now undertook a full-scale six-month siege at the end of which he finally
sacked the city, removing his potential rival as a possible focus for rebellion.
Thereafter a number of cities submitted, and the few that still resisted were ruth-
lessly sacked and destroyed (MHT 52-3; KH 81-2).
With internal stability restored in Anatolia, Hattusilis undertook a second
campaign against northern Syria, in which he crushed the army of the coalition of
Aleppo in open battle. With the field army defeated, Hattusilis was able to con-
quer a number of cities in the region.
In the following year I marched against Zaruna and destroyed Zaruna. And I
marched against Hassuwa and the men of Hassuwa came against me in battle.
They were assisted by [their allies, the| troops from Aleppo. They came
against me in battle and I overthrew them. Wiihin .i few d.ivs I crossed the
ANATOLIA
river Puruna and I overcame [the city of] Hassuwa like a lion with its eta
And when I overthrew it I heaped dust upon it [in a ritual burial mound] i
took possession of all its property and filled Hattusas with it. I entered [
city of] Zippasna, and I ascended [the walls of] Zippasna [by stratagem] in
dead of night. I entered into battle with them and heaped dust upon them.
I took possession of [the statues of] its gods and brought them to the temple
the Sun Goddess of Arinna. And I marched against Hahha and three tir
made battle within the gates. I destroyed Hahha and took possession of
property and carried it off to Hattusa. Two pairs of transport wagons w
loaded with silver [from the plunder of the victories]. (MHT 52-4; KH 82-
Hattusilis' force then briefly raided crossed the Euphrates, allowing him
boast that he had surpassed the military achievements of Sargon of Akkad, vv
had crossed the Euphrates from the other direction, and whose martial fame ^
still pre-eminent 600 years after his death.
No one had crossed the Euphrates River [with an army], but I, the Gr
King Tabarna [i.e. Hattusilis], crossed it on foot, and my army crossed it
foot. Sargon also crossed it [600 years ago], but although he overthrew i
troops of Hahha, he did nothing to Hahha itself and did not burn it dov
nor did he offer the smoke [of the burning city as a sacrifice] to the Sto
God of Heaven. (MHT 55; KH 84)
Hattusilis' army made no attempt at permanent occupation of Syria at t
point, but, rich with plunder (MHT 54—5), withdrew back into Anatolian Hiti
territory. Although he had devastated part of the kingdom of Aleppo, and defeai
i heir army in battle, he had not decisively defeated them nor taken their stron
lortified capital. Unfortunately his detailed Annals end at this point and we arc
with only vague references to later campaigns against both Arzawa and Alep
(KH 88-9). A later document, the "Alaksandu Treaty", possibly alludes to i
subjugation of Arzawa late in Hattusilis' reign (MHT 89), but stalemate seems
have ensued on the Syrian frontier. Overall, Hattusilis' victories established i
I littites as the pre-eminent power in Anatolia, and one of the leading empires in i
Near East, allowing Hattusilis to claim the title of "Great King" (MHT 100, 10
Part of the reason for Hattusilis' failure to fully capitalize on his initial victoi
in Syria may have been factional feuding among his potential heirs, as described
Ins deathbed Testament (CS 2:79-81; MHT 100-7; KH 89-99). As the old ki
began to age, lie lost control of his kingdom:
Hach of his sons went to |rule| .i |conqnered| country; the great cities w
assigned to them. I .iter on, however, the servants ol the pi m< es |ihe sons
1 Li! t i isi 1 is I bee. line rebellious, thev began to devour then [the prim i
houses; thev took id i (Mispn uie . iMidnu.illv .ig.imsi then lords, and the\ bej
to shed then |]oid ! i ..I ( S 1 I'M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
One son, Huzziya, who had been made governor of Tappassanda, unsuccess-
fully rebelled against Hattusilis and tried to seize the throne (CS 2:80). A daughter
in the capital Hattusas plotted with some of the nobility of that city to overthrow
her father and place her son on the throne. She seems to have been tem-
porarily successful, massacring her opponents in the capital, but was eventually
overthrown and banished (CS 2:81). Another son, Labarna, plotted with his
mother — "that snake", as Hattusilis describes her — to murder the king and seize
the throne. Considering Hattusilis' record of devastation and massacre against
his enemies, it is with no apparent irony that he criticises his son: "He showed no
mercy. He was cold. He was heartless." Labarna's plot was exposed and he too was
banished (CS 2:79-80). Despite these plots and rebellions, Hattusilis is never said
to have ordered any of his children to be executed; banishment was the usual
punishment.
This type of dynastic instability, presumably occurring when the Great King
was either away from the capital on campaign, or mentally or physically debilitated
with age, seriously undermined the military potential of the Hittites by regularly
requiring the king to abandon a campaign and rush back to the capital to secure
the throne. It would be a problem that would plague the dynasty throughout its
history. Hattusilis finally called an assembly of all the "army and dignitaries" of the
kingdom and formally adopted his grandson Mursilis as his heir: "In the place of
the lion [Hattusilis] the god will establish only another lion [Mursilis]" (CS 2:80a).
At the time, Mursilis was still a young man, and was placed under the regency of
Pimpira, a minister, for three years (CS 2:80a; KH 101).
Hittite siegecmft: the siege of Ursha
(Warsuwa) {1620s?} 16
Although the precise date is unclear, at some point in Hattusilis' reign he under-
took a major siege of the city of Ursha in northern Syria (MHT 65—6; SHP 76—7).
It may have been during his second Syrian campaign, or in one of his later
unrecorded campaigns. When an enemy army invaded, some cities preferred to
meet the enemy in open battle rather than having their countryside ravaged while
they retreated into their main fortified city (HW2 66-7; CS 1:183b). Other cities,
seeing no hope of victory, would simply submit without a fight and become vassals
(CS 1:184b).
The city of Ursha decided to resist. It was apparently a vassal of a Hurrian king
(KH 78; SHP 76), but was also in alliance with the king of Aleppo, both of whom
provided support during the siege. When a siege began, the besieger would build a
fortified and entrenched camp near the city (HW2 67). Thereafter a siege ramp
was constructed, providing access to the upper walls for battering rams and siege
towers (HW2 67—8). A later literary account describes some of the events sur-
rounding the siege of Ursha, giving us insight into the nature of Middle Bronze
siegecraft. The first part of the text is lost, and the account begins in the middle oi
the siege:
198
ANATOLIA
The [defenders of Ursha] broke the [Hittite] battering ram. The king [Hi
tusilis] was angry and his face was grim: "They constantly bring me bad nev
may the Weather-god carry you away in a flood! Be not idle! Make a [ne 1
battering-ram in the Hurrian manner and let it be brought into place. Mak<
'mountain' [siege-ramp] and let it also be set in its place. Hew a great batterin
ram from the [large trees in the] mountains of Hassu and let it be brought in
place. Begin to heap up earth [into an assault ramp]. When you have finish
let everyone take post. Only let the enemy give battle, then his plans will
confounded." (GH 148)
It is not clear why the first battering ram broke; it could have been destroyed
a sortie from Ursha, but it seems that it was poorly made out of inferior materia
I lattusilis therefore ordered a new ram constructed "in the Hurrian mannei
implying that Hurrian and Mesopotamian siege technology was superior to that
the Hittites at that time. He also ordered the new battering-ram to be made fro
I I ecs from the "mountains of Hassu", implying that the local trees were too sm
.ii id the wood too soft to make a sturdy enough ram. There is a lacuna in the te:
with some missing events, in which a Hittite ally or vassal named Iriyaya app<'
'illy failed to bring promised reinforcements. Hattusilis then complained:
Would anyone have thought that Iriyaya would have come and lied sayir
"We will bring a tower and a battering-ram" - but they bring neither a tow
nor a battering-ram, but he brings them to another place. Seize him and s
to him: "You are deceiving us and so we deceive the king." (GH 148)
I his combination of siege-ramp, tower, and battering-ram was the standard sie
equipment for the Middle Bronze Age. Following another lacuna, in which t
n -,(■ did not progress well, Hattusilis again berated his officers for their failures:
"Why have you not given battle? You stand on chariots of water, you a
almost turned into water yourself. . . You had only to kneel before him |i
enemy king in Urshu] and you would have killed him or at least frighten
him. But as it is you have behaved like a woman." . . . Thus they [the km
officers] answered him: "Eight times we will give battle. We will con Ton i
their [defensive] schemes and destroy the city." The king answered, Li ( loot!
(GH 148)
I >cspite these assurances, the siege still dragged on interminably. In the me.i
tune, the 1 I it tiro army had not fully blockaded Ursha and the agents ol alii
kings and presumably reinforcements and supplies were continually entcrn
the i nv under the eyes oi the 1 Intite army.
hul while thc\ » in I iioihmr to the i it v. m.inv o! the l.ni" srtv.mis w <
wounded so th.it inn I h< \ inn w .is ani'.eied and saul "W.ittll t
,.,.,
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
roads. Observe who enters the city and who leaves the city. No one is to go
out from the city to the enemy." . . . They answered: "We watch. Eighty
chariots and eight armies [one army for each gate?] surround the city. Let not
the king's heart be troubled. I remain at my post." But a fugitive [enemy
deserter] came out of the city and reported: "The subject of the king of
Aleppo came in [to Ursha] five times, the subject of [the city-state of] Zuppa
is dwelling in the city itself, the men of Zaruar go in and out, the subject of
my lord the Son of [the Hurrian war-god] Teshub [the Hurrian king, overlord
of Usha] goes to and fro." . . . The king [Hattusilis] was furious. (GH 148-9)
The text ends here, but there is no evidence that Hattusilis was successful in the
siege. The use of eighty chariots, ten for each of eight companies, to patrol the
entrances to Ursha emphasizes that, although the Hittites seem to have inferior
siegecraft at this time, they are none the less at the forefront of chariot warfare.
The weakness of Hittite siegecraft in this early period is reiterated by an
examination of the overall ineffectiveness of their sieges (HW2 67—9). The siege of
Harsamma by king Inar of Nesha lasted for nine years (KH 36); Sanahuitta was
blockaded for four years, after which it was actively besieged for six months (MHT
52); Zalpa was besieged for two years (CS 1:182b). On the other hand, cities could
fall quickly to a surprise assault, sometimes at night (CS 182-3). In comparison,
sieges in the Mari documents often proceed relatively rapidly (see Chapter Eight) .
Mursilis I {c. 1620-1590} (KH 101-5; SHP 80-3)
Militarily, Mursilis was one of the most successful kings of the Middle Bronze period.
Unfortunately, our records for his reign are few and short. None the less, the basic
outline of his campaigns can be determined. His succession to the throne seems to
have been a last-minute decision by his grandfather, Hattusilis, in response to the
plots and intrigues of his children (CS 2:79-81). Mursilis' father had been killed in
Hattusilis' wars against Aleppo (KH 102), leaving Mursilis a minor upon his suc-
cession to the throne; he ruled for three years under the tutelage of a regent (CS
2:80a). Presumably the political instability plaguing the Hittite royal family con-
tinued in the first years of Mursilis' reign, but, if so, no records of such disturbances
have been preserved. Rather, later historical recollection idealizes Mursilis' rule:
When Mursilis was King in Hattusas, his sons, his brothers, his in-laws, his
extended family members and his troops were united. They held enemy
country he subdued by his might, he stripped the [enemy] lands of their
power and extended his borders to the sea. (CS 1:195a)
The emphasis on "subduing" and "stripping" enemy lands "to the sea" may
imply that the vassal states of Anatolia rebelled at the death of 1 lattusilis, requiring
military campaigns to bring them back into submission, extending I litutc borders
back to both the Mediterranean and lilac k Seas
KX)
ANATOLIA
Upon subduing any last rivals for the throne and restoring order in Anatolia
Mursilis, by now probably in his twenties, turned his attention to the unfinishe(
conquest of Syria, which had been begun by his grandfather and father.
Mursilis set out against Aleppo to avenge his father's blood [who had earlie
been killed in a war with Aleppo]. Hattusilis had assigned Aleppo to his soi
[Mursilis' father] to deal with. And to him [Mursilis] the king of Aleppo mad
atonement. (KH 102)
This laconic text leaves many questions unanswered, but it appears that in hi
old age Hattusilis had ordered his unnamed son - Mursilis' father - to continue th<
■ ars against Aleppo. While on one of these campaigns Mursilis' father was killec
in battle, and, as a dutiful son, Mursilis invaded Syria on the pretext o
avenging the death of his father. In the coming campaigns the king of Aleppo
hose kingdom had been devastated during Hattusilis' wars, finally agreed t(
ecome the vassal of Mursilis, thereby "making atonement" for the deatl
• I Mursilis' father. This state of vassalage did not last, however. Presumably a
nme point the king of Aleppo rebelled against Mursilis, requiring a new campaigt
to punish the rebellious vassal, probably around 1600, which is only brief! 1
described in Hittite records: "Mursilis went to the city of Aleppo, destroyet
Mrppo, and brought Aleppo's deportees [as slaves] and its goods [as plunder] t(
I httusas" (CS 1:195a).
With all of Syria subdued, Mursilis faced two enemies to the west: the Hurrian
hi northern Mesopotamia and the Babylonians in central and southen
Mesopotamia. Again the details are scanty, but in 1595 Mursilis marched t(
I I abylon, and destroyed and sacked the city. On his return march he was apparently
1 1 1. u ked by the Hurrians, but defeated them as well: "Now, later, he went t(
Uabylon, he destroyed Babylon and fought the Hurrian troops. Babylon 1
deportees and its goods he kept in Hattusas" (CS 1:195a; MHT 143-5). Meso
potamian records confirm the fall of Babylon: "In the time of Samsuditan
(king of Babylon], the Man of Hatti marched against Akkad [i.e. Babylon]'
(MHT 143).
The capture of Babylon by Mursilis was the most audacious military achieve
Blent of the Middle Bronze Age. Given the relative technological and logistic. i
I apacities of Middle Bronze armies, Mursilis' victory probably appeared to con
temporaries rather like Alexander's conquests 1300 years later. On the other hand
tin- long term impact of Mursilis' conquest of Babylon was ephemeral, for he wa
uulcrcd by his brother-in-law, Handlis, in a palace coup shortly after rcturnini
(< i I lattusas in triumph.
Now 1 lantilis was cupbearer |to king Mursilis] and he had Mursilis' siste
I l.n.ipsilis (oi his wife /id. mi. i had the daughtci ol 1 lantilis (oi a witc, and h
plotted with I lantilis in. I ilu\ i nmmittcd an evil di-rd they killed Mui.ili
and 'died his hinnd (( S I I'J ... Mil I 1 IS)
101
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Although his sister Harapsilis was able to seize his throne after this murder, the
Hittite state collapsed into quasi-anarchy with several successive coups; the Hittite
records claim the gods abandoned these wicked Hittite kings, and "wherever their
troops went on campaign they did not come back successfully" (CS 1:196a; KM
101—30). By the time that Hittite stability and military power were restored in the
fifteenth century, the political situation in Syria had changed dramatically The Kassite
dynasty in Mesopotamia (DANE 164-5; EA 3:271-5) and the Hurrians of Mitanni
in Syria (see pp. 303-7) became the real benefactors of early Hittite imperialism.
Hittite military ideology
The Middle Bronze Hittite records present a consistent pattern of military ideol-
ogy. The Hittite king was chosen by the gods to rule the land of Hatti and subdue
all enemies (KH 87—8; HW2 71-2). He was successful in battle when he properly
served the gods, and was "beloved of the gods" (MHT 24, 51), but failed in battle
when the gods turned against him for his sins (CS 1:195-6). Victories were won
"with the help of the Sun God" (MHT 25). Hattusilis, the "Great King", was the
"beloved of the Sun Goddess of Arinna"; "she put me [in her lap as her son] and
took me [by the hand] and went before me in battle, granting victory" (MH 51).
Hittite kings might also attack under direct oracular instructions from the gods,
presumably pronounced by temple prophets. One oracle read: "the Sun goddess is
sitting [on her throne in the temple] and sends out [her] messengers [the prophets
to the king, saying]: 'Go to [attack] Aleppo!' " (CS 1:185a). Cities that resisted the
Hittite king were resisting the gods; rebellion was tantamount to apostasy and
resulted in complete devastation of a city, often with a ritual curse forbidding its
future rebuilding (MHT 26; CS 1:183). This curse was symbolized by sowing the
land with weeds (MHT 26), or covering the ruins with dust (MHT 53-4). 17
In return for military victory, Hittite kings shared their plunder with the gods,
just as they would with any other military ally: "I delivered [the plunder] up to the
Storm God of Heaven" (MHT 25). The "deeds" of warfare and destruction are
themselves "offerings" to the gods (MHT 52—3); the rising smoke of a sacked and
burning city ascends to heaven like the smoke of a burnt offering on an altar
(MHT 55). New temples were built by slave labor captured in war and from the
plundered wealth: "whatever possession I brought home from the field [of battle | 1
thereby supplied [to the temples of the gods]" (MHT 27, 50—5). Part of the
plunder dedicated to the gods included the images of the gods of conquered cities,
which were taken captive and brought to serve the gods of the Hittites in their
temples, symbolized by setting up the captured statues in subservient places in the
Hittite temples (MHT 26, 51-2, 54),
Early Hittite military system ] H
While Late Bronze {1600-1200} artistic and textual soiiucn foi Hittite militan
history are quite rich, for the Middle Brnn/e penml mn tn.it <-t i.ils ate still ratlin
ANATOLIA
inty. While most Hittite soldiers were infantry (HW2 55-7), chariots none the les
■m) to make an appearance in both art and texts. Middle Bronze Hittite infantr
K depicted with the standard Near Eastern weapons: mace (AH §20), javelin, ax.
\l I §35c-d, §44; WV §29), and thrusting spear (FI §737). Some warriors ar
Im iwn with helmets and shields (FI §737). From the few examples where number
soldiers are recorded, Hittite armies seemed to have numbered in the lov
lousands: numbers mentioned include 300, 700, 1400, and 3000 (HW2 72-3).
When details are mentioned, most Middle Bronze Hittite armies are describe*
, onsisting of both infantry and chariots (HW.2 57-8; MHT 27; GH 149). Text
fiom this period mention capturing enemy chariots (MHT 54, 55); thirty chariot
I .art of the spoil at the fall of a city (HW2 59). One Anatolian army consisted
i I 100 infantry and 40 chariots, a ratio of 1 to 35 (MHT 27). Another early Lat
onze text mentioned 200 chariots (HW2 73). Middle Bronze Hittite chariot
hould not be confused with the later Late Bronze chariots depicted on the famou
lirteenth-century Kadesh battle-reliefs of Ramses II, which show three-mai
pews for many Hittite chariots (EAE 2:219-20). Contemporary depictions o
Anatolian chariots show standard Middle Bronze two-horse, spoked- wheel vehi
I Irs with either one or two riders (see Chapter Five). One charioteer has an axe
lnle others use the bow from the chariot. 19 Horseriding was also known amon;
the 1 littites; a cylinder seal shows two helmeted men on horseback with reins; th
..I i text is apparently military, since they are accompanied by a man on foot witl
hield and spear (FI §737).
The importance of plunder in Hittite warfare is emphasized in many of th
i (HW2 69). When a country was first invaded, if the enemy king and hi
ii my withdrew to their citadel, the countryside was stripped of livestock ani
foodstuffs and small, poorly defended villages and towns were plundered (HW
f. l > 70; MHT 51). These captured supplies were used to feed the army during th
forthcoming siege (MHT 50). People who were captured were enslaved; som
were put to work at forced labor to support the army in such tasks as building
Mcge ramp. Others, however, were simply rounded up and deported back to th
. apital, creating large displaced slave populations (CS 2:195a). When a major cit
was captured it was looted of all valuable possessions, and frequently burned. Th
Hittites paid special attention to captured gold and silver, which is sometirru
described in great detail in lists of plunder sent back to the capital (MHT 51-55;
I Ins plunder is naturally shared with the gods - the most important allies of th
I littite kings - and presumably with the soldiers as well, though this is general I
mil explicitly mentioned.
The Hurrians 20
luirly Hutrian conquests {2400-2190) ]
\ | | [mi i i.i ir, I n si appeal m In iniii J in ouls as mountain tribes ol south rastei
\n.ilnha I mm sum i\ in I i" philolup.ists hav< dct« iiiutu d lh.it th
Vu\
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
ANATOLIA
Hurrian language is non-Indo-European; they appear to be related to the Lit -
Urartians who also inhabited south-eastern Anatolia in the first millennium
(DANE 311-12). Around the twenty-fourth century, Hurrian names began to
appear in the records from the Khabur Triangle region of north-eastern Syria an<
northern Mesopotamia. It was likely that the Hurrian conquest of that region was
a complex phenomenon including peaceful migration, infiltration by mercenary
bands in the pay of local city-states, followed by the rise to power of Hurrian
mercenary warlords over predominantly Semitic inhabitants, and culminating in
the eventual full-scale migration of Hurrian herding tribes out of the mountains
into the more fertile river valleys (HE2 160—4). The lack of Hurrian names - "
in the twenty- fourth century indicates that they were still restricted to the Khabui
triangle at that time (AS 285).
Although the precise sequence of military conquests cannot be determined,
dynasties with Hurrian personal names and worshipping Hurrian gods - partial
larly the storm god Teshub and goddess Shauskha - appear in a number oi
Northern Mesopotamian city-states, including Kharbe, Nagar, and Urkesh. '
Tupkish, king of Urkesh, is the only Hurrian ruler known from this period (AS
284-5), during which Hurrians for the most part adopted the urban culture of the
city-states they conquered. We have no evidence of a distinctive Hurrian military
system.
Hurrian migration and domination of northern Mesopotamia and Syria vv.i
temporarily slowed during the period of Akkadian imperialism (HE2 161—3)
Sargon {2334-2279} campaigned in northern Mesopotamia, probably in part
against Hurrian city-states (R2:12, 15, 28-31; WH 7-8). His grandson Naram-Sin
{2255-2218} also campaigned in the north, capturing a number of Hurrian city
states (R2: 91, 141; LKA 176-87; WH 8-9). The names Tahishatili of Azuhinnnm
and Puttim-atal appear to be Hurrian city-state rulers who were among tin-
rebellious vassals of Naram-Sin (WH 8). Naram-Sin made the Hurrian city-
state of Nagar his regional capital, where he built a large administrative palace
(AS 278-81).
The second phase of Hurrian expansion {2190-1900}
The power vacuum left in Mesopotamia in the wake of the fall of the Akkadian
empire in 2190 was filled in part by two non-Mesopotamian peoples: the Gutians
in the south (see pp. 102-4) and the Hurrians in the north. Throughout this
period Urkesh seems to have been the principal Hurrian city-state. We should not,
however, think of a Hurrian "empire" during this period. Rather, there were a
number of northern Mesopotamian city-states ruled by independent Hurrian
dynasties, perhaps in some sort of loose confederation, sometimes allied togethei
but sometimes feuding. We have only vague hints from scattered fragmentary
records alluding to Human-ruled city-states (WH 9—10). Talpus atali ruled Nagai
in the twenty-second century, one of the first iiulepi m<I< ni llmii.ui rulers aftci
the fall of the Akkadians. The most impoit.mi lluiii.m mli-i "I i his period was
".Ml
I Shen {21 C}, who was king of the two major Hurrian cities of Urkesh and
i ir,u\ and probably of other cities as well (WH 9).
i lurrian arms met a second setback during the Ur III period {2112-2004}.
i the Gutian warlords had been overthrown and driven from Mesopotamia by
ig Utuhegal of Uruk {2117-2111}, the successor Third Dynasty of Ur
mpted to expand Sumerian power into northern Mesopotamia as well. Shulgi
| I fr {2094-2047} in particular is noted for his campaigns up the Tigris river,
re he engaged and conquered several Hurrian cities (see pp. 109-1 1). 23 Lists of
VII slaves obtained by the Sumerians during Shulgi's wars include numerous
I ii nan names (WH 10). Shulgi's grandson Shusin {2037-2029} continued
uiipaigning against the Hurrians in the north until his attention was diverted by
Amorite threat from the west (WH 10-11). Despite their success in the Tigris
illey, neither of these two kings were able to capture the Hurrian heartland in the
labur triangle, nor take the Hurrian 's capital city of Urkesh.
1 1 1 the last decades the Ur III dynasty, Hurrian fortunes revived under their
ii king Tish-atal {Y3 of Shusin = 2034}, who ruled from his capital Urkesh
n included the cities of Nagar and Nineveh in his domain (WH 11-12). He
mis to have successfully resisted further Ur III expansion into northern Meso-
otamia, and wrote a temple dedicatory inscription, the oldest document in the
I lurrian language:
I ish-atal, endan [god-king] of Urkesh, has built a temple for [the god]
Nerigal. . . Who destroys it, him may [the god] Lubadaga destroy. . . May the
mistress of Nagar [the goddess Shauskha?], the sun-god, and the storm-god
| Teshub] [destroy] him who destroys it. (WH 11)
\n exasperating piece of evidence is a seal of unknown date and provenance
hit h mentions "Tish-atal, king of Karahar [Harhar]" (WH 11). It is sometimes
limed that this has reference to the city of Harhar in western Iran, north-east oi
Uabylon. A maximalist interpretation of this data is that the Hurrian king Tish-
ktal's domain included not only the Khabur Triangle and the upper Tigris valley
hi also part of western Iran in the Zagros Mountains. The minimalist inter-
in, it ion is either that the city is misidentified, or that the king is a later Tish-atal,
i mIoi innately, the issue cannot be resolved with our limited evidence (WH 11-12)
Another source has recently come to light giving us additional evidence o:
I I in i ian militarism at the end of the Early Bronze Age. Based on a recently dis-
I i Arered 1 lurrian mythological text on the fall of Ebla, Astour sees a description o:
hi historical war between Ebla and the Human kingdom of Ikinkalish (HE2 145)
In the course of the war the Human god Teshub ordains the destruction of EbL
foi attacking Ikinkalish and enslaving some of its citizens (HE2 142):
I | leshnhl will smash the outei wall [of Libia | like a goblet
I w ill trample the min i ' 'II hi ■ i heap ol refuse.
In t In middle <»! th. m I II » mi Ii the menlolk like a I'.obli I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
ANATOLIA
I will cast the incense burners of the upper city into the lower city
And cast the incense burners of the lower city into the river. (HE2 156-9)
In response to the oracle from the gods, a coalition of three Hurrian kings,
Arib-Ibla, Paib-Ibla, and Eshe-pabu, gathered their armies and captured and
sacked Ebla. Astour believes that the city was subsequently ruled by a dynasty of
Hurrian descent (HE2 164). Others attribute this destruction of Ebla in around
2000 to the Amorites.
The subsequent history of the kingdom of Urkesh is obscure due to lack of
textual sources. Based on later Hurrian traditions tracing their kingship back to
Urkesh (WH 12), it is presumed that the kingdom or confederation lasted several
generations. By the eighteenth century the rulers of most of the city-states in
northern Mesopotamia and north-east Syria were still Hurrian.
By the late sixteenth century, the Hurrian city-state confederations of north
cistern Syria and northern Mesopotamia appear to have coalesced into a majo
kingdom, destined to become one of the most powerful states of the Late Bronz
Age: the kingdom of Mitanni (Hanigalbat) , whose capital was Washukanni. 2
I hiring the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries the Hurrian king of Mitanni wa
I onsidered the equal and rival of the other contemporary "Great Kings" of Egypt
Babylon, Assyria, and the Hittites,
Hurrian expansion into Syria {1900-1600}
In the nineteenth through the sixteenth centuries Hurrian names begin to appear
in records throughout Syria, indicating ongoing migration. Much of this migra-
tion was probably through the peaceful movement of merchants, mercenaries,
craftsmen, nomads, slaves, or farmers. There is also, however, a good deal of evi-
dence for ongoing and increasing Hurrian militarism. During these centuries
Hurrian names appear in the texts of Mari, Emar, Ugarit, and Alalakh — where 50
percent of the names are Hurrian - indicating the migration of either groups or
individuals into these areas. In some of these areas Hurrians appear to have risen to
positions of power; the king of Ursha in northern Syria seems to have a Hurrian
name (WH 15). By the seventeenth century some Hurrian clans have also migra-
ted as far as Canaan, where their descendants later appear as the Horites (or
Hivites) of the Bible (Gen. 34.2, Josh. 9.7). 24
Hurrians were also active on the south-eastern fringes of Hittite central Ana-
tolia, and strongly resisted Hittite imperialism in Syria, A letter from the Nesha
archive {18C} mentions a Hurrian king Anumhirbi, king of Mama, a city appar-
ently near modern Maras in eastern Turkey (WH 12). When Hattusilis I {1650-
1620} campaigned against Arzawa (south-west Anatolia), the army of "the enemy
of the city of the Hurrians entered my land" and attacked him from the rear
(MHT 51). Throughout the Hittite wars, the Hurrians seem to have been strong
allies of Aleppo. The city of Ursha, which strongly resisted a Hittite siege by
Hattusilis as described above (pp. 298-300), appears to have been ruled by a
Hurrian dynasty (KH 78; WH 15). During the siege, Hattusilis ordered his soldiers
to "Make a battering-ram in the Hurrian manner", indicating that he recognized the
superiority of Hurrian siege technology (GH 148). On his campaign against Babylon
in 1595, Mursilis mentions fighting Hurrians (CS 1:195a); he does not, however,
claim to have conquered their land nor destroyed their (it it*s. The Liter, more famous
wars between the Hittites and the Hurrian kingdom <>l Mil. mm were ( litis mere]}
the continuation of an ongoing struggle which bej»an m the M-\niieenth leuiurv
CHAPTER TWELVE
Pre-Dynastic and Early Dynastic Egypt
{3500-2687}
Geographical constraints on Ancient Egyptian warfare
The existence of Egypt as a coherent geographical and cultural concept is based on
the interaction of the ecology of the Sahara and the Nile. The Sahara, the largest
desert in the world, is capable of supporting only small foraging clans of hunters
and herders. The Nile River, with its source in the rains of highland Ethiopia,
transects the Sahara on its eastern edge, cutting a narrow and shallow canyon
through the region (EAE 2:16-20; AAE). Before the building of the Aswan Dam
the Nile flooded regularly, based on rain patterns in north-east Africa. The Nile
floodplain provided a haven for animal and human life in the otherwise barren
Sahara. Along with scattered oases, it is the only region in the Sahara where agri-
culture can flourish. 1 Thus, in the words of the fifth-century BC Greek historian
Herodotus, Egypt "is a gift of the [Nile] river" (Her. 2.5). Egyptian civilization
flourished in the Nile valley and surrounding oases, and was intimately tied to the
Nile ecology in many ways (EAE 2:543—51).
The geographical and ecological foundation that created Egypt also set the stage
for Egypt's military history. Surrounded by desert and ocean, the Nile valley of
Egypt formed a coherent and highly defensible military region. Egypt is separated
from the southern or Nubian Nile valley by a cataract, or rapid, at Aswan, which
prevents river traffic, but which is easily bypassed by overland portage. The barrier
of the First Cataract formed both the geographical and the cultural boundary
between Egypt and Nubia (modern northern Sudan), and Kush (modern centra!
Sudan) to the south. The Nile floodplain in Nubia and Kush is often too narrow
and rocky in many regions to permit the same degree of intensive agriculture
found in Egypt. Thus, Nubia and Kush were less densely populated than Egypt, and
consequently generally less powerful economically and militarily than then
northern neighbor. Although there were frequent tensions and raids on the Nubian
frontier, the Nubians and Kushites were able to present a serious military threat to
Egypt only when it had become internally weakened or broken into several i iv.il stairs
To the east and west, the desert regions were inhabited by nomadic peoples, but
the limited population levels in these regions generally prevented them from
raising military forces strong enough lo pose ,i m.ijoi unlit. n\ tlne.ii to h.gvpt .is .i
in
limn
\,M I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
whole. They could raid and plunder, and even do significant local damage, bul
could not threaten the state or conquer a united Egypt. To the north, Egypt was
bordered by the Mediterranean Sea. Egypt did not face major military invasion
from either the western desert or by sea until the time of the Libyans and Sea
Peoples in 1190 (EAE 3:257-60), and the rise of the Libyan Twenty-second
Dynasty under Sheshonq in the tenth century (EAE 3:280-1). Both of these
events are outside the chronological purview of this volume.
Before the rise of the New Kingdom, therefore, Egypt faced only four poten
tial military threats:
1 raids from the Sahara desert by Libyans;
2 the Nubian frontier beginning at Aswan, but later pushed further south;
3 the north-eastern frontier with the Sinai and Canaan;
4 internal wars when the Egyptian Nile valley was fragmented into rival states
All of ancient Egyptian military history falls into patterns based on the shifting
balance of power and fortunes of war in these four military zones of threat.
For the purposes of this study I will adopt a simplified version of the periodizatioi i
schema presented in the Oxford Encyclopedia of Ancient Egypt (EAE 3:61-5) (se<
Table 12.1). Developments in early Neolithic Egypt are discussed in Chapter Oni
Naqada I (Amratian), Middle Neolithic {4000-3500} 2
Naqada (ancient Nubt), an archaeological site about 18 miles north of Luxor, was
one of the most important fourth-millennium cities in Egypt, revealing a number
of important early military transformations, 3 A crucial development manifest a
Naqada was the rise of copper working, entailing the shift between Neolithic ami
Table 12. 1 Chronological periodization for Egypt
Dates
Historical period
Tool age
Material culture
To 8500
8500-5500
5500-3150
Paleolithic
Prehistoric
(Pre-Dynastic)
Mesolithic
Neolithic
Badanan 5500-4000
Amratian (Naqada I) 4000 '■ ,
Gerzean (Naqada II) 3500-3150
3150-2687
Early Dynasti<
2687-2061
Old Kingdom
Chalcolithic
"Copper Age"
2061-1569
Middle Kingdom
1589-1081
New Kingdom
Bronze Age
1081-332
Late Period
Iron Age
110
PRE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
ill olithic periods. Although in many respects Egypt remained a Neolith
icty, with most weapons made from, stone, the introduction of copper initiate
w weapons' technology that would culminate in full-fledged Bronze A^
in the third millennium. The search for copper also contributed to i
p nisionistic mentality in Egyptian society. Although some copper was accessib
i 'Vptians in the Eastern Desert, the most important copper sources were
kii Maghara in the south-west Sinai, where an estimated 100,000 tons of copp<
i\ excavated throughout antiquity (EAE 1:295). Some copper was mined t
I peoples and imported into Egypt in the form of flat ingots. By the Ear
n i\tie period, however, Egyptians began to intervene militarily in Sinai ar
Libia in an attempt to access directly or even control the sources of copp<
ng, .ilong with rare prestige items such as gold from Nubia and turquoise froi
I (see pp. 317-21). 4 Thus, the increasing importance of a copper-based ecor
i i eated both the demand for secure access to those resources (and hence f(
i ii v intervention to control the mines), and rising military power as coppt
I later bronze) became increasingly used in weapons industries (which in tur
ided improved means to secure those resource centers).
1 he earliest method of working copper was cold hammering; eventual
king developed and copper came to be melted and poured into stone (
mi* molds (EAE 295). Many of the earliest surviving copper artifacts at
try, including pins, beads, bracelets, and rings. Cold hammered copper als
in to be used for tools and weapons, including surviving examples of hea\
I" i axes, knives and daggers, spearheads, and projectile points (EE 43, 51, 8!
I ' ')). The latter are frequently described as "harpoon tips", and may t
im uted with the royal ritual hippopotamus hunt (see pp. 313-4). However, sue
i pi ins could obviously also be used in war. Copper knives and axeheads ai
u to have been poured into molds, with their cutting edge created by hair
i As elite burials show, with the rise of proto-kingdoms (known fc
Kropologists as "chiefdoms") at Naqada, we find a large copper axehead i
limb 3131 (EDE29; FP 22).
Another development in Naqada I {4000—3500}, in part associated with th
h lor copper, was the rise of international trade, especially with souther
mi and the Phoenician coast. From a military perspective, the importance (
[national trade is reflected in three developments. First, trade brougl
n .i\ nig economic specialization and contributed to the rise of social elites, an
nitu.illy of military specialists. Second, trade introduced new military resource
iid technologies into Egypt, such as copper for weapons and the donkey f<
■i-aiis Finally, trade brought Egypt into contact with surrounding people
in 'oik's of interaction with Nubia, Libya, and Canaan, which would cu
n i i i it ci national military conflict.
1 lie void trade with Nubia appears to have begun in the Naqada I period; tf
n nl name foi Naqada wis Nubt , mean in t», "( Jo Id |town |'\ with referent e to i
in the b.astern iVsert via Warn I lammamal ( iolil as a souree (
and. indina th, miln u | ■> > • ■ i is an impoi taut theme in 1 y\ pt nn mihtai
M 1
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
history, and it is quite likely that part of Naqada's early wealth and military pre-
dominance was due to its access to the early gold trade.
The Naqada I period is also associated with two other social phenomena with
importance for military history. Several cities in southern Egypt associated with
Naqada I show an overall increase in population density - the largest towns yet
discovered in Egypt during this period. Increasing agricultural surpluses and
growing sedentary populations laid the manpower and resource foundations for
the rise of the great protodynastic city-states which will be discussed in this chap-
ter. Agricultural wealth could be converted into cultural predominance as well; for
the first time in the Nile Valley we begin to see elements of an Egypt- wide shared
material culture, as elite trade goods were transported and imitated throughout
Egypt. Although Egypt still consisted politically of a number of independent
proto-city-states, for the first time we can begin to speak of Egypt as a cultural
entity. This process continued into the Naqada II period {3500—3150}. Finally, the
egalitarian settlements of earlier periods were transformed, as control over the
increasing surpluses and wealth tended to create small religious and political elites
within the Egyptian proto-city-states; this process is most apparent in the building
of monumental tombs adorned with rich grave goods. This is generally viewed as
indicating a transition from the anthropological category of "chiefdoms" to
regional city-states ruled by local independent military and hieratic elites.
Naqada II (Gerzean), Late Neolithic {3500-3150} 5
As the small egalitarian peasant farming villages of the Nile valley grew and coa-
lesced into larger confederations and city-states, evidence from burials demon-
strates the rise of elites within Egyptian communities. These elites probably filled a
number of different interrelated functions in society — religious, economic, and
political. From the military perspective, however, the rise of elites coincides with
the first manifestations of an ideology of militarism in Egyptian society - elites as
warlords. The late Neolithic or Pre-Dynastic period in Egypt thus offers the first
glimpses of military history. The lack of written sources during the Naqada II
period prevents us from writing a full military history of this period. From
archaeological and artistic evidence, however, it is possible to examine a number of
military trends.
One clear indicator of rising militarism is the development of fortifications/'
Expensive and difficult to construct, fortifications are generally made only when
three military criteria are present. First, there must be a serious and sustained
military threat. Occasional haphazard raids are generally not serious enough to
merit the large-scale investment of labor and resources necessary to build for-
tifications. Second, there must be a non-moveable resource of sufficient value to
merit the expense of fortification. In Egypt this was the development of sedentary
cities that had become centers of agriculture, population, resource collection and
storage, trade, manufacture of prestige products, government, and religious
shrines. The aggregation of all these valuable rcsouu es in .1 Mtu*.l< urni moveable
I
PRE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
.•nter made early Egyptian cities a magnet for potential attack, necessitating vig-
| mt defense through fortification. Finally, a society must have a sufficient laboi
hi plus to invest the time and resources necessary to construct fortifications. Thus.
I he absence of fortifications does not demonstrate an absence of warfare, but the
,.iesence of fortifications is decisive evidence for serious long-term military threat
mdeed, one could argue that serious and sustained military threat must pre-date
I I ic earliest construction of fortifications. The specific nature of the earliest Egyptiar
ratifications will be discussed in the section on Early Dynastic Egypt, at whicf
Cage the evidence becomes more abundant (pp. 325-6). However, it is clear thai
{ .1 tification building in Egypt began at least during the Naqada II period, as witness
die mud brick defense built at the "South Town" region of Naqada (EAE 2:494).
The development of the mace is another clear indicator of the rising impor-
1 nice of military power. 7 Since weapons like axes and arrows have both military
is id non-military uses, they are not certain indicators of warfare. The mace, on the
.iher hand, was exclusively and pre-eminently used as a weapon in archaic Egyp-
■ 1. in warfare (BAH pi. 1). Technologically, the mace was simply a variation on the
1 1 ib or axe, with a heavy stone head designed for smashing rather than cutting
I he earliest evidence for maces in Egypt occurs during the Naqada I perioc
I 1000-3500}. A recently discovered vase from tomb U-239 at Abydos depicts i
• lies of warriors with pear-shaped maces herding, and perhaps dispatching, ;
number of prisoners (GP 79). The "Painted Tomb" (Tomb 100) from the Naqad;
He period {c. 3300} depicts a royal figure standing in a boat with a mace (GP 79)
1 arly maces took two forms: disk-like (mnw) or conical, and pear-shaped (hd); tht
I ntcr became the predominant form of the weapon. 8 By the late Naqada II perioc
1 1 1. ices had become the pre-eminent symbol of kingship and military power. /
i irge number of Pre-Dynastic maces have been discovered in tombs, and as votiv(
gifts to the gods in temples, especially at the "Main Deposit" at the Hierakonpoli
1 mple. Iconographically, Pre-Dynastic Egyptian kings are generally depicted car
1 ing maces as the royal weapon, often in the famous "smiting" stance that was t<
I M> the norm in Egyptian royal martial iconography for the next three thousand year
I igure 8, p. 318; MB; PSE). Several maces are carved with scenes of the rituals o
! ingship that will be discussed on p. 316. Archaeologists have also discovered elegan
Hint knives (EE 43; AW 1:115), flint projectile points, and a copper harpooi
I u »int, presumably used for the ritual hippopotamus hunt (EE 51; EDE 216-17).
Although no detailed written records survive, the names of several legendar
I rings of the period are associated with the falcon war-god Horus, emphasizin;
1 heir military prowess: "Horus Fights", "Horus Siezes", "Horus Decapitates
(KCI 24). The combination of archaeological and artistic evidence provides 11
u ith a broad outline of military trends during the Naqada II period. These mclud
the spread of agriculture throughout the Nile valley, the development of increas
mgly large settlements, increasing contact between various regions of Egypt, an
the slow adoption ol .1 miiu1.ii material culture throughout the Nile valley. Durin
this nei iod Egypt was di\ ul<-d um> two majoi cultural regions that persist in varyin
arv.iees thiourhoui its iihmii hit.us I Ippn (southern) and I .own (northen
M \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Egypt. Politically and militarily, Egypt was further subdivided into a number of
independent city-states, laying the foundation for the later "nomes" or provinces
of Egypt.
In the late fourth millennium BC, evidence exists indicating steady expansion
of the material culture (pottery and other artifacts) of the Naqada II peoples from
the south into the north. It is unclear if this transition of material culture was
caused by trade, peaceful migration, or conquest — or, most likely, a combination
of all three. Certain sites, by fortune of geography, had superior access to trade
routes and rare natural resources, which both facilitated the rise of internal elites,
and provided a basis for potential military power over rival neighboring city-states.
Economic competition between these city-states eventually took on military aspects,
with weaker cities being exploited and eventually absorbed into larger proto-states.
Artistic sources for Late Pre-Dynastic {3500-3150} military history
Martial art provides an important source for understanding warfare in late Pre-
Dynastic Egypt. The "Painted Cloth" from a tomb in Gebelein depicts the king in
a martial stance harpooning a hippopotamus as part of a ritual hunt symbolizing the
power of the king over the forces of chaos (EDE 33; EDE 216). The Hierakonpolis
"Painted tomb" (tomb 100) shows a number of scenes of hunting, herding, and
religious rituals, but includes three depictions of combat. 9 In the first (lower right)
a soldier wearing an animal-skin jacket and armed with a javelin and knife fights
another man with an animal-skin shield. Nearby a similarly-armed man has
defeated a fallen enemy. Finally, in the lower left, the king with upraised mace in
the archetypal smiting posture prepares to execute three kneeling captured prisoners.
The most detailed Pre-Dynastic artistic scene of battle is the Gebal el-Araq
knife handle. 10 Here nine warriors in loincloths engage in various stages of hand-
to-hand combat. Some warriors have their heads shaved, while others have long
hair, apparently indicating hairstyles of the rival tribes. The scene is divided into
four registers; in the upper register two soldiers armed with maces and flint knives
grapple with one another. One longhaired warrior has been captured by a shaven -
headed mace-wielding foe. The lower two panels show a flotilla of riverboats
interspersed with corpses of slain enemies, perhaps indicating the post-combat
slaughter of prisoners. This is also the first clear evidence of naval combat on rivers.
The "Hunter's Palette" is also a rich source for understanding Pre-Dynastic
warfare. 11 The scene probably depicts a great hunt rather than actual combat.
However, since kings can be depicted by their tribal totems in Pre-Dynastic art, it
may symbolically represent combat. 12 For this discussion it will be assumed that,
even if the scene depicts a pure hunting expedition, the military and hunting
equipment and techniques overlapped during this period. Indeed, the palette may
represent a military unit hunting while on campaign. From the military perspe<
tive we see the soldiers are all similarly dressed, wearing kilts, with some type <>l
animal tail in the rear as adornment. Most warriors also have ostrich feathers m
their hair. None carries a shield or any type ol chest oi lee. pmte< nun I lowevei.
W I
PRE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
since the Painted Tomb demonstrates that both animal-skin jackets and shields
were used in Egypt during this period, their lack of representation here may
indicate that such items were not used in hunting. Most of the men in the lower
column carry some type of bundle on their backs, probably a bag of supplies. The
palette depicts two columns of warriors encircling antelopes, rabbits, and two
lions, probably implying the use of flanking tactics. Both columns have a man with
a Horus banner near the front. The upper column consists of twelve men, the
lower of seven (two of whom are largely lost in a missing piece of the palette);
most of the men are double-armed. Their weaponry includes: bow alone (1); bow
with three arrows (1); banner with mace (1); banner and double-headed axe (1);
mace and throwing stick (1); spear and fighting stick (3); spear with axe (1); bow
with mace (3); spear and mace (1); lasso (2); bow with double-headed axe (1); two
spears and fighting stick (1); bow and perhaps another weapon on the lost frag-
ment (1); unknown, due to lost fragment (1). In total the nineteen men are armed
with seven bows, six maces, six spears, five fighting sticks, two double-headed
axes, two lassos and one axe. The presence of a man with two spears may indicate
that the spears could also be thrown. Nearly all the men are thus armed with both
some type of missile weapon (bow, fighting stick, and perhaps javelin), and some
type of melee weapon (mace, axe, spear).
A fifth source of military information for the Naqada II period is the "Battle-
field Palette". 13 This scene depicts the aftermath of the battle. In the upper
register - which is fragmentary - at least three captive enemies, stripped naked
with their arms bound behind their backs, are marched off the battlefield by totem
standards symbolizing the victorious clans. In the lower register six enemy corpses,
limbs akimbo, lie naked on the battlefield, being eaten by vultures and a lion. One
of the corpses, whose eye is being eaten by a carrion bird, has his arms bound
behind his back, indicating that at least some of the prisoners were executed or
sacrificed after the battle.
Thus, although no precise dates, battles, or commanders can be given, the
« ombination of several lines of convergent evidence - fortifications, elite tombs,
war maces, and martial iconography - indicates that city-state-sponsored militarism
had become widespread in Egypt during the Naqada II period. This process would
i ulminate in the rise of competing regional kingdoms in southern Egypt in the
Naqada III period {3150-3050}, and the military unification of Egypt around 3050.
Naqada III (Proto-Dynastic, Dynasty "0") {3150-3Q50} 14
Intelligible military history of Egypt begins with wars between rival city-states of
... it hern Egypt around 3150. 15 The sparse protohistoncal evidence for this
period consisting of a few single-word inscriptions of king's names and icono-
sM.iphn representations of royal rituals and warfare - makes any interpretation of
events ambiguous ami dubious .u best Ihe following reconstruction is necessarily
p, , Lil.u ive. Alt hoi it'll (in n uhlan aspei is ol the nniln at ion of l-gypt will he the
tt>< us dl .(Mention h« e it inn I U
• h.isi/cd I hit this pnn ess undoubtedly
in
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
included a combination of peaceful activities such as developing cultural and eco
nomic bonds, political marriages, alliances, etc.
By around 3150 southern Egypt - for which we have the most documentation in
the Pre-Dynastic period - was divided into at least four independent states: Naqad.i
(Nubt), Abydos (This), Hierakonpolis (Nekhen), and Qustul (Ta-Sety) in northern
Nubia (Sudan) (M= HAAE 22-3). Each had access to trade routes for gold, stone,
copper, or other important resources (EDE 36-41). The thirty-second century
was one of increasing competition between these and other rival city-states. As
one proto-kingdom absorbed another, its military resources concomitantly
expanded, making it increasingly difficult for rivals to defeat, thus creating a type
of snowball effect. This period of military competition and expansion culminated
in the unification of all Egypt under Narmer, to be discussed on pp. 318—20.
The wars of unification of Egypt began with a three-way struggle between the
confederations of Abydos, Naqada, and Hierakonpolis. Around 3125, king Uj 16 ol
Abydos was buried in the largest monumental tomb yet built in Egypt. It is often
assumed that Uj had expanded his kingdom from Abydos, to the north, thereby
becoming the dominant power in Middle Egypt. The extra resources obtained by
this expansion permitted him to construct his monumental tomb. At the same
time in the south, the kingdom of Hierakonpolis emerged victorious over the rival
kings of Naqada, whose lineage disappears around 3100, probably indicating con-
quest by Hierakonpolis (EDE 47-8). Thus, by about 3075 two major powers had
emerged in middle and southern Egypt: king Scorpion of Hierakonpolis and Uj's
successor, king Ka of Abydos. These rivals soon became enmeshed in a struggle for
domination of Egypt.
King Scorpion {3085?-3060?f 7
Scorpion is known largely from the ritual scene depicted on the ceremonial
"Scorpion Mace" found at a temple in his capital of Hierakonpolis. 18 The overall
ceremonial context depicted on the mace-head is uncertain, but perhaps involved
the ritual opening of irrigation canals, the foundation of a temple, or the heb-sed
festival. From the military perspective the upper register is the most important. It
depicts a row of captured enemy banners, from each of which hangs a dead
lapwing bird. This is generally thought to depict the conquests of Scorpion, or his
immediate predecessors. Included among the conquered banners is the bow sym-
bol of Nubia, probably indicating a campaign to the south of the first cataract.
One can conclude from this that there was ongoing warfare during Scorpions
reign, with substantial military success against his rivals.
Ka {3075-3050?} (EDE 57-8)
Scorpion of Hierakonpolis' great military rival was king Ka of Abydos. Seals
bearing Ka's name have been discovered in the north eastei n delta Although they
could have been introduced into the area by traders, the se.iis m.i\ indicate some
l
PRE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
tvpe of military intervention and perhaps the beginning of the conquest of th(
delta by the kings of Abydos. At some point, perhaps around 3060, Ka seems tc
luve defeated Scorpion (or his immediate successor) and conquered his kingdon
| i southern Egypt. This left Ka with only one serious rival in the Nile Valley, the
fubian kings of Ta-Sety (Qustul) {3200-3000}. 19 The existence of the Pre-
I tynastic Nubian kingdom of Ta-Sety in northern Sudan was virtually unknowr
until excavations carried out in the late 1960s and 1970s. These revealed a ceme-
i y with about a dozen royal burials, rulers of a powerful Pre-Dynastic kingdon
hat was the equal and competitor of contemporary kingdoms in Egypt. Althougl
there are a few tentative proto-hieroglyphs, written texts are lacking, making i
precise reconstruction impossible. None the less, Ta-Sety shared many elements o
military technology and royal military ideology with its Egyptian rivals.
As with all Pre-Dynastic Egyptian history, the details of the struggle betweer
i .i of Abydos and the kings of Ta-Sety cannot be recovered. It appears that Kc
unpaigned south to the Second Cataract in Nubia, defeating the kingdom o
[ustul, as memorialized by the Gebel Sheikh Suleiman monument in Nubia
which depicts a boat - presumably used for military transport — surrounded b)
l.i lightered and captured enemies, along with proto-hieroglyphic signs of tht
■ onquered cities of Ta-Sety. 20 There is also slight evidence of a possible campaigr
into southern Canaan (EDE 51). By his death around 3050 Ka had conquered hi:
major military rival at Hierakonpolis and unified all Egypt south of the delta into i
ingle kingdom. He had probably begun the conquest of the north-eastern delta a;
1 ell. The completion of his conquests of unification was to fall to his son Narmer
who founded the First Dynasty of Egypt.
Early Dynastic Egypt {3050-2687}
-onrces for the military history of the Early Dynastic period are quite sparse
.i I lowing only an uncertain reconstruction of broad patterns. None the less, there it
I substantial increase of data when compared with the Pre-Dynastic period. The
■onrces for the military history of Early Dynastic Egypt can be divided into sis
• .itegories, in order of importance:
I rock-cut victory stele;
! annals (principally the Palermo Stone); 21
^ military art;
I archaeological remains of weapons and fortifications;
seals or other name inscriptions possibly representing the authority of the
pharaoh in a particular region; and
f) later martial legends collected by Herodotus, Manetho, Diodorus, and othei
( classical historians."
r.acli ol these eatcgoiies of evident e is fragmentary and ambiguous, treating .
mimhei ol difficulties in hi nu lop.iphu a! interpretation. Although I will no!
endlessly use the .uheih > pteseruc should he ubtquitoush assmm 'I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
First Dynasty (Thinite) {305Q~285Q} 23
Narmer/Menes {3050-302 5 ?} 24
Later Egyptian legend, as transmitted by the Greeks, viewed Menes as the first
human ruler of Egypt who "built the city which is now called Memphis". 25 This
legendary Menes is frequently identified by many scholars with Narmer, the first
king of the First Dynasty. 26 The famous "Narmer Palette" shows the king -
overshadowed by the falcon war-god Horus, who granted victory in battle —
wearing the White and Red Crowns of both Upper and Lower Egypt (EAE
1:321—6). Narmer is depicted defeating his enemies, ritually smiting a prisoner
Figure 8 The "Narmer Palette", Hierakonpolis, Egypt (c. K)40)
Source: Cairo, Egyptian Museum (Xil47U>; drawim*. In Mn lt.nl I
'.I-
PRE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
with his mace, marching in triumph among the corpses of his enemies whose
decapitated heads are placed between their legs, and capturing rival cities (sym-
bolized by a bull smashing through city walls). 27 The symbolism of the king-as-
I Mill is also found in the Pyramid Texts (PT 205, 409, 474, 572), in a passage whicr
may well be describing the same mythic scenario as that depicted on the Narme]
I 'alette. "King is the Bull . . . the King has united the heavens, the King has powei
• »\ cr the southern and northern lands . . . the King has built the city of the goc
| Memphis?] in accordance with its proper due" (PT 319). The Narmer Palette
clebrating Narmer's military victories and prowess, is often seen as a memorial o:
his military unification of Egypt. At the very least, it symbolizes the ritual military
prowess and activities that Egyptian kings wished to memorialize (DAE 196). Twc
nace heads from roughly the time of Narmer celebrate bearded captives bearing
i lbute to the king (EWA 5-6; FP 161).
Another memorial often associated with Narmer's campaigns is the "Cities
1 * ilette", which may depict a king's conquest of the north-west delta and Libya,
with seven cities symbolically represented by walled enclosures surrounding proto-
hicroglyphs for city names. Animals from tribal or city banners - representing
military units - are depicted digging through the mud-brick city walls with hoes.
vmbolizing their assault and conquest of enemy cities. The opposite side of the
palette shows rows of cattle, donkeys, and goats, probably representing the plundei
from the expedition. 28
The new unified domain of all of Egypt established by Narmer and his suc-
• essors was consolidated by the creation of a new capital at Memphis, originally
i ailed Ineb Hedj (inbw-hd), or "White Fortress". 29 The construction of this fortress
as the symbolic act of the primordial unification of Egypt was remembered as 2
fulfillment of a divine commission in later theological texts. The Shabaqa Stone
explains that the king as personified by the war god Horus "stood over the land,
lie is the uniter of this land.. . . He is Horus who arose as king of Upper anc
I owcr Egypt, who united the Two Lands in the Nome of the Wall.. . . There [al
Memphis] was the royal fortress built at the command of [the god] Geb" (AEL
1 :53). Defended by a massive mud brick wall and strategically located at the ape^
of the Nile delta, Memphis controlled communications and trade between south-
ern and northern Egypt, allowing the rapid transportation of troops and supplier
anywhere in the Nile valley. Memphis thus became both a symbol of the nev\
united kingdom, as well as a practical means of militarily enforcing that unity. 30 B)
about 3025 Narmer's united Egypt stretched from Aswan to the Mediterranean.
I rearing the first trans-city-state kingdom in world history. During the ensuing
I 11st Dynasty, we begin to see written language, professional administration, cen-
tralized kingship, the extension of irrigation and agriculture, mining, monumenta
irehitecture, and increasing wealth and social stratification. From the military
perspective Narmer's I'.gvpt had become the most powerful state in the world.
While the tin i I it at 1011 "I I I'.vpl solved the problem of military struggle betweei
i ompeting ( at\ states in 1 1 1 • Nil- Vill«-\ that had c harai lei i/ed Hgvpl in the Pre
|)yua\ih nciiod, i( <i .1 j in.d military problems I he .uliuial am
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
ethnic unity of the new state did not extend beyond the geographical boundaries
of the Nile Valley, leaving three potential external enemies: Nubians to the south,
Libyans to the west, and Sinai nomads and Canaanites to the east. Having com-
pleted the conquest and subjection of the independent Egyptian city-states begun
by his father Ka, Narmer appears to have undertaken external campaigns against
Libya and southern Palestine to secure those frontiers. 31
Seals of king Narmer have been found at Arad, indicating that at the very least
trade was occurring with Egypt. Given the fact that, for Egyptians of this period,
trade, exploration, and military action were intrinsically intertwined, it is not
impossible that Narmer may have campaigned in the region, establishing hege-
mony over Arad in southern Canaan. 32 The massive fortifications of Arad were
first built in Stratum II (3000—2800), probably at least partly in response to Egyp-
tian military threat (EA 1:169). Narmer's external campaigns may be vaguely
remembered in the later legends that Menes "reigned for thirty years, and
advanced with his army beyond the frontiers of his realm, winning renown by his
exploits" (Man. 33).
Narmer's successors {3025—2965}
Records of the military exploits of Narmer's first four successors, if any occurred,
have not been well preserved. Seals with the name of Aha {3025— 3000?}, 33 Nar-
mer's son, have not been found in southern Palestine, leading some to speculate
concerning a possible decline of the Egyptian presence there - though this may
simply represent the vagaries of survival and discovery. Two labels, however, depict
campaigns, one showing the execution of a bearded enemy (EWA 8), the other
recording a campaign by Aha against the Nubians (Ta-Sety) (EDE 178; AE 51).
Djer (Zer) { 3000-2977? } 34 is noted for an expedition to Palestine, 35 - perhaps to
shore up the decline of Egyptian influence there during the reign of his father - as
well as a victory over the Libyans. 36 Djer's son Djet {2977-2965?} had only a brief
reign, leaving his young son Den under the regency of Djer's wife Merneith — the
first woman known to have ruled Egypt as regent. 37 Evidence of military activities
during Djet's reign and the subsequent regency of his mother has not survived.
Den {2965-291 5} 38
Den was the second great martial king of the First Dynasty, "the preponderance ol
entries [in the annals of the Palermo Stone] from the reign of Den referring to
military activity is particularly striking" (PS 245). Den was a long-lived ruler who
during his fifty-year reign celebrated two sed festivals (DAE 256) — religious rituals
of recoronation for the renewal of kingship. His military efforts were focused on
the eastern desert and Canaan, commemorated by five decorative ivory panels.
The most important, from a tomb in Abydos, shows the king smiting a cowering
Easterner, and reads "the first time of the smiting of the east |hy king Den]' 1 . "
Others depict the destruction of fortified cities m ( tn.un inlM.li/rJ hy .i hoe
\ 'i i
PPJE-DYNASTIC AND EAPXY DYNASTIC EGYPT
'faking through a symbolic city wall surrounding the name of an enemy (EDE
>6). These, or related expeditions, are also recorded in the Palermo Stone, which
preserves accounts of three campaigns against Canaan over a fourteen-year period,
bribing the "smiting of the bowmen (sqr 'Iumtiw)" referring to tribes to the
Miitheast of Egypt (PS 106, 242). The exact referent of the campaign against the
dog-pike] people" is uncertain, but probably refers to the ongoing wars with
OUthern Palestine as well (PS 244-5). Another entry may describe the "sailing
li'wnstream [north] by boat . . . and smiting of [the city] Werka" (PS 116). This
ief statement highlights the importance of river transportation in Nile Valley
irl are. Part of Den's royal titles included Khasty (h3sti), with a determinative sign
■ i ''foreign desert", perhaps alluding to a campaign into the Sinai or Negev (PS
I >). If so, this would anticipate the later practice of Roman emperors taking the
1 1 1 1 nphal titles of enemies or regions they had conquered. Given this emphasis of
Military effort, southern Canaan may have come under direct rule of Egypt during
'i least part of Den's reign (ECI 29-37).
Last kings of the First Dynasty {2915-2850?}
e cords of military activities for the last three kings of the First Dynasty are sparse.
I iifdjib {2925-2900?} and Semerkhet (Semsem) {2890-2880?} made no recorded
nnpaigns. 40 The last king, Ka'a {2880-2850?}, has an ivory rod depicting a bound
• 'inad, which is possibly commemorative of a campaign into the Sinai or southern
I .niaan. 41 Thus, by the end of the First Dynasty, the basic strategic patterns asso-
i.i led with later Egyptian military history had already been established. Military
i> tivities focused on attacking enemies of Egypt residing in southern Canaan,
I ibya, and Nubia, either as punitive expeditions, plundering raids, or to defend
i.ule and mining operations. Dealing with potential threats from these three
frontiers would be a strategic constant throughout Egyptian military history.
Second Dynasty {2850-2687} 42
Origins of the Second Dynasty {2850—2790}
Ml hough the details of the transition between First and Second Dynasties are
i ibscure, it seems to have been relatively peaceful. A possible attempt at usurpation
l>v the shadowy Horus-Ba is speculated, but the first king of the Second Dynasty,
I letepsekhemwy, oversaw the burial rituals of the last king of the First Dynasty,
Ka\i, indicating a regular transition of legitimacy (EDE 82-3). The history of the
ii < ond I )ynasty is rather obscure, with a number of kings known only by name.
I IclvpsvL'hcimey and Ranebi
I i i pi toi [he iris'.ir "l I in" Nniuii'i ami K hasckhemwy, military events of this
pericul aie ilitlu nil h Hf trpsrkhrinwv J^SSO 2S20) is not credited
m
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
with any military activities (EDE 83—4; AE 91—2), while a stele found on the
desert road near Armant indicates his successor Ranebi (Nebra) {2820-2790}
undertook an expedition of some sort — perhaps with a military component — to
the Kharga oasis in the Western Desert (EDE 84; AE 92-3)
Ninuter
The only known military campaign of Ninuter (Ninetjer) {2790-2754} is descri-
bed in the Palermo Stone for year 13 {2777}: "hacking up [the place] Shem-Ra;
hacking up [the place] Ha". 43 Neither of these sites can be precisely identified. It
has been speculated that Ha, meaning "North", refers to a location in the delta,
and this campaign was to suppress rebellion there, which is certainly possible (EDE
85; AE 93).
It is also possible that Shem-Ra and Ha/"North" are references to southern
Canaan, where archaeological evidence shows that the stone walls of the city of
Arad were breached and the city sacked and burned at the end of Stratum III (c.
2800 }. 44 It is possible that a rival Canaanite city-state, or even nomads, could have
been responsible for the sacking of Arad around this time. But the city's massive
fortifications — a 1700-meter circuit of mud-brick walls 2.5-meters thick on stone
foundations, defended by several dozen projecting towers - indicate that only a
determined and powerful enemy could have taken the city by assault. Given the
repeated military activity of Egypt in southern Canaan, one is tempted to conclude
that Arad had built its massive fortifications in defense against Egyptian incursions,
but was ultimately destroyed by the Egyptians. Chronologically, the rough
archaeological dating of the fall of Arad to 2800 fits into the mid-Second Dynasty
in Egypt, and early in the reign of Ninuter. 45 If the Egyptians did conquer Arad,
they were not able to maintain control over the region for long; the walls of Arad
were rebuilt in subsequent years, which might correspond to the period of Egyp-
tian weakness and turmoil that followed Ninuter.
Ninuter was succeeded by several obscure kings, Wadjnas (Weneg), Senedy, and
possibly Nubnefer {2754-2734?}, for whom we have no recorded campaigns. It
has been suggested that the succession to Ninuter was contested, and Egypt
entered a period of civil strife with rival kings, which culminated in the civil war
between Peribsen and Khasekhemwy (EDE 87—9).
Peribsen
The known military activities of Peribsen {2734-271 4 } 46 are based on several
brief inscriptions in which he claims to be "conqueror of Canaan" and "con-
queror of foreign lands". 47 Another small seal from the period mentions an
"administrator of the foreign land", pointing to some type of officer in charge
of foreign areas (EWA 24). Additionally however, Peribsen is ,i unique king in
Egyptian history, the only native Egyptian to have been assoi i.iinl with the ch.ios
god Seth (EAE 3:269-71; DAE 264 5). This is often minpieied to reflect .i
\ ' '
PRE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
trligio-political revolution of some sort during his reign, in which Egypt was spli
niio rival factions or even separate kingdoms supporting the traditional Horu
i i tigs against the upstart radical Seth king Peribsen. 48 Details of any military
M i ivities associated with this conflict are unknown, but the struggle culminated ii
i civil war during the succeeding reign of Khasekhemwy.
Khasekhemwy {2714-2687} 49
Hie military activities of Khasekhemwy are well documented by Early Dynastic
i.mdards. Due to the strife engendered by Peribsen s "Seth rebellion", during th<
I arly part of-Khasekhemwy's reign he ruled only in southern Egypt with his capita
ii Kierakonpolis. The exact chronology and relative order of campaigns in hi:
reign is unclear, but in the "year of the fighting the northern enemy" he defeatec
the "rebels" in the north (AE 100; EDE 91), a probable reference to the Seth kin^
Peribsen. This delta campaigns culminated in claims of killing "47,209 northerr
enemies" (AE 99, MB 128, 216, TEM 45; EDE 92), a number often thought tc
be an exaggeration. But, exaggerated or not, it is clear that Khasekhemwy suc-
eeded in reunifying Egypt after the troubled reign of Peribsen. Following the
ie unification, Khasekhemwy undertook the "humbling of foreign lands" as wel
(AE 100; EDE 92). Nubia was invaded, and the fragmentary remains of ar
inscription at a temple in Hierakonpolis list foreign countries which were appar-
I • i illy defeated, while another inscription mentions an office of "overseer of for-
i ',n lands", indicating that some type of direct Egyptian control may have been
• mblished outside the Nile valley (EDE 92). Maritime trade to Byblos was also
trnewed (EDE 92). Khasekhemwy s walls surrounding his tomb complex at
1 lierakonpolis provide some of the best evidence from the period for the design oi
fortifications. Khasekhemwy 's victories, combined with a thriving economy and
intense cultural and religious activity, laid the foundation for the rise of the Old
Kingdom, which his son Djoser {2687-2668} was to found (see p. 329).
The Early Dynastic Egyptian military system
Hit
pi
Organization
>nly the faintest hints survive concerning Egyptian military organization in the
're-Dynastic and Early Dynastic periods. The Early Dynastic Egyptians had a large
well-organized bureaucracy - 10,000 graves of government officials from this
•nod have been discovered at subsidiary non-royal cemeteries near the capital
Memphis (EDE 109-49). This did not necessarily translate, however, into a per-
in.inent military bureaucracy or standing army. Specific military duties and
responsibilities were generally organized on an ad hoc basis. Officials could have
concurrent economic, ceremonial, religious, administrative, and military respon
Nihilities. This is illustrated In the most detailed funerary inscription from the Early
Dyanstii period, thai of ot M.il ■ j 'swi ; horn Sai|i|ara ( I ■. I > 1 MX ■>, Al l )2)
VM
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
A member of the extended royal family, Merka's offices included priest, governor
of the Hare-nome, "follower of the king" - probably courtier - and "comptroller
of the palace." Militarily he was "district administrator of the desert," which seems
to have involved security of the frontier.
The state organized a vast system of taxation, collection, storage, manufactur-
ing, and redistribution of food, goods and equipment, creating an unprecedented
logistical foundation for military activities, one that was absent in all of Egypt's
nearby military rivals during this period. Combined with its vast wealth from
agricultural surplus, gold, and trade, Egypt had a significant military advantage
over all her potential enemies.
Military expeditions - led by a "commander of the expedition" - were often
not solely military in purpose, but rather combined exploration, trading, resource
exploitation, and military functions. Titles such as "controller of the desert" or
"keeper of the Canaanites" probably point to regional military frontier comman-
ders, while the "overseer of the foreign land" was apparently the military governor
of Sinai or southern Canaan (EDE 134, 143-4, 149).
Arms and armor 50
Although we lack any detailed combat narratives from this period, we have a
number of surviving weapons and combat scenes preserved in military art that
provide us with a basic understanding of Egyptian military equipment. Generally
speaking, Egyptian warriors are depicted as wearing a kilt, with no helmet or
shield, nor any armor for chest or lower legs. The major exception to this is found
in the "Painted Tomb" which shows warriors wearing animal-skin jackets and
carrying a shield of animal skin (EE 36—7; AW 1:1 17). Melee weapons depicted in
contemporary art include fighting sticks, clubs, stone-headed maces, axes, double-
headed axes, spears, and daggers.
Missile weapons included bows and arrows, throwing sticks (broadly similar to
boomerangs; LA 6:1299-300), and javelins. The bow during this period was rela-
tively small, with light arrows averaging slightly under 50 cm in length; hundreds
were found in leather quivers from a tomb at Saqqara. The short arrows indicated
a limited draw capacity for the bows, and hence limited penetrating power. The
arrows include a number of different styles with different-shaped arrow-heads
made from agate, bone, and ivory; some lack fletching (AE 113—14; FP 42). The
bow was also a royal weapon, as indicated by a late Second Dynasty {2700?}
fragmentary temple relief from Gebelein depicting the king in martial stance car-
rying a bundle of four arrows in his right hand — his left hand, missing from the
relief, probably held a bow (EWP 39). The mace seems to have been the preferred
melee weapon, with numerous depictions of the king using it to ritually slaughter
his enemies. 51
Throughout most of the Early Dynastic period most arrow and spear-heads,
axes, maces and daggers continued to be made from stone (IT -\ { ) SO; AW 1:11;
TEM 29, 39). A number of copper axes and daggers sin vivc imtii tomb rx< avations.
PRE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
ii these were probably expensive weapons of the elite that were rarely found in
hands of the ordinary soldiers. Although the fundamental military technology
i i he Early Dynastic period remained Neolithic, the importance and number of
rpper weapons increased steadily throughout the period. Copper axes are espe-
i illy prominent, with fewer daggers (EE, 85). Copper axes are found in a number
I larly Dynastic burials, with an especially large hoard of copper weapons and
►ois from the reign of Djer {3000-2975?} (EDE 72). The search for copper also
1 1 ibably stimulated Egyptian military activities outside the Nile Valley. Copper sources
ploited in the Early Dynastic and Old Kingdoms were found in the Eastern
I > sert, Sinai, and northern Nubia, each of which were zones of known Egyptian
ulitary intervention in the Early Dynastic period. The discovery of copper
Belting at the Early Dynastic level at the Buhen fortification in northern Nubia
monstrates the increasing importance of copper exploitation and trade in
i vptian relations with Nubia (DAE 71). Khasekhemwy {2714-2687}, the last king
i the Second Dynasty, is noted for two developments in metallurgy with military
Ignificance. He is the first Egyptian king known to have built a copper statue of
himself (PS 133), which would indicate that although copper was now becoming
lit tvely plentiful, it was still rare enough to warrant special attention in the royal annals
hen a statue was made of that metal Second, the oldest surviving examples of
bronze-working in Egypt - two ritual vessels found in a tomb (EAE 1:417b) - date
his reign. Thus, although Egypt could be said to have entered the Bronze Age
iround 2700 BC, in reality most weapons continued to be made of stone, and thus
I uly Dynastic Egypt was, practically speaking, a militarily Neolithic state.
Fortifications and siegecraft
\ It hough the archaeological remains of Early Dynastic fortifications are sparse,
there is sufficient evidence to show a great deal of sophisticated military engi-
neering (EAE 2:552-9). The ongoing wars for domination within Egypt led to
\ pan ding fortification of all major cities in Egypt with increasingly massive mud-
brick walls. 52 Memphis was the greatest fortress of the age, but no remains of the
ills have been discovered from this period. The only surviving remains of an
I arly Dynastic Egyptian fortress are at Elephantine, fortifying the Nubian border.
1 his had large, thick mud-brick walls with semi-circular projecting bastions,
iquare towers on the corners and a fortified gate (AEA 80). In addition, it is often
assumed that funerary enclosures and outer temple and palace walls paralleled the
basic architecture of fortifications. The enclosure wall of Shunet el-Zebib at
\hvdos, and the tombs of Khasekhemwy {2714-2687} and queen Neithhotep
! KK)0?} are well preserved. 53 The remains of some palace walls may reflect mili-
eu v architectural features as well (EE 58, 72-3). Hieroglyphic symbols for cities
how a fortress wall with square projecting towers surrounding a glyph with the
city name."" 1 The importance ol fortifications is emphasized by the ritual "circu
mamhulation ol the |eii\| w.ili" h \h mphis, which was undertaken as pari of the
< oinii.ii n mi i erenuHiY of tin kn
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
En Besor, in southern Palestine, was a small fortified Egyptian way station on
the route to Palestine, protecting an important spring for merchants and armies
crossing the Sinai (EAE 1:552-9). Art from the period depicts stylized repre
sentations of square fortresses with projecting towers. Little can be said of Early
Dynastic siegecraft, but it is clear that fortresses were captured on a regular basis.
Military palettes show animals — probably clan totems — assaulting the walls of cities
with large triangular Egyptian hoes, presumably representing the undermining oi
mud-brick walls (EE 53; AW 1:122-3). As noted on p. 319, brief historical
inscriptions also make mention of "assaulting" various towns, which may be a
generic term for any type of siege.
The fragmentary "Cities (or Libyan) Palette", which depicts seven cities with
mud-brick "walls and towers being assaulted by armies represented by animals of
their clan or nome totems, such as a scorpion, lion, and falcon. These animal
totems wield large Egyptian agricultural hoes to undermine and destroy the brick
walls of the besieged towns. As described above, it probably memorializes the
Egyptian conquest of the north-western delta and parts of the Libyan desert duriin>,
the Protodynastic period or the early First Dynasty {3100-3000}. Presumably,
with enough time and manpower, the unbaked mud-brick walls of Early Dynastit
fortifications could be undermined and breached, either forcing the city to sur
render or permitting an assault to take the city by storm.
Naval warfare 56
The importance of the Nile in the Egyptian economy and culture was associated
with the very early use of river craft in Egypt. The earliest vessels seem to have
been either canoes made of skins, or skiffs made of papyrus bundles; models indi
cate that such boats were in use by at least the Badarian period {5500-4000} (EBS
11). There are a number of artistic representations of Pre-Dynastic and Early
Dynasty boats. 57 Most of these are in the context of either religious and royal
processions, or the transport of gods or the soul of the king to the other world.
These illustrations demonstrate that the Egyptians used multiple oars — one boat
having twenty-two oars on one side (GP 154) - and a rudder; sails also appear by
at least late Naqada II {c. 3200}. 58
There are, however, two early illustrations of possible naval combat. The first is
the Gebel el-Araq knife handle, which depicts boats in the background of combai
by rival armies. 59 The second is from the Gebel Sheikh Suleiman monument from
the Second Cataract in Nubia, which depicts a boat surrounded by corpses and
bound prisoners (EDE 176-9; EBS 20). These sources, along with the Palermo
Stone (PS 116), show that the transport of armies by river occurred from the very
beginning of Egyptian military history; they may also illustrate the earliest actual
combat aboard ships. Although a river war fleet was a crucial element in Early
Dynastic Nile military power, there is no evidence of a permanent naval organ i
zation. Rather, it seems, ships were commandeered m even Unit .is needed to
serve the immediate transport and logistic requirements <<! (In ,u iu\ Naval warfare
PFIE-DYNASTIC AND EARLY DYNASTIC EGYPT
II have consisted of exchanges of missile fire as well as boat-to-boat combat;
Of the figures by the boat in the Gebel Sheikh Suleiman monument has been
r< i'd by an arrow.
Sea-going vessels are also attested to in the Early Dynastic Period, though the
I recorded example of the military use of sea vessels dates to the Old Kingdom.
I trade with Phoenician coastal cities is found as early as the Naqada II period
"<) -3150}, with Byblos being especially important (EAE 1:219-21). Khase-
invvy {2714-2687} is the first king who included shipbuilding activities as a
|jor event in his royal annals (PS 134-5 = ARE 1:64). Since artistic evidence
monstrates that Egyptians had various types of river craft for centuries, Khase-
Nivvys emphasis on shipbuilding in his annals is generally associated with the
' iade to Byblos, where a stone vessel with his name was also discovered, con-
ning such contacts (EDE 92, 160).
By the end of the Early Dynastic period {2687} we find naval technology
idy being quite developed, including wooden ships with rudders propelled by
iltiple oars and sails. Sea-going vessels could make round- trip journeys of at least
1 miles to Byblos, and could probably go much further. In the Old Kingdom
maritime technology would be transformed into the ability to project military
tower hundreds of miles across the sea.
Treatment of prisoners
nography repeatedly shows the ritual slaughter of prisoners of war. 60 The upper
register of the Battlefield Palette (EE 54, EWP 29) depicts naked prisoners of war
Wng marched in procession. They are bound with their arms pinioned behind
tfieir backs at the elbows, a technique that appears repeatedly throughout sub-
quent Egyptian military art. The lower register shows the bodies of dead war-
brs being eaten by carrion birds and a lion. Importantly, the lower right section
lepicts a bound corpse being eaten by a bird, indicating that the scene shows not
•n I v the corpses of military casualties left on the battlefield, but bound prisoners
ho were executed after capture.
CHAPTER THIRTEEN
Old Kingdom Egypt {2 687-21 8 1} 1
During the first millennium of its military history, Egypt continued to face its foui
basic military problems: potential for internal revolt, the Nubian frontier to tin
south, the Libyan frontier to the west, and the Canaanite frontier to the north
east. All of the military campaigns of the Old Kingdom can be related to one oi
these four strategic issues.
Sources
As with much of the ancient Near East, the sources for a military history of tin-
Old Kingdom are fragmentary and unsatisfactory. Royal inscriptions give only
laconic references to the king "smiting" his enemies, but can provide a rough
chronology of military activity. Military art memorializing the great martial deeds
of the king or his commanders is potentially a valuable source of information foi
the Old Kingdom. This can be organized into two types: royal temples and tombs;
and the private tombs of nobles. Unfortunately, neither source is very fruitful for
the Old Kingdom. For the most part, both royal and private tomb art was con
cerned with funerary ritual, prayers and offerings preparing the tomb's occupant
for the afterlife. Kings were generally depicted as divine figures fulfilling their
cosmic religious functions. From surviving architecture and fragments of murals
from royal temples, however, it is clear that they once contained important reliefs
of royal military campaigns broadly similar to the massive monumental military
murals of the New Kingdom. Unfortunately, Old and Middle Kingdom temples
were used for centuries as quarries by later builders, and only fragments of these
have survived, which will be discussed in this chapter (BSMK; NEA 21-3).
The biographical inscriptions of Egyptian nobles have proven to be our most
important sources for military history (EAE 1:184-9). The purpose of the auto
biographical inscriptions in ancient Egypt was threefold: first, to insure that the
proper funerary rituals, offerings, and prayers were conducted; second, to describe
the moral perfection of the deceased as one worthy to obtain a happy afterlife; and
finally to memorialize the greatest achievements of the deceased (AHAB, 5-7).
The earliest archaic prototype of the funerary autobiography is the inscription ol
Merka {2850?}, which amounts to little mote than a lea ol titles including the
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
ilitary offices he held (EDE 148-9). More detailed autobiographies begin during
I ifth Dynasty {2513-2374} (AEAB 5-20; ARE 1:99-127). For the most part
earliest biographies contain little military information, dealing instead with
i il and courtly functions, and honors received by the deceased from the king.
the Sixth Dynasty {2374-2191}, however, some autobiographies begin to
nphasize the military exploits of the deceased, providing us with the major
irees of information on military campaigns and organization during the Old
ingdom.
Third Dynasty {2687-2649} 2
1 spite the cultural and architectural splendors of the beginning of the Pyramid
■<■, the Third Dynasty is very poorly documented in military matters. Indeed,
cultural magnificence of the Pyramid Age is based in part on the absolute
lilitary predominance Egypt had achieved during the Early Dynastic Period over
|Hy potential rival military power. The exact order and length of reigns of the
rigs of the Third Dynasty is only poorly understood. Whatever military activities
• urred were either left largely unrecorded, or such records have perished — for
imple, the section of the royal annals known as the Palermo Stone dealing with
I 1 1 nd Dynasty kings is lost. This may in part be because there were relatively few
lilitary campaigns during this era. Given the great resources and military potential
i Egypt during this period, its military strength probably seemed overwhelming
its possible enemies. On the other hand, since the major royal inscriptions of
ins period relate to the ritual and religious functions of the kings, military matters
1 1. iv have been deemed unimportant for the funerary cult, and may thus be under-
presented in surviving funerary evidence. It should thus be emphasized that it is
I ely that Third Dynasty kings undertook unrecorded military expeditions, and
the picture we have of Egyptian military history is thus a minimal one.
The major source of military information is a sequence of victory reliefs and
inscriptions at the Egyptian malachite, turquoise and copper-mining camp and
military outpost at Wadi al-Mughara in the south-western Sinai. 3 Turquoise was a
lighly prized gemstone for jewelry and ornamentation (DAE 297). Copper was an
increasingly important metal for tools and weapons, and was thus at least in part a
military resource. The pharaohs of the Third Dynasty therefore made every effort
to keep control of their mines in the Sinai, and to protect the caravan routes
I oi meeting those mines with the Nile Valley. The scarce water and food resources
at Wadi al-Mughara in the Sinai meant that only a limited number of men could
he maintained as a garrison in the area. It is likely that many of them served double
duty as both quarry-men and soldiers.
The precise nature of the relationship between the Second and Third Dynasties
is uncertain. There is some evidence that the first king of the Third Dynasty,
I ►joser, was tin 1 son of Khasekhemwy, the last king of the Second Dynasty from his
wife Nimaathap. Whatcvci the e\.u I interrelationship, there was strong continuity
between the two dv nasties, mdii .it me .i peaceful I ransit ion. '
\ "i
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
Djoser (Netjerikhet) { 2687-2668 } 5 is rightly renowned for constructing the
first great stepped pyramid at Saqqara. Militarily, his only major recorded expedi-
tion was to the mines at Wadi Maghara in south-west Sinai, where he claims to
have defeated bedouin raiders (PSE Figure 11). His successor Sekhemkhet (Djoser-
Tety) {2668-2662} recorded three expeditions to the Sinai, where stylized reliefs
show the king smiting the cowering bedouins. 6 Sanakht (Nebka) {2662-2653}
has two victory reliefs at Wadi al-Mughara. The first depicts the king carrying a
mace, worshipping at a shrine of Horus with a banner of the wolf war-god Wep-
wawet, while the second is the traditional "smiting-the-enemy" pose. 7 Huny
(Qahedjet) {2653-2649}, the last king of the dynasty, probably built or expanded
the fortification at Elephantine, 8 perhaps against a rising Nubian threat which
would be fully faced by Sneferu, first king of the Fourth Dynasty. A statue base
from an unknown king of the Third Dynasty depicts the king standing on the
bearded heads of executed Canaanite war prisoners (ISP 95).
A very late Egyptian legend recorded by Manetho claims that, during the reign
of a Third Dynasty king called Necherophes, "the Libyans revolted against Egypt,
and when the moon waxed unseasonably, they were terrified and returned to their
allegiance" (Man. 11-12). Assuming that this incident is not entirely legendary, it
is not clear with which king of the Third Dynasty Necherophes should be equa-
ted. The Horus name of Djoser, Netjerikhet, is a weak possible parallel; if so, this
Libyan war may refer to the final subjugation of the western delta or desert in the
wake of Khasekhemwy's reunification of Egypt at the end of the Second Dynasty,
described on p., 323.
Fourth Dynasty {2649-25 13 } 9
Although military records for the Fourth Dynasty are still fragmentary, we begin to
see, for the first time in Egyptian history, details on military affairs beyond varia-
tions of the stylized "smiting-the-enemy" motif. The transition from the Third to
the Fourth Dynasty seems to have been relatively peaceful, with power passing
from Huni to Sneferu, his son by a concubine Meresankh.
Sneferu {2649-2609} 10
The founder of the Fourth Dynasty was also its greatest martial king, who was
active in all aspects of Egyptian military affairs. In part this may represent the fact
that we are fortunate to have Sneferu's reign relatively well preserved in the
Palermo Stone and related annalistic fragments. Other kings may have been just as
militarily active, but records of their campaigns, if any, are lost. None the less,
Sneferu's military achievements are impressive. During his reign he campaigned
against Nubia, Libya, and the Sinai, built fortifications in the north and south to
strengthen the defense of Egypt, and engaged in a substantial naval building pro
gram. His military successes and expansion of trade laid the foundation for the
cultural glories of his successors in the Pyramid Agi
In twelfth year of his reign {2637} Sneferu invaded northern Nubia, "smiting
Nubia, bringing 7000 male and female live captives [as slaves], [and] 200,000 sheep
nid goats". 11 Assuming such figures are not exaggerations, this would represent a
■ itastrophic defeat of the northern Nubians. Northern Nubia seems to have been
uanporarily occupied by Sneferu, for following his invasion he "built of the wall of
the south" (PS 141), apparently referring to the construction or expansion of the
great Egyptian fortress at Buhen. 12 At the same time Sneferu also built the "wall of
the north" (PS 141), a reference to unknown fortifications on the fringes of the
delta for defense against either Libyans or Canaanites. Two reliefs at the Egyptian
mining outpost at Wadi al-Mughara in the Sinai show that Sneferu was also mili-
i.irily active in that region, describing "Sneferu, the great god ... subjugating
foreign countries". 13
Later in his reign, in a campaign against Libya, the military pattern was the
ime, with Sneferu describing "what was brought [as plunder] from Libya [Thnw\:
I 100 live captives [and] 23,000 sheep and goats". 14 Such raids against Libyans in
the Western Desert were probably not uncommon during the Old Kingdom.
meferu's brief account provides our first glimpse of the scale of such operations;
i he total number of Egyptian soldiers involved was probably a few thousand at
most.
Sneferu also greatly strengthened the Egyptian navy, building a number of ships
Up to 100 cubits (c. 50 meters) long, and a fleet of "sixty 'sixteener' royal boats of
> edar" — a "sixteener" probably refers to a boat propelled by sixteen oars per
ide. 15 A trading expedition to Byblos in Lebanon returned with forty shiploads of
I edar wood for naval and building construction (PS 141; EWA 26a). Although
ihese expeditions appear to have been solely trading voyages, there was often little
distinction in the Egyptian view between military, trading, exploration, or mining
expeditions; there was probably a military component to these merchant fleets,
hoth for their protection and for "influencing" Egypt's trading partners. At the
very least this incident demonstrates the development of the Egyptian navy, which
I >v this time could man and supply a fleet of forty large ships and sail to Lebanon,
loreshadowing more purely military expeditions in subsequent reigns. The full
military implications of the rise of Egyptian naval power in the Mediterranean will
Income clearer in the reign of Pepi I in the Sixth Dynasty (pp. 336-40).
Khufu (Khnum-Khufu, Cheops) {2609-2 5 84} 16
As builder of the great pyramid of Giza, Khufu - better known by the Greek
mispronunciation Cheops - is rightly one of the most famous kings of ancient
Egypt. From the military perspective, however, he is an undistinguished successor
to his martial father Sneferu. It may be that Senferu's many military victories left
I gypt with a period of predominance and peace, but, whatever the reason, Khu-
tifs reign records lew military activities.
A reliei at Wadi .il \l.i"li n i m Sm.n describes "Khnum-Khufu, the great god
smiting the nomad '\iu<tli. i him upturn records a similar expedition to the
; a i
HI
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
quarries at Hatnub on the west coast of the Red Sea (LHAE 249). A third expo
dition seems to have been undertaken to diorite quarries to the west of Abu
Simbel in Nubia, perhaps indicating a continuation of the hegemony over north
ern Nubia that had been established by Sneferu (HAE 71; Cl/2 167). We have no
information during this period of the size of these mining expeditions, nor tin
details of their activities. In general, however, such expeditions had three majoi
mnctions: protecting caravans going to and from the mines; protecting the miners
and mining operations outside the Nile Valley; and undertaking punitive opera
tions against bedouin raiders (LA 2:55—68),
Two other military artifacts from the age of Khufu merit attention: an archen
scene, and the royal ship of Khufu - which will be discussed in detail on p. 366.
The archery scene is a fragment of battle relief from Khufu s mortuary complex
depicting archers drawing their bows (AW 1:146; EWA 29). This scene is
remarkable in a number of ways. The mere existence of this fragment from the
temple murals implies that Khufu undertook unrecorded military expeditions,
once depicted on now-lost murals. Artistically it represents the first surviving
example of the stylized representation of Egyptian warfare that would, broadly
speaking, remain the normative style for Egyptian martial art for the next 2500
years. It is stylistically quite different than the martial representations of the Early
Dynastic Period, yet obviously has a long period of artistic development behind it
Such a highly developed style might indicate that it is quite likely that more mar
tial art was created during the Old Kingdom, although only fragments survive-.
Third, in contrast to the rough-and-tumble chaos depicted in Early Dynasii*
martial art, the archers in the Old Kingdom are in orderly ranks drawing then
bows in unison, possibly pointing to the development of more formalized org.i
nization and tactical formations. Finally, the bows themselves are self-bows, with
braided strings; several arrows are held by each archer; the bows are drawn only to
the elbow.
Successors of Khufu {2584-2513} 18
We have almost no information concerning the military affairs of Khufu 's succes
sors. Khufu's son Djedefhor {2584—2576} succeeded his father to the throne;
there are no known military activities of this rule, but some scholars speculate,
based on deliberate damage to tombs and inscriptions, that there may have been
some type of power struggle for the throne with his half-brother Khafre (HAE 72
3). However this may be, Khafre {2576-2551} - better know by his Greek name
Chephren — came to the throne and ruled for a quarter of a century, and r
renowned for building the Sphinx and the second pyramid of Giza. 19 We have no
information about any military campaigns save for a fragmentary relief of a bound
war-captive from Khafre's pyramid causeway (NEA 22). Under Khafre, minim'
expeditions were sent to Toshka, in Nubia, and the Si n;ii (TAI ; . 2:2.M). The militan
affairs of Khafre's son Menkanre (My cern ins) [2551 25JM ] hinlilu <>| tin- lm
pyramid of Giza andgrandsonShrpsesk.il ]2S.M ' ,r M n hi . w ■, m|im mv
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
I he exact genealogical relationship between the Fourth and Fifth Dynasties is
mm what uncertain, but succession seems to have passed through Khentkawes,
1 nkaure's daughter, whose descendants formed the Fifth Dynasty.
Fifth Dynasty {2513-2374}
21
With most of the Old Kingdom, we have only limited and fragmentary infor-
Ittion about the military history of the Fifth Dynasty, It is not until the end of this
n.isty that we begin to see details of military history emerging. There are a
mber of indications of the increasing importance of the solar cult and the power
■ I wealth of the priesthood of the Sun-god Re at Heliopolis (ancient lunu,
blicaJ On). The annals from the Palermo Stone record numerous large gifts to
cult of the Sun-god (PS 152-80), Theophoric names of the pharaohs asso-
ited with Re, the rise to prominence of the sun-temple of Heliopolis, and
inges in funerary ritual and practice all indicate a shift in religious ideology and
er. 2 From the perspective of military history the rise of the power of priestly
litcs reflects a decentralization of royal authority to both priestly and secular
■lonal powers. This trend is confirmed late in the Fifth Dynasty when we see
incial authorities gaining greater local autonomy, the ability of ministers and
>U1 Hers to make their offices hereditary, and the building of magnificent and
hly endowed tombs (mastabas) for important court officials. These trends,
■■inning in the Fifth Dynasty, culminated in the collapse of a united Egypt at the
Bd of the Sixth Dynasty.
I he first king of the Fifth Dynasty, Userkaf {2513-2506}, is believed to have
ried out expeditions into the Eastern Desert and against Nubia (EAE 598a,
lb). He recorded that 303 prisoners from an unnamed campaign were given to
i I pyramid, probably to serve as slave laborers for its construction (PS 217-18), as
II .is 70 foreign women as tribute (EWA 30). Sahure {2506-2492} 23 carried out
bree recorded military expeditions. The first was to the mines in the Sinai, which
turned with "6000 measures of copper", and which also hailed the king as the
miter of all countries". 24 The second two are campaigns against Libya and
1 i ii. i, in, which were memorialized in his funerary temple (AEA 207); they are the
i surviving examples of fully developed martial murals, and remain a mainstay
i Egyptian military history and ideology for the next 1500 years. The first mural,
ii the south wall, depicts an expedition against Libya, 25 showing the king in his
tylized mace-smiting scene. There are a number of registers showing Libyan
ipnves and spoils being brought before the gods, including the wife and children
I the Libyan chieftain (AAK 2/1:5). There are no surviving scenes of actual
hat. The emphasis is on how the gods granted victory to Sahure, who in
turn gave slaves and tribute to the gods (presumably via donations to temples).
I h«- second mural, on the east wall, depicts an expedition to Syria, which shows a
■ i departing, and returning in glory, hailing the king as "God of the living". 26
I In may have been an entirely peaceful trading expedition, but is important evi-
deiic r of the nse of Egyptian naval power, which will be discussed on pp. 366-7.
\ H
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
We have no military information about Sahure's two successors, Neferirkare
Kakai {2492-2482} and Shepseskare {2482-2475}. Raneferef (or Neferefre)
{2475-2474} undertook military expeditions into southern Canaan and Nubia,
depicted in fragmentary statues of Nubian and Canaanite prisoners from his
funerary temple. 27 At his death there may have been a struggle for succession
between rival branches of the royal family The details are not known, and the
struggle may have been peaceful, but it could have included some military opera-
tions in association with an attempted coup. The next two kings of the dynasty,
Newoserre Any {2474-2444} and Menkauhor {2444-2436} each record expe-
ditions to the mines at Wadi Mughara in the Sinai (ARE 1:114, 120; PSE Figure 17);
Newoserre also has a statue of a bound Canaanite captive in his mortuary temple,
perhaps alluding to a campaign in Canaan (EWA 34; PSE Figure 18).
Djedkare Izezi (Isesi) { 2436-2404 } 28 campaigned twice in the Sinai, declaring
himself in memorial inscriptions to be the "Great: God [who] smites the Canaa-
nites" and the "smiter of all countries" (ARE 1:121; EWA 36; PSE Figure 19). He
also continued his predecessors' maritime relations with Byblos, and with Punt,
which may have included a military component (EWA 36a). Punt is a somewhat
vague geographical term referring to lands on the south-west coast of the Red
Sea - broadly the coasts of modern southern Sudan, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Djibouti,
and Somalia - and was the source of many highly prized exotic trade goods such as
aromatics and panther skins (DAE 231-2; EAE 3:85-6). The expedition to Punt
was under the command of the "seal-bearer Bawerded", who brought back a
"pygmy of the god's dances" to court, an event remembered at court a century
later (AEL 1:26). Statues of bound Canaanite captives were found in Djedkare 's
funerary temple, with an inscription describing "the prostration of all the multi-
tudes [and the] overthrowing of the foreign lands" (EWA 36-6a). A mining-
military expedition was also sent to the diorite quarries to the west of Abu Simbel
(HAE 79). The date of the important military mural from the tomb of Inty at
Deshasheh is uncertain; some scholars think it may represent a campaign by
Djedkare; others date it to the early sixth dynasty (NAE 30; EAE 2:590b). It will
be discussed on pp. 358—9 in the broader discussion of Old Kingdom siegecraft.
The final king of the Fifth Dynasty, Unas (Wenis){ 2404-2374} (HAE 80; EAE
2:590, 600—1), is noted for his pyramid at Saqqara containing the earliest Pyramid
Texts, which will be discussed on pp. 353-4, and fragmentary murals from its
associated causeway (EWA 38). From the military perspective the most important
mural is a battle scene depicting Egyptian soldiers armed with bows and daggers
"smiting the Shasi", or eastern bedouins, while the mortuary temple contains
statues of bound Canaanites (NEA 24-5; EWA 38-9; PSE Figure 22b). The cau-
seway also depicts maritime expeditions to Byblos. Unas is said to have met for
negotiations with chieftains of the Nubians at Elephantine. It is sometimes inferred
from this that there was increasing unrest in Nubia as Egyptian domination began
to subside - instead of issuing the standard claim that tin- king had crushed the
Nubians, Unas was forced to negotiate (HAE 2:5 { )().i) The most I anions nun a I
from Unas's causeway depicts starving people U vin" im fund (ISP 12(0; one ol
i lie figures is bearded, possibly representing a Canaanite (ANEP §102). The precise
| ontext for this scene is unknown, but is probably meant to memorialize Unas's
hcneficence in providing food to the hungry. From the military perspective, it
teininds us that starvation has frequently been associated with war, either because
u.itural disasters leading to hunger can be a contributing cause of war, or because
war frequently brings hunger and deprivation in its wake.
Sixth Dynasty {2374-2191}
29
I he exact relationship between the fifth and sixth dynasties is obscure; some
- holars assume that Teti {2374-2354}, its first king, was the son-in-law of Unas,
last king of the Fifth Dynasty (EAE 3:379-81). Teti's Horus name, Seheteptawi,
means "He who pacifies the two lands", and has been taken by some scholars to
imply a contested succession to the throne which required some "pacification" to
secure completely. A number of Teti's important ministers, including Mehu,
.igemni, and Isi, all had served in the administration of the former king Unas,
however, indicating a strong continuity between the dynasties. Military activities
luring Teti's reign are poorly documented. His mortuary temple includes stylized
utiles of bound captives, indicating the defeat of Canaanites (EWA 41a— 2); there
is also mention of an expedition to the alabaster quarries at Hatnub. Maritime
expeditions to Punt and Byblos are implied in surviving artifacts (C 1/2; 190).
( iraffiti found at Tomas in Nubia indicate caravans to Nubia were active in this
i lod (EAE 3:380). Later legends — which cannot be confirmed by contemporary
"i i ices - claim that Teti was murdered by one of his guardsmen (Man. 19-20).
I h was briefly succeeded by an ephemeral and poorly attested ruler, Userkare,
ho may have been the instigator of the palace coup.
Pepy I (Phiops) {2354-2310} (EAE 3:33-4; LA 4:926)
Whatever the authenticity of the legends of assassination, Teti's legitimate and
stable successor was his son Pepy I. Inscriptions record expeditions to the Sinai, the
I I. it nub quarries, and Wadi Hammamat (ARE 1:136-40; PSE figs 20-1). Most of
these expeditions had at least a military component to them, and for the first time
||t begin to see the names and deeds of the actual commanders. The Sinai rock
relief shows the traditional head-smiting scene, with an inscription, "The Great
1 .<ul | Pepy I| it is that smites and subdues the Montiu [mntw] of all foreign lands"
(EWA 43). In reality, the Sinai expedition was under the leadership of the "com-
maiuler of the army Ibdu, son of the commander of the troops Merire-onekh"
\Rh 1:139). The Wadi Hammamat expedition likewise had a military escort,
i nmmanded by "God's [Pepy's] seal-bearer, overseer of the army ... overseer of
foreign lands" (HWA 44). At least one maritime expedition to Byblos was also
undertaken (EWA 45), as well as a gold seeking expedition to Nubia (HAE 81).
Pepy's court, however, was not without intrigue, perhaps reflecting ongoing
in LiluliM spun oil h\ the usuip. i ol Userk.ire, IVpvs first wile was charged
334
\ \ ^
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
with conspiracy, and tried in a secret tribunal (AEL 1:19). He thereafter married
two daughters of Khui, a noble of Abydos, one of whom was the mother of
Merenre, Pepy's successor. The fact that Pepy was succeeded by a younger son has
led some to speculate that the elder heir apparent was involved in the coup attempt
associated with his mother, and thereby lost the throne, if not his life. In any event,
through its marriage to the royal family, the clan of Khui would come to play a
prominent role in the rest of the Sixth Dynasty (HAE 83), providing further evi-
dence of the rising power of the regional nobility that would eventually destabilize
Egypt. Pepy I is also noted for his decentralizing reforms of the Egyptian admin-
istration. A large portion of royal property devolved into the hands of private
courtiers or temple priesthoods, encouraging the cults of local deities. This
included exemptions from taxes and labor obligations to the king, as well as giving
increasing autonomy to regional governors and priests. This culminated in the rise
of semi-independent nomarchs (governors of nomes or provinces, EAE 1:16—20;
LA 2:385-417), whose growing power is symbolized by their large rock-cut tombs
and mastabas (brick tomb mounds, EAE 3:433-42). Pepy attempted to secure the
loyalty of these rising nomarchs by intermarriage with them, including the mar-
riage of his daughter to his vizier Mereruka. In one sense these actions certainly
strengthened the immediate power of Pepy I and his dynasty by binding regional
strongmen to his family. On the other hand, the rise of these semi-independent
nomarchs laid the foundation for the fragmentation of the Egyptian state in the
First Intermediate Period (see p. 368).
A life-size copper statue of Pepy I was found at Hierakonpolis, the earliest
copper statue discovered in Egypt (TEM 89). From the military perspective it
represents the expansion of the availability of copper, and hence the potential for
more copper-based weapons. None the less, it is likely that the average Egyptian
soldiers were still largely armed with stone weapons at this time; copper remained
a metal for the elites. As is traditional in Old Kingdom mortuary temples, Pepy s
temple contains statues of bound captive Canaanites and Nubians, emphasizing the
military exploits of his reign (EWA 46, EAE 3:33). His copper statue also depicts
Pepy trampling the "Nine Bows", a symbolic name of Egypt's traditional enemies
(HAE 84). Since such statues are stylized, and perhaps even ritual in purpose, they
may simply represent the ideal order of the universe rather than actual military
expeditions that returned with real captives. However, that the captive statues in
Pepy's mortuary temple could represent the results of real campaigns is confirmed
by the most important military document of the Old Kingdom, the autobiography
of Weni.
Weni's campaigns to Canaan {c. 2350-2330} 30
With the reign of Pepy I we begin, for the first time, to see written details oi
Egyptian military campaigns. The most extensive and Important source 1 is the
autobiography of Weni of Abydos {c. 2375-2305?}, n one ol the iradmg gcncials
and courtiers of the age. It is the first eyewitness .imnini « »t am detail nl warfan m
\W,
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
Egypt. Weni's battle narrative of his campaigns to Canaan begins with a descrip-
non of the mobilization of the army of Egypt:
When his majesty took action against the Eastern Sand-dwellers, his majesty
made an army of many tens of thousands from all of Upper Egypt: from Yebu
[Aswan] in the south to Medenyt [Aphroditopolis] in the north; from Lower
Egypt: from all of the Two-Sides-of-the-House and from Sedjer and Khen-
sedjru; and [mercenaries] from Irtjet-Nubians, Medja-Nubians, Yam-
Nubians, Wawat-Nubians, Kaau-Nubians; and from Tjemeh [southern Lib-
yans]. (AEL 1:19)
This text first tells us that, unlike later pharaohs, king Pepy did not go on this
I ampaign himself. It is not clear if this was the norm for the Old Kingdom, but
i here is little evidence from this period for kings engaging in actual combat. The
nemy was the "Sand-dwellers" an Egyptian ethnonym referring to the peoples of
die Sinai and southern Canaan. We are not told the background to the campaign,
but apparently it was a fairly serious matter, for the army allegedly consisted of
many tens of thousands". This may be an example of the hyperbole that some-
ii nes infects the tomb autobiographies of Egypt, but certainly the army would
bave numbered in the thousands. It is also unlikely that the entire force was com-
H.sed of combatants. Areas of recruitment were divided into three categories:
i "Ops of Upper Egypt, of Lower Egypt, and Nubians. There is no direct evidence
"I a standing army in the Old Kingdom, and it is not clear from this text if the
oldiers were professional or militia - or, most likely, a combination of both.
I nilkner argues that there must have been some type of standing army for policing
the country, royal security, responding to raiders, and maintaining control of
fubian mercenaries (EMO 33). At any rate, most nomes in the country were
quired to supply men for military service for the war in Canaan.
Weni's description of the Nubian mercenaries is interesting for a number of
isons. There are five specific Nubian tribes mentioned: Irtjet, Medja (or Med-
i i\ ), Yam, Wawat, and Kaau. These names represent regions or clans in Nubia
pom between the First and the Third Cataracts. 32 The most famous of these are
I I m ■ Medjay, from the Eastern Desert and eastern banks of the Nubian Nile, who
lerved as light infantry mercenaries in later periods. The final group of auxiliary
uoops was from "Tjemeh-land", generally thought to be Libyans from the deserts
to the west of southern Egypt and northern Nubia. The exact political relationship
I-* i ween Egypt and northern Nubia is unclear. Egyptians probably had some sort
"I hegemony over these tribes, but apparently did not have direct administrative
i uitrcl over the region. As tributary tribes the Nubians were required not to raid
iwthern 1 igypt , but instead to serve as Egyptian mercenaries, probably for both pay and
plunder, t Kins', Nubians as mercenaries had a number of advantages for the Egyptians.
I itst, it limited Nubian raids against Kgypt. Second, it provided a source of war-like
manpower. !'he Nubians could he used .is border guards to defend the southern
ii I ai'.amsi otht'i i aids t ion l i iv.il Nubian tribes, as well as troops for campaigns
137
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
elsewhere, as in Weni's invasion of Canaan. The Egyptians were thus employing,
for the first time what would become the time-tested tactic of "using barbarians to
fight barbarians". 33 A strong force of Nubian mercenaries could also provide a
counter-balance to the growing independent military power of the nomarchs.
Weni next provides a list of the various Egyptian officials who took part in the
campaign:
His majesty sent me at the head of this army, there being counts, royal seal-
bearers, sole companions of the palace, chieftains and mayors of towns of
Upper and Lower Egypt, companions, commander of foreigners, chief priests
of Upper and Lower Egypt, and chief district officials at the head of the troops
of Upper and Lower Egypt, from the villages and towns that they governed
and from the Nubians of those foreign lands. (AEL 1:20) 34
Weni's purpose here is to describe his own remarkable authority, listing all the
mighty officials of Egypt who were under his command. But, from the military
perspective, this text also tells us two other important things. Most of the leaders
of the expedition had some type of normal non-military function, and were
doubling as military leaders. For the offices listed by Weni, only "commander of
foreigners" seems to be a military title. The regional governmental administrators
and officials were in command of the military units raised in their villages and
nomes. This is perhaps an indication that the provincial Egyptian army was a
militia force, but it also implies that local nomarchs had command over their own
regional military units; this apparent regional military autonomy would culminate
in full independence of warring nomarchs during the First Intermediate Period.
Weni took his duties as commander seriously, boasting of the logistical effi-
ciency with which the army operated.
I was the one who commanded them — while my rank was that of overseer of
[royal tenants] — because of my rectitude, so that no one attacked his fellow, so
that no one seized a loaf or sandals from a traveler, so that no one took a cloth
from any town, so that no one took a goat from anyone. I led them from
Northern Isle and [gate] of lyhotep [in] the district of Horus-lord-of-truth
[north-eastern Delta] while being in this rank.. . . I determined the number of
these troops [through a military census] . It had never been determined by any
servant. (AEL 1:20)
Weni's emphasis on the fact that under his command the army was orderly and
did not plunder Egyptian villages through which it passed on the way to Canaan
could be seen as an indictment of the typical behavior of an Egyptian army in this
age, which presumably engaged in precisely these types of activities — otherwise,
why would Weni boast of accomplishing something that was the norm for Egyp-
tian armies on campaign? This passage also implies tli.it tin- ! r.vptians were well
aware of logistical issues — an army needed bre.nl. sandal- - l«»il nui gnats, ,md
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
i hey were not provided by the leader, the soldiers would plunder them from the
►pie. In this regard Weni emphasizes that he actually "determined the number
these troops", something which "had never been determined by any servant"
before. In other words, his ability to prevent the army from plundering was
Irecdy related to the fact that he had numbered his army, and therefore knew
niething of the order of magnitude of supplies that would be required - some-
lung that had apparently seldom been done before. In a sense Weni's former
•mictions as a court administrator prepared him for the logistical demands of his
Military campaign to Canaan. We see, in other words, the birth of logistics - the
H I that getting an army intact to the battlefield was in many ways just as impor-
ii! as tactical leadership during the battle.
Weni also provides us with the world's first example of martial poetry. While
i giving any tactical details of actual battles, Weni makes the overall results of the
mpaign very clear.
This army returned in safety,
It had ravaged the Sand- dwellers' land.
This army returned in safety,
It had flattened the Sand-dwellers' land.
This army returned in safety,
It had sacked its strongholds.
This army returned in safety,
It had cut down its figs, its vines.
This army returned in safety,
It had thrown fire in all its [dwellings].
This army returned in safety,
It had slain its troops by many ten-thousands.
This army returned in safety,
[It had carried] off many [troops] as captives. (AEL 1:20)
In this poem, already discussed on pp. 275-6, Weni provides us with no geo-
uphical specifics of which cities were attacked, but the descriptions of capturing
fortresses and destroying agriculture makes it clear that the war was with the urban
n y -states of southern Canaan rather than merely bedouins. An Egyptian army of
.is many as ten or twenty thousand would have been an overwhelming force to the
I lanaanite city-states of the twenty-fourth century; Weni's description of devas-
tating the land, capturing fortified cites, destroying agriculture, burning, plunder-
ing, and enslaving is probably an authentic picture of an Egyptian army marauding
through southern Canaan.
Willi booty and slaves, Weni and his army returned to praise and triumph in
I gypt: Lt l lis majesty praised me for [this victory] beyond anything" (AEL 1:20).
I Infortunately, from the Egyptian perspective, the invasion only served to further
mil, mi. .nui Egyptian sentiments "rebellion" as the Egyptians viewed it -
iniim in) 1 Imn .ulilitioii.il < .impaiens, in whu h Weni ,ilso claimed victory.
(38
H'l
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
His majesty sent me to lead this army five times, to attack the land of the
Sand-dwellers as often as they rebelled, with these troops. I acted so that his
majesty praised me [for it beyond anything]. (AEL 1:20)
The fact that the Egyptians were compelled to make five major expeditions
into Canaan demonstrates that, even with their overwhelming military might, they
were either unable to, or uninterested in, establishing permanent stable control
over Canaan.
Weni's biography provides additional strategic details for one of his five
campaigns — though which one is uncertain.
Told there were marauders among these foreigners at the nose of Gazelle's
head, I crossed in ships with these troops. I made a landing in the back of
the height of the mountain range, to the north of the land of the Sand
dwellers, while half of this army was on the road [approaching from the
south]. I came and caught them all and slew every marauder among them.
(AEL 1:20)
This passage first tells us that the Egyptians had some type of intelligence available
concerning Canaan, whether from returning merchants, collaborating kings of
city-states, or, possibly Egyptian garrisons. However the information was
obtained, the Egyptians responded quickly. Splitting his force in two, Weni sent
half by sea and half by land in a strategic double envelopment, crushing Egypt's
enemies. The location of the "Gazelle's-head" mountain is uncertain, but most
scholars associate it with Mt. Carmel near modern Haifa in Israel. If this is correct,
the Egyptians were able to mobilize a fleet capable of transporting at least hun-
dreds, and possibly several thousand men, for several hundred miles. While it is
likely that soldiers had accompanied earlier trading expedition both for the pro
tection of Egyptian merchants and the intimidation of trading partners, this is the
first account we have of transporting a major army by sea. Large-scale maritinu
trade, which had begun at least three centuries earlier during the reign of Sneferu
{2649-2609}, who received forty shiploads of timber from Byblos (PS 141-3),
had by now developed into the capacity to successfully transport major armies
across the Mediterranean Sea, illustrating the important military principle that
where merchants go, armies can eventually follow.
Weni's remarkable autobiography thus provides us with a number of Egyptian
military "firsts". It is the first example of a detailed eyewitness military menion
the first evidence of the extensive use of foreign mercenaries, the first recognition
of the importance of logistics, the first martial poetry, the first example of strategic
double envelopment, amphibious operations, and combined operations by land
and sea. But although Weni's autobiography provides the first surviving recorded
examples, centuries of military development lay behind Wen is remarkable
achievements. There were undoubtedly earlier examples loi winch no evidene i
has survived.
'< |M
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
Merenve II (Antyemsaj) {2310-2300} and Nubia 35
1 renre, son of Pepy I, had a short but eventful reign. The redoubtable Weni
mi appears in the reign of Merenre again as governor of Upper Egypt, where he
oids leading quarrying expeditions to Aswan for granite and Hatnub for alaba-
i (AEL 1 :21). More importantly, however, he constructed "five canals" designed
allow boats to float around the First Cataract at Aswan for transporting granite.
I he ''foreign [Nubian] chiefs of Irtjet, Wawat, Yam and Medja cut the [acacia]
Miher" for the boats used on the canal (AEL 1:21-2); these are precisely the same
ibes who sent troops with Weni on the Canaanite expeditions described above,
rther emphasizing their probable tributary status to Egypt. In theory these canals
ild have had military applications by floating troops and supplies around the
1 irsl Cataract, thereby facilitating Egyptian military operations in Nubia. The
nlJing of this canal may thus in part be connected to Merenre 's overall Nubian
• In y ; we shall see that direct Egyptian dominance of Nubia increased in the
I lowing centuries.
The expeditions of Horkhuf (HarkhuJ) {2310-2300} 36
l< iwever that may be, it is clear that, whereas Pepy had focused his attention on
inaan with the five campaigns of Weni, the reign of Merenre is closely associated
1 1 1 1 the foreign affairs of Nubia. Several inscriptions at Tomas, in the modern
1 1 hern Sudan, record the passing of Egyptian expeditions through the region
I I \l ; . 85). The most important record of Egyptian intervention into Nubia was
.niLobiography of Horkhuf, apparently Weni's successor as governor of southern
I a . I Iorkhuf s autobiography is important because it provides the clearest evidence
i" how Old Kingdom trading, exploring, and mining expeditions were often
H lisiinguishable from military operations. Horkhuf was governor of Upper Egypt, as
II as a royal administrator, mayor of Nekheb, and a lector-priest (AEL 1:23—5),
mi reflecting the wide range of civil, economic, religious, and military offices
Id by Egyptian officials. From the military perspective, Horkhuf 's major offices
veie "commander of foreigners" and "governor of all mountain lands belonging
1 1 if southern region", meaning the desert and mountain regions outside the
File valley. In this function, Horkhuf claims to have "cast the dread of [the war-
pd] I Eorus into the foreign lands", or, in other words, to have intimidated the
.ill ii, in and Libyan tribes of the region to acquiesce to Egypt's wishes (AEL 1:25).
I Iorkhuf undertook three expeditions into Nubia, which provide the most
letailed surviving accounts of the trade-military expeditions of the Old Kingdom.
I In major purpose of these expeditions was trade or tribute - the two are barely
i tinguishable in the Old Kingdom. As Horkhuf put it, he was to "bring the
[»t t ulin e of all foreign lands to his lord" king Merenre (AEL 1:25).
In his Inst expedition, I Iorkhuf went with his father Iri, who may have had
in.il command til the expedition. In his second expedition Horkhuf was clearly
in i h.ii i',e
Ul
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
The majesty of Merenre, my lord, sent me together with my father, the sole
companion and lector-priest, Iri, to Yam [between the Second and Third
Cataracts], to open the way to that country. I did it in seven months; I
brought from it all kinds of beautiful and rare gifts, and was praised for it very
greatly
His majesty sent me a second time [without my father]. I went up on the
Yebu [Aswan] road and came down via Mekher, Terers, and Irtjetj (which are
in) Irtjet in the space of eight months. I came down bringing gifts from that
country in great quantity, the likes of which had never before been brought
back to this land. I came down through the region of the house of the
[Nubian] chief of Setju and Irtjet, I explored those foreign lands. I have not
found it done by any companion and commander of foreigners who went to
Yam previously. (AEL 1:25)
These two journeys each took seven to eight months, covering a route along the
Nile of 300— 350 miles each way, or 700 miles for the round trip. This gives an
average travel distance of only 100 miles a month, 25 miles a week, or only four
miles a day Obviously Horkhuf's men spent a great deal of time trading, but
probably also explored side wadis such as the Wadi 'Allaqi, which could have
added several hundred miles to the overall journey. The tribal names mentioned in
the text - Mekher, Terers, Irtjetj, and Setju - are all tribal areas between the First
Cataract at Aswan and the Second Cataract near Buhen; the entire region has been
flooded by Lake Nasser since the building of the Aswan Darn in the 1960s.
Given that Weni had constructed a canal around the first cataract a few years ear-
lier, it is possible that the expedition was accompanied by a river fleet on part of its
journey.
The first expedition was essentially a trading operation to bring back "all kinds
of beautiful and rare gifts". The second, however, although it was also concerned
with trade, or "gifts", was much more focused on exploration — Harkhuf
"explored those foreign lands" that had never been explored before. From the
military perspective, we find an Egyptian armed caravan seemingly operating with
impunity in the lands of ostensibly autonomous, and possibly hostile Nubian
chiefs, implying that there was a strong military component to the second expe
dition, which is explicitly mentioned in Horkhuf's third expedition. This Egyptian
predominance seems to have been possible because of disunity among the Nubian
tribes of the region. The presence of father and son together on the first expedi
tion is another indication that provincial authority was becoming increasingly-
hereditary in the late Old Kingdom.
From the military perspective, Horkhuf's third expedition is the most interest-
ing. The date is not given, but it is generally assumed that it occurred near the end
of the reign of Merenre {2300}.
Then his majesty sent me a third time to Yam. 1 urni up Imin the nome ol
This [Abydos] upon the Oasis road |vi.i the Khau-a ' >a i ] I l<>uiul ili.ii th<
342
ruler of Yam [the land between the Second and Third Cataracts] had gone off
to Tjemeh-land [deserts west of the Nile valley, home of the Tjemeh tribe of
Libyans], to smite the Tjemeh [Libyans] to the western corner of heaven. I
went up after him to Tjemeh-land and satisfied him, so that he praised all the
gods for the sovereign [king of Egypt].
I sent a report with a [Nubian] man from Yam to the retinue of Horus, to
let the majesty of Merenre, my lord, know [that I had gone to Tjemeh-land]
after the ruler of Yam.
Now when I had satisfied this ruler of Yam, I came down through [the Nile
Valley and the Second Cataract] south of Irtjet and north of Setju. I found the
ruler of [the Nubian confederacy of] Irtjet, Setju, and Wawat. I came down
with three hundred donkeys laden with incense, ebony, hknw-oi\, s3t, panther
skins, elephants' tusks, throw sticks, and all sorts of good products. Now when
the ruler of Irtjet, Setju, and Wawat saw how strong and numerous the [allied
Nubian mercenary] troop from Yam was which came down with me to the
residence together with the [Egyptian] army that had been sent with me, this
ruler escorted me, gave me cattle and goats [for supplies], and led me on the
mountain paths of Irtjet [on the ridge to the west of the Nile valley] - because
of the excellence of the vigilance I had employed beyond that of any com-
panion and commander of the foreigners who had been sent to Yam before.
(AEL 1 :25-6)
Reading a bit between the lines, we can broadly outline the military relations
M the Nubian frontier as follows. Around 2330 Weni was using Nubian
m rcenaries from the Irtjet, Medja, Yam, Wawat, and Kaau tribes for Egyptian
mipaigns in Canaan. It is unclear if the Nubians participated because of coercion
i were voluntarily seeking adventure and a share of the plunder of Canaan;
most likely a combination of both. By around 2310, however, relations on the
Libian frontier seem strained. Horkhuf is able to operate relatively freely in
rthern Nubia, but the passage of his expedition was probably expensive and
i uptive. The Nubians therefore formed a confederacy of the disunited Nubian
lubes of Irtjet, Setju, and Wawat to unite under the leadership of the "chief of
li tjet".
I his forced Horkhuf's third expedition to take the Oasis Road (LA 4:541-2)
through the desert, thereby bypassing northern Nubia between the First and Sec-
id < "ataracts, to reach Yam, the land between the Second and Third Cataracts.
I here 1 lorkhuf "satisfied" the chief of Yam, apparently allying with the chief of
\ mi against his Libyan Tjemeh enemies, and greatly strengthening his overall
ition. In return the chief of Yam agreed to send a mercenary force back to
l>i with I lorkhuf The Nubian confederacy between the First and Second
.. is was now surrounded by Egyptians to the north, and the allied chief of
Vim id tin* south. Faring a large Hgyptian Yam Nubian army that accompanied
[H-ilnion, the < I in 'I ol the Irtjet confederacy agreed to provide supplies for
I. i Mm! [oiM and permitted f lorkhuf to return to Fgvpt through his lands - not
143
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
through the Nile valley itself, but rather on the Mountain Road along the ridges
to the west where the Egyptian army would be unable to plunder or harass the
Nubians. This type of fluctuating state of affairs on the Nubian frontier was
probably the norm in Egyptian-Nubian relations during most of the Old King
dom. These relations are brought into focus here only because of the fortunate
survival of the tomb autobiographies of Weni and Horkhuf.
Thanks in part to the efforts of Horkhuf, the Nubian frontier seems to have
stabilized, at least temporarily. Following the success of Horkhuf's second
expedition, Merenre went in person in the last year of his reign {2300} to
Aswan to receive the submission of the northern Nubian chiefs. An inscription
from the First Cataract at Aswan shows Merenre flanked by the god Khnuni
receiving the submission of the Nubian chiefs. The inscription reads "the coming
of the king [Merenre] himself . . . while the chiefs of the Medja, Irtjet and
Wawat did obeisance and gave [him] great praise" (ARE 1:145-6); again we see
three of the same tribes (excluding Yam and Kaau, who dwelt further south) in a
formal act of submission to the Egyptian king. This Nubian peace, however, was
not to last.
The logistical capabilities of the Egyptian army are also made manifest by
Horkhuf's expedition. First, we see the Egyptians could keep a small army in the
field in foreign lands for up to eight months, in part by plundering or requisi-
tioning supplies from the local people. They could also march through the open
desert, using the Sahara oases as supply bases, with hundreds of donkeys for car-
rying supplies, equipment, and trade goods. We also see Harkhuf marching west
into the open desert following the Nubian chief of Yam in his pursuit of Libyan
Tjemeh raiders. Thus, by 2300 the Egyptian army had developed the logistical and
technological capacity to operate by land and sea in all types of terrain, to keep
armies in the field for months, and to move troops up to at least 500 miles by land
or sea from their nearest frontier bases in Egypt.
The Western Desert and Libyans 37
Horkhuf's decision to take the desert road through the oases of the Western Desert
highlights the role of the Libyans of the Western Desert in Egyptian military his-
tory. Unlike the Eastern Desert, with its rich natural resources, the Western Desert
is a vast region of barren dunes and dry rock, essentially devoid of resources to
attract Egyptian attention. Also unlike the Eastern Desert, the West has five oases
that can sustain agriculture and human and animal life; today these are known as
Siwa, Bahriya, Farafra, Dakhla, and Kharga. Further south opposite the Nubian
Nile is a sixth oasis, Selima (M = AAE 13, 287; HAAE 27). In Islamic times (after
640 CE) the route from the Nile through Kharga to Selima was called Darb a\-
Arba } in — the "Forty-[Day] Trail". The entire desert journey from Abydos to the
Nubian Nile was roughly 430 miles. Since the camel was not available in Egypt
until Hellenistic times, the ancient Egyptians would have made the journey by
donkey caravan, which would not only have added ■ m i il d.e n> the trip, but
-I I
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
'i iki have compounded the logistical problem of water supply for both men and
on keys. None the less, Horkhuf's expedition, along with other evidence,
monstrates that this route was practicable to both donkey caravans and their
ulitary escorts.
1 he Western Desert was inhabited by peoples the Egyptians called Tjehenu and
/ jemehu (or Tjemeh), terms used for both the land and its peoples that are generally
instated as Libyan. 38 The Tjehenu occupied the Western Desert from the Med-
1 1 anean south through the Fayyum; the Tjemehu from the Fayyum south to the
I 'ma Oasis and the Third Cataract of the Nile. Both of these groups were pas-
i.ilists, eking a slight subsistence from the fierce Saharan desert. The Tjehenu
i tiered on the Mediterranean coast of Libya, where the marginal rainfall was
ifficient to sustain their herds. It is possible that some of the people living in the
>i th-western delta of the Nile were also linguistically related to the Tjehenu. The
I jemehu focused on the oases of the Western Desert, and a few scattered wells and
I her scanty water resources.
Strategically speaking, the Libyans of the Old and Middle Kingdom periods
ere not a serious military threat to Egypt. The pastoral economy of the Western
■ert simply could not sustain a sufficient number of people to seriously threaten
the Nile Valley. Although there are no records of any major attacks by Libyans
■ n nst Egypt before the New Kingdom, it is likely that they occasionally raided
Ik Mile valley or plundered caravans passing on the Desert Road to Nubia.
( )n the other hand, the Libyans offered the Egyptians a potential source of
Under through livestock and slaves. From Pre-Dynastic times through the end of
(lie Old Kingdom, we have eight accounts of wars between Egyptians and Libyans.
• The "Battlefield Palette" {c. 3200} depicts what appear to be slain and cap-
tured Libyans (EWP 29, MB 119-44).
• The "Cities" or "Libyan Palette" {c. 3100} depicts an assault on Libya (or
perhaps Libyans in the north-western delta) and rows of livestock plundered
during the campaign. 39
• King Djer (Zer) {3000-2977} of the First Dynasty has a stele showing him
smiting a cowering Libyan (AE 60).
• Sneferu {2649-2609} gives us the earliest written account of such a raid,
describing the plunder "from Libya [Thnw]: 1100 live captives [and] 23,000
sheep and goats" (PS 235).
• The mortuary temple of Sahure {2506-2492} contains a relief depicting the
submission of a Libyan chieftain and his family, along with plunder or tribute
from the Libyans (PE 161-2; AEA 207).
• Weni's autobiography {c. 2340} mentions the Egyptians using Libyan mer-
cenaries from the southern "Tjemeh-land" in his campaign against Canaan
(ALL 1:19).
• I lorkluifs third expedition ] e. 2296) allied with the Nubian chieftain of
Yam in .i vvai with the Ijemeh Libyans in the deserts west of Nubia
(ALT 1:25).
; . I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
® Pepy II {2300—2206} has a stylized " smiting- the-Libyans" scene in his mor-
tuary temple, which seems to be an exact duplicate of Sahure's earlier relict,
discussed above (PE 181; AEA 173).
These records indicate sporadic warfare between Egypt and Libya, essential I \
taking the form of plundering expeditions by Egyptians against Libyans. Tin
absence of accounts of Libyan attacks against Egypt does not necessarily mean the)
did not occur. The records for this period are quite fragmentary, and the Egyptian
seldom recorded accounts of defeats at the hands of their enemies; Egypt is always
portrayed as victorious. Some of these Egyptian attacks on Libyans may also have
been essentially retaliatory expeditions in response to Libyan raids. None the less
the picture derived from the sources is not one of Libyans threatening Egypt, but
of Egyptians plundering Libyans.
This general picture is partially confirmed by archaeological evidence, which
indicates that the Dakhla and Kharga oases were colonized by the Egyptians by tin-
Sixth Dynasty. Dakhla, in particular, had a Sixth Dynasty fortress, which served
both as protection for Egyptian colonists in the oases, control of the desert trade
route to Nubia, and probably as a base for offensive or retaliatory operations
against Libyans (AEA 26; EAE 2:290). The Pyramid Texts mention a fortre.
"which keeps Libya out" of Egypt (PT 665C); although its location is not identi
fied, it may refer to the Dakhla Oasis fortress, or perhaps border forts on the
western edge of the Delta.
Thus, throughout the Old Kingdom there was internecine warfare betwc< 1 1
Egyptians and Libyans, generally taking the form of raids and counter-raid
Although the Libyans lacked the manpower seriously to threaten the stability ol
the Egyptian kingdom itself, they were strong enough to require fortification of
the oases, and their martial qualities were such that they were used as mercenai i>
by the Egyptians. The role of the Libyans as mercenaries for the Egyptians would
expand greatly during the First Intermediate Period and the Middle Kingdom.
Pepy (Phiops) II {2300-2206} 40
Pepy II came to the throne at the age of six, and had a reign lasting an incredibli
ninety-four years, making him the longest-reigning ruler in world history. 41 Vw
first meet him at the age often, when he sends a letter (transcribed onto Horklnil
tomb wall) congratulating Horkhuf for his successful third expedition. In it, youn]
Pepy was not overly concerned with trade, war, or the affairs of state. He w;is urn
interested in . . .
the pygmy of the god's dances from the land of the horizon-dwellers |,it tin
end of the earth].. . . Hurry and bring with yon this pygmy . . . get wortlr
men to be around him on deck [of the boat|, lest he fall in the water |on th>
trip down the Nile|! When he lies down .it night, get worthy men to Ir
around him in his tent. Inspect him ten times .ii mj'ht! (Al 1 I '(>
M6
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
ii rival of a dancing pygmy, however entertaining to the boy-king, did not
n sent a solution to the problems of the Nubian frontier.
\ lew inscriptions and reliefs point to military activities during Pepy IPs long
ii Murals at Pepy IPs funerary complex show the king as a mythic sphinx
nmpling his defeated Libyan enemies, along with statues of bound captives from
i -ii lands. This scene seems to be a close duplicate of the funerary relief of
• Ii nre. While it may represent an actual campaign against the Libyans - which for
Blplicity's sake was merely copied from Sahure's temple in a stylized form - it is
possible that it is a ritualized depiction of the royal ideal of the king as ruler of
world and victor over all enemies (PE 181; AEA 173; PSE Figure 22a).
1 1 prions also record an expedition to Sinai (ARE 1:156-7), along with addi-
ii il trading-military expeditions to Nubia and Punt mentioned in an inscription
I . Inn (ARE 1:164). In a passage from the Pyramid Texts dating to the reign of
pv II, the god Horus "sets Upper Egypt in order for [the King], he sets Lower
pi m order for him, he hacks up (b3) the fortresses of Canaan for him, he quells
I nin all the hostile peoples under his fingers" (PT 650, EWA 51). Although this
I mythical text, it may contain an allusion to a historical campaign. The most
uportant historical source, however, is the autobiography of Pepinakht.
The campaigns of Pepinakht 42
tomb complex at Qubbet el-Hawa at Aswan contains two autobiographies of
miiers during Pepy IPs reign - Pepinakht Heqaib and his son Sabni - that
1 1 mi accounts of military affairs along the Nubian border. The career of Pepi-
ikht again demonstrates the overlapping of religious, civilian, and military offices
the Old Kingdom - indeed, it is probably anachronistic to impose such modern
tcgories on ancient Egyptian officials. Pepinakht's titles include Lector Priest,
- ribe, Royal Seal-Bearer, and "Commander of the Foreigners" (AEAB 15-16),
liu h meant both that he was responsible for border affairs, and that he com-
mded Nubian mercenary troops. In this capacity he "brought the produce of
feign lands to his lord [Pepy II]" and went on punitive military expeditions to
i i the terror of [the wargod] Horus into foreign lands" (AEAB 15).
The submission of the Nubian chiefs of Wawet and Irtjet to king JVlerenre
\K1, 1:145-6), described on p. 341, was nominal at best. We do not know
exact cause, but Pepy II ordered two campaigns against some of these
lubian tribes. The first was a raid to plunder and devastate ("hack up") northern
I he majesty of my lord [Pepy II] sent me [Pepinakht] to hack up [the Nubian
print ip.ilities of] Wawat and Irjet. I acted to the satisfaction of my lord. I slew
,i large number of them, [including] sons of the ruler, and excellent troop
leaders. I brought a large number of them to the [royal] residence as captives,
while I was .it the head of numerous and strong troops in boldness of heart.
i \IA1S If))
W '
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
The second campaign was more successful, resulting in the capture of tl it-
Nubian chiefs.
[Pepy II] also sent me to pacify these lands [Wawat and Irjet].. . . I brought the
two rulers of these lands to the residence [of Pepy II] with offerings of livi
cattle . . . together with the sons of the rulers and the troop leaders who wen
with them. (AEAB 16)
They thus ritually renewed the submission that had earlier been given to Merenre.
Some of the captured "sons of the rulers" may have been kept at court as hostages
for future good behavior.
The importance of military affairs in Nubia during the reign of Pepy II is also
reflected in Execration Texts found at Giza. 43 Clay figurines of Nubians wen
made, inscribed with ritual curses, and then shattered and buried as a means ol
"sending" the curse to the inscribed victim. Some of the curses were generic,
against the entire people and country of Nubia. The following is typical:
[Let a curse fall upon] every rebel of this land [Nubia], all people, all nobles
all commoners, all males, all eunuchs, all women, every chieftain, ever)
Nubian, every strongman, every messenger, every confederate, every ally oi
every [foreign] land who will rebel in [the Nubian provinces of] Wawat.
Zatu, Irjet, Yam, Yanakh, Masit, and Kaw, who •will rebel or who will plot by
saying plots or by speaking anything evil against Upper Egypt or Lower Egypi
forever.
[Let a curse fall upon] every Nubian who will rebel in [the Nubian pro-
vinces of] Irjet, Wawat, Zatu, Yam, Kaw, Yanakh, Masit, Medja, and Meterti,
who will rebel or who will make plots, or who will plot, or who will say
anything evil. (MAEM 139) 44
Other, smaller clay figurines, representing specific named individuals - possibly
enemy rulers or commanders - were also cursed. The Execration Texts will be
discussed more fully on pp. 415—8, but it is important to note both that magic
power was considered an important supplement to military power in foreign
affairs, and that the Nubians were perceived as posing a serious enough threat to
warrant these types of curses.
Pepinakht's third recorded campaign was a punitive expedition to the Sinai, which
offers our first insight into the nature of combat in that region, and the first indirect
indication that Egyptian combat with foreigners was not aways the victorious triumph
of the king and his soldiers that funerary inscriptions and reliefs unusually claim.
[Pepy II] also sent me to the land of the Easterners [in the Eastern I )esert and
Sinai], to bring him the sole companion, ship's captain, and Commander ol
the Foreigners An-Ankhet, who had been equipping a ship there foj Punt
when the Easterners belonging to the Sand dwellers slew him togethei with
Us
i he company of soldiers that was with him . . . [text lost] I drove to flight and
lew some of their men, I together with the company of soldiers that was with
me [I] cast the terror of [the wargod] Horus into foreign lands. (AEAB 16)
Before Pepinakht's punitive expedition, an earlier mission under the command
\ 1 1 Ankhet had apparently crossed from the Nile to the western shore of the
I Sea, where they were preparing a ship to sail to Punt, when they were
n ked by nomad raiders who killed most of the soldiers and plundered the
' handise and other equipment and supplies. Since Egyptian texts almost never
mi ion defeat by enemies, this allusion is instructive, and no doubt reflective of
I ■ ingoing threat from nomads that is generally obscured by the sources.
IVpinakht's account reflects a number of realities of Old Kingdom warfare.
i the Eastern nomads, while generally not a threat to Egypt itself, were a
instant potential threat to any Egyptian expedition into the Eastern Desert or
ii it. Nearly all of these expeditions would thus have to have been accompanied
i strong military escort. The relative proportion of soldiers to workers is illu-
m nee! in two inscriptions from Wadi Hammamat with reference to the quarry-
1 stone. The first included 200 soldiers and 200 workers (APJE 1:174). 45 The
"id mentions 1100 men and 1200 soldiers, with 200 donkeys for carrying
ipplies and returning with the quarried stone (ARE 1:175). If typical, these
imbers indicate that the standard proportion for these types of expeditions was
11 percent soldiers and 50 percent laborers, with about one donkey per ten men.
Iionld, however, assume that the workers would fight when needed, and that
nldiers would often form part of the labor force.
Pi pinakht's mission had not only been to punish the nomads for daring to
Utack Lgypt, but also to recover the bodies of the dead for proper burial in Egypt.
ing m a foreign land, and thereby missing a proper burial in Egypt, was of ser-
DUS eternal concern to ancient Egyptians. Without a proper burial, ritual, and
ruve goods, the soul of the departed would suffer in eternity. 46 This would have
• n of great concern to soldiers and officers going on foreign military expedi-
Ons. To die and have one's corpse left rotting in a foreign battlefield was tanta-
lounl to a condemnation to hell, probably creating a type of "leave no man
hind" mentality among Egyptian soldiers.
I Ml km Egyptian texts confirm the importance of proper burial to the Egyptians.
[Tie mortuary inscription of Sabni, son of Mekhu, the governor of southern
I 'i not to be confused with Sabni, son of Pepinakht, discussed on p. 350 -
i ibes a similar expedition to Nubia to retrieve the body of his father who had
I '1 in Wawat, apparently of natural causes. Sabni brought a group of his personal
l Minis, along with 100 donkey loads of incense, honey, clothing and oil as pre-
vails foi the Nubians, probably to "ransom" his father's corpse. The line between
tli trade goods, and bribes is greatly blurred in these texts; trade with Nubia
"(ten seemed .i combination <>l extortion, tribute, the ritual exchange of gifts,
.ilnng with i in we mundane e< onomic business. There are naturally hints of militarv
" iivtts in i he text, v\ n 1 1 ilif mention ol soldiers accompanying the ex petti (ion and
• r>
WAPvFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
OLD KINGDOM EGYPT
the "pacification" of Nubia (ARE 1:166-9). The Middle Kingdom "Tale ol
Sinuhe" (see pp. 430-3) also emphasizes this fear; the desire for a proper burial in
Egypt was one of the prime motives for Sinuhe to return from exile (TS 40). If the
corpses of the dead were not recovered and returned to Egypt, the morale of
future expeditions could seriously suffer. Thus Pepinakht's expedition was more
than merely punitive. It was also necessary to maintain the morale of the Egyptian
army. This fear of being left behind and unburied may in part account for the
expansion of the use of non-Egyptian mercenaries in foreign campaigns during the
Old Kingdom, mercenaries who, with different religious traditions, might not
have felt this concern to the same extent as the Egyptians.
Sabni
Sabni (Sebni), the son of Pepinakht, succeeded his father as "Commander of the
Foreigners" on the Nubian frontier (AEAB 17 = ARE 1:164-9). Like his fathers,
Sabni 's autobiography recounts his command of a military expedition to Nubia. As
military commander of the Nubian frontier, or the "southern gate" to Egypt as it
was often called, Sabni was ordered by the king to "build two great barges in [the|
Wawat [province of Nubia], in order to convey two great obelisks to On [Helio-
polis, near Cairo]". Despite the earlier claims that Nubia had been "pacified", the
animosity of the Nubians continued, forcing special tactical arrangements to pro-
tect the barges and their obelisks.
I went forth to Wawat [in northern Nubia] with two troops of soldiers, while
the [Nubian mercenary] scouts who I had paid were on the west and east
[banks of the Nile] of Wasat, so as to bring back my troops of soldiers in
peace. Never did I let a man's sandal or loaf be stolen [by the Hostile
Nubians]. (AEAB 17) 47
It appears from this description that the Egyptian army was divided in two, with
half on each bank of the Nile accompanying the flotilla bringing the obelisks. In
addition to the Egyptian troops in the Nile valley, however, Nubian mercenaries
were enlisted. It is not clear if they were paid protection money to allow the
expedition to pass, or if they were more permanently hired mercenaries to
accompany the Egyptian force. At any rate, the Nubians were apparently sent to
the edges of the Nile valley on the desert ridges and fringes, to protect the far
flanks and scout for possible hostile movement. This account gives the distinct
impression that the armed expedition was undertaken without the permission ol
the Wawat Nubians and in the face of a potential serious threat of attack.
The collapse of the Old Kingdom {2206-2191)
48
There were a number of factors at work in Egypt that mu
the monarchy. One major problem was the devolution ol
■I mined the strength of
■■ ■ ■ ■ i iiul tin- we.ilth of"
king to the regional nomarchs. Land, titles, authority, and wealth were natu-
■ llv given to loyal and successful soldiers, ministers, and nomarchs throughout the
Old Kingdom. Since government office and land could on occasion be inherited
i nomarch's successors, this wealth often became permanently alienated from
I rown. Furthermore, pious and for the most part perpetual endowments were
"le to temples. There were also rising numbers of mortuary temples for the
/ increasing numbers of royal ancestors; many of these were exempt from taxes
i ither forms of royal service. The land and wealth necessary to maintain the cult
the dead divine ancestors thus progressively increased. The construction of
1 1 pies and pyramids and great funerary complexes absorbed an increasing portion
late revenue and resources. The priestly bureaucracy necessary to run the
i ties designed to maintain the proper rites for the temples and pyramids likewise
■tew in size while decreasing in efficiency. Thus, slowly, the resources of the
n( nil state were diffused to regional rulers and religious institutions. At some
"int the resources of the state became insufficient for the demands placed upon
iiem. Some speculate that the advancing age and possible incapacity of Pepy II at
end of his reign may have left rival ministers and governors increasingly inde-
inlent. At the death of Pepy II {2206} a succession crisis erupted, culminating
ii Inn fourteen years in the fragmentation of Egypt into a number of small
ional kingdoms, inaugurating what is know as the First Intermediate Period.
Economically, this period seems to have been one of extended drought and low
•ding levels of the Nile, decreasing food production and creating the potential
i famine, while increasing competition for decreasing food resources. Further-
liore, drought and food shortages undercut both the real economic power of the
I ing and his ideological legitimacy, which was based on the claim that the king
■ .is the divinely sanctioned sustainer of moral and natural order. The transition to
the First Intermediate Period was also characterized by the devolution of power
Min the centralized royal court to provincial governors and mayors, who
increasingly claimed the credit for regional administration and building projects
mil who chose to be buried in their own provinces rather than near the king.
Provincial rulers also managed to make succession to their offices hereditary,
[hereby further undermining central control. To some extent these developments
.ii e simply a matter of degree, since regional leaders were also prominent and semi-
.mtonomous during much of the Old Kingdom. None the less, during most of the
| rtd Kingdom provincial rulers at least nominally submitted to royal authority.
Pepy IPs death, after a reign of 94 years, left numerous sons as possible rival
hens to the throne. The declining power of the Sixth Dynasty is apparent in the
an cession of ephemeral short-reigning rulers during its last half-century {2206-
2165}. Pepy II was succeeded by his son Antyemsaf II, who, given his father's
innty four-year reign, was apparently already an old man at his ascension. He ruled
foi only a year, and was succeeded by his wife, Nitokerty (Nitocris) {2205-2200},
apparently the first woman to rule Egypt independently. 49 Her brief rule was fol-
lowed by possibly five eplninei.il rulers over the course of nine years {2200—
!I ( M| 1 he details are noi known, hut n seems < le.u ( li.it provincial nomarchs
\ ^\
•I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
rapidly asserted independent power, fragmenting the kingdom into a number of
separate regional warring nomes. The collapse of royal authority was probably
accompanied by decreasing security on the frontiers; there is evidence of incur-
sions of Easterners into the north-eastern delta shortly after the death of Pepy 1 1
(HAE 139-40). This collapse of royal authority inaugurated what historians call
the First Intermediate Period {2190-2061}, which will be discussed in Chaptei
Fifteen.
Vv'
CHAPTER FOURTEEN
Warfare during the Old Kingdom
Ideology of sacred warfare
I he Pyramid Texts 1 are a collection of Old Kingdom funerary prayers and rituals
'signed to assist the king in obtaining eternal life in the realm of the gods after
death. The surviving texts are composed of nearly a thousand "spells" or "utter-
ihcs" dating to roughly two centuries spanning the reigns from Unas {2404—
'74} through Pepy II {2300-2206}. Many scholars believe, however, that some
i the texts may have originated centuries earlier - the first surviving copies are
thus rather late versions. Although primarily ritual and religious in purpose, they
t on tain a number of passages describing weapons and the martial virtues of the
I ing, thus providing us with insights into the ritual and ideology of Old Kingdom
arfare.
Warfare in ancient Egypt was not perceived as merely the struggle between the
inrtals; it was theomachy - the war of the gods. As in the Iliad and Mahabharata -
n the Bible, for that matter — the gods themselves came to earth and intervened in
battle to assist the king. The gods gave the king a divine mandate to conquer and
rule the entire world. An inscription from the mortuary temple of king Sahure
nukes the divine mandate for foreign conquests clear. In this inscription, a god
addresses king Sahure, proclaiming: "I grant thee all western and eastern foreign
I Mitls with all the Montiu bowmen who are in every land" (EWA 137).
The war god Horus particularly aids the king in battle: "May you be mighty in
I fpper Egypt as is this Horus through whom you are mighty; may you be mighty
m lower Egypt as is this Horus through whom you are mighty, that you may be
Blighty and protect yourself from your foe" (PT 645). The victory in battle of the
king over his enemies is frequently described in mythic terms relating to the
in lietypal combat between Horus and his enemy, the god Seth.
1 1 [orus] lias driven back the heart of Seth for you, for you [the king] are
greater than |Seth].. . . | Horus) has caused the gods to protect you, and Geb
has pui his sandal on the head of your 'defeated and prostrate] foe, who flin-
• In-, from vou Your son I lotus has smitten him, he has wrested his Eye [the
mythical talisman i< Eye ol I lm us| from him |Seth| and has given it to you.. . .
353
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE DURING THE OLD KINGDOM
Horus has caused you to lay hold of your foes, and there is none of them who
shall escape from you.. . . Horus has laid hold of Seth and has set him under
you on your behalf . . . Horus has caused you to examine [Seth] in his inmost
parts, lest he escape from you; he has caused you to lay hold of him with your
hand, lest he get away from you. (PT 356) 2
And again:
O Osiris the King, mount up to Horus . . . [for] he has smitten Seth for you
bound . . . Horus has driven him off for you, for you are greater than he.. . .
Horus has protected you, and he will not fail to protect you. (PT 357; see also
364, 606)
In the end, its seems that even the gods must surrender to the overwhelming
power of the divine king: "The gods come to me bowing, the spirits serve me
because of my power; they have broken their staffs and smashed their weapons [in
submission] because I am a great one" (PT 510).
Commanders faithfully serving the pharaoh would likewise be aided by the
gods in battle. Sabni, the "Commander of the Foreigners", describes himself as
"herald of the words of [the wargod] Horus to his following"; he is metaphorically
a weapon wielded by the gods, the "throwstick of Horus in foreign lands" (AEAB
17). The king, and indirectly his duly appointed commanders, were in reality the
representatives of the war god Horus. His commands reflected the will of the gods,
not merely political or military decisions of human beings. The pharaoh and his
commanders were the weapons of the gods to do their will on earth.
The propaganda of the king as the ideal warrior and athlete is particularly well
represented in the mortuary statues of the three great builders of the pyramids of
the Fourth Dynasty. Enthroned or standing, the mortuary statues of these kings
depict the idealized, well-muscled physiques of powerful young warriors, symbo-
lizing the ideal of the pharaoh as warrior-king. 3 Ritually the king was the ideal
athlete — the strongest and fastest man in the kingdom (SGAE 19—59). From Pre-
Dynastic times the king's physical prowess was demonstrated by a ritual run asso-
ciated with the Heb-sed festival, the Jubilee or festival of renewal of the king's
power and authority, in which the king was required to run around set markers to
demonstrate his physical strength. One of these Heb-sed running tracks is preserved
south of the pyramid of Djoser at Saqqara, in what seems to be the oldest formal
racetrack in history (EDE 212-15).
Military organization in the Old Kingdom (EMO 32-6)
R. Faulkner has rightly noted that "regarding the organization of the army dui Ing
the Old Kingdom there is not a great deal of evidence" (EMO 32). There is,
the less, sufficient to give us a broad understanding of the subject. Much <>l oui
knowledge on military ranks and commissions amies from tomb .itilobiotuaphn
from which we learn that there probably was not a professional military officer
class in the Old Kingdom. Rather, courtiers and government officials served in a
wide variety of religious, administrative, legal, economic, and military capacities,
according to the immediate needs of the state.
The most fully documented example of such a mixed military— civilian-reli-
gious-administrative career comes from the autobiography of Weni (AEL 1:18-22;
EMO 34-5). Weni began his career as "custodian of the storehouse" under king
Teti, rising to the office of inspector and "overseer of the robing-room" under
Pepy I (AEL 1:18—19). Thereafter he became "senior warden" of Mekhen, serving
as a judge as well. He then became "overseer of the royal tenants", and was a judge
in a case involving charges against the first wife of Pepy I. He thus already had a
distinguished career as administrator and judge before beginning his military
duties, probably in his thirties (AEL 1 9) . After distinguishing himself in several
campaigns in Sinai and Canaan, he became governor of Upper Egypt, in which
capacity he supervised or led expeditions to Nubia for granite, and to Hatnub for
alabaster, along with digging canals, boat-building, and negotiations with Nubians
(AEL 1:21-2). Weni's career is thus the classic Old Kingdom example of the
Egyptian practice of having courtiers and officers assigned to tasks on an ad hoc
basis — scribe, administrator, judge, governor, explorer, engineer, diplomat, miner,
ship-builder, priest, and soldier, all combined into one.
Other autobiographies give hints of the same type of ad hoc recruitment of
military officers. The autobiographical inscription of Meten, from the Third
Dynasty Mastaba at Saqqara, describes his roles as administrator, judge, and gov-
ernor, noting as well that he served as "commander of the fortress of Snf\ "gov-
ernor of the stronghold Hsn\ and "governor of the Cow-stronghold" (ARE
1:77-8), indicating that civil administrators served as garrison commanders of the
fortresses in their provinces. Mention is also made of commanders of individual
arsenals and fortresses, as well as a "commander of the affairs of the fortresses" who
seems to have had broader authority over fortifications throughout the kingdom
(EMO 36). The tomb of Ka-aper contains an inscription describing the presence
of "the scribe of the king's army" during expeditions (EWA §41), indicating the
presence of literate military officers providing logistical and administrative support
on Old Kingdom campaigns. Military and other official positions could be inher-
ned from father to son. Ibdu and his father Merire-onekh were both military
I ommanders (ARE 1:139), as were Heqaib and his son Sabni (AEAB 15-17).
It is unclear if the Egyptian army was organized into formal, permanent mili-
i.ny units. Rather, it seems that each nome or province of Egypt was required to
I I mster a certain number of troops for a military campaign, and that these troops
were commanded by the government officials of those nome. Egyptian armies
Were thus organized on a provincial basis with soldiers serving with their kinsmen,
h icnds and neighbors (EMO 32; AEL 1:19). This regional military organization
with nomarchs in command of their own provincial troops seems to have laid the
foundation ol ■< r i i i autonomous nomarch military power which would contribute
in the hatvmeuuhnu ul [e.\ni .luiine, the hirst Intermediate Period. Whether
\ . I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
these provincial troops were purely irregular militias or included professional sol-
diers stationed in the provinces is unclear (EMO 33). These Egyptian troops were
frequently supported by Nubian and Libyan mercenaries (EMO 33).
The only military unit mentioned during the Old Kingdom was the teset (tst), a
battalion or regiment; this seems to be a general term for any ordered body of
soldiers rather than a technical term for a formal military unit of a specific size
(EMO 32). Soldiers are generically known as meshe c (ms^), while the only regular
officer mentioned is the imy-r ms c , the "commander" or "overseer of the soldiers" -
perhaps roughly "captain" or "general". This title is held by commanders of
quarrying expeditions as well as more strictly military campaigns (EMO 33—4).
Weapons
Our knowledge of weapons from the Old Kingdom period, and, indeed from all
of Near Eastern military history, comes from three sources: archaeology, artistic
depictions of weapons, and texts. A section of the Pyramid Texts describes the
ritual clothing and arming of the king in preparation for religious ceremonies and
battle, and gives us a detailed description of elite Old Kingdom armament. In
general the king is described as being equipped with weapons like those of the
gods (PT 68, 222). Paralleling representations in royal iconography, the king wears
sandals (PT 106), a kilt or loincloth and belt (PT 57L-0, S, 58, 59A, 225), and is
sometimes described wearing a "tail", which probably alludes to bull tails attached
to the back of the belt as depicted in the Narmer palette and other Early Dynastic
art (PT 57N-0, S). He also occasionally wears a "leopard-skin" (PT 469, 485).
The king receives four different types of "mantlets" associated with fighting,
which may be some type of shield (PT 7 IF— I).
The three primary royal weapons in the arming ritual and other parts of the
Pyramid Texts are mace, bow, and dagger. The most frequently mentioned
weapon is the mace, which the king's "fist grips" in preparation for battle (PT 412,
512, 555, 675). There are several types: m/m-mace, dsr-mace, zzr-mace, (PT 62-4;
LA 3:414—15). It is impossible to tell precisely what is meant by these different
mace names. They may refer to different structural designs or military functions, but
it is more likely a reference to art motifs or engravings, ritual function, or perhaps
even a personal name for the weapon, like naming King Arthur's sword Excalibur.
Archery is particularly associated with the war god Horus. Horus is "Lord of
the Bows" (PT 437), and "the shooter" of the bow (PT 659). In mythical stories
he "draws his nine bows" against snake demons (PT 385). 4 The king, as Horus s
counterpart on earth, is "he who draws the bowstring as Horus and who pulls the
cord as Osiris" (PT 390). In the ritual arming ceremony the king is given several
different types of bows (iwnt and pdt), bowstrings and arrows (PT 57A— H, 71(1).
Two types of dagger are mentioned in the ritual arming text: Mfptt(Y)-daggei
and M3gsw-<kgger 9 (PT 57Q-R). One knife is described as "black" (PT 290)
which may refer to the obsidian or dark flint of the blade. In battle, the king "he. us
a sharp knife which cuts throats" (PT 251). I ike other weapons, the kme/s li.ie.eri
(56
WARFARE DURING THE OLD KINGDOM
parallel those of the gods, such as the "knife of Seth" (PT 666A, 674). The dagger
is described as delivering the coup de grace to the king's enemies: "Sharpen your
knife, O Thoth, which is keen and cutting, which removes heads and cuts out
hearts! He will remove the heads and cut out the hearts of those who would
oppose themselves to me" (PT 477). 3
All the archaeological evidence indicates that the weapons in Old Kingdom
Egypt were in a transitional phase between Neolithic and Bronze Age. While
copper daggers and axes are known, most daggers, maces, and projectile points
used by the ordinary soldiers of this period still seem to have been made of stone.
In this context the frequent mention of iron in the Pyramid Texts is, at first glance,
puzzling. The gods in heaven sit upon an "iron throne" which the king shares in
the afterlife. 6 In heaven the king receives an "iron scepter" (PT 665C), and the
god Horus wears "iron bands on [his] arms" (PT 214). In the resurrection the
king's bones will be made of iron (PT 570, 684, 724), strong and everlasting., The
gates to the gods' celestial castle are protected by "doors of iron" (PT 469).
Although the earthly realm of the king is perceived as the mirror image of the
celestial realm of the gods, these texts should not be understood as reflecting the
real weapons of the king. The Egyptians understood that meteoric iron fell from
heaven — it was sometimes called "copper from heaven" (EAE 2:183). Thus, hea-
ven, the realm of the gods, was the place where iron came from; indeed, the metal
is described as "god's iron" (PT 38), while the very firmament of heaven is itself
made of iron (PT 509). Heavenly weapons and other items made of iron would be
the celestial counterparts of earthly weapons made from stone or copper. During
the early Old Kingdom the weapons of the gods were of iron, those of the king
and nobles of copper, while those of most common soldiers were of stone.
Combat
I )nc& the arming ceremony was complete the king set out for battle, Several texts
rem to describe a pre-battle ceremony in which the King opens the city gates,
marshals and counts his soldiers ("slayers" or "slaughterers"), and then marches to
• let eat the enemy
The bolt is opened for you in the double Ram-gate which keeps out the
[enemy] peoples; may you number the slaughterers [in your army] (PT 611).
The six door-bolts, which keep Libya out, are opened for you; your iron
scepter is in your hand that you may number the slayers, [and] control the
Nine Bows [enemy nations] (PT 665C). Your scepter is laid in your hand that
you may open the bolt in the double Ram-gate which keeps out the Fenkhu
("Phoenicians" or Canaanites]. May you number the slayers, may you control
the Nine Bows. (PT716) 7
When the army marched to confront the "Nine Bows" — a generic term to
i • nbe .ill the enemies ol li>\|>t the king w.is, naturally, always victorious in
157
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
battle; at least this is what the Pyramid Texts would have us believe. "I have sub-
dued those [enemies] who are to be punished, I have smitten their foreheads, and I
am not opposed [by enemies] in the horizon" (PT 251) — the Egyptian way of
saying to the end of the earth. In battle the king will always "smite [the enemy],
destroy thern, drown them on land and sea" (PT 717), an interesting possible
reference to river or naval battles. In the end, "the bowmen , , . are felled" (PT
231) by the king's army, and "the [enemy Nine] Bows bow to" the king in sub-
mission (PT 693), an act also depicted on some martial reliefs.
Battle scene from Inty's tomb 8
Two scenes from tombs, probably dating to the late Old Kingdom, provide fasci-
nating glimpses of tactics and siegecraft in this period. The first, and most illumi-
nating, comes from the tomb of Inty (Inti) at Deshasheh in middle Egypt.
Although the inscription is lost, most scholars believe the scene depicts a
siege in southern Canaan. The scene is divided into two halves. The left half, in
four registers, depicts a battle outside the city — presumably leading up to the siege.
The right half shows the siege itself. Inty's siege mural gives us our best under-
standing of both the tactics of combat and methods of siegecraft in the late Old
Kingdom.
The upper register is partly lost, but depicts Egyptian soldiers advancing over
wounded Canaanite enemies who are pierced with arrows. The next two scenes
show Egyptians fighting the Canaanites. Here the Canaanites are stumbling and
fleeing in disarray from the Egyptian attack. All are pierced with multiple arrows;
one has six such wounds. None of the Canaanites offers serious resistance; the
orderly Egyptians are all armed with axes, marching through and dispatching the
Canaanites with blows to the head, neck, and shoulders. The Canaanites seem to
be armed only with bows, although one or two may have other weapons (the
murals are badly damaged, leading to some uncertainty in interpretation). The
fourth and lowest register, possibly reflecting events after the successful siege,
depicts bound prisoners of war — men, women, and children — being led off to
captivity in Egypt.
In both of these scenes the numerous arrows stuck in the Canaanites imply that
some Egyptian soldiers had bows. Most of the Egyptians carry axes; none are
shown with a shield, spear, mace, or dagger. They wear kilts, but no other armor
or helmet. The Canaanites likewise have no armor or shield; they too wear a kilt
and are distinguished from the Egyptians only by their longer hair and headbands.
In terms of weapons technology, the implication of the Inty mural - confirmed by
that of Kaemheset - is that the stone-headed mace, which had been the pre-emi-
nent weapon during the Early Dynastic period and early Old Kingdom, had been
largely superceded among common soldiers by copper-headed axes by the late ( )K1
Kingdom, as copper became more available and less expensive. The axe heads in
the two battle scenes are of two types; examples of both have been discovered from
archaeology (EWW 35; EAE 2:407; BAN pi. > \) I'he Insi sometimes called the
WARFARE DURING THE OLD KINGDOM
l 'epsilon" (E-shaped) axe, has a long and broad blade (AW 1:146, 154-5, 168-71;
FP 49); the second type has a semi-circular blade sometimes described as "eye"-
shaped (AW 1:12, 147; BAH 22-3). The proportional relation of the haft to the
size of the Egyptian soldiers implies the haft was 50—75 cm long. It is shown
wielded with either one or two hands. Both of these weapons seem to have been
known to the Egyptians as mibt in the Old Kingdom and minb in the Middle
Kingdom (EG 511, sign T7). 10 It is not clear if this shift in terminology merely
reflects a change in pronunciation, or is related to the difference between the
"epsilon" and "eye" styles of axes.
Battle tactics
Whereas the autobiography of Weni shows us the sophisticated strategy of the Old
Kingdom, the Inty siege mural allows us for the first time to get a glimpse of Old
Kingdom battle tactics, if only inferred from a hypothetical reading of the narrative
scene. The battle began with a missile barrage from archers. Al though no Egyptian
.ireher is actually depicted on the surviving portions of the scene, the upper half of
I he first register is lost, and the four advancing soldiers in that panel may have been
archers. However that may be, every Canaanite soldier is wounded by multiple
arrows, implying massed archery by the Egyptians. The individual effectiveness of
Fgyptian arrows, however, seems to have been rather limited. None of the
Canaanites is armored, and although there appears to be one man killed by
archery - struck by six arrows in the legs, back and head - several Canaanites have
three or four arrow wounds and are still alive and resisting. One is still fighting
with two arrows in his leg, one in his arm and two in his head. This implies that
the wounds from arrows were not very serious, and therefore that either the
arrows were shot from a great distance, or they did not have great penetrating
power, or both. The effectiveness of Egyptian archery was thus most likely based
on the large number of arrows shot at unarmored targets.
When either the missile supply was exhausted, or the enemy was sufficiently
disorganized and debilitated, the axe-armed Egyptian infantry advanced into a
melee. The two middle registers show a chaotic melee in the heat of battle, but the
damaged upper register shows Egyptian soldiers advancing into combat in ordered
inks. It is unclear if the Egyptian army at this time had separate regiments spe-
( lalizing in archery or axe combat. One man holding the siege-ladder and another
iipervising the mining operation both have their axes stuck in their belts behind
(heir backs, allowing them to use both hands. The Kaemheset mural, discussed on
p|>. 362-3, also shows the Egyptians putting the haft of the axe in their belts
leaving their hands free to climb a ladder. Since no Egyptian is shown with a shield
i >i .i bow, it is possible that the Egyptian soldiers were double-armed with bow and
axe. I hey first exchanged missile fire with the enemy, then dropped their bows,
drew their axes from their belts, and charged. On the other hand, it is also possible
thai the archers simply are not depicted in the melee scene, having remained in the
real when the axe aimed shock infantry advance into battle.
v,S
1
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Fortifications
11
Fortifications (wmtt, EG 496, sign 036; and mnw) are found in Egypt in Pre-
Dynastic times, and were well developed by the Old Kingdom. Many, if not all,
cities were fortified with mud brick walls; one archaic hieroglyphic symbol for a
city is simply a turreted wall (HEA 1:48, 177-8). The mud brick walls (inb, EG
496, sign 036) were up to five meters thick, with numerous projecting bastions
and towers (tsm); gateways (sbht, EG 494, sign 013) were heavily protected by
mud-brick towers as well. Principles of concentric fortifications were understood
by the Egyptians. The city walls of Buhen in Nubia included a central keep, the
main wall with eighteen projecting semi-circular towers, a dry moat, and a barbi-
can 65 meters from the main wall (AEA 40).
A number of archaeological remains of Old Kingdom fortresses have survived
(Figure 9). The fortified city of Balat in the Dakhla Oasis had rectangular city walls
(110 X 230 meters) with a separate citadel on the south (AEA 26). The Nubian
frontier was the most highly fortified — or at least has the best surviving examples —
which have been studied in great detail before they were submerged by Take
Nasser and the Aswan Dam (FB) . The First Dynasty fortress on Elephantine Island
at Aswan - sometimes called the "southern gate" to Egypt - continued in use
during the Old Kingdom. The city itself was surrounded by a wall with semicircular
towers, which followed the contours of the terrain of the island. A separate
s ip
'vi* . I" *<£■
Figure
Mud-brick city walls at El-Kab, Egypt {c. 1600-1000}. Although these well-
preserved fortifications date to the New Kingdom, the basic size and structure .in-
similar to earlier Middle Kingdom city- walls
Source: Photograph by William Hamblin.
WARFARE DURING THE OLD KINGDOM
53 X 53 meters citadel added to the defensibility of the site (AEA 81). In addition
to the Elephantine fortress at the First Cataract, three Old Kingdom fortresses
were constructed in northern Nubia itself: Ikkur (82 X 110 meters) (AEA 115),
Kubban (70 x 125 meters) (AEA 132), and Aniba (87 x 138 meters) (AEA 18;
HEA 1:178). Ikkur and Aniba had dry moats and semi-circular towers. The
spectacular fortress of Buhen in Nubia (150 X 70 meters) dates to the Middle
Kingdom, and will be discussed below (pp. 443—5). However, the Old Kingdom
town at Buhen (120 X 950 meters) was also fortified, with eighteen surviving
semi-circular towers and a barbican 65 meters from the main wall (AEA 40). In
general, fortified mud brick walls are essentially the same as the enclosure walls of
temple complexes, of which several examples have also survived.
Texts of the Old Kingdom provide some additional information about
fortifications and siegecraft. Egyptian titles from Old Kingdom mortuary inscrip-
tions include officers who were responsible for the garrisons and upkeep of for-
tresses, such as the Third Dynasty "commander of the stronghold of Snt",
"commander of the stronghold Hsn in the Harpoon Nome", and commander of
the "the Cow Stronghold". These titles indicate that there were fortified sites in
various nomes of Egypt, even though the surviving archaeological evidence in the
Nile valley is sparse (ARE 1:77—8). Other titles mentioning fortresses include:
"Commander of the Desert Keeps and Royal Fortresses", and "Commander of the
Way(s) of Horus", which was the road through the northern Sinai to Canaan
(EAE 1:553).
The Pyramid Texts, which have been introduced above, also contain
important — though rather mythical — allusions to fortifications and siegecraft.
Specific historical fortifications are possibly mentioned in the texts. The king "is
i lie Great Bull who smote [the city of] Kenzet" in Nubia (PT 205). An allusion to
flic "Fortress of the Bitter Lakes" (PT 366) - the lakes and marshes between
modern Suez and Port Said (AAE 167) — indicates that the western frontier was
lortified against incursions from the Sinai during the Old Kingdom. This may be
related to the "double Ram-gate" which "keeps out the Fenkhu [CanaanitesJ "
ipT 716). There is another fortress "which keeps Libya out" of Egypt as well (PT
K5C). Vague details of fortress design are alluded to in the texts. The "double
(Lam-gate" is bolted shut (PT 611); one fortress gate has "six door-bolts" (PT
B65C). Standing on the ramparts in defense of his fortress, the king is described as
a great falcon which is on the battlements" (PT 627).
The most frequent allusion to fortifications in the Pyramid Texts is the
mythic "Castle of the Mace of the Great Ones [gods]" to which the king gains
jntrance during his ascent to heaven (PT 262, 600, 611, 665). It is also called the
"castle of the Mace of p3'r wood" (PT 219), and is frequently associated
\ nli the god Thoth. 12 What is important from the military perspective is that the
gods in the celestial world dwell in a fortress-palace (PT 322); the king on earth,
who imitates the gods in all things, does as well. The king's fortress-palace at
Memphis may be the earthly counterpart to the gods' heavenly "Castle of the
Maec".
Ir.n
U.I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE DURING THE OLD KINGDOM
Siegecraft (LA 3:765-86)
The mural from the tomb of Inty, introduced on pp. 358—9, also shows a siege i
progress. 13 Having lost the open battle, the surviving defeated Canaanites fled b
their fortified city, depicted as walled with regularly-spaced, semi-circular pro
jecting towers. Following their victory in the field the Egyptians assaulted the < il
using two different siege techniques. First, as also described in the Pyramid Te
(discussed on pp. 353—4), they placed a tall siege ladder against the wall for a
assault. In the Inty relief the assault has not yet begun. The siege scene from thi
tomb of Kaemheset at Saqqara, however, complements our knowledge of I in
siege scene. 14 Here the wooden ladder is apparently on wheels - though how thi
axle could rotate while the ladder remained stable is unclear from the illus
tration. The wheeled ladder is braced by a man wedging it in place with a thi< 1
piece of wood, while five soldiers ascend the ladder. All five wear brown kilts and
are unarmored and unshielded. All are also armed with axes. Rather than climbii);
over the wall into the city, two of the soldiers seem to be hacking at the brick wall
with their axes.
The second siege technique shown in both the Inty and the Kaemheset reliefs i
undermining the base of the wall. Here Egyptians with long wooden beams oi
crowbars are attempting to dislodge the mud bricks from the base of the wall
hoping to get the wall to collapse and form a breach. Given that all fortifications
from this period were of mud brick — although some had stone foundations at the
base - undermining a wall would only have been a matter of time, though such
efforts could have been seriously hindered by stones and missiles thrown b)
defenders from the top of the wall. Thus both the Inty and the Kaemheset relict
show the same siege techniques: a ladder assault combined with undermining tin
brick wall.
The reliefs also give us important information about defending fortified cities
The defenders in the Kaemheset relief are divided into four registers, but unfor
tunately the upper two panels are severely damaged. They possibly show soldiers
throwing stones or javelins, or shooting bows at the Egyptian assaulters. The third
panel depicts the herds of the Canaanites - cattle, goats, and donkeys - being
brought into the city for safety, and being fed from a pile of gram. The fourth
panel seems to show the women and children of the city being given a gram
ration. 15 The Inty relief is even more evocative of life in a besieged city, focusing
on the important role of women in logistical and medical support for the arm)
The first panel shows a woman extracting an arrow from a wounded Canaan ite
soldier, probably one who had escaped the battle that is depicted on the left side of
the relief. The second panel shows a woman embracing (or throttling?) a returning
soldier, and the women and children mourning before the Canaanite king on his
throne. 16 In the third and fourth panels the women are again helping wounded
soldiers, one who is staggering from his wounds. In the last scene some men art-
listening at the wall opposite to where the Egyptian soldiers are undermining from
the outside. The lower left corner of the wall shows three senu mi. nl.n lust ions m
lose proximity where the Egyptians are attempting to undermine, which may
present either additional towers used to strengthen a weak section of the wall, or
i gate flanked by protecting towers.
The after-life ascent of the king into heaven is occasionally described in ima-
i v that is probably associated with siegecraft. The king storms heaven like a
stress (PT 255, 257); he "overthrows the ramparts [of the heavenly fortress], he
moves the ramparts" (PT 667C), and "demolishes the ramparts of Shu" (PT
109), probably by undermining as shown in the siege reliefs. In the process the
king boasts he "will smite away the arms of [the god] Shu which support the sky
I I I will thrust my shoulder into that rampart on which you lean" (PT 255). One
i describes how the "King takes possession of the sky, he cleaves its iron" (PT
157), probably alluding to the "doors of iron" (PT 469) of the heavenly castle. As
ted above, these references to iron in the Pyramid Texts are probably mythical -
nee meteoric iron falls from heaven, iron is the metal of the gods. It is quite
sible, however, that Old Kingdom fortress doors were reinforced at their joints
i.l bolts with copper bands.
['he gods sometimes assist the king in his victorious conquest of this mythic
bn ress by the use of siege ladders. In one text the four Sons of Horus aid the king
i Ins siege by preparing both wooden and rope ladders for the king: 17
| They] tie the rope ladder for this King, they make firm the wooden ladder
for this King, they cause the King to mount up [to heaven] . . . [The wooden
ladder's] timbers have been hewn by 553; the lashings which are on it have
been drawn tight with the sinews of G3swty, Bull of the sky, the rungs have
been fastened to its sides. (PT 688)
I attacking the celestial fortress, the king "sets up the ladder" (PT 333), which
!,.- gods hold steady for him (PT 304). These textual references to the use of
Iders in siegecraft are confirmed by contemporary military art from Deshasheh
1 1. 1 Saqqara, discussed above, both of which show men assaulting city walls with
| .Iders held firm by other soldiers at the bottom.
Treatment of prisoners (LA 3:786-8)
\lur the battle, "the enemies are hunted down" (PT 724), and the prisoners
Cought bound before the king (PT 222, 357) under the "guard of the prisoners
itter the great battle" (CT 493). The Coffin Texts describe a magical spell
designed to prevent capture in battle, providing a description of the treatment of
prisoners: "you shall not be imprisoned, you shall not be restrained, you shall not
I n fettered, you shall not be put under guard, you shall not be put in the place of
exec ution in which rebels are put" (CT 23). Captured enemies might be physi-
< ally abused, even tortured, and their corpses mutilated and dismembered; mercy
is unthinkable. The king is promised by the gods that he "will not be hanged head
downwards" (PT o'Ui ipjuimtlv a reference to the public exposure of the
W,.'
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE DURING THE OLD KINGDOM
corpses of enemies. The treatment of prisoners is often described in mythic terms
relating to the tale of the primordial combat between Horus and Seth. Horns
"bound [Seth's] legs and bound his arms and threw him down on his side" (PT
485B). He "sets [Seth, the King's] foe under your feet" (PT 368, cf. PT 371). The
king's enemy "is smitten by the children of Horus, they have made bloody his
beating, they have punished him" (PT 369). Captive Seth is castrated (PT 570),
and dismembered: "Horus has cut off the strong arms of your foes and Horus has
brought them to you cut up" (PT 372). Although these are mythic narratives,
there is no reason to think the Egyptian kings did not do these types of things to
their real enemies, as depicted on several of the artistic sources mentioned earlier.
The fate of the enemies of pharaoh is described in gruesome, and almost gleeful
detail in the Pyramid Texts:
I am stronger than they . „ . their hearts fall to my fingers, their entrails are for
the denizens of the sky [carrion birds], their blood is for the denizens of the
earth [carrion animals]. Their heirs are [doomed] to poverty, their houses to
conflagration . . . But I am happy, happy, for 1 am the Unique One, the Bull of
the sky, I have crushed those who would do this against me and have annihi-
lated their survivors. (PT 254)
In the Horus— Seth combat myth, Horus takes revenge for the death of his
father Osiris, who is later resurrected by his wife Isis (EAE 2:188—91). "O Osiris
the King, I bring to you him [Seth] who would killed you; do not let him escape
from your hand.. . „ A knife is made ready for him ... he having been cut three
times" (PT 543, cf. 545). Torturing the defeated enemy Seth is described as reta-
liatory revenge for the torture Seth had previously inflicted when he temporarily
defeated Osiris.
O my father Osiris this King, I have smitten for you him [Seth] who smote
you ... I have killed for you him who killed you ... I have broken for you
him who broke you.. . . He who stretched you out is a stretched bull; he who
shot you is a bull to be shot.. . . I have cut off its head, I have cut off its tail, I
have cut off its arms, I have cut off its legs. (PT 580, cf. 670)
Such mythic texts represent a military worldview in which retaliatory raids and
personal revenge on enemies were a positive moral responsibility.
The most ghastly passage in the Pyramid Texts is the so-called "Cannibal
Hymn" (PT 273-4), which describes the king dismembering, cooking, and eating
the bodies of his enemies to absorb their spiritual power.
The sky is overcast,
The stars are darkened,
The celestial expanses quiver,
The bones of the (".nth gods tremble,
The planets are stilled,
For they have seen the King appearing in power . . .
The King is the Bull of the sky,
Who conquers at will,
Who lives on the being of every god
Who eats their entrails . . .
The King is a possessor of offerings who knots the cord [binding captives]
And who himself prepares his meal;
The King is the one who eats men and lives on the gods . . .
It is "Grasper-of-topknots" who is Kehau,
Who lassoes them for the King
It is "the Serpent with raised head"
Who guards them [the prisoners] for him [the king]
And restrains them for him;
It is "He who is over the reddening" [blood-letting]
Who binds them for him;
It is Khons who slew the lords
Who strangles them for the King
And extracts for him what is in their bodies . . .
It is Shezmu who cuts them up for the King
And who cooks for him a portion of them
On his evening hearth-stones;
It is the King who eats their magic
And gulps down their spirits;
Their big ones are for his morning meal,
Their middle-sized ones are for his evening meal,
Their little ones are for his night meal,
Their old men and their old women are for his incense-burning;
It is the Great Ones [circumpolar stars] in the northern sky
Who set the fire for him
To the cauldrons containing them
With the thighs of their oldest ones.. . .
[The King] has traveled around the whole of the two skies [the whole earth],
He has circumambulated the Two Banks [of the Nile]
For the King is a great Power.. . .
The King has appeared again in the sky,
He is crowned as Lord of the horizon;
He has broken the back-bones
And taken the hearts of the gods . . ,
The King feeds on the lungs of the Wise Ones,
And is satisfied with living on hearts and their magic . . .
1 le enjoys himself when their magic is in his belly . . .
[ o, thru souls ,nr in the King's belly,
I 'I irii spirits .in- iii tin' Kind's possession . . .
,*, I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
WARFARE DURING THE OLD KINGDOM
Lo, their souls are in the King's possession,
Their shades are (removed) from their owners.
Here we see martial cannibalism, with the king taking bound captives, slaughtci
ing and dismembering them, and finally cooking and eating them to obtain thru
magical power. The cannibalization of defeated enemies is also mentioned in pis
sing elsewhere: "I will eat a limb from your foe, I will carve it for [the god] Osiris'
(PT 477). A variant on the "Cannibal Hymn" is found again in the Middle
Kingdom Coffin Texts (CT 573).
The imagery of warfare in the Pyramid Texts describes a world filled wnl
magical and divine power where the gods intervene in battle for their son, tin
king. The victorious king is merciless to his enemies, rejoicing in their downl.ill
and suffering. For the ancient Egyptians war certainly was a physical activity in tin*
material world; but it was also much more. For the Egyptians, war was a heady
mixture of violence, religious ritual, magic, and divine sanction and intervention
War was a ritual act by which the mythic combat of Horus and Seth was re-
enacted, and, through the king's ultimate victory, the cosmic balance of the uni-
verse maintained. The gods had granted pharaoh the authority to rule the world,
and the king's enemies were the enemies of the gods.
Maritime developments (EBS 21-6; SP 26-69)
Egyptian ships of the Old Kingdom ranged from small three- or four-man papyni
fishing skiffs to large cedar oared and sailing ships capable of sailing throughout tin-
eastern Mediterranean and the Red Sea„ The oldest fully preserved ship ever found
from this region is the royal ship buried near the pyramid of Khufu {25 SI J
intended to be used by the king in the afterlife. 18 This 43-meter vessel was buried
in specially designed pits to the south of Khufu 's pyramid. Made entirely of cedai
wood imported from Phoenicia, it was designed for river travel and was propelled
by oars that also survive. A complex system of nautical knots and lashing was used
on the boat (FP 29). Its purpose was probably ritual rather than military, but it
none the less stands as a remarkable example of Egyptian shipbuilding skill in the
Old Kingdom. Sea-going vessels were larger and propelled by sails (SP 63—9), ,r
seen from a depiction in the tomb of the Vizier Mehu {2330?} from the earls
Sixth Dynasty (EWP 89); the tomb of Inti also depicts a large vessel under sail
(EBS 24).
It is clear that Egyptian maritime capacity developed significantly during ih
Fifth and Sixth Dynasties. This is reflected in three trading and exploration expe
ditions. A marble vessel bearing Userkaf's {2513-2506} name was found in i lit
island of Kythera in the Aegean, the earliest indication of maritime cont.it i
between the Minoans and Egyptians — though it may have been brought to tin
Aegean later than Userkaf's reign (EAE 2:588b). Sahure's {2506 2492 ] funcr.m
temple at Abusir depicts naval vessels returning from an expedition to Phoenn i,i
probably from Byblos bringing valuable cedai wood (!•'.( I r\ I MS M) SahuieaKi'
}66
mdertook the first recorded Egyptian naval expedition to Punt, the south-western
Oast of the Red Sea, which returned with "80,000 measures of myrrh, 6000
leisures of electrum, 2900 measures of malachite, and 23,020 measures of [text
•t]" (PS 168). Djedkare Izezi {2436-2404} likewise undertook trading expedi-
• ns to both Phoenicia and Punt. Although none of these maritime expeditions
ere strictly military affairs, the distinction between trading, exploring, mining,
M I warfare was rather vague in ancient Egypt. It is quite likely that each of these
I ii itime expeditions had a military component, if only a company of soldiers, to
otect the ships. More importantly, the ongoing maritime trade to Phoenicia and
'iint provided the foundation for the capacity of the Egyptian navy to move large
"lies of troops in true amphibious operations. This culminated in the Sixth
' nasty with the amphibious operations of Weni in Canaan {c. 2340}, discussed
ii p. 340.
We have funerary inscriptions of two naval captains, Inikaf and Khenty, from
i ill Dynasty Coptos. Among other ritual and administrative functions, both are
t ribed as "One who puts the Fear of Horus [the King] into the Foreign Tands,
ho brings the treasure of the King from the Southern Lands" (ICN 31, 33),
Meeting the dual function of naval captains - warfare and trade. "Putting the fear
i I lorus [the King] into foreign lands" is often a euphemism for military action
hicb intimidates the enemy, while "bringing the treasure" refers to either plun-
i or trade.
Raver combat undoubtedly remained the most important aspect of naval war-
u during the Old Kingdom. Some indication of the nature of ship-to-ship
nibat can be found in some interesting jousting scenes and harpoon hunts from
1 Hil Kingdom tombs at Saqqara. 19 Fishermen often used long poles to propel their
■ nulled papyrus skiffs in the marshes and shallows of the Nile. In the murals some
i i he fishermen are depicted using their poles to propel their ships, others use the
'ii", poles to jab their rivals or swing them overhead. When two skiffs collide, the
hermen are depicted as wrestling on the bow (TEM 53; SP 97). A least part of
die goal is to knock the opponent into the river, from which some of the fisher-
men are being recovered by their friends (TEM 53). The hippopotamus-hunting
i ene from the tomb of Mereruka at Saqqara (EWP 93; ISP 13, 42; SP 94) shows
>apyrus craft approaching three hippopotami from two different direction. They
I uvc used ropes to either lasso or hook the hippos, and have long harpoons raised
i head in preparation for the kill. Although neither the jousting nor the hunting
i nes are strictly military, if we add the use of archery from on board ship, these
i enes provide our best window into the rough and tumble melee of Egyptian
ivei warfare.
W.
FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
but rather a vague recollection of a period of instability. We have no specific
information about rulers or military events of this period of coups, civil war, and
anarchy, as the power of the Sixth Dynasty collapsed.
CHAPTER FIFTEEN
First Intermediate Period Egypt
{2190-2061}
The First Intermediate Period 1 is the name given by modern Egyptologists to the
time in Egyptian history from the end of the Sixth Dynasty {2191} to the reuni-
fication of Egypt by the fourth king of the Eleventh Dynasty, Montuhotep 1
{2061-2011}. It is characterized by political fragmentation and instability, in
contrast with the political unity of Egypt in the Old and Middle Kingdoms. Royal
monumental building declines and even disappears during this period, replaced by
local tombs and cults in the provinces. Instead of centralizing surplus wealth to
build royal tombs and temples, regional nomarchs and priests kept local resources
and developed local power bases. In terms of power, wealth, and ideology, the First
Intermediate Period is thus characterized by decentralization and fragmentation .
Militarily this decentralization is manifest in military conflict between rival
regional Egyptian states. Egyptian military intervention outside Egypt ebbed as th<
grand trading and exploration expeditions of the Old Kingdom into Nubia, Punt,
and Canaan largely disappear during the early First Intermediate Period (HA I
139-40). In some ways the records for this period are quite fragmentary and
ambiguous, making precise reconstruction of events and dates difficult and con
troversial. On the other hand, military historians are provided with a number oi
important tomb autobiographies that contain a great deal of military information
Following late ancient Egyptian historiographic tradition, the First Intermedi.it.
Period is divided by scholars into five dynasties, the Seventh through the Eleven 1 1 1
In some ways these divisions simplify a complex political and military situation
Seventh Dynasty {c. 2190}
The numerous problems facing Egypt at the end of the Sixth Dynasty were i
cerbated by a power struggle for the throne among the numerous progeny of ih
centegenarian Pepy II. The political chaos following the death of Niiokeu
(Nitocris) {2205-2200}, Pepy Us daughter-in-law, was remembered in l.it<
Egyptian legends as the "Seventh Dynasty" of Memphis {c. 21 t )()j, vvhi< h i
to have consisted of "five kings of Memphis who reigned tor seventy five d.r
or alternatively, even "seventy kings of Memphis, who reigned foi sevent\ <l«
(Man. 23—4). These phrases are not seen hy modern s< hol.us as spet ih< miml
168
Eighth Dynasty {c. 2190-2165}
Thereafter, royal power at Memphis passed into the hands of the so-called Eighth
I )ynasty, which is tentatively and hypothetically reconstructed with eighteen kings
i tiling for a mere 25 years in total {2190—2165}, averaging a reign of less than one-
utd-a-half years per king (CS 1:70). However, the existence of many of these rulers
I .mnot be confirmed by any contemporary records, and the precise number, names,
.ind lengths of reign cannot be determined with certainty. Some scholars suggest that
the kings of the Eighth Dynasty may have been descendants of Pepy II of the Sixth
I >ynasty through a subsidiary line, and were thus the branch of Pepy's family that
merged in a dominant position following the anarchy of the Seventh Dynasty.
Nominal authority of the Eighth Dynasty was recognized throughout Egypt, but the
lomarchs were becoming increasingly autonomous (HAE 140—1; Cl/2:198— 200)
The weakening internal situation of the Eighth Dynasty left Egypt more vul-
nerable to outside military threat than it had ever been before. Bedouins from
linai and Palestine are thought to have migrated into or possibly even invaded the
lelta toward the end of the Eighth Dynasty, contributing to the collapse of the
nasty and perhaps establishing some kind of Canaanite hegemony in the north-
i.i delta (HAE 139-40).
I lie combination of social chaos, political impotence, regional autonomy,
leological instability, and economic crisis, all complicated by low flooding of the
lie and occasional famine, culminated in the complete fragmentation of the
ptian state, with regional nomarchs transforming their former semi-autonomy
into real independence. Famine is mentioned in a number of texts from the First
it) i mediate Period, and efforts to alleviate or avoid famine appear frequently
ong the merits in funerary inscriptions of contemporary nomarchs. The
"i lurch Henqu of the "Mountainviper", or twelfth southern nome, emphasized
II he "gave bread and beer to all the hungry" and "resettled the towns that were
nfeebied in this nome with persons of other nomes" (AEAB 23—4, 32—3; M =
I 14-15, HAAE 31). In part this may simply be vague pious claims to have
I lot med good deeds, as are often found in funerary autobiographies, but it quite
ibly reflects the actual circumstances of hunger and depopulation. Con-
mporary autobiographies from Edfu, Thebes, and Coptos mention "painful years
• t distress" due to drought and famine, and efforts to transport grain to afflicted
Hies during this period (AEL 1:87-90, HAE 142).
Ninth Dynasty of Herakleopolis {2164-2040} 2
nome oi Herakleopolis m central Hgypt was the largest and most powerful
dm in 1 .' i hi- pei u ul ! en irn ihered in I .p.vpu.iu t rati it ion .is the Ninth and Tenth
W.'J
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Dynasties, which controlled the sacred Old Kingdom capital at Memphis. Its for
mal establishment of full independence occurred under Akhtoy I (Khety, Ach-
thoes) {2165—2135?}, founder of the Ninth Dynasty, who may have been a
descendent of Pepy II through a subsidiary line that had traditionally served a
governors of Herakleopolis. The kings of Herakleopolis seem to have retained
control of Memphis and maintained at least part of its religious cult — Akhtoy I was
buried there. Later Egyptian legends remember Akhtoy I as "behaving more
cruelly than his predecessors" (Man. 27-8), which is sometimes thought to be a
legendary recollection of attempts to suppress the independence of rival nomarchs
For a decade or two Akhtoy I seems to have exerted at least nominal influence as
far south as Aswan, where his name is recorded in an inscription. But his dynasty \
power in the south ultimately proved ephemeral. Under subsequent rulers south
ern Egypt emerged fully into independence, precipitating a civil war.
The struggle for the South {2134-2061}
The move toward the regional autonomy of nomarchs, which had begun during
the late Sixth Dynasty, reached its culmination in the Ninth, with the establish
ment in the 2130s through 2120s of at least six separate states in Egypt. Some of
these remained, formally and nominally, loyal to the kings of the Ninth Dynasty at
Herakleopolis. Others became defiantly independent. As far as can be determined
the Ninth Dynasty retained control of A4iddlc Egypt from the ninth nome to the
southern part of the delta. The rebellion was most pronounced and successful in
southern Egypt from the first through the eighth nomes. The following list shows
the nomes, capital cities, and rulers of the major players in the southern civil war,
dating to roughly 2130 (EAE 1:528-30; M = HAAE 31):
• first nome, at Aswan/Elephantine, ruled by Setika;
• second and eventually third nome, at Hierakonpolis, ruled by Ankhtifi;
• fourth nome, at Thebes, ruled by Antef I (of the Eleventh Dynasty);
• fifth nome, at Coptos, ruled by Shemai and his son Idi, who were the semi-
autonomous official governors of southern Egypt for the Ninth Dynasty
kings. Tjauti and Woser were also leading figures of this nome;
• sixth, seventh and eighth nomes, at Thinis, ruled by Abichu.
Middle Egypt, from the ninth nome northward, remained loyal to the Ninth
Dynasty kings of Herakleopolis. Conditions in the delta are uncertain; some delta
nomes may have been independent, while Easterners - Canaanites or Sinai
bedouins — may have held hegemony in the north-east delta.
The precise dates and sequence of events in this civil w T ar cannot be detci
mined. However, the surviving records give us occasional incidental snapshots ol
warfare in southern Egypt. The autonomous nomarchs of southern Hgypt caused
concern for King Neferkahor of the Ninth Dynasty [< . 21 \()\ \ Neferkahor sent
his son-in-law Shemai to serve as "(iovrrnoi of I Ippei I e.Ypt", based al \\u- fifth
i
FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
nne of Coptos, apparently with instructions to regain control of the situation
i \E 1:528). Shemai in turn assigned his own son Idi as governor of the turbulent
i i nes One through Four. Their attempts to reassert royal control in the south
ere plagued by recalcitrant nomarchs who refused to submit to royal authority on
part of what they viewed as the upstart kings of Herakleopolis. This defiance
i ion developed into military conflict.
The campaigns of Ankhtifi of Hierakonpolis {c. 2130-2125?} 3
I he most instructive source on the early southern civil war is the autobiography of
\nkhtifi, nomarch of Hierakonpolis (nome three). Although functionally inde-
i ii lent, Ankhtifi 's titles include reference to royal offices, indicating a lingering
lominal respect from the kings of Herakleopolis - at least he sometimes claimed to
acting in the name and interest of the king. In addition to governor, his titles
iclude military offices such as "General", "Commander of Mercenaries", and
1 ommander of Foreign Lands", the last title, if not sheer boasting, presumably
l erred to Nubia. In an attempt to lend legitimacy to his rule, he claimed that the
I "Horus brought me to [rule] the Horus-Throne [of Edfu] ... for Horus
: ihed to re-establish it, because he brought me to [be ruler to] re-establish" the
sperity and peace of Edfu (AEAB 25); no reference is made to royal investiture.
I I ins, Ankhtifi claimed to be acting not for personal power or aggrandizement,
hi according to the will of the gods. The power base of the First Intermediate
f i tod nomarchs was often solidified by local priests and gods. Many rulers, like
\nkhdfi, were themselves priests, and were careful to care for and build temples to
oca] deities. Ankhtifi claimed that the "temple of Khuu was inundated like a
■i i.i i sh, abandoned by him [the former nomarch] who belonged to it, in the grip of
i rebel" (AEL 1:85). Part of Ankhtifi's justification for seizing power was the
.(oration of the proper ritual order for the gods. As we shall see, when the
k unarchs of Thebes eventually reunite Egypt, they bring to power with them the
n v.ional Theban gods Montu and Amun.
Ankhtifi's first campaign was against Edfu (nome Two). Ankhtifi overthrew the
bcl and re-established law and order (AEAB 25). This type of breakdown of
Miiliority is also reflected in another text which describes a local leader who "kept
«1i\e every man of this province . . . while the great ones [former nomarchs?] were
id", and who provided food for the people, not because of "an order that is sent
I I i servant of the king" but on his own initiative, "out of love for [the god] Min"
I AH 1 :530a).
Mi hough no details are given, Ankhtifi also at some point campaigned south-
•a.iuI to the first nome, Elephantine, which was under the command of the
'in. n« h Setika. I le boasted that "my speech was clever and my bravery won the
day when it was necessary to join the [southern] three nomes together" into a
tni'Je state liy conquest (I IAH 142). At his death Ankhtifi's domain included "the
provinces of Hierakonpolis |the third nomc| and Hdfu |second nome], Elephantine
(Aswan] and < hnhos |m the fust nome|" (I 1 A 1 I 1 v )
■ I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
At the time of this consolidation of power over the southernmost three nomes
of Egypt, Ankhtifi's major rival was Antef I, ruler of the fourth nome of Thebes,
and founder of what was to become the Eleventh Dynasty of the Middle King
dom. During the ongoing struggle between Thebes and Ankhtifi, an unnamed
general of the Theban city of Armant — supported by allied troops from Coptos
issued a challenge to battle to Ankhtifi, which Ankhtifi accepted:
The commander of troops of Armant had come to say: "Come [to battle],
you hero, come [north] to the [war] camps of the Theban and Coptite dis
trict, which have separated." When I went north in the west channel of [the
Nile at] Armant, I found the [armies of] the entire districts of Thebes and
Coptus as they were making ready the [military] camp of Armant at the
mount of Semekhsen. [I said:] "I myself shall approach it! May the strong
armed [god] stand for [me in battle]! [I shall pin them down] as with a har-
poon on the nose of a hippopotamus ready to flee, after I turned south from
destroying their camp with the victorious troops of Hefat. I truly am a man
like no other." (AF 29-30)
The details of the battle are lost in a lacuna in the text, but Ankhtifi w.i
apparently victorious. Eater he continued his campaign against Thebes:
When I had sailed north [to attack Thebes] with my troop of victorious
trustworthy [warriors] and had landed on the west side [of the Nile] in the
Theban district: the south of my navigation [of the naval operations of in\
fleet on the west bank of the Nile] was at the mount Smhsn, the north of ni\
navigations [in the Theban district] was at the estate of Tmy. While my troop
of trustworthy [warriors] was seeking to fight throughout the west side of the
Theban district, no one would come forth for his fear [of my army]. When I
had sailed north and I had landed on the east side of the Theban district: the
north of my navigation [of the naval operations of my fleet on the east bank of
the Nile] was at the tomb of Imbi, the south of my navigations was at the ford
of Sg3, which was probed against the walls [of Thebes] after it had closed tin
doorbolts [of its gates] as it was not ready [to fight] for fear of this troop ot
victorious trustworthy [warriors]. And so this troop of trustworthy [warriors]
became challengers [to the enemy to come out and fight in open combat |
through the west and east of the Theban district, while seeking battle, but no
one would come forth [from their fortified cities] because of his fear. I, truly,
am a man, of whom there is not another [like me]. (AF 37; OHAE 131)
This narrative gives us an excellent view of the use of river fleets in campaign!
It appears that, after his victory over the Theban Coptos alliance at the earl hi
Battle of Armant, Ankhtifi took his army in his fleet and sailed up and clown both
banks of the Nile. His army was either on foot and accompanied M)i\ supported In
the fleet, or perhaps was entirely carried by the Heel and dropped oil at strauy.ii
points for land operations. They were able to sail and march unhindered
i hroughout the entire Theban district - presumably plundering as they went. The
Theban troops, being cowed by their defeat at Armant, refused to leave the safety
-I their city fortresses and meet Ankhtifi's army again in open battle. On the other
■ttld, Ankhtifi did not feel strong enough to undertake a serious long-term siege
< 1 Thebes itself. His victory over Thebes was thus only temporary; Thebes
inained independent and would later challenge Ankhtifi's descendants.
After establishing his predominance in the south, Ankhtifi sought further
legitimization of his conquests by asking "the Overseer of Upper Egypt [for the
I ing of the Ninth Dynasty] who is in the Thinite nome" - probably referring to
Ither Shemai or his son Idi - to accept his authority as "the Prince, Count, Chief
Priest, and Great Headman" of the south (AEAB 26). The de facto nature of
udependent rule was apparently recognized by the kings of Herakleopolis, per-
il ps in return for shipments of grain. The combination of low Nile flooding and
ditical and economic collapse caused "all of Upper Egypt [to die] of hunger and
people were eating their children..,. The [people of the] whole country had
i ome like locusts going upstream and downstream in search of food" Pre-
niiably in return for recognition of his authority, Ankhtifi sent food to the sur-
■ ■ Minding nomes (OHAE 129 = AEL 1:87). He may even have made an armed
I monstration up the Nile as far as the eighth nome of Thinis, for he claims:
hen I travel to the nome of Thinis against one who forgot himself" - pre-
umably meaning he questioned Ankhtifi's authority — "I find it with its watchmen
ii the walls. When 1 hasten to the combat [against them], 'Woe!' says the wretch"
\l AB 26). This policly of using a combination of carrot and stick made Ankhtifi
the predominant military power in southern Egypt.
Ankhtifi's autobiography also reflects the martial braggadocio of the warlords of
i I irst Intermediate Period. He calls himself "Ankhtifi the Brave", and boasts
lis! he is the "vanguard and rearguard" of his men, a "champion who has nc
er". He threatens that, "as for any fool or wretch who sets himself against me, I
i ill give more than he has given" in battle - "my like [in battle] has not been, nor
ill be!" (AEAB 26). At his death sometime around 2120, Ankhtifi had reason to
boast. He ruled the first three nomes directly, and had subjugated, but did not
lirectly rule, the Egyptian nomarchs of the fourth through the eighth nomes.
I lowever, his conquests were to prove ephemeral, for Antef II of Thebes {2118—
,j >(>8 | would eventually conquer his kingdom from Ankhtifi's successor.
The Early Eleventh Dynasty at Thebes {2134-2061}
I »in Hi;-, the Old Kingdom, Thebes (ancient Waset) had been a rather small, sleepy
ro\ MK i.il town, dedicated to its local gods Montu and Amun, and adorned with
ii ill tombs for the regional aristocracy (EAE 3:384-8). As elsewhere in Egypt,
i In* breakdown ol central authority during the early First Intermediate Period led
lo increasing autonomy ol the local elites. According to later Eleventh Dynasty
in iltijucs ,ind liyriids, b\ pci haps the MSds ,i local nomarch Montuhotep
\ >
\ M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
(Mentuhotpe) {2155P-2134} had established semi-independent power at Thebes.
He is remembered as the first "ancestor" and father of the "gods" of the Eleventh
Dynasty. His position, however, was relatively weak, and judging from Ankhtifi's
account of his war with Thebes, discussed on p. 372, his authority was not even
secure in his own province.
Ankhtifi of Hierakonpolis' victory over Thebes made him the dominant power
in southern Egypt in the 2130s and 2120s. None the less, although defeated,
Thebes under Antef I {2134—2118}, son of Montohotep I, remained independent
of Ankhtifi (LA 1:300—1). There is some indication that the Hierakonpolis prin-
cipality in southern Egypt collapsed shortly after the death of Ankhtifi, allowing
Antef I to assert authority over the three southernmost nomes of Upper Egypt,
proclaiming himself "great overlord of Upper Egypt" (OHAE 133).
On the other hand, the full subjugation and conquest of the southernmost
three nomes of Ankhtifi's domain seems to have occurred early in the reign of
Antef Fs brother and successor, Wahankh Antef (Inyotef) II {2118—2068}, during
whose half-century reign Thebes conquered all of southern Egypt. The details and
precise order of Antef II's conquests are not known. In his autobiography he set
Thebes's "northern boundary up to the nome of Wadjet [the tenth nome].. . . 1
conquered Abydos [the eighth Thinite nome] and the whole surrounding region.
I captured all the fortresses of the nome of Wadjet and I made them into the
Gateway of the North", meaning the border with the northern Ninth Dynasty of
Herakleopolis. His conquests were "splendid for the glory of Thebes" (HAE 145
= ARE 1:200). We also have a brief autobiographical inscription by the actual
commander of the army that led this campaign, Djari, "commander of the for-
eigners". He "battled with the House of Akhtoy [Ninth Dynasty] in the west ol
Thinis", where he "raised a storm over the nome . . . [and] made the [new|
boundary at Wadi Hesy" in the tenth nome (AEAB 40—1). As reward for his vic-
tories, he "was promoted among the elder [commanders] because I was fierce on
the day of battle" (JV1KT 13). Antef II appears to have made use of flanking
operations via desert roads to assault his enemies in the Nile valley. A graf-
fito was left by one of his soldiers on the 'Alamat Tal Road in the Western Desert,
recording the march of "the assault troops of the Son of Re, [king] Antef [II]"
which could have given him some element of strategic surprise contributing to his
victory. 4 The struggle for strategic control of the desert routes allowing sur-
prise flank attacks into the Nile valley is also reflected in an inscription ol
commander Tjauti's expedition. When Shamai, the pro-Herakleopolitan governor
of the fifth nome of Coptos sent general Tjauti on an expedition against Thebes to
the south, Tjauti recorded that he was forced to "make this [the 'Alamat Tal
Road] for crossing this desert [with his army], which the ruler of another nomi
[Thebes?] had closed". 5 Overall the ability to move armies, as well as merchant
caravans, overland through desert roads complicated the seemingly straightforward
strategy of defending the borders on the Nile River alone. If an army ton It!
operate several hundred miles along desert roads, large stret< \m-\ ol the Nile would
presumably be vulnerable to surprise attack, rrqiiii inr, tin dispeisal ol garrison
i'i
FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
troops throughout the entire Nile valley rather than concentrating forces solely on
the border regions. « , ■ r
In addition Antef II claims to have subdued the southern Libyan chiefs who
rule the Red [Western Desert] Land" (AEL 1:91), and placed his treasurer Thethi
over the regular tribute required from the Libyan chiefs (ARE 1:202). By the
death of Antef II {2068}, he ruled the southern eight nomes from "Yebu [Aswan,
first nome] to Thims [eighth nome] . . . [receiving] tribute from this entire land,
owing to the fear of him throughout this land" (AEL 1:91).
The wars of Akhtoy (Khety) III {c. 2090-2070?} 6
The martial progress of Thebes and the decline of the Ninth Dynasty at Her-
akleopolis was halted, though only temporarily, by king Akhtoy III. In his famous
Instructions for his son and successor King Menkare (see pp. 377-9), he describes
how he mobilized a strong army, stopped the Theban attack at Thims, recon-
quered the Delta from Eastern nomad invaders, and refortified the frontiers, leaving
the Ninth Dynasty in its strongest military position in decades.
Counterattack from Asyut {c. 2080-2070?}
Some aspects of resistance to Antef II's invasion of Middle Egypt can be found in
the autobiographical inscriptions from the tombs of the nomarchs of Asyut (AEA
23; EAE 1:154-6). From these sources we learn that Antef II's triumphahst
rhetoric masks a more problematic reality. His campaigns into middle Egypt were
strongly resisted by a family of nomarchs of Asyut allied to Akhtoy III {c. 2090-
2070?} of the Ninth Dynasty at Herakleopolis. The exact chronology cannot be
determined - all dates given in this section are quite speculative, and are intended
only to give a rough sense of chronology. It is clear that the territory between
Thims and Asyut (Siut) (nomes 8-12) became a battleground between Antef II of
Thebes and the nomarchs of Asyut, the provincial allies of the Ninth Dynasty.
In a fragmentary inscription Tefibi (Ity-yeb), nomarch of Asyut {c. 2090-
2070?} describes his successful counterattack against the invasion by Antef II.
Tefibi's'father, the nomarch Akhtoy {c. 2110-2090?} - not to be confused with
king Akhtoy III - had laid the foundation for resistance to growing Theban power
in the south. His autobiography emphasizes his efforts at canal construction and
agricultural restoration after the lean years of the late twenty-second century
(ARE 1:188-9). This economic revival also permitted him to restore the strength
of the pro-Ninth Dynasty provincial Egyptian army in Middle Egypt.
Thus, when Antef II's invasion of Middle Egypt occurred, Tefibi was able to
benefit from the military foundation laid by his father. According to Tefibi's auto-
biography "my soldiers fought with the [armies of the] southern nomes [of Antef II]",
describing the advance of Antef II on the "west side" of the Nile to an unnamed
City north of Asyut - presumably beyond Thinis in the eighth nome, which
aeeoR
ting to his own inscription is the maximum extent of Antef s conquests.
375
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
When I [Tefibi] came to the city [that was besieged or recently conquered by
Antef], I overthrew the foe, and drove him as far as the fortress of the port of
the South. [Antef] gave to me the land [which he had previously attempted to
conquer]. (ARE 1:182)
His offensive toward Asyut thus foiled, Antef of Thebes attempted a different
strategy, sailing an armed fleet up the Nile. When word of this second attack
reached Tefibi in Asyut, he mobilized his own fleet and took to the river. Tefibi's
autobiography describes a naval victory on the Nile - which will be discussed on
pp. 453-5 - and concludes with a discussion of restoring order in Egypt.
When a man did well, I promoted [him] to the head of my soldiers The land
was under the fear of my soldiers; no [enemy from the] highland [desert sur-
rounding the Nile valley] was free from the fear [of my soldiers]. (ARE 1:183)
Tefibi's great victory may also be remembered in the Instructions of Akhtoy III
(discussed on pp. 377-9), although with a different emphasis on who was respon-
sible for the victory. "I [claims King Akhtoy III] went to Thinis on the southern
border; like a thunderstorm I seized [Thinis from the king of Thebes]; [my pre-
decessor] King Meriibre, the justified, had not done this" (TS 222). This last
phrase is presumably an allusion to the earlier sequence of victories of Antef II of
Thebes before the counterattack by the nomarch Tefibi and Akhtoy III. During
this campaign there was apparently the destruction or desecration of a necropolis -
perhaps the famous mortuary complex of Abydos. A battle may actually have taken
place there, for Akhtoy 's Instructions mentions this battle as fulfilling a prophecy
that "Egypt will fight in the necropolis, destroying tomb-chambers in a destruc-
tion of deeds" (TS 221). Akhtoy, however, refused to take personal responsibility
for the sacrilege: "a vile deed happened in my time: the nome of Thinis was
destroyed. It happened, but not as my action, and I knew of it only after it was
done" (TS 225). He instructs his son to "destroy not the [sacred and funerary |
monuments of another" (TS 222).
Following this victory, there seems to have a temporary truce between Thebes
and the Ninth dynasty, bringing peace to Middle Egypt {c. 2070-2060?}, and the
boundary was set at the northern border of the eighth nome. Near the end of his
reign, king Akhtoy told his son Merikare "there is now no enemy on youi
borders All is now well for you with the Southern Region [of Thebes), which
comes to you bearing produce, bearing tribute.. . . to you comes granite [from the
south] unhindered." Merikare is therefore instructed "to be kind to those who
yield to you" and "renew the treaties" with Thebes (TS 222). None the less. he
should be prepared for war: "Arm your border against the South [kingdom ol
Thebes] — they are bowmen who take up the war belt!" (TS 224). This w.r
excellent advice, for within two decades after the death of Akhtoy III, Thebes
renewed the offensive {2047} under the great warlord Montuhotep I, who would
destroy the Ninth Dynasty and conquer all Egypt.
According to Tefibi's son and successor Akhtoy (Khety) {c. 2070-2050?} (agaii
not to be confused with king Akhtoy III), "there was no one fighting, nor am
shooting an arrow" during his administration at Asyut (ARE 1:187). He none th<
less maintained a strong army in the face of possible renewal of the Theban threat
"I am one strong of bow, mighty with his army, much feared by his neighbors,
formed a troop of spearmen and a troop of bowmen, the best Thousand of Uppe:
Egypt. I have a fine fleet" (AEAB 28-9). The nomarch Akhtoy served Merikare
son of king Akhtoy III, the last (or next to last) king of the Ninth Dynasty a
Herakleopolis, who claims to have "repelled the evil-doer" Antef III and "over-
thrown the rebels" of Thebes in alliance with Tefibi and Akhtoy of Asyut (ART
1:184-5). The victories of the Asyut nomarchs in Middle Egypt were secured by c
grand river campaign through Middle Egypt led by king Merikare, who sailed hi*
fleet to Shashotpe (Shutb), near Asyut, intimidating and stalemating Thebar
aggression for a time (ARE 1:185-6 = MKT 23).
"Akhtoy Ill's Instructions for his Son Merikare" 7
One of the most intriguing and potentially useful texts of the First Intermediate
Period purports to be the political and military instructions of king Akhtoy III {c.
2090-2070?} of the Herakleopolitan Ninth Dynasty to his son and successoi
Merikare {c. 2070-2050?}, the last (or next to last) king of the line. Unfortu-
nately, both the authorship and the date of this text is controversial. Wendy P^aver.
for example, argues that "the text may be pseudepigraphical, but it was most
probably composed in the court of Khety [Akhtoy] III during the tenth dynasty
(EAE 2:169)." 8 R. Parkinson, on the other hand, believes the text "is not con-
temporaneous with the Heracleopolitan [Ninth-Tenth] Dynasty" but should "be
Hated to late in the Middle Kingdom" (TS 212). Given the paucity and ambiguity
of the data, it is impossible to resolve this question with certainty. For this discus-
sion I will assume the text originated in the court of the late Ninth-Tenth
I )ynasty, and that it reflects the historical realities of that period.
At the very least the Instructions for Merikare represent Egyptian views on dealing
with periods of internal turmoil and military crisis such as the First Intermediate
IVriod. As such, it is an excellent reflection of the practical military policies of
i lie lent Egypt, even if it cannot be linked to the specific historical situation in the
life First Intermediate Period. The advice given in the Instructions is both practical
■ ml ideological - how to raise armies and win battles, as well as how to gain the
Bpport of the gods. Akhtoy III gives a great deal of didactic military advice to his son,
teilecting the standard military policies and practices of ancient Egypt. Although
the work by China's great military theorist Sun Tzu The Art of War is frequently
I' « ribed as the earliest surviving military manual, 9 Akhtoy s Instructions, written
fifteen hundred years earlier, contains sufficient military advice to consider it an
m haii military manual, perhaps the first surviving military handbook in history.
In the I list Intel m edi ale IVriod the king was dependent on the support ol the
i it -I n.ii i lis "(in 1 1 i ill. i n niii' 1 1 - m:'[ whose great ones [tinman hs| ate gi eat
177
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
The king who is the lord of an entourage [of nomarchs] is strong" (TS 219)
Nomarchs and other powerful officials must be cultivated to insure their alio
giance. "If you encounter a mighty man who is the master of a town [i.e. a
nomarch], and is the lord of a clan, care for him" (TS 216-17). Diplomatic skills
are crucial for the king. "Be skillful with words, and you will be victorious. The
strong arm of the king is his tongue. Words are stronger than any weapons" (TS 218)
The power of the nomarchs is also reflected in the fact that, for Akhtoy, a majoi
concern is the ever-present danger of rebellion. For such there should be no
mercy: "Do not be lenient to [the rebel]! You should kill those who owe him
allegiance.. . . Punish the people who are conspiring.. . . Drive him away! Kill Ins
children! Erase his name!" (TS 216-17). At the same time, the king must "beware
of punishing wrongly" (TS 220).
Proper recruitment and pay of troops is emphasized, for "soldiers are good foi
their lord" (TS 221).
Raise your Youth [shwt], so that the [royal] Residence will love you! Make your
supporters plentiful among the Veterans [s'gyu/]! Look, your town is full
new growth [of the next generation ready for military recruiting]. These
twenty years, the Youth has been happy, following its heart; and the Veterans arc-
now going forth once again; the recruits are recruited to it [the army]. ... On
my accession I raised up troops from them. So make your great ones [nobles |
great! Advance your fighters! Increase the Youth of your following, equipped with
amounts [of wealth], established with fields, and endowed with cattle! (TS 220-1).
The precise meaning of this passage is uncertain, but the general picture is fairly
clear. The "Youth" or "Young Men" seem to be a military or paramilitary group
recruited from the populace. It is possible that they are the town militia, but also
possible that they are professional soldiers. Throughout the ancient Near East the
term "Young Men" commonly refered to men in their late teens and twenties at
the prime age for military service. These Young Men are contrasted with tin
Veterans, an older, more experienced class of soldier. It is possible that these are
simply generic terms for young and old people, but they may reflect technical
categories, rather like the Greek and Roman practice of categorizing soldiers
according to age groups. 10 The phrase "twenty years" may refer either to the
length of military service, or the length of Akhtoy s reign during which his policies
were followed. Akhtoy emphasizes not only the importance of continually
recruiting soldiers into the two classes of troops, but also of ensuring their happi-
ness and loyalty by paying them well in moveable wealth, agricultural fields, and
domesticated animals. These types of payment are reflected in the autobiographies
of soldiers as well. The importance of a fortified and garrisoned frontier is
emphasized in the Instructions: "Strengthen your borders and your [ frontier |
patrols! . . . Protect your border! Secure your fortresses!" (TS 219, 221).
Akhtoy also gives some very specific military advice foi dealing with tin
nomadic Easterners:
178
FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
But now, these things are said about the barbarian [Eastern] bowmen: the vile
Easterner is wretched because of the place where he is - lacking in water,
barren of trees, whose roads are painful because of the mountains. He has
never settled in any one place, lack of food makes him wander about on foot!
He has been fighting since the [mythical] Time of Horus [at the beginning of
the world]. He cannot conquer; he cannot be conquered. He does not
announce the day of battle, but sneaks about like a gang of thieves.. „ . Do not
worry about him! The Easterner is a crocodile on its riverbank that can snatch
[his victim] from a lonely road but cannot take from the quay of a populous
town. (TS 223-4 = ECI 67 = AEL 1:103-4)
These ideas are remarkably similar to the broader views of sedentary peoples
ftbout their nomadic enemies. The nomads are described as destitute raiders from
i he wilderness, who make sneak attacks and plunder, before fleeing back into the
desert. Although they can raid and plunder, they are not viewed as posing a serious
military threat to security.
As is normal in Egyptian warfare, religion played a crucial role in military pol-
u y. The gods are in control, and ultimately determine military success or failure:
( Jod will impose his doom with blood" (TS 220). Disaster will strike anyone
who goes against God" (TS 222). Because of this, the gods must be placated with
proper cultic piety. "Make many monuments for God.... Make the [sacrificial]
offering tables [in the temples] flourish" (TS 221). Royal patronage of the proper
religious rites will insure the gods' blessings. "Act for God - with great offerings
for a flourishing altar, and with inscriptions [in temples] - and he will act for you"
i IS 226). Opposing the king was equivalent to opposing the gods: Indeed, "to
i -volt against [the king] is to attack [the gods of] heaven" (TS 225). Likewise,
( Jod will attack someone who rebels against the temples" (TS 224).
Magical practices, such as Execration Texts, were also "a weapon" against ene-
mies (TS 226). Prophecy and divination could play a key role in military decision-
making. Akhtoy refers to one such prophecy: "The Youth will attack the Youth
| in civil war] just as the ancestors foretold it. Egypt will fight in the necropolis,
ti stroying tomb-chambers" (TS 221). It was also generally believed that divina-
ioi) and oracles revealed the will of the gods and could therefore influence mili-
i.uy policies and practices. Referring to his campaign against Thinis, Akhtoy
drsrribcs the fatalistic belief in the inevitable fulfillment of prophecy: "You [my
"ii Merikare] know what the [temple prophets at the royal] residence foretold it.
As such things happen, these happened. Those things could not go otherwise,
ven as they [the prophets] said it" (TS 22).
Akhtoy Ill's reconquest of the Delta {c. 20757}
Mthongh we have no details or archaeological confirmation (OHAE 139) it
appears that, (.hiring the decline of royal power under the Ninth Dynasty, the delta was
i aided ,\\\A pai i u!l\ < >< < upied by both I ibyan and Eastern nomads -j c. 2125—2075?}.
\ '•
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
FIRST INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
After securing the southern frontier with Thebes, Akhtoy's "heart grievi
of the [situation in the] Delta" (TS 222), and he undertook two cam]
restore Egyptian authority there. They first focused on the western deli
Hetshenu to Sembaqa, and south to Two-Fish Channel [a south-western I
the Nile], I pacified the entire West as far as the sand-dunes of the [coasl
(AEL 1:103 = TS 222). This may have been a reference to the restoration
authority over recalcitrant nomarchs of the western delta, but could also i
punitive expeditions against Libyan nomads who had been raiding or mi.
the delta.
The reconquest of the Libyans in the western delta was followed by an ofl
in the east against Sinai and Canaanite nomads who had penetrated thai I
Thereafter, Akhtoy recaptured some of the Delta cities the nomads had o< i
These [barbarian nomad] bowmen were [like] a walled fortress, who
tifications I breached, [and] which I had isolated [as in a siege]! I ha\<
the [Egyptian army of the] Delta attack them, I have enslaved their undi
and taken away their cattle, to horrify the Easterners who are enemii
Egypt. (TS 223-4 = AEL 1:104)
The eastern nomad threat, however, was not completely eliminated. Akli
describes his efforts to restore Egyptian power in the delta:
The [land of the delta] which [the eastern nomads] had destroyed is mat It i
nomes; every great town is refounded; what one man ruled now belonv
ten [nomarchs loyal to the king] . . . The taxes of the Delta belong to yon |
son and successor]. Look, the border marker [of Egypt] which I have in.nl
the East is driven in, from Hebenu [in Middle Egypt] to the Ways of I Im
[roads leaving eastward from Egypt from Sile in the north-east delta], |l ■■
is] founded with townspeople, full of people, the best of the whole lam I
beat back attacks on them [from the Canaanite and nomad raiders]. (TS '
His defensive preparations are further emphasized. The region of the apei
the delta was said to be the "defense against foreigners. Its walls and tighten
many, whose commoners know how to take up weapons" - probably an allu i
to a regional militia. The area of Memphis had "ten thousand men [in the arm
commoners and freemen who are without labor duty [because of their niiln.n
service].... its borders are firm, its strongholds are mighty" (TS 224). Tin
possibly a reference to a form of tax exemption in return for military service, bin
whatever the exact meaning, it is clear that Akhtoy was engaged in raising trooj
and fortifications for the defense of his delta conquests.
If Akhtoy Ill's Instructions are to be believed — and they may be pseudepi
graphical hyperbole - Akhtoy in many ways prepared the paih for the imifu at ion
of Egypt by reuniting the delta with Middle Egypt. The fruit of his victory, how
ever, would be harvested by Montuhotep of Thebes, the fouiulei o1 die MnKlI.
m
i as will be discussed in Chapter Sixteen. Additional characteristics of the
\ stem of the First Intermediate Period will be discussed along with those
1 n Idle Kingdom in Chapter Seventeen.
lii and Nubian mercenaries in the First Intermediate Period
been observed that "the periods of [northern] Nubia's greatest prosperity
■ nally those of Egypt's greatest weakness" (AAA, 47). This was certainly
the First Intermediate Period, when Nubia witnessed increasing popula-
kd prosperity as attested by the "C-group" archaeological finds (EAE 258—
1 n ing most of the First Intermediate Period there are no records of conflict
the Nubian frontier. Although Nubian mercenaries had served in Egyptian
i torn at least the Sixth Dynasty of the Old Kingdom, during the First
mate Period the use of Nubian mercenaries expanded rapidly throughout
mi and middle Egypt. 11 Indeed, it is likely that the ongoing civil wars in
lining the First Intermediate Period increased the demand for Nubian
1 1 ii ies. The Thebans may have ultimately emerged victorious from their war
northern Egypt in part because they had ready access to the Nubian mer-
it iarket, thereby bolstering their military strength relative to the north's.
mm mercenaries intermarried with Egyptian women during this period; a
H .ii v stele from Gebelein shows Nenu, a tall Nubian mercenary, holding his
nil his Egyptian wife by his side (OHAE 129).
his biography, Qedes, a common soldier from Gebelein, boasts of his mili-
prowess, claiming to be "the foremost [soldier] of his whole troop", and that
hi passed this whole town in swiftness - its Nubians and its Upper Egyptians"
I 1:90). This text reflects both the obvious fact that soldiers were selected for
physical prowess, and that Nubian mercenaries made up a significant portion
the .ii inies of southern Egypt. Qedes's biography also makes it clear that a
unmon man could become relatively wealthy through mercenary service in the
I a in i army. During his military career, Qedes "acquired oxen and goats. I
ijuired granaries of Upper Egyptian barley I acquired a title to a great field.
ide .i boat of 30 cubits [12 meters] and a small boat."
\X\
CHAPTER SIXTEEN
Middle Kingdom Egypt
{2061-1786}
The Middle Kingdom 1 was a three-centuries-long period of essential unity in
Egypt and concomitant international military power. Unfortunately, the Middle
Kingdom "remains one of the most enigmatic periods in the sphere of foreign
relations" which has "bequeathed us precious little evidence" on military matter
(ECI 70). None the less, there are sufficient sources with enough detail to allow u:
to reconstruct the broad outline of military history.
The Eleventh Dynasty {2061-1998} 2
From a military perspective, the reunification of Egypt and the beginning of tin-
Middle Kingdom was the work of the great Theban warlord Montuhotep I
{2061-2010}, In subsequent Egyptian history his great military achievements
caused him to be remembered — along with Narmer/Menes and Ahmose of the
New Kingdom - as one of the three unifiers of Egypt (EAE 2:437; MKT 31).
Montuhotep (Mentuhotep; Mentuhotpe) I {2061-201 1} 3
As has been discussed on pp. 373—7, the foundations for Montuhotep Is reunih
cation of Egypt were laid by both his grandfather, Antef II of Thebes, and his
grandfather's rival, Akhtoy III of Herakleopolis. The stalemate between these two
kings that had developed in Middle Egypt during the 2060s seems to have con
tinued during the first decade-and-a-half of the reign of Montuhotep I {2061
2048}, when he was essentially the regional king of southern Egypt. Although the
chronology is uncertain, it appears that during these years, however, he undertook
an invasion of Nubia.
Nubian campaigns of Montuhotep I {c. 2050?} (CI/ 2:485-8; AAA 48-9)
At an unknown date Montuhotep personally led a major expedition into Nubia
which reached Buhen at the Second Cataract; it m;iy have occurred during the
fourteen years of his reign that preceded his reimilu .iiiou of I "\pi [2(H>1 ?<MS|
The two royal inscriptions, which will he tutthei dismissed lu-low, mention
>82
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
nslaving the Nubians . . . [of the] Medjay and Wawat [tribes]", indicating that
■ arfare against Nubia was part of the royal agenda (Cl/2:480-2 = MKT 24, 28).
I he el-Deir inscription of Montuhotep I, though fragmentary, provides a few
i> (ails about this Nubian campaign:
. . . [from] Wawat [in Nubia] and the Oasis ... I drove out the troublemakers
in them. I annexed them to Upper Egypt. There is no [Egyptian] king whom
they [the Nubians] served in his time [i.e. in the First Intermediate Period
before Montuhotep] . . . My wrath [against the enemies of Egypt] was
slaked . . . [by the victories of] the strong troops of my recruiting, (ICN 113)
I .iter in the inscription he recounts: "[as for] Wawat [Nubia] and the Oasis [of
! liarga?]. 1 annexed them to Upper Egypt. I drove out the rebellious [enemy]"
U N 1 14). To maintain his control of Nubia he "placed reinforcements in Elephantine
\swan]" (ICN 114), under the command of an official, Akhtoy, who left a
.umber of inscriptions in the region (Cl/2:480). In the year 39 {2022}, Mon-
■uhotep again visited the borders of Nubia, commemorating his reunification of
Egypt and other triumphs by celebrating a great sed-festival (Cl/2:479-80; MKT
i 12). Two years later, in year 41 {2020}, the "triumphant" commander Akhtoy
took ships to Wawat [in Nubia]" (ARE 1:206-7); the details of this expedition
lie not known; it may have been largely a trading operation. At the least Akhtoy 's
et would have reinforced the nominal submission of northern Nubia. None the
is, the Nubian frontier was by no means permanently subjugated; as described on
l ■ 397-9, later Egyptian kings were required to undertake regular Nubian campaigns.
( )ne important outgrowth of Montuhotep 's relationship with Nubia was the
nlistment of Nubian warriors to strengthen his army in its wars against the rival
i nth Dynasty at Herakleopolis. 4 We have a remarkable autobiographical
inscription by one of these Nubian mercenaries, Tjehemau, who served in Mon-
ihotep's army and described his participation in these campaigns, unfortunately
iihout giving a precise chronology. Both Tjehemau and his son enlisted in the
vptian army at the time of Montuhotep 's Nubian campaigns, subsequently ser-
\ ing in the reunification of Egypt and the invasion of Canaan. His autobiography,
i i orded in two inscriptions from Abisko, near Aswan, is the best account of the
I .ueer of a Nubian mercenary.
Inscription which Tjehemau made. Year of smiting the foreign land of the
south: I began to fight [as a mercenary for the Egyptians] in the reign of
Nebhepetre [Montuhotep I] in the army, when it [the Egyptian army] went
south to Buhen. My son went down with me towards the king [to offer our
service .is mercenaries]. He [the king] traversed the entire land, for he planned
to exterminate the A'amu ofDjaty [in southern Wawat] . (ITM 11-20)
I lere wc In id Montuhotep 1 personally commanding one of his Nubian expe-
i In it M is V, the 1:'.\ pi i.mis s.uled south, Tjehemau and Ins son and presumably
\H\
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
other Nubians — were recruited to serve as mercenaries to fight those Nubian
who were still hostile to Egypt. As Montuhotep's campaign continued, Tjehemau
described the decisive battle.
When they [the rival Egyptian and hostile Nubian armies] approached [i
give battle, the Egyptian regiments from] Thebes [were put to] flight [by the
hostile Nubians]. It was the [pro-Egyptian] Nubian [mercenaries serving
Montuhotep] who brought about the rally [against the hostile Nubians]. Tin -n
he [king Montuhotep] overthrew [the hostile] Djaty [Nubian tribe]. I Ic
[Montuhotep] raised sail in sailing southwards to the south [into Nubia] as .1
result of raising the arm against the [enemy] ruler of the [Nubian] lands . .
pleasing the king as when were surpassed those who fled among the people
(ITM 11-20)
Even if Tjehemau 's ethnic pride in the Nubian mercenary regiment perhaps led him
to exaggerate the role of his fellow Nubian mercenaries in the battle, none the less the
martial qualities of the Nubians were highly - and, based upon this battle, rightly
regarded by the Egyptians. On the other hand, it is also important to note that
Tjehemau feels no compunction about fighting in the service of the Egyptian king
against other Nubian tribes. This reflects an important factor influencing the success
of the Egyptian domination in Nubia. Tjehemau 's loyalty, and that of most Nubians,
was to his own specific tribe of Nubians, rather than an amorphous trans-tribal
"Nubian people" as a whole. Most Nubians often viewed other Nubian tribes .1
rivals and enemies, rather than potential allies against Egypt. This tribal disunity was
a major factor contributing to the eventual Egyptian subjugation of Nubia, a
discussed on pp. 397—9. After contributing to Montuhotep's victory in Nubia
Tjehemau continued in Montuhotep's service in his campaigns of unification
Egypt.
Montuhotep's unification of Egypt {2047-2035?}
Montuhotep's fourteenth year {2047} was "the year when Thinis rebelled" (ITM
25), apparently with the support of the Ninth Dynasty of Herakleopolis. In
response Montuhotep mobilized his army; his el-Deir inscription provides a ran
glimpse of the pre- and post-battle celebrations of the Egyptian army. Before thi
campaign the troops were marshaled for ritualized war speeches and chants thai
inaugurated the campaign.
The king's army addresses him [as they prepare to go into battle]: "... it is In
thy hand [O King] . . . [that we triumph]"
The King addresses his army: "... I come and destroy |niy eneniies|. W<
shall go downstream [north] when we have crushed the foreign lands . . . I will
give you full title to it [lands captured from the northern kingdom], [and]
everything which you desire |in phmdrr|." <U N I l.M
\s\
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
The king's emphasis on the material rewards of victory highlights the role of
i'iunder as a motivating force for Egyptian armies. After the campaign, the vic-
arious army is again marshaled for a victory triumph, with more ritualized vic-
<ry speeches:
And when [the army] had landed in health [after their victory] ... the King's
army addresses him: ". . . the chiefs of the foreign lands come to thee bow-
ing, kissing every limb of yours. Your heart in your body reposes. Upper
Egypt and the southern lands [of Nubia] ... the [foreign] bowmen
[submit] ..."
[The King speaks:] "My ancestors in the necropolis [of Thebes near where
the army is marshaled in triumph], at the place where the gods are, they see
this thing. (ICN 112)
Later, however, in proper Egyptian fashion, the king piously attributes his vic-
ories to the blessings of the gods:
It was the god . . . who caused Upper Egypt to be broad for me [i.e. easy to traverse
and conquer]. I did this while I was King.. . . I caused the Two Lands to come
to it [in unification] . . . Wawat [in Nubia] and the [Kharga?] Oasis. I annexed
them to Upper Egypt. I drove out the rebellious [enemies] . . . (ICN 114)
We have some further details of Montuhotep's campaign of reunification.
lontuhotep first subdued the rebellious nome of Thinis, driving off their allies
■in Herakleopolis who may have instigated the rebellion. These initial victories
ncouraged him to continue his march further northward, where some of the
•marchs in middle Egypt apparently shifted allegiance, wisely throwing in their
btS with rising Thebes. Their descendants were thus able to retain their positions
nomarchs under the Montuhotep and his successors in the Eleventh Dynasty
1 VL 144). Other recalcitrant nomarchs, however, were eventually replaced with
tUSted ministers, strengthening Montuhotep's direct control over middle Egypt
< 1/2:483).
I he autobiography of the redoubtable Nubian mercenary Tjehemau, now
"•1 noted to officer status, provides an eyewitness account of Montuhotep's con-
quests from the perspective of an officer on the front battle lines.
Then, | after his Nubian campaign, Montuhotep sailed northward] ... to
northern Egypt to kill [the rival king of the Ninth Dynasty] ... Going
forth . . . against the Lake of Sobek [Faiyum] ... I overthrew the [enemy on
the| sandbank . . . [and] the river, to lead the sand-dwellers [nomad mercen-
aries] and [the Nubian mercenaries of] Wawat ... to put to flight the man
[kmg| oi the North. Then it [the northern kingdom of Herakleopolis] mus-
teioi us \\,n Heel and it traversed a!! its nomes of the entire [northern) land to
uVtrn.l itsell (MM M Ml)
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
The details of the next phase of the campaign are not clear. It seems that the
army of the Ninth Dynasty won some initial victories and invaded Montuhotep s
domain of Thebes. In defense of Thebes, Tjehemau and his Egyptian-Nubian
force was required to make an amphibious assault from their boats against an
enemy who was marshaled on the banks of the river.
Tjehemau sailed north like a lion in the following of the king [Montuhotep | ,
together with this, his army [of Nubian mercenaries], which he had brought.
He tasted of the fighting, his arm being strong due to what he did to the-
north. I went down to the district of Thebes. I found [the enemy] standing on
the riverbank. They planned fighting. The opposition fell [before our attack],
fleeing because of me ... in the district of Thebes. Then I came and was at
peace together with its people, for I was strong against [their enemies] ... A
herdsman of account of driving off [the enemies'] cattle [as plunder] - it is [,
Tjehemau the bold! Extend the arm to me, ye who depart. The lord Tjehe
mau says: Live, prosper, be healthy! (ITM 11-20)
After this victory Montuhotep Is forces advanced on Herakleopolis, where the
crumbling resistance of the Ninth Dynasty was shattered by the death of kin; 1 ,
Merikare in unknown circumstances — his tomb is at Memphis, indicating that In
successor was still in power long enough to bury him. This successor apparently
ascended the throne and ruled for only a few months, for the capital Herakleopolis
was soon captured {2040} and the Ninth Dynasty ended. Funerary monuments at
Herakleopolis were ritually hacked to pieces by the conquerors (OHAE 145),
perhaps in revenge for the earlier desecration of the tombs of Abydos that had
occurred in the days of Akhtoy III (TS 221, 225). Thereafter Montuhotep I con
tinned the conquest of the delta, completing his subjugation of the Nile Valley
Tjehemau mentions sailing through "all the nomes of the entire land ... in the
north, against the king of Lower Egypt [Merikare of Herakleopolis] and his army"
(C1/2-.482).
The grim reality of warfare during Montuhotep I's reconquests is illustrated by
the "Tomb of the Warriors" at Deir el-Bahri in Middle Egypt, where the partially
preserved bodies of sixty warriors of Montuhotep I were discovered. All had been
killed in Montuhotep 's wars of unification, with war wounds preserved for foren
sic analysis. The exact circumstance of their deaths and burials is not known, but it
is generally assumed that they died during a siege in some heroic and decisive
circumstances that merited special burial honors, perhaps in the final assault on
Herakleopolis itself (SSN, discussed on pp. 438-40).
Foreign campaigns of Montuhotep I {c. 2035-2022?}
I he i mqnesi oi the Nile Valley did not end Monl uhotcp's military activities
traditional desert enemies of Hgypt the bedouins ol Sinai and the I ibyans ol tin
Western Deserl remained recalcitrant. Alt In nii'li umiii iln r\.n t i hi minima
cannot be determined, the conqueror undertook expeditions against the Sinai,
Canaan, Libyans in the Western Desert, the western Oases, and Nubia. The evi-
dence for these campaigns, though vague and fragmentary, points to an overall
policy of subduing any possible enemy surrounding Egypt. However, permanent
Egyptian occupation outside the Nile Valley remained flimsy at this time.
Two royal inscriptions speak rather generically of Montuhotep 's foreign cam-
paigns. The Dendera chapel inscription describes "clubbing the eastern lands,
# striking down the hill-countries, trampling the deserts, enslaving the Nubians . . .
| of the] Medjay and Wawat [tribes], the Libyans and the [Easterners], by [the
power of the war god] Horus" (0/2:480; PSE Figure 25). Inscriptions from a
temple at Gebelein also celebrate the reunification and subsequent campaigns. The
first shows the kings smiting a Libyan called "Hedj-wawesh, Prince of Libya" (FP
177; PSE Figure 23). The second relief shows Montuhotep smiting four cowering
prisoners: an Egyptian - representing his conquest of northern Egypt - as well as a
Nubian, a Canaanite, and a Libyan (PSE Figure 24). The king is described as
'conquering the Chiefs of the Two Lands, the South and the North [of Egypt],
|and] the foreigners and the two Nile banks [east and west], the Nine Bows and
both Egypts" (MKT 24 = ARE 1:204-5 = Cl/2:482). From these two inscrip-
tions (NEA 36) we see royal propaganda claiming to have not only reunified
Egypt, but defeated all of Egypt's traditional foreign enemies.
Montuhotep 's el-Deir inscription describes the defeat of the foreigners,
and their subsequent ritual acts of submission and oath of loyalty taken to the
I nig.
His [the king's] flames fell among the foreign lands . , . the foreign lands were
hastening [to fight] ... the hinterlands were blocked and the Qedem lands
were closed [after the Egyptian victory]; . . . the Easterners came bowing head
[in submission] to the banks of the sea. I went downstream to the estate of
Khss-sezt of the Rule of the Two Lands.. . . the people of the foreign lands
came with arm bent [in submission]. They made the Oath of the God,
everyone [of the defeated foreign enemies] therein upon his head, and the
subjugated man therein was put to work [as forced laborers for Egypt].
(ICN 113)
c )ther contemporary inscriptions confirm that this is not mere royal brag-
ultu lo. The Western Desert posed two threats: Egyptian fugitives from the Ninth
I >\ nasty and Libyan nomads. Some officials and leaders from the collapsing Ninth
I tynasty at I lerakleopolis fled into the Western Desert, taking last refuge in one or
more ol the oases there. One of Montuhotep 's commanders named Kay was sent
^ the oases, where he defeated and captured the fugitives, bringing them back to
1 i-vpi (or punishment. The oases were apparently permanently occupied, since
they were latei administered for Montuhotep by Henenu (Cl/2:482-3). The
i-tloits to rapture the last supporters of the Ninth Dynasty may have been
hmed with the aforementioned punitive raid against tin- Libyans in which
is '
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
"Hedj-wawesh, Prince of Libya" was captured (MKT 24). Montuhotep's hege-
mony over the Eastern and Western deserts is confirmed by a funerary inscription
of an official of the Coptos nome, whose name is lost. His titles included "Over-
seer of All Hunters of the West and East", indicating responsibility for the nomads
of those deserts (ICN 107-8).
Three pieces of evidence describe Montuhotep's campaigns through the Sinai
and into Canaan (ECI 69-70). The Deir el-Ballas inscription gives vague refer-
ence to military activity in the "Eastern lands" (ECI 69). More detail is provided
in the account of an expedition to the "mineral country" in the Sinai -
undoubtedly meaning the mines at Wadi Maghara - by an official named
Akhtoy. His goal was to re-establish Egyptian mines and quarries that apparently
had become largely inactive since the end of the Old Kingdom. Akhtoy reported:
"I punished the Eastern [nomads] in their land. It was the fear of the king that
spread respect for me and his influence that spread terror of me, so that those
countries in which I went [in the Sinai] cried out 'Hail! Hail!' to his might" (MKT
35). One suspects that at least some of the nomads' salutations were less than
sincere.
At some point thereafter further expeditions were apparently taken to the urban
areas of southern Palestine; the tomb of general Antef at Thebes depicts an
Egyptian army assaulting what is clearly a Canaanite city (EWW 38; NEA Figure 3).
No text accompanies the mural, but it seems to depict a major siege. Addition. 1 1
details from this scene concerning siegecraft will be discussed on pp. 447—51. The
Nubian mercenary commander Tjehemau may have participated in this campaign;
in the murals of Antef 's tomb Nubian archers are shown along with the Egyptian
infantry assaulting the Canaanite fortress. 5
By the end of his reign in 2011, Montuthotep I had reunited Egypt, subdiu d
the Nubians, overcome the Libyan nomads and captured the oasis, defeated the
eastern nomads, and campaigned in Canaan. His military victories represent i
brilliant beginning to the military predominance of Egypt during the reigns of hi
successors.
Montuhotep II {2011-2000} 6
The long and successful reign of Montuhotep I meant that his son, Montuhotq
II, came to the throne at an advanced age and ruled for only a decade. The milit.n
success of his father on all fronts also meant that Montuhotep II faced no seriou
military threat, and only few recorded military activities survive from his reiei
Instead we find a reign focusing on building, art, and trade.
Montuhotep I's earlier punitive expeditions against the Easterners of Sinn
Canaan, despite their nominal submission, were apparently insufficient to cum
quell their military ardor. Montuhotep Us approach to the military problem of th
Canaanite frontier focused on expanding an elaborate fortification system >>
borders of the eastern delta to prevent further incursions the "(Ire.it Will
mentality which in military history has only worked in coiijimt tiou with a stum
Z m 77^ " ^l ° f regUkr PUnitlVC ex P editlons beyond the wall. The details of
Middle Kingdom fortifications win be discussed on pp. 440-5.
Henenu's expedition to Punt {2004} 7
The most notable military mission during the reign of Montuhoteo II is Henenu's
expedition to Punt - the south-west coast of the Red Sea - which is especially
interesting for its detailed description of logistics. Building on the military vic-
tories of his father, Montuhotep II was able to reopen the Red Sea maritime trade
to Punt sending his important minister Henenu, governor of southern Egypt as
leader of the expedition. When he had successfully returned from Punt Henenu
arved an inscription describing his expedition on a rock face in Wadi Hamma-
tnat. The initial part of the inscription contains the self-adulation so typical of
I gyptian autobiography, but the second half provides a detailed description of his
.pcdition to Punt, under orders to return with myrrh, a precious incense.
I set out from Coptos [in the fifth nome] on the way his majesty commanded
me with me being an army of Upper Egypt from the m?W-garrisons of the
Theban nome, from Imyotru to Shabet. All royal offices from town and
country were assembled and followed me, and four companies of scouts U3-
pw] cleared the way before me, smiting any [nomads] who rebelled against
<he king. Hunters, natives of the deserts, were employed as bodyguards
Setting out with an army of 3000 men, I made the road into a river, the desert into
a held border. For I gave a water skin and a bread bag, with two Js-measures
of water and twenty loaves, to every one of [the 3000 men in the expedition]
every day. Donkeys were laden with sandals; when a foot became unshod
.nother sandal was ready. I also made twelve wells on the valley floor and two
wells in Idahet, one measuring twenty cubits, the other thirty. I made another
m Yaheteb of 10 by 10 cubits at all water levels. Then I reached the sea and
then I built this fleet. I loaded it with everything when I made for it a great
sacrifice of cattle and goats. When I had returned from the sea I had done
J» hat his majesty had commanded me, bringing for him all kinds of gifts that I
had found on the shores of god's land [Punt].. . . Never had the like been done
l-v any King's Friend since the [mythical] time of the god. (AEAB 53-4)
rhe extensive logistical and scouting preparations described in this account
onstrate why Egyptian armies were able to operate successfully hundreds of
* hom their military bases m Egypt. Nomads were hired - or perhaps bribed -
rve as scouts and guides. Four companies of scouts - perhaps one vanguard
"■■"W'.'rd and one on each flank - kept the army safe from ambush. Donkeys
gun.cd tor supply transport, including food, water, and spare sandals
P-vsumably od.er equipment. Although generally not mentioned in the sour-
" i ". ! ' 1 "'"-' 1 I' 1 - ",g undoubtedly lay behind all successful foreign
iss
|M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Montuhotep III {2000-1998}
Major military activities are not recorded in this short and poorly document vi\
reign. One mining expedition was dispatched to the Wadi el-Hudy amethv
mines under Shed-ptah, "commander of the foreign troops". Another was sent
Wadi Hammamat, possibly to establish some water stations on the desert routes I
the quarries. It was commanded by Se'onkh, "the general responsible for i
[desert] highlands" who, like Henenu, equipped his men, numbering only (
adults, with "water skins, baskets, bread, beer and every fresh vegetable ol I
South" (ARE 217 = ECI 72), again emphasizing the logistical basis of Egypt in
expeditions.
The most notable mission, however, occurred in 1999 and was commanded I
the vizier Amenemhet, who led an expedition to the quarries in Wadi Hamni
mat, reaching the port of Mersa Gawasis that was destined to become the priiu ipj
Pved Sea port in future years. 8 His expedition, said to have numbered "10,000 mi
from the southern nomes of Upper Egypt, and from the garrisons of Thebes", \\.»
sent to "bring a precious block of the pure stone of this mountain" for the king
sarcophagus. The expedition included "miners, artificers, quarrymen, artist
draughtsmen, stonecutters, and gold-workers". Three thousand sailors later trail
ported the huge block down the Nile to the delta. Amenemhet emphasized h
personal administrative skill, noting that not a man nor animal perished on tin
expedition — a not uncommon claim in autobiographies from this period, iniph
ing divine blessing on the journey. It is important to note that Amenemhet's abiln
to mobilize, supply, and command 10,000 men in the Eastern Desert probabh
contributed to his later victory in the civil war that followed the death of Mi i
tuhotep III.
Civil war {1998-1991} (ECI 72-4)
The Turin Canon records a gap of seven years after Montuhotep III; this possibl
covers a year or two of the reign of an ephemeral Mentuhotep IV, but prohabk
indicates a period of chaos and civil war, the details of which have not Y
served (Cl/2:492— 3). It is sometimes suggested that the vizier Amenemhet, win
led the Wadi Hammamat expedition described in the last section, rebelled again
Montuhotep III or his successor. However that may be, some fragments inn
contemporary biographies reflect the problems of the time. These come from the
family of Nehry, nomarch of Hermopolis (the fifteenth "Hare" nome, ECI 7
After the standard flamboyant self-aggrandizement, Nehry records a battle with ai
unnamed king who had besieged Nehry 's army in Hermopolis and was dull' i
ging Nehry to come out of his city to battle: "[The king challenged: | 'draw s<>
up the battle line! See, I too am in battle line!' But I |Nchry| was a fortress tin
fighting in Shedyet-sha to which all the people rallied . . . who rescued his city < ■
the day of terror instigated by the [attack of the army of the] kings house" (I <
73). Meanwhile, Nehry's son Kay aided in the defense ol I lermopolis (l|
;'ji,
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
recruited the city's draftees of young men in order that its levees be numer-
ous.. . . I trained my draftees of young men and went to fight along with my
city. I acted as its fortress in Shedyet-sha. When there was no one with me
except my retainers; [while the king's army included mercenary Nubian]
IVledjay, Wawat, [Egyptian] southerners, Easterners, the Southland and the
I )elta being united against me. I emerged, the affair being a success, my entire
city being with me without loss. (ECI 73)
Kay is apparently describing a more professional army of the "young men" in
tervice supported by the city militia mobilized to defend his city when under
Hack. But the exact background and circumstances of this battle are unclear,
I e his family retained power in Hermopolis, it appears that he was in alliance
th the upstart Amenemhet against the soon-to-be-toppled "king's house" of
..tuhotep IV. Here we see a local nomarch, mobilizing his provincial army,
img a royal army behind fortress walls, but unwilling to leave the safety of
walls and face the enemy in open battle. The king's army, it will be noted,
luiled troops from Egypt, and mercenaries from Nubia and Canaan.
I wo literary sources provide a broader context for the events of the civil war
d the rise to power of Amenemhet I: the "Instructions of Amenemhet" and the
tophecy of Neferti". Although purporting to describe events associated with
reign of Amenemhet I, both works are at least semi-fictional, and their precise
I Jtorical significance is debated. These texts none the less provide insights into the
I'han view of the rise of Amenemhet, at least from the perspective of the later
>l propaganda of the victor.
The "Prophecy of Neferti" 9
his is a fascinating proto-messianic text - a prophecy of the coming of a future
ing who will free Egypt from its enemies and restore the divinely established
*da of the gods. Although the "prophecy" is set in the time of king Sneferu of
Fourth Dynasty, it is generally assumed to be a work of propaganda from the
I n of Amenemhet, which justifies his ascension to the throne as the fulfillment
the gods' plan as described in an "ancient" prophecy. According to the text, all
I I ourtiers and priests are gathered to pay their respects at court; the king is
: lrt1 of a great sage named Neferti, a priest of the cat-goddess Bastet of
klbastis in the eastern delta. Neferti is brought before the king and asked to pro-
ihe future. The prophecy begins with a vision of devastation in Egypt
tore the reign of Amenemhet - presumably during the period of instability and
i! wai before his ascension {1998-1991}. The Nile is dry, storms rage, the land
infertile ami depopulated. Then the Easterners invade the Delta from the east:
I he land is burdened with misfortune
Because ol those searching for food,
I isternei s maminti (he land.
''I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
Foes have arisen in the east,
Easterners have descended into Egypt.
The [frontier] fortifications are destroyed . . .
The animals of the [nomads] of the desert
will drink from the river of Egypt (CS 108)
Chaos spreads, as civil war breaks out in Egypt:
I will show you the land in turmoil
That which has never happened [before] has happened
One will seize the weapons of warfare,
The land lives in confusion
One will make arrows of copper,
One will beg for bread with blood . . .
A man sits with his back turned,
While one man kills another.
I show you a son as an enemy,
A brother as a foe
A man killing his own father.. . .
The land [ruled by the king] diminishes
But its [small independent] rulers are numerous
[The land is] bare, but its taxes are great . . .
Re [the supreme god] separates himself from mankind. (CS 108-9)
All is not lost, however, for in his vision Neferti sees the coming of a redeen
king who will drive out the enemies of Egypt and restore order. He reuni
Egypt, defeats rebellious Egyptians and drives out the Libyan and Eastern invadei
Then a king will come from the south
Imeny [Amenemhet], the justified, is his name
A son is he of a woman of the land of Nubia,
A child is he of Upper Egypt.
He will take the white crown [of south Egypt],
He will wear the red crown [of north Egypt];
He will unite the Two Mighty Ones [goddesses of Upper and Lower Egypt |
Rejoice, O people of his time
The son of man [Amenemhet] will make his name forever and ever.. . .
The Easterners will fall to his slaughter,
The Libyans will fall to his flame,
The rebels [within Egypt] to his wrath,
The traitors to his might,
He will build the "Walls of the Ruler" [on the north east I >elta|
To prevent Easterners from descending to I ; a»;ypt
Then order will come into its place. (CS 100 1(1)
wi
Amenemhet's rise to power is thus portrayed as the divine mandate of the gods to
save Egypt from chaos and invasion.
Amenemhet's victory in the Civil War {1993P-1991}
The rather vague and propagandistic panegyrics of the "Prophecy of Neferti" are
supplemented by several more concrete reference to Amenemhet's victories in the
civil wars. The first comes from an inscription of Khnumhotep I, a nomarch of
Beni Hasan in Middle Egypt:
I went down with his majesty [Amenemhet] to Im[et] in twenty ships of
cedar; then he came to Pelusium [in the north-east delta] . . . When he had
expelled him [the rival in the civil war] from the two banks of Horus [the
Nile].. . . Nubians perished . . . and Syrians fell. [Amenemhet] organized the
land [of Egypt] ... the two banks [of the Nile]. (AIB 148-9 = ARE 1:225,
283; Cl/2:496-7)
In return for his services, Khnumhotep was appointed "overseer of the eastern
desert in Menat-Khufu" (AIB 152).
The Nesu-Montu inscription, written by one of Amenemhet's generals, prob-
ihly recalls some of the battles of the civil war as well:
I am one firm of foot, excellent of counsel, one whose conduct his lord [king
Amenemhet] praises. The conscripts of Thebes adore me, as I never made
display of cruelty [in disciplinary punishment].. . . I am the only one worthy to
be called the hero of this land, swift of hand and quick of pace, a citizen
skilled in arms. I trained the troops in ambush, and at daybreak, the landing-
stage [of the city] surrendered. When I grasped the tip of the bow, I led the
battle for the Two Lands. I was victorious, my arms making so much spoil
that I had to leave some on the ground. I destroyed the foes, I overthrew the
enemies of my lord [Amenemhet], there being none other whole will say the
like. (AIB 108)
I I ii is, despite the uncertainties concerning the specific course of the civil war, the
im.il result is clear: the prime minister Amenemhet emerged victorious, ascending
il,,- tl
none
as king Amenemhet I, founder of the Twelfth Dynasty.
Twelfth Dynasty {1191-1786} 10
Amenemhet I {1991-1971 / 1962} n
In the posthumous "Instructions of Amenemhet", 12 the dead king appears to his
"ii Senwosivt I as .i ghost in a dream or vision after his assassination, giving his son
i hroad summary ol his military career in rather generalized and poetic terms:
I'M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
I [Amenemhet] strode to Elephantine [Aswan in the far south]
I traveled to the Marshes [of the delta in the north]
I stood firm on the limits of the land, having seen its midst
I attained the borders of the [frontier] strongholds
With my strong arm, and my [military] feats.. . .
All that I decreed was as it should be.
I tamed lions, and captured crocodiles.
I subjugated the Nubians, and captured JVledjay;
I made the Syrians do the "dog- walk".. (TS 207-8 = AEL 1:137)
Though this is a stylized and poetic summary, the essence of Amenemhet's cum
paigns is clear from the text. He conquered all Egypt during the civil war (as in tin
previous section), established firm frontier fortifications, and campaigned again
both Nubia and Canaan.
Upon securing the throne through victory in the civil war, the new king built i
new fortified capital named Amenemhet-Iti-tawy - "Amenemhet, seizer of tin
Two Lands", some fifty miles south of Cairo (modern el-Lisht; EAE 2:29 I
AEA 84), perhaps in part to establish a new secure base of operations outside the
sphere of influence - and possible intrigue - of the priests and courtiers of the old
regime he had overthrown. Amenemhet also reorganized the nome structure am
appointed new officers to insure personal loyalty to himself (AIB 152—3), and
continued royal sponsorship of expeditions to the diorite quarries to the south
west of Aswan (C 1/2:497).
With Egypt unified, Amenemhet faced the two standard military problems * >
all Egyptian rulers: the Nubian frontier, and the north-eastern frontier. On both
frontiers Amenemhet's policy was the same: offensive invasion aimed not so nun h
at direct occupation, but at undermining the military capabilities of the Nubians
and Canaanites, while securing the frontier with a strong fortification system.
Amenemhet's Nubian policy (AAA 49—50)
Amenemhet was said to have been "the son of a woman from Ta-sety" (TS 1 38), i
term often associated with Nubia. Though he was half Nubian, he did not show-
any particular favor towards his mother's ancestral homeland. The broad outlines
of Amenemhet's Nubian strategy can be learned from archaeology and some
fragmentary inscriptions from Girgawi, which describe a campaign against north
ern Nubians - called the "C-group" by archaeologists (EAE 1:258-9). Tin-
expedition was under the command of the vizier Intefiqer, who left a description
of the desolation caused by his invasion.
This [temporary fortified] enclosure being built, then I slaughtered Nubian
and all the rest of Wawat [Nubia]. Then I went upstream [south] in vi< tory,
slaughtering the Nubian in their own land, ami came hack downstream
stripping crops, and cutting down the rest ol thru trees so that I could pui hie
•>'M
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
to their homes, as is done against a rebel against the king. 1 have not heard of
another soldier doing the like.. . . Intefiqer [sailed] in the ship called "Great
Oar". (VAE 95-6 = AIB 134)
I rom this account it appears that the Nubians had "rebelled" against Egypt, perhaps
•amply implying either a refusal to accept Amenemhet's suzerainty, or some type of
tid by Nubians into Egypt. In response, the Egyptians sent a fleet around the First
ataract at Aswan, probably through the canal originally cut by Weni in the Sixth
I ►ynasty (AEL 1:21). The army regiments either marched on the riverbank, supported
t he river fleet, or were transported by the fleet. At some point they built a tem-
I h wrary fortified camp as a base for military operations. Thereafter, the army advanced
iii lier southwards, systematically slaughtering any Nubians they found, while
troying their crops, orchards, and cities, and leaving devastation in their wake.
The Korosko inscription allows us to date the campaign to year 29 {1962}, and
ntions a number of the other commanders: Shnumu, Amenemhet (not the
ing), Ishteka, and "the king's son Nakhti" who "came to overthrow Wawat
northern Nubia]" (AIB 128 = ARE 1:228). Intefiqer 's fleet, described as "com-
ftg and going against Wawat", was under the command of "Redis, the overseer of
lie ships" (AIB 129). Amenemhet's Nubian campaigns resulted in the extension of
Egyptian military power to the Second Cataract, where he built the Semna fortress
I I AE 161), the first in a string of fortresses designed to give Egypt direct domination
over northern Nubia and control over trade between Nubian Africa and Egypt.
The northern frontiers
Whereas Amenemhet's Nubian policy was one of invasion and pushing the
Muindaries southward, in the north he remained essentially on the defensive. The
ii lier problem of Eastern bedouin incursions continued, compelling Amenemhet
bC strengthen the eastern delta fortifications with the "Wall of the Ruler" at Wadi
liimilat (CS 1:110; Cl/2:497); archaeological remains of these fortifications have
not been discovered. This fortification process was supplemented by punitive raids
i-ainst the nomads beyond the Egyptian fortified border. The Nesu-Montu
inscription describes one such expedition in Year 24 {1967}:
I destroyed the [nomadic] wild bow-people, the Sand-dwellers. I demolished
[their] fortresses and prowled like a jackal on the desert's edge. I went up and
down through their streets, there being not my match therein, because [the
war god] Montu had ordered the victory. (ECI 77 = AIB 109 = ARE 1:227-8)
As on the north-eastern frontier, fortresses were also built in the western delta
at Qaret el-Dahr south of Wadi Natrun to defend the Western Desert approaches
to I j'Ypt. Details about campaigns against the Libyan western frontier are not
I noun, tin hi- 1 1 i In rn tphfi v of Ncferti" claims "the Libyans will fall to [Ame-
ncmhe('s| flann ' '■ I l<i miplvinr that some type of punitive expeditions were
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
undertaken to subdue the Libyans. Indeed, when Amenemhet was assassinated in
1962, his son Senwosret was on a campaign in the Libyan desert, from which he
was quickly recalled to secure the vacant throne (TS 27).
In year 20 {1971} the aging Amenemhet made his son Senwosret I co-regent
{co-regent, 1971-1962; sole ruler, 1962-1928}. Thereafter Senwosret seems to
have controlled foreign policy and led most major military expeditions. The mili-
tary affairs of the last decade {1971-1962} of Amenemhet's reign, during his co-
regency with Senwosret I, will thus be discussed in the next section, since they
represent the military policy of Senwosret. Despite his great military achievements,
Amenemhet's political policy caused dissatisfaction and instability at court, where
he was assassinated by a harem conspiracy that was organized by a vizier but
implemented by his own bodyguard. According to the "Instructions of Ame-
nemhet", the ghost of the murdered king returned to his son and successor Sen-
wosret and described his murder:
After supper, when darkness had fallen ... I was lying on my bed ... I woke
to fighting, and I found it was an attack of the bodyguard . . . Had women [of
the harem] ever before commanded troops [to attack the king]? (TS 207;
Man, 34-6)
Amenemhet's murder apparently created a temporary succession crisis, but ultimately
the conspirators failed, and his son Senwosret was able to succeed to the throne.
Senwosret (Sesostvis) I {1971/ 1962-1 92 8} 13
Senwosret's personal reign began with a crisis {1962}. He had been sent by his
father on a punitive expedition into Libya, and "was returning [to Egypt], havhu-,
carried off Libyan captives and all sorts of cattle without number", when a mes-
senger met his army on the march and informed him of the assassination of his
father. Remembering his father was himself a usurper, and realizing that his throne
was at stake, "he did not wait a moment; the falcon [Senwosret] flew off with his
[personal] followers (smsw), without informing [the rest of] army" of the death of
king Amenemhet. His quick march to the palace at el-Lisht forestalled the assas
sins, and he was able to claim the throne (TS 27-8).
Although the first ten years of Senwosret s reign {1971-1962} had been spent
in co-regency with his father, Senwosret appears to have been in charge of foreign
and military affairs during most of this period. Some punitive expeditions were
undertaken against the Libyans (TS 27); an officer, Ded-Iqu, who is proud ol
having "secured his majesty's borders", records that "as commander of young
recruits" he was sent "to secure the land of the oasis-dweller", probably the Lib
yans around the Kharga Oasis (AEA 93-4).
None the less, for the most part Senwosret was satisfied to maintain his north
western and north-eastern frontiers seen re by strongly garrisoned fortifications thai
had been begun by his father (C1/2:500- I). This polity is explicitly stated In
Sinuhe, "he [Senwosret I] will conquer the southern lands [of Nubia], without yet
considering the northern countries [of Syria]" (TS 31). The maintenance of the
northern frontier required occasional expeditions against the Sinai bedouins, per-
haps in conjunction with mining expeditions to the Sinai for turquoise and copper
(LA 5:892). A nobleman named Montuhotep described one such punitive expe-
dition in his funerary inscription: he "put his terror among the barbarians when he
silenced the Sand-dwellers, pacifying the rebels because of their [rebellious] deeds"
(ARE 1:256).
The Eastern Desert of Egypt was also the scene of other paramilitary mining
• wpeditions (SI 361-400). Senwosret sent an expedition under the vizier Intefiqer
to Wadi Gawasis on the Red Sea, from which ships were built (or assembled from
transported parts) and dispatched to Punt (AIB 139). Several expeditions were sent
io the quarries in Wadi Hamammat; an inscription from year 38 {1933} describes
one with 17,000 men that transported 210 huge stones to make sphinxes (CI/
2:500). Although not strictly a military expedition, the huge size of the force
reflects the Egyptians' logistical capacity to mobilize and sustain large armies in the
I icld. The military prominence of the reign of Senwosret I is also reflected in some
Oi the tomb paintings of the period. The Beni Hasan rock-cut tombs of Khety
(tomb 17, c. 2000) and Amenemhet (tomb 2, c. 1950) both contain depictions of
Wrestlers training, and of actual combat (EWP 120-1, 126), which will be dis-
ussed in greater detail on pp. 433-8.
The Nubian frontier
i-nwosret's major military efforts, however, were centered on the Nubian frontier,
... using on securing access to the mineral resources of Nubia (SI 237-360; M =
I IAAE 45; AAE 41). Expedition inscriptions tell us that he exploited gneiss at
[bshka, amethyst at Wadi el-Hudi, and gold and copper at Wadi Allaqi in the
fubian eastern deserts. Ameni, commander of the troops of the Oryx nome,
participated in two of these gold-seeking expeditions, which he described in his
lUtobiography:
1 sailed south [into Nubia] to fetch gold ore to the majesty of King Khe-
perkare [Senwosret I], living forever and ever. 1 sailed south with the Prince,
Count, Eldest King's Son of his body, [the future] Amenemhet II, life— pros-
perity-health. I sailed south with 400 conscripts, the choicest of my troops,
and returned in safety without loss to them. I brought the gold he had
demanded, was rewarded for it in the king's house, and the king's son thanked
me. (AEAB 138 = ARE 1:251-2)
1 lie second expedition is similarly described:
llu'ii 1 sailed s< nidi to hi mj
with u(Hl i on si i iptS, the br
)I<1 ore to the town of Coptos.. . . I sailed south
■a oi (he Oryx nome. I returned in peace, my
}96
197
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
soldiers safe, and I had done all I had been ordered. (AEAB 138
1:251-2)
AR1
Senwosret's increased military activity in Nubia was closely linked to the eco
nomic importance of gold, intended to protect the mining expeditions, control
trade, and prevent possible raids by Nubians into Egypt. In the sixth year {1965 \ ,
Ibes, son of Id, participated in an expedition to Nubia, in which he "traveled
downstream with the army". However, he laments: "there was no fighting",
because of which he was unable to "bring a Nubian back as captive from the land
of the Nubians" (VAE 95). These incidents reflect the fact that even a moderate
Egyptian force of from 400 to 600 men could at this time operate with some
impunity in northern Nubia, perhaps because of the devastation wrought by for
mer campaigns such as that of Intefiqer, described on pp. 394-5. Ibes's complain i
that he was not able to bring back Nubian slaves also illustrates the importance oi
personal plunder to Egyptian soldiers.
In his eighteenth year {1953}, Senwosret launched the major campaign of his
reign, an expedition into Nubia, commanded by his general Montuhotep (CI
2:499-500). In the first phase, Montuhotep led his army to the Second Cataract,
where they established a new fortified base at Buhen, intended to be the basis foi
permanent Egyptian occupation and annexation of Nubia. (The nature and
importance of these fortifications will be discussed on pp. 443-5.) A fragmentan
inscription by the "commander of the army" Montuhotep describes the devasta
tion wrought on the local population by this campaign: "[the Nubians'] life i^
finished, [they are] slain . . . [their] tents are burned . . . their grain cast into the
Nile" (ARE 1:249).
An inscription near Buhen commemorates this campaign, showing Sen
wosret and the war-god Montu with ten bound and cowering Nubians symbo
lizing ten cities, regions, or tribes defeated in the campaign (ARE 1:247). The fust
name on the list is "Kush", the leader of the enemy confederation. This is th<
first historical mention of an important new military power in the Sudan, which
will be discussed on pp. 402-6. Although permanent Egyptian occupation
under Senwosret I ended at the fortress of Buhen at the Second Cataract,
the army campaigned further south into to the land of Kush. Ameni, "com
mander of the troops of the Oryx nome", described the second phase of tin-
expedition:
I followed my lord [Senwosret I's heir apparent Amenemhet II] when h
sailed south to overthrow his enemies [in Kush] among the foreign barbarian
As Count's Son, Royal Sealbearer, and Chief Troop Commander of the Oi \
nome did I sail . . .
I passed by Kush, sailing south,
I reached the ends of the earth;
I brought back tribute of all kinds
And praise of me reached |even| in heaven
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
Then his majesty returned in safety, having overthrown his enemies in
wretched Kush. I returned in his following in alertness and no loss occurred
in my troops. 14
Like Alexander's army on the banks of the Indus, Ameni and his Egyptian sol-
diers felt like they had marched to the end of the earth, 15 It is possible that the
I Egyptians were militarily active as far south as Argo Island, near the Kushite capital
If Kerma (twenty-five miles north of modern Dongola), where the name Sen-
wosret was found inscribed on a vessel — whether it was brought by trade or
military expedition is unclear (0/2:500). The new military frontier of Kush was
not completely stabilized by Senwosret I's campaign and fortress building; his
•reat-grandson Senwosret III was required to undertake a number of additional
I ampaigns and build more fortresses a half-century later. None the less, the mili-
ary successes of Senwosret I laid the foundation for the permanent Egyptian
■ x cupation of Nubia and a century of prosperity for Egypt.
Amenemhet II {1929-1895} 16
1 hi til 1980, historians of ancient Egypt generally described the reign of
'nienemhet II as one of peace (0/2:503, EIAE 165). The publication of a
erntly discovered inscription from Memphis, however, contains passages from
Xmenemhet's "Daybook" describing details of his military campaigns into
Syria during a single year. Beginning in the Middle Kingdom the Egyptian court
kept a "daybook or journal (hrwyt) as a means to record day-to-day accounts
ucome and disbursements) and events (arrivals, departures, civil and military
matters, court cases, etc.)" (EAE 1:97a; LA 3:789-90). Nearly all of these
n £ ords have perished, but some passages have survived and other sections were
used as the basis for official military inscriptions on stone. 17 In the case of Ame-
nihet II, the recently discovered inscription includes a portion of the court
urnal for a single year - often called by Egyptologists the annus mirabilis, or
i mazing year" — which includes accounts of tribute received and military cam-
paigns to Syria.
Unfortunately the beginning of the inscription is lost and the year in question is
BO! certain. None the less, the inscription describes a number of different military
expeditions during this single year. First, there is the "dispatch of the army to
I henty-she [Lebanese coast]" and its return later in the same year: "the return
< 'I the army dispatched to Khenty-she in ten ships" (ECI 78—9). The size of the
txpedition, ten ships, indicates that the total size of the force involved was
robably in the hundreds, certainly not many more than a thousand men. None
I ss, this force was able to return with substantial wealth - though it is not clear
this was trade, tribute, or plunder. Their goods included "1665 units of
iKn; 4882 units of gold, |and| 15,961 units of copper" (ECI 79). The list
"I wealth also included bion/c weapons inlaid with gold, silver, and ivory. A sec-
ond jimv left Ij'Api 1 1i.it veai, hut is noi described as returning. It laconically
m
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
mentions the "dispatch of the army together with the commander of the
elite troops and the commander of the army to hack up Iw3s [Alse?] in Syria'
(ECI 79).
Two other armies returned to Egypt in this year, although they had apparent I
been sent out the year before. The first "army" returned with wealth from the
"turquoise terraces", presumably an expedition to the Sinai mines. The second
was more clearly military, a naval plundering raid to Cyprus and another land,
perhaps on the Levantine coast:
Arrival of the shock troops sent to destroy the towns of Iw3y and I3sy
[Cyprus]. Tally of prisoners of war brought back from these two foreign lands;
1554 Easterners [as prisoners]; bronze-and-wood [weapons]: 10 battle-axes,
33 scimitars; 12 daggers; 11 knives; [?] javelins, as well as copper, gold, lapi^
lazuli and gems. (ECI 79)
From the military perspective one thing is particularly striking: although fifteen
hundred people were taken prisoner, only 66 weapons (and an unknown number
of javelins lost in a lacuna) are included in the plunder. This first indicates that a
large number of the prisoners would have been women and children. The weap
ons list may, in fact, include only bronze weapons, which were considered worth \
of special attention as plunder for the king. There is also the mention of thirty
three "scimitars" - literally "reaping implements" (ECI 79 n49) - taken as plun
der. Presumably these are the curved "sickle-swords" found in Royal Tombs I — 1 1 1
at Byblos in Syria and Shechem in Canaan during the late Middle Bronze Age {c.
nineteenth century} (MW 1:142-3, 2:514; AW 1:172-3, 206-7; FP 51). The
Egyptians called this weapon the kopesh (ftps, EG 513, sign T16); there is limited
evidence for the use of these weapons in Egypt before the New Kingdom, when
they became more widespread.
In summary, Egypt had four separate military expeditions underway in a single year .
Two were naval expeditions, one to Lebanon and the other to Cyprus. Two others
were overland into the Sinai and Canaan. Egypt was successfully able to exert mod-
erate levels of military force throughout Cyprus, Lebanon, southern Canaan, and
Sinai in a single year. In the same year, emissaries arrived from both Nubia and Syria
bringing "tribute" for the king - often a euphemism for merchants arriving with trade
goods - as well as "suppliants of the Tmp3w [Ugarit?]" with "238 ingots of lead"
(ECI 79). The inscription also records a large number of donations given to the gods
and temples, exemplifying the symbiotic relationship between the gods, who gran-
ted Egypt prosperity, wealth, and victory in battle, in return for which the pharaoh
gave a portion of this wealth back in the form of donations to the gods, through
priests of the temples, in thanks for divine blessings. While praising and thanking
the gods for their assistance, however, the army was not forgotten; the Daybook
also records distribution of rewards to the military officers in command (FC1 7 ( ^).
The survival of Amenemhet lis journal for this one yeai points to an important
historiographical principle that needs to he icpcatrd when Uvuir, to reconstruct
lie military history of the ancient Near East: absence of evidence is not necessarily
vidence of absence. Before the publication of this inscription in 1980, Ame-
nemhet II's reign was described as essentially peaceful. In reality there were four
simultaneous campaigns underway in a single year - the only year for which we
have surviving evidence from the Daybooks. Records for most of Egypt's military
ustory simply have not survived. All we can do is reconstruct a minimal account
• I Egyptian militarism.
That the military affairs of Nubia were not neglected by Amenemhet is indi-
>ted by an inspection tour of some of the Nubian frontier fortresses (ARE 1:278).
I wo mining expeditions were undertaken to the Sinai in which the local chiefs
\ere "suppressed" (VAE 137 = ARE 1:274). In addition there is one record of
Military intervention on the Nubian frontier, commanded by the "assistant treas-
urer" Sihathor, who "reached the land of Nubia [where] the Nubians came
! n >wing down [in submission] for fear of the Lord of the Two Lands [king Ame-
uemhet II]" (VAE 138 = ARE 1:274). There were likewise at least two trading
voyages to Punt from the major Egyptian Red Sea port of Sawu (Wadi el-Gasus).
I he first was in 1901, when "Captain of the Gate" Khentekhtay-wer returned
ifely from an expedition to Punt, "his army being with him" (ARE 1:275). The
c ond, in 1897, was under the Treasurer Khnumhotpe (CI /2: 504).
Commercial relations played an increasingly important role during this period.
In addition to the Nubian trade for gold and semi-precious stones, Egyptian
ommercial and cultural contacts flourished with Syria, and extended into Ana-
fcolia and Crete as well. A number of Egyptian artifacts have been found at Ugarit,
Megiddo, and other Canaanite cities. Byblos was especially important as an
Egyptian ally; its rulers took the Egyptian title h3ty- } ("count" or "mayor"), and
the court at Byblos was strongly influenced by Egyptian culture (Cl/2:503-4;
l-.AE 1:219-21; DANE 62). Byblos probably served as a naval base for at least some
M the maritime expeditions of Amenemhet II described in the Daybook.
although the presence of Egyptian artifacts in Syria is generally thought to
represent prestige items acquired through exchange (possibly even in exchanges
i li.it occurred several generations after the artifact was made), given the previously
unknown military activities of Amenemhet, it is not impossible that some may
represent the extent of potential Egyptian military activity as well.
A treasure consisting of four bronze caskets filled with gold and silver tribute
i mm Syria was discovered at the temple of Montu at Tod in Upper Egypt, indi-
| Iting the rich trade, tribute, or plunder - the Egyptians didn't necessarily always
distinguish between these categories - that was obtained during the reign of
\inenemhet II. The growing wealth of Egypt from trade, tribute, plunder, mining
p( ditions, and expansions and improvements to irrigation systems (such as those
undertaken by Senwosret II in the Fayyum, OHAE 164), laid the foundation for
! gypt's military power. The Tomb of Khnumhotep at Beni Hasan (Tomb 3) has
splendid color murals depicting the arrival of a Canaanite caravan under
the chieftain Abisha in Lgvpt (AW 1:166-7; EWP 124; OHAE 192; BH 1 §30;
\\\\ ' !*(>) Tins mmal r.ivrs us .i j/ood indication of the dress and weapons of
ii
ll'l
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
Canaanite soldiers during this period. The men of the caravan are dressed in col
orful kilts and tunics, and are armed with bows, javelins, throwing sticks, and .1
curved axe. The fact that the men in this caravan are armed indicates the danger
of crossing the Sinai, and adds support to the assumption that most trading expc
ditions mentioned in Egyptian texts were paramilitary affairs.
No major military campaigns are recorded for Amenemhet II's successor, Sen
wosret (Sesostris) II {1897-1877}. 18
Senwosret (Sesostris) III {U78-lS43f 9
Militarily, the thirty- five-year reign of Senwosret III was one of the most impoi
tant of the Middle Kingdom. Senwosret Ill's military prowess became the stuff oi
later legend; he was remembered over 1500 years later by the Greeks as a con-
queror greater than Alexander. 20 Within Egypt, Senwosret III suppressed th<
semi-independence enjoyed by some of the nomarchs, contributing to a stabiliza
tion of the internal political situation for the next century, while also increasing
the central resources of the king (Cl/2:505-6). It is unclear if these activities
involved the exercise of military power, or were purely political in nature. Outside
of Egypt, Senwosret III campaigned on both the Nubian and Canaanite frontiers
us or one of the later campaigns, Senwosret was accompanied by one of his
I uirtiers, Sebek-khu, who served as a commander in the army and left an account
I his promotion during the campaign in his autobiography.
I commanded sixty men when his majesty traveled upstream to overthrow the
tribesmen of Nubia. Thereupon I captured a Nubian in Kenket [while fight-
ing] alongside the regiment of my city. Then I returned downstream [north],
following with six men of the [royal] residence. Then his majesty appointed
me as inspector of the retainers and [command of a company of] 100 men
were given to me as a reward. (AIB 120 = ARE 1:306)
Another undated text from the mortuary biography of Ibia describes his com-
i.ind of a campaign in Kush, probably under Senwosret III, but perhaps under
mother ruler:
The king sent me to open up Kush because he deemed me efficient. I set the
power of the Lord of the Two Lands [the king of Egypt] in the midst of
rebellious foreign lands [of Kush] , and followed the monuments of the king
into remote foreign lands. (AEA 127)
Nubian campaigns {1870-1859} 21
In order to facilitate both trade and military access to Nubia, Senwosret HI
repaired and expanded earlier Old Kingdom work on the Aswan canal which
allowed ships to bypass the First Cataract. In his eighth year {1870}, the king had
the canal enlarged to 75 meters long, 10 meters wide and 7 meters deep (ARI
1:291-2). With his communications and logistics between Egypt and Nubi.i
secured by the refurbished canal, Senwosret marched his army southward, past the
fortification line of Buhen at the Second Cataract that had been established by his
grandfather, conquering to half-way between the Second and Third Cataracts and
establishing a new southern military boundary for Egypt at Semna (ARE 293-4).
where in the coming years he built and garrisoned eight large mud-brick for
tresses. 22 According to Senwosret s official policy declaration, the new fortified
boundary was designed . . .
to prevent any Nubian from passing it downstream, either overland or by
boat, or any herds of the Nubians, apart from any Nubian who shall come to
trade at [the Egyptian fortified, officially sanctioned trading center at] Iken [at
the Second Cataract], or upon any good business that may be done with [the
Nubians], but forever forbidding a ship of the Nubians to pass by [Fort] Heh
[Semna]. (EP 135 = ARE 1:293-4)
As with most Egyptian campaigns, efficient young offn eis who might the eye
of the pharaoh were given rewards and promotion (oi then s\n i essful servii c. On
his text indicates the difficulty of subduing Kush, the land beyond Nubia; the
!' w that it was a "remote foreign land" implies that military operations in Kush
iirtched the logistical limits of the Egyptians to their maximum capacity. The
phrase "following the monuments of the king" into foreign lands possibly has
reference to images of the king carried with the army and set up in a portable
ii me (e.g. BH 2 §15c). Since the king was always the official, though frequently
bsent, leader of the campaign, images of the king may have been carried with the
iimy; statues and stele of kings were certainly erected along the campaign trail.
Mternatively, the phrase "following the monuments of the king" may refer to the
iele of Senwosret at Semna, or a similar monument.
The goals of Senwosret Ill's original campaign were not immediately fully
U hieved. The Nubian frontier was by no means stable and secure in the coming
wars, requiring several additional punitive expeditions. In 1866 Senwosret III
igain "journeyed to overthrow Kush" (ARE 1:294); four years later, in year 16
| 1862}, Senwosret erected a victory and boundary stele near fort Semna, which
I K ribes his ongoing efforts at the pacification of the Nubians.
[The King] making the southern boundary [of Egypt] at Semna:
i have made my boundary, going further south than my forefathers.
] have exceeded [the military conquests] that were handed down to me.
I am a king, whose word becomes deed . . .
One who is aggressive to capture, swift to success . . .
Who is imincii ilul in ih< riirmv thai attacks him;
Who mi h I '•*- h< ii in H krd, ,n ul is quiet when it is quiet; ...
to '
103
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
For he who remains quiet after [an enemy] attack,
He is making the enemy's heart strong.
Aggression is bravery; retreat is vile.
He who is driven from his boundary is a true back- turner,
Since the Nubian only has to hear [of the approach of the Egyptian ai
to fall [in submission] at a word:
Answering [the Nubian] makes him retreat.
One is aggressive to him and he shows his back;
Retreat and he becomes aggressive. (VAE 43—6 — ARE 1:294)
Perhaps protesting too much, Senwosrets grandiose claims are undoubi
reflection of the problems of securing his new southern border beyond th<
Cataract. When Senwosret talked of "he who remains quiet after [an i
attack is making the enemy's heart strong", he was probably alluding to .in
military experience of Nubian insurgency against Egyptian occupation
strong Egyptian armies were present on the southern frontier, the Nuhi.u
Kushites submitted. But such submission was nominal, and when tl it-
Egyptian field army withdrew or they saw other signs of Egyptian weakiu
frontier, the Nubians and Kushites recommenced resistence and raiding. Sen ■
ret's statement is given in the form of military advice, probably represent in;
conventional wisdom of Egyptian policymakers on dealing with recalcitranl
mies on their frontiers.
Senwosret faced this ongoing Nubian insurgency to his invasion with «
Egyptian brutality.
[The Nubians are] not a people to be respected.. . .
I have seen it in person, it is not an untruth,
For I have plundered their women, and carried off their underlings,
Gone to their wells, driven off their bulls,
Torn up their corn, and put fire to it. . . . (VAE 43-6)
The plunder from Nubia also included gold, one of the principle reasons i
the Egyptian desire to control the trade there. The holy of holies in the < >
temple at Abydos was adorned with some of the Nubian plunder, a gift fin i
victory the gods had given him, "which he [the god Osiris] caused my m.ip
[the king Senwosret III] to bring from Upper Nubia in victory and in triumph
(ARE 1:298).
Even after the expeditions in 1866 and 1862, another campaign was net cssai
in year 19 {1859}, in which "the King of Upper and Lower Egypt khel m
[Senwosret III], living forever, journeyed [southward], overthrowing the wren h<
Kush" (ARE 1:301). Thus, the pacification of the Nubian frontier required null
tary intervention every three to four years, frequently under the command ol tli
king himself; it is likely that there were other campaigns whose records an In
Obviously aware of the potential difficulties of the Nuln.m frontier, Sen
Ji'l
li d his victory stele at Semna with a special plea to his descendents to
in his territory in Nubia:
| lor any son of mine who shall maintain this boundary which My Majesty
i made, he is my [true] son and was born to me . . . but he who shall destroy
md fail to fight for it, he is not my son and was not born to me. (EP 135)
iwosret was obviously concerned that the ongoing military difficulties and
of his occupation of southern Nubia might encourage his successors to
ii his hard- won conquests. In order to administer his new domains, Sen-
i reated a third Egyptian administrative ministry (waret) alongside the stan-
ino of northern and southern Egypt. He called it the "head of the south",
i incorporated Elephantine and Nubia (HAE 167).
The Confederation of Kush 23
people of central Sudan south of the Second Cataract who faced the Egyptian
ght are known historically as the Kushites, and archaeologically as the
( lulture. The kingdom of Kush centered on their capital city of Kerma
\l I: 227-8), a few miles north of modern Dongola, in a fertile agricultural
n on the southern Nile. By the time of Senwosrets invasion the inner city of
1 1 i.i was surrounded by imposing fortifications, probably built in response to
i owing Egyptian threat. The site has been occupied since around 2500, but
• region seems to have coalesced into a kingdom perhaps around 2000. The
i •Join - perhaps more accurately described at this time as a confederation -
mnpassed the land from the Second to the Fourth Cataracts. By the Second
i mediate Period it would become a serious military rival to Egypt, intervening
1 1 1. 1 1 lly in Egypt; a thousand years later the other Kushite kings would conquer
I rule Egypt as the Twenty-fifth Dynasty {755-656}.
I Mic to lack of surviving indigenous written sources, we are forced to rely on
ryptian records and archaeology for historical information about Kush. From the
i ration Texts (discussed on pp. 415-8), we know the names of several rulers of
I (us 1 1 during the nineteenth century. Unfortunately, little more is known about them
in their names; the following dates can be nothing more than vague estimates.
I ing Kaa ruled around 1900. He was succeeded first by his son Teriahi {1880?},
mil [\\c\\ by a second son Awawa {1870?}; Awawa was in turn succeeded by his
Ml 1 1 Ftererjses {1850?}. The Execration Texts also contain the names of a number
nl other Nubian commanders and chiefs, and of queens (CS 1:50-1; SIP 253-4).
Mthough generally described as "wretched" and cowardly in Egyptian military
propaganda, their military prowess in facing the Egyptian invasion can be inferred
In reading between the lines. As described above, Senwosret III was forced to
undertake loin known latupaigns there were quite possibly others for which
ords have not mii\ ued in i do/en ve.irs against the Kushites, building six large
ttic-sst-s at (In Scinni i.mi.l imdv r het ween the Second and Third Cataracts)
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
to control the border. Given Egypt's overwhelming superiority in wealth, resour-
ces, and manpower, the Kushites obviously defended their homeland with valor;
their capital and three-fourths of their kingdom, remained unconquered. The new
boundary at Semna also probably in part represents the maximum Egyptian logis-
tical capacity at this time.
The Canaaniie campaigns of Senwosret III (M = HAAE 49)
The military activity of Senwosret III in Canaan is much less well documented
than his Nubian campaigns. This may in part reflect less interest in Canaan, but, if
the example of the inscription of Amenemhet II discussed above is typical, it more
likely represents a dearth of surviving sources. It seems, however, that there was no
attempt by the Egyptians to establish permanent colonial rule in Canaan as there
was in Nubia. None the less, the sparse evidence demonstrates that Egyptian armies
and navies did operate throughout Canaan, and on the coastal regions of Syria.
The most important military text relating to Canaan is the Inscription of
Sebek-khu, an important military commander of the age who had begun his
military career during Senwosret's Nubian campaigns. Sebek-khu described an
undated campaign of Senwosret against Canaan:
[After the Nubian campaign] his majesty traveled downstream [northward] to
overthrow the Bedouin of the Canaan. His majesty arrived at a foreign land,
Shechem [skmm] by name.. . . Then Shechem fell, together with the vile
Retjenu [Canaanites] , while I acted as the rearguard [for the army on its
return march to Egypt]. Then the soldiers joined in to fight with the East-
erners [who attacked the rear of the column]. Thereupon I [personally] cap
tured an Easterner. Then I had his weapons seized by two soldiers. There was
no turning back from the fray, but my face was [always] to the fore [of tin-
battle]. I did not show my back to the Easterner [in retreat]., . . [In reward,
Senwosret] gave to me a staff of electrum into my hand, a bow, and a daggei
wrought with electrum, together with the weapons [I had captured from tin*
enemy]. (AIB 120 = ARE 1:304-5)
This text is interesting for what it both does and does not say. The purpose ol
this mortuary inscription is to glorify the deeds of the deceased Sebek-khu, and
thus it unfortunately provides neither a date nor a broader strategic context in
which the campaign occurred. None the less, if the identification of skmm with
the biblical Shechem is correct, it demonstrates that the Egyptian army at this tun*
could operate well into northern Canaan. In any event, it is clear from the text that
the Egyptians did not permanently occupy Shechem, nor decisively defeat tin
Canaanites, for as Sebek-khu leads the rearguard of the withdrawing Egypt i. in
army, the Canaanites are still bold enough to attack the retreating Egyptians. Thci i
are hints of other military activity in Canaan as well; <\ mining inscription m W.uli
Hammamat records a "smiting of the four eastern counti ies" (AK I 1 : K)2), whn h
lor.
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
may have reference to Canaan, but could alternatively refer to nomads in the
Eastern Desert or Sinai.
The legend of Sesostris the Conqueror
Senwosret is also an important figure in later Greek legends, which seem to con-
flate several different kings into a single composite figure whom they called
Sesostris or Sesoosis. 24 Manetho records late Egyptian legendary recollections of
Senwosret's Canaanite campaigns.
In nine years [Senwosret] subdued the whole of [the Near East], and Europe
as far as Thrace, everywhere erecting memorials of his conquest of tribes.
Upon pillars he engraved for a valiant race the secret parts of a man, for an
ignoble race those of a woman. Accordingly he was esteemed by the Egyp-
tians as next in rank to [the god] Osiris, (Man, 32-6)
According to Diodorus, Sesostris s conquests outstripped those of Alexander the
Great, including India and the Ganges valley, and Scythian Central Asia (1.55). Whereas
Alexander only dreamed of an Arabian campaign before his death, Sesostris
accomplished it: "he overcame drought and failure of provisions to subdue the
entire nation of the Arabians, which had never been conquered ere this time";
Sesostris is likewise said to have "reduced the greatest part of Libya to subjection"
(Diod. 1.53). He also organized a fleet of 400 ships for the conquest and explora-
tion of the Red Sea (Diod. 1.55). Diodorus claims that Sesostris s victories were
stopped in Thrace - by the unconquerable ancestors of the Greeks, of course -
only because of lack of supplies. However exaggerated these tales may be, they
none the less demonstrate that Senwosret's military career was extraordinary enough
lor him still to be remembered 1500 years later as the greatest Egyptian conqueror.
Amenemhet III {i843-1797} 26
Amenemhet III is most famous from later Greek legend as Ammenemes, the
builder of the fabled Labyrinth, which was actually the pyramid and temple com-
plex at Hawara. 27 His prominence as a cultural figure is well justified by the
prosperity and achievements of most of his nearly half-century reign, including
both Nubian and Syrian trade, the agricultural expansion of the Fayyum, and
mineral exploitation of the Sinai and Nubia (HAE 169-70; Cl/2:509-12). From a
military perspective, his reign seems to have been largely a period of peace, though
(here are a few indications of some low-level military activities.
7 lie north-eastern frontier
An inscription from ye.n ' |I.S-I/!] mentions "the opening of the land of the
l.istei nets" In tin um\ i nmm.uuirr" Aineuenihet son of Ibeb (ARE 1:313).
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Some military activity in Canaan is confirmed, at least in an idealized sense, by a
splendid pectoral of the princess Mereret, showing a scene of her brother Ame-
nemhet III in the traditional "smiting" stance, grabbing the hair of a Canaanite
bedouin and raising an axe-mace to smite him, with a generic martial inscription:
"the good god [the king], the lord of the Two Lands [of Egypt], smiter of all for-
eign lands, Nimaatre [Amenemhet III]" (EWP 116; TEM 150-1; RA3 122).
Other glyphs speak of him as "he who defeats the Eastern bedouins" (TEM 151).
In general, however, the north-eastern frontier seems to have been relatively
peaceful. By the end of Amenemhet Ill's reign a policy of more or less open bor-
ders seems to have allowed the peaceful migration of Eastern nomads into the
north-east delta, laying the foundation for the rise of semi-autonomous Canaanite
rulers in the delta in subsequent generations (OHAE 169; see Chapter Eighteen).
The Sinai (RA3 211-21)
Throughout the Middle Kingdom the turquoise and copper mines of the Sinai
continued to be exploited by regular Egyptian expeditions. This exploitation
reached its peak in the reign of Amenemhet III, perhaps achieving the point
where we can speak of a quasi-permanent Egyptian garrison at the mines. The
reign of Amenemhet III is particularly rich in surviving inscriptions of such
expeditions; 59 graffiti or inscriptions from Amenemhet Ill's reign have been dis-
covered in the region, nearly three times the number of those from all his Middle
Kingdom predecessors combined (RA3 251; OHAE 168). These expeditions
presumably reflect the overall pattern of Egyptian paramilitary operations in the
Sinai throughout this period. Although frequently commanded by Treasury offi-
cials, and generally concerned solely with mining turquoise and copper, there
seems to have been a military component to most, if not all, expeditions to the
Sinai mines.
Some inscriptions mention explorers in the Sinai (RA3 22), presumably pro-
specting new areas for precious stones and metals. On the other hand paramilitary
forces are occasionally described as "opening up the foreign lands" and "tram-
pling" enemies (RA3 16; ECI 80-1). Since such phrases are generally descriptions
of military conflict, it can be assumed that there were military activities designed to
protect the miners from raids from Sinai nomads (RA3 70). On the other hand,
there does not seem to have been a formal invasion, conquest, or permanent
military occupation of most of the Sinai (RA3 217—19). Relations with local
peoples could also be peaceful: one inscription implies peaceful interaction with
the "brother of the Prince of Retjenu [Canaan], Khebded" (RA3 21-2, 45, 155-6).
An expedition in year 2 {1841} to the Sinai to mine malachite and copper
numbered 734 men (RA3 221; ARE 1:315). This expedition, or a related one,
went overland from the Nile to the coast of the Red Sea, crossed by sea to tin
Sinai, and then marched inland to the mines at Wadi Maghara, presumably therein
avoiding the -arduous journey through the Sinai desert, and also possible conHii i
with Sinai nomads (RA3 32, 53, 224-6; ARE 1:316). A second Sin.ii expedition is
IMS
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
recorded for year 6 {1837} (VAE 97-8). Additional inscriptions about expeditions
to the Sinai mines are recorded for years 41 through 45 {1802-1798}, but most contain
no military information (ARE 1:316— 18). 28 None the less, there was clearly a
paramilitary component to these expeditions, if only for protection from possible
bedouin raids. Ptahwer, the commander of the expedition of year 45 {1798},
wrote that "I was sent to bring plentiful [resources] from the land of [Sinai] . . .
delivering the East to him who is in the palace [Amenemhet III] , bringing Sinai at his
heels, traversing inaccessible valleys, reaching the unknown extremities [of the world]"
(ARE 1:319). Similar quarrying expeditions were also sent to Wadi Hammamat by
Amenemhet (RA3 38-41), one of which included 2000 men (RA3 41).
Nubian frontier
In the south, Amenemhet's reign was again relatively peaceful. Some of the frontier
fortresses at Semna were repaired and perhaps enlarged in year 33 {1810} (RA3 58—9,
212; OHAE 168), indicating that there was still tension and possible danger from
the kingdom of Kush. The repair of the fortresses was undertaken by the Overseer
of Treasure Intef, son of Sem-ib, who tells us that "the number of bricks which
went into the rampart . . . when [I] was on frontier-patrol from Elephantine was
35,300" (RA3 59). The need to count every brick used in repairing the fortress is quite
typical of the Egyptian bureaucratic mentality. The repairs to the city fortification
at El-Kab in Egypt are also recorded (RA3 73). A royal river fleet was also maintained
in Nubia (RA3 213), probably to control trade and to transport men and supplies.
There are only two recorded military expeditions against Kush in Amenemhet's
nearly fifty-year reign. An inscription by the "army commander" Amenemhet son
of Ibeb in year 2 {1842} alludes to the "smiting of the Nubians" (RA3 16; ARE
1 :313). This may have been the final phase of the preceding Kushite wars of Sen-
wosret III, described above, which finally forced Kush into submission. As long as
access to the trade, gold, and other mineral resources of northern Nubia was
secure, Amenemhet did not seem interested in further expansionist conquests; the
majority of the Nubian-related texts of his reign deal with day-to-day administra-
tion (RA, 210-16).
An inscription near the Semna fort from Amenemhet's ninth year {1835}
describes the suppression of a Nubian rebellion, indicating that not all was stable
and peaceful in the region. A local commander, Nekhen Samontu, describes a
punitive expedition:
Together with my crews, I sailed downstream through Nubia, without a
casualty among them. I did not put any [Nubian] man in jail, but I destroyed
and killed those rebels of [the Nubian chief] especially for the praise of the
kmg who desires justice. (RA3 26-8, 193)
1 his text implies that local leaders and their garrison troops in the Egyptian border
(ortifh at ions were ; 'emu Ik able to deal with the problem of "rebellion" in Nubia
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
without the need for the direct involvement of the central government. It is pos-
sible that there were a number of similar local punitive expeditions undertaken on
the authority of local commanders which were never recorded.
Byhlos in Syria 29
The full military implications of Egypt's relationship with Byblos are not clear.
Byblos was certainly ruled by a local Canaanite dynasty, whose tombs from a
Middle Bronze Age cemetery have been excavated. However, some of these rulers
took the Egyptian title of "mayor" (or "count", h3ty), suggesting some type of
Egyptian hegemony over Byblos, if only nominal. It may be that the kings of
Byblos wanted to be seen as allies of the Egyptians by the kings of their rival
Canaanite city-states. The kings of Byblos also wrote inscriptions in hieroglyphics,
indicating either the presence of Egyptian scribes, or that Byblite scribes were
familiar with the Egyptian language. A4iddle Kingdom statues and other inscribed
objects have been found in the city.
Egypt's major interest in Byblos was trade, which focused on the all-important
cedar wood for palace, temple, and shipbuilding. Other products were imported
from Syria and beyond, including lapis-lazuli and tin. One can thus probably speak
of Egyptian hegemony over Byblos, with strong political, cultural, religious, and
economic ties of mutual interest. There were probably permanent Egyptian mer-
chants and administrators in Byblos, with perhaps a regular military presence. The
port of Byblos would certainly have been available to the Egyptian fleet for repairs
and resupply, as well as serving as a potential base of embarkation for land forces.
Amenemhet IV {1798-1790} and Sobekneferu (Nofmsobk) {1790-1786} 30
The reigns of the last two rulers of the Twelfth Dynasty are short and poorly
documented, with no recorded military activities. The exact nature of the suc-
cession is also obscure. Manetho claims that Amenemhet IV was the son of Ame-
nemhet III and brother of Sobekneferu (called "Scemiophris", Man. 34), but this
is unconfirmed by any contemporary evidence. Some scholars think Sobekneferu,
daughter of Amenemhet III, was the wife of Amenemhet IV, who ruled Egypt as
husband of the legitimate queen; when her husband died, Sobekneferu continued
reigning in her own right (OHAE 170). On the other hand, it is possible that
Amenemhet III had no surviving male heir, and chose one of his court officials to
succeed him as Amenemhet IV Sobekneferu, as the daughter of Amenemhet III,
might thus have been seen by some as the legitimate heir in place of the usurper
Amenemhet IV This might suggest a succession crisis and possible strife or even
civil war during the 1780s, though this is quite uncertain (SIP 294—5).
Amenemhet IV was probably an older man when he succeeded to the throne,
reigning only eight years before being succeeded by Queen Sobekneferu { 1790
1786}, one of the few women to rule Egypt independently. Despite the lack of
recorded military activities during the reigns, it is clear from ,i Nile inundation
Ho
MIDDLE KINGDOM EGYPT
inscription at the Nubian fortress of Kumma that Egyptian military control over
the Nubian fortresses and frontier continued until at least the third year of Sobe-
kneferu's reign {1787}. A statue depicting the Queen trampling the "Nine Bows",
the traditional enemies of Egypt (EAE 3:301), could memorialize some type of
military campaign during her reign, but is also possibly a stylized depiction of royal
power. At the end of the reign of Sobekneferu {1786}, Egypt entered another
period of crisis and fragmentation known as the Second Intermediate Period
{1786-1569}, which will be discussed in Chapter Eighteen.
II I
CHAPTER SEVENTEEN
The military system of the
Middle Kingdom
Ideology of sacred warfare
Throughout ancient Egyptian military history, victory in battle was attributed to
the will and blessings of the gods. 1 The king is described, in an ideological and ritual
sense, as ruling the entire earth: "may fear of you resound in the lowlands and the
highlands, for you have subdued all [the lands] that the sun encircles!'*
(AEL 1:230), which was the Egyptian way of describing the entire world.
Although there are certainly elements of boasting and perhaps megalomania in
these types of claims, within the limited geographical knowledge of Egyptian
society during the Old and Middle Kingdoms the Egyptian king was, in many
ways, ruler of the entire world. Enemies from Canaan, Libya, or Nubia are fre-
quently described as "rebels" against the god-given rule of the Egyptian world-king.
The conceptualization of the king as divinely established ruler of the world is the
central martial ideology of the Egyptians, and is reflected in a number of ways in
their texts.
Montuhotep I {2061-201 1 }, founder of the Eleventh Dynasty, reported that his
conquests were accomplished "by [the power of the god] Horus" (MKT 28). The
twenty-first-century tomb of Meru reflects this same attitude in a pious inscription
proclaiming "a good beginning [for the new Eleventh Dynasty] came about
when [the Theban war god] Montu gave both lands [of upper and lower Egypt] to
King Montuhotep" (OHAE 132). This intimate connection between the kings
and the gods was most clearly reflected in texts describing the king's deification in
temple inscriptions. In the thirty-ninth year of his reign {2022}, Montuhotep
celebrated a great festival commemorated in the Shatt er-Rigal relief, taking
upon himself the glories of godhood and using the title of Sematawy — "He
who unites the Two Lands [of Egypt]" (Cl/2:479-80; MKT pi. 12). He is
remembered in later Egyptian legend as a god who restored unity and glory to
Egypt (Man. 34).
Inscriptions by many other kings reflect the same belief that the gods have
established the power of the king and granted him victory in battle. The "Loyalist
Instruction" {c. 1790}, an ideological statement empliasi/ing the proper respect
for the kin<>, advocates that all men must venerate tin- kmr loi lie is tin- sun s»od
II >
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
under whose governance one lives ... It is [the gods' divine] power that fights for
him [the king]. His ferocity emits dread of him [to his enemies]" (TS 238). Antef
II {2118-2068} was also careful to honor the gods and to stress that his authority
derived from them. In two hymns to Re and Hathor, Antef claims that he is the
"deputy" of Re, and is "honored by Osiris, son of Re" (AEL 1:95). Amenemhet's
coup and foundation of the Twelfth Dynasty {1991} was likewise divinely
ordained. The king "appeared like [the god] Atum himself that he might restore
what he had found in rums [in Egypt]" (AIB 152). Likewise, victory m battle was
given by the gods to their fellow god Senwosret I {1971-1928}: "[The war-god]
Montu, lord of Thebes [says]: 'I have brought for you, beneath your feet, Good
God [Senwosret I], all the countries which are in Nubia' " (ARE 1.247)'. On a
pectoral of princess Mereret, king Senwosret III {1878-1843} is depicted as a
griffin-like creature, with the hawk-head of the war god Horus, and the body of a
lion, mauling cowering Canaanites (TEM 137, 139).
Special deities were entrusted with the defense of the Egyptian frontiers for
each of the four cardinal directions:
Those [enemies] who shall come against you from the South shall be driven off
by Satis, Lady of Elephantine [Aswan; guardian goddess of the southern frontier],
who will shoot at them with her arrows, which are painful and sharp.
Those who shall come against you from the North shall be doomed to [the
gods] Hekes and to Hephep.
Those who shall come against you from the East shall be doomed to Sopd,
Lord [and guardian of the frontier] of the East, and they shall be driven off
with your knives in them.
Those who shall come against you from the West shall be doomed to Ha,
Lord of the West, and they shall be driven off by the striking-power of Atum
in his ascendings from the horizon. (CT 313)
The Coffin Texts (EAE 1:287-8) present precisely the same ideology of the
gods commanding the kings to go to war and granting victory m battle. "I have
gone up and have set my [defeated] foes under my sandals, that I may have power
over them, in accordance with what [the sun-god] Re commands for me" (CT
87). Horus, in particular, is invoked as war god (EAE 2:119-22). "I have assaulted
and conquered the horizon by my own hand ... The kingship on the thrones of
Horus is given to me, he shoots down the slaughterers for me" (CT 256). "Horus
will not let you perish; Horus has set your [defeated] foes under you[r feet]"
(CT 835).
The ideology of the king as the divinely predestined conqueror is most clearly
enunciated in a temple building inscription -of Senwosret I {1971-1928}. Royal
conquests were undertaken at the explicit command of the gods.
1 l t,u * k'nj'J will mm /inn decrees for [the god] Harakhty 2
1 lc I 1 '■hAIhvI U T ,it mr m t jn what should be done for him,
(I \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
To accomplish what he commands to do.. . .
I am a king by nature . . .
I conquered as a youth . . .
He [Harakhty] destined me to rule the people [of Egypt] . . .
Mine is the land, its length and breadth,
I was nursed to be a conqueror.
Mine is the land, I am its lord,
My power reaches heaven's height.
I am his [Harakhty s] son and his protector,
He gave me to conquer what he conquered.
He [the god] will enrich himself [with tribute and plunder from conquests]
Because he made me conqueror.
I will supply his altars on earth [with offerings provided from plunder]
(AEL 1:116-17 = VAE 40-3 = ARE 1:241-5)
The king's role as triumphant defender of Egypt is similarly lauded in a hymn tc
Senwosret III {1878—1843} as divinely ordained protector:
How great is the lord of his city:
He is unique and millionfold; a thousand other men are little! . . .
Lo, he is a rampart, walled with copper of Sinai! . . .
Lo, he is a shelter, rescuing the fearful from his enemies! . . .
Lo he is [the god] Sekhment against his enemies who have trespassed his
boundaries! (VAE 46-7)
On the other hand, despite claims of divine kingship, the pharaohs were
sometimes subject to quite ordinary plots and coup attempts. After Axnenemhet I
was assassinated by his own guardsmen {1962}, his ghost appeared to his successor
Senwosret, warning: "Do not approach them [your subjects] when you are alone!
Trust no brother! Know no friend!" (TS 207). Even god-kings, it seems, were
potentially subject to the effects of an assassin's dagger.
Evidence of divine support and blessings on military campaigns was believed by
the Egyptians to be manifest through omens in nature. On his expedition to Wadi
Hammamat, the vizier (and later pharaoh) Amenemhet I recorded two prodigies
from the god Min. In the first, "a pregnant gazelle" wandered into the midst of the
army camp and gave birth directly on the large stone block they were quarrying.
The animal was promptly sacrificed to Min (ARE 1:212 = ECI 71-2). In a similar
way, other animals were sacrificed before battle (AEAB 54).
A second wonder was apparently a flash flood, bringing divinely provided water
to the army in the desert: 3
The power of this god [Min] was seen and his might manifested to the plebs:
the upland was turned into a lake, and water arose over the hard stone. Foi .i
well was found in the midst of the valley, ten cubits |< five meters| square.
filled with water to its brim.. . . It had been bypassed by the former expedi-
tions of kings . . . Only to His Majesty [Amenemhet I] alone was it revealed
[by the gods]. (ECI 72 = ARE 1:216)
Although this specific omen did not occur in a military context, it represents
the supernaturalistic orientation of most Egyptian warriors, where unusual natural
occurrences are interpreted as signs from the gods. The importance of divination
through prophecy and oracular dreams is reflected in a number of texts, such as the
"Prophecy of Neferti" (TS 134-9; AEL 1:139-44) and the "Instructions of
Amenemhet" (TS 206-8; AEL 1:136-8), which have been discussed on pp„ 391-4.
We should assume that belief in the importance of omens, dreams, and divination
was an integral part of the martial mentality of the age, and could affect troop
morale for good or ill. 4
Although generally reflected in royal propaganda, the divine-king ideology of
the Egyptians had an impact on the rank and file as well. As servants of the phar-
aohs, commanders and even common soldiers were also entitled to the blessings of
the gods. A royal inscription included an invocation by king Amenemhet III to the
gods for the safety of his army on an expedition to the Sinai: "O you who live on
earth, who shall come to this Mine-land [Sinai]! As your king has established you,
as your gods favor you, may you arrive home in safety" (ARE 1:318). An officer,
Amenemhet son of Ibeb, records his personal thanks to the gods for his successful
expedition: "I came to this highland [in the Eastern Desert] in safety with my
army by the power of [the god] Min, lord of the highlands" (RA3 16; ARE
1:313). The Egyptian ideology of divine favors and omens could have an impor-
tant impact on the ordinary soldiers as well, who believed their gods would
intervene for them in battle. In military crises, belief in omens and promises of
divine aide could improve or undermine the morale of troops, thus indirectly
contributing to victory or defeat.
Execration Texts and war magic 5
The belief that the gods controlled the fate of kings and nations is reflected in
another body of evidence known as the "Execration Texts". The image of the
smiting or trampling of bound captives was a mainstay of Egyptian ritual art for
over 3000 years, with such images appearing on temple walls, tombs, doorposts,
thrones, statues, footstools, canes, chariot decorations, and sandals (MAEM 112-
36; PSE; MB). While many of these images had artistic or ceremonial purposes,
i hey none the less reflect the brutal reality of the ritual execution of defeated
enemies. These monuments may represent the actual execution of real war-cap-
lives, but they are also ritual acts, designed not only to commemorate previous
victories, but to guarantee future victories. This ritual smiting of enemies was also
practiced vicariously by priests, who used figurines for magical cursing of enemies.
From the military perspective, the Execration Texts are examples of military
magic, oi "spiritual waitarr", designed to defeat enemies through supernatural
II I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
rather than merely material weapons. These texts and figurines - made of clay, stoi
alabaster, wood, and wax - are broadly similar to "voodoo dolls". A curse was m.i
calfy bound to an image, and transferred to the actual enemy through the destn
tion or burial of that image. Of these, those made of wax would have left aim
no identifiable archaeological remains. Alternatively, clay pots were also insci i
with the curses and names of enemies, and then ritually destroyed. 6 There are < «■
1000 surviving examples of pots and figurines used for the ritual cursing of ei
mies, covering almost of the entire range of Egyptian history (MAEM 137).
The essential purpose of the Middle Kingdom Execration Texts was to cursi
enemies of Egypt "who may rebel, who may plot, who may fight, who may thil
of fighting, or who may think of rebelling on this entire earth" (MAEM 140). ( a
are issued against all the traditional enemies of Egypt — Nubians, Easterners, a
Libyans - as well as any potential internal Egyptian rebels. Some curses are genei i
against entire peoples, tribes, cities, or regions. Others are focused on spe<
individuals. The curses are formulaic and standardized, with a type of fill-in-the-bl.m
format for the name of the enemy. Even the dead, who have potential supernal in
power as hostile ghosts, are cursed in some of these texts (VAE 126; CS 1:52).
An important collection of Execration Texts from the Middle Kingdom \\ i
discovered at the Egyptian fortress at Iken (Mirgissa) at the Second Cataract, win
includes burial pits with shattered pots and figurines (MAEM 153—80). Presum.iU
these cursing rituals were performed by Egyptian priests assigned to the frontier gam
sons. A decapitated human skull was also discovered, indicating the ritual sac i ih
of a Nubian prisoner as part of the cursing ritual; significantly, many of the figi
ines were also headless (MAEM 162-3). Burial upside down without the severed he.i
was a particularly abhorrent form of netherworld cursing from an Egyptian funeral
perspective, and thus represented a particularly vicious form of curse meant t
destroy the enemy not only in this world but in the next (MAEM 168-72). fl
archaic form of this practice may be seen in the Narmer Palette {c. 3050} which slu n
rows of bound, decapitated prisoners with their severed heads between their leg
The Execration Texts are generally quite formulaic; the following is a typii ll
example:
[A curse upon] every rebel who plans to rebel in the entire land: all il
Medjai [Nubian nomads of the south-eastern deserts] of Webat-sepet; all tin-
Nubians of [the tribes or provinces of] Wawat, Kush, Shaat and Beqes, thi il
[elite warrior] heroes, their [light infantry] runners, all Egyptians who .it*
with them, all the Nubians who are with them, all the Easterners who .m
with them ... all the foreigners who are with them, all the [ Libyan | Tjemhl
of the western hill-countries of Libya, of [the Libyan chiefs?] Hekes and
Hebeqes, their heroes and their runners. (VAE 125-6)
This text includes the interesting reference to "Egyptians who are with" tin
Nubian enemies, perhaps indicating that there were Iiomiui renegade I L^ypt un-
serving with Nubian armies and raiders.
1 I
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
A similar type of Execration Text is found in the Coffin Texts, a collection of
Egyptian rituals designed to preserve the soul in the afterlife. 8
"May your soul be strong against [your enemy].. . . May you break and over-
throw your foes and set them under your sandals." [These words are] to be
spoken over a figure of the foe made of wax and inscribed with the name of
that foe on his breast with the bone of a Synodontis fish: to be put in the
ground in the abode of Osiris [in Abydos]. (CT 37)
The Coffin Texts describe a heady mix of war, magic, religion, shape-shifting
shamanism, and cruel human sacrifice which was probably not uncommon in
mythic idealizations of Egyptian warfare.
It is granted that I have power over that foe of mine so that I may conquer
him in the presence of the people who came to contend with me by means of
the magic spells which were on their lips. I have appeared as a great falcon
[the god Horus], I have grasped him [the enemy] with my talons, my lips
[beak?] are on him as a gleaming knife, my talons are on him like the arrows
of [the lion goddess] Sekhmet, my horns are on him as the Great Wild Bull . . .
[I] alight upon his spine, I cut his throat in the presence of his family, I take
out his heart unknown to them, for I am a human falcon.. . . See, I have come
and I have brought my [defeated] foe, I have crushed his family, I have thrown
down his house, I have crushed his surviving children, I have crushed his
cultivator who is in his field. The spirits are glad; Osiris is joyful when he sees
me mount aloft as a falcon. (CT 149, cf CT 995)
Weapons were often viewed not merely as physical objects but as things having
• spiritual or magical power as well. Kings could be invested with special weapons
is divine gifts from the gods.
This strong arm of yours is in the realm of [the creator god] Atum.
Receive your weapons in your hand [from the gods]; . . . Smite this killer . . .
with the strength and might of yours, with this power of yours ... for I
| the king] am [the god] Atum equipped with my [divine] weapons.
(CT 586)
Magical spells were also used to ward off the power of enemy weapons, such as
iluowsticks (CT 418) or knives (CT 335b.2). 9 One spell from the Coffin Texts
promises immunity from arrows:
I am one mighty and aggressive.... I am one more powerful than you, so
prepare ,i path foi me I am a vindicated one who serves Him of blood; I am a
man ot a million who i annol he seen by those about him who shoot arrows.
« I 'i
II
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
It is likely that many Egyptian warriors used such magical prayers or charms
which were intended to protect them from enemy weapons and magic.
From the Egyptian perspective, the ritual cursing of enemies and the invocation
of magical protection was a natural part of any military campaign, simply another
form of invoking the aid of the gods in battle - always the ultimate source of
victory in war. In another sense, however, these texts may also represent an early
form of "psychological warfare", in which the morale of the Egyptian soldier
could be hardened by priests and magicians calling blessings upon the Egyptians
and curses upon their enemies. At the same time, the morale of enemy troops
might suffer with the knowledge that Egyptian magicians and priests were cursing
them,. Similar attitudes are perhaps reflected in the Bible where, during the Exo-
dus, the Israelites, although certain of the ultimate superiority of their god Yah-
weh, none the less believed that Egyptian priests and magicians had real magical
powers (Exodus 7.11-12, 22, 8.7, 18).
From, the perspective of military history, these types of magical text not only
give us an insight into war magic and psychology, but also provide a type of ene-
mies-list, showing the regions of military concern for Middle Kingdom Egyptians
(ECI 87-93). These texts confirm our other historical data, that Nubia and
Canaan are the regions of central military concern, with Libya in the Western
Desert a distant third.
The Execration Texts against Canaan and Syria are particularly rich in lists of
cursed places and rulers, providing a brief snapshot of the political and military
situation in Canaan during the eighteenth century (ANET 328-9; CS 1:51-2). It
is clear that most of Canaan and Syria were divided into a number of independent
or semi-autonomous city-states ruled by Semitic-speaking peoples, most of whom
were considered to be at least potential enemies to Egypt. Some curse-lists give
two to four entries for the same city, each listing a different ruler (CS 1:51-2).
These are presumably either several different leaders of the same city - king, priest,
general, or minister - or perhaps represent an updating of the lists; when one ruler
dies his name is kept on the list to curse his ghost, while his living successor's name
is added. The implications of these texts for understanding the political and mili-
tary situation in Syria and Canaan have been discussed on pp. 283-4.
Military organization and administration
(EMO; LA 4:128-34)
The army of the Middle Kingdom was organized into province-based regiments,
named after the nome (district) or city in which they were recruited or stationed
(AEMK 191-2). Each nome recruited its own provincial regiment or company
(s3), while also occasionally supplying troops to the national army of the king.
Recruitment was supervised by a military scribe (ss n ms l ) - a type of quartermastei
or logistics officer - who kept recruitment and service records, administered sup
plies, and accompanied armies on expeditions (KMO Y)). One text describes a
representative of the king passing through .i pmvnue ,uul in i uitmi-, "one man in
lis
a hundred males" into the royal army (EMO 37). Individual soldiers mentioned in
administrative papyri are identified as "X son of Y", sometimes referring to the
region or regiment of recruitment: "from Z". Soldiers thus generally served in
companies with friends and kinsmen, under officers from their hometowns. Dur-
ing periods of collapsing central power and civil war, these provincial regiments
were transformed into the quasi-independent private armies of the nomarchs. As
discussed on p. 438, in addition to Egyptian troops, the kings recruited large
numbers of mercenaries, including Nubians, Libyans, and Canaanites into foreign
mercenary regiments (ECI 73), Nubians being especially prominent.
Although most of the documents have vanished, it is clear from surviving
fragments that the Egyptians maintained extensive written records of military
administration, kept by the military scribes. One census record from el-Lahun
describes the household of "the soldier Djehutis son Elori, of the second company
of troops raised up for service in the [northern?] Sector" (VAE 112). Although not
strictly military, papyri documents of the dockyard at Thinis record the specific
number of men required in a work crew, along with the food to be allocated to the
workers and the number of copper axes, adzes, and chisels needed by the crew
(VAE 85-8). People who fled from such corvee labor assignments were listed by
name, household, and village, and pursued by government officials (VAE 101).
Although these records describe work crews, military records kept by the army
scribes presumably contained precisely the same type of information about num-
bers of men, supplies, and weapons needed for the army.
Details on the payment of soldiers are vague, but the broad pattern is clear.
Remuneration for military service occurred in at least five different forms: daily
food allotment, clothing and equipment, land or livestock endowments, plunder,
and "gold of honor" - special gifts from the king for exceptional service in com-
bat. On campaign, soldiers were provided with food, clothing, and other equip-
ment (AEAB 53-4). The ordinary soldier was given ten small loaves of bread a day,
along with three jars of beer, two "units" of meat, and three cakes. Company
commanders were given proportionally higher allotments of 100 loaves, while
expedition commanders were given 200 loaves. (EAE 2:404-5). The extra food
allotment of the officers was presumably used for slaves, servants, attendants,
retainers, or family members.
Administrative papyri from the late Middle Kingdom provide hints of the
sophisticated administrative machinery that operated behind the scenes to maintain
the Egyptian army Administrative control over this bureaucracy was an important
and lucrative position run by a type of quartermaster corps of military scribes. A
military scribe named Ameny described himself as the "King's favorite who con-
trols the supply depots" (AEA 137). Surviving administrative documents include
lists of provisions to be given to different groups in Egyptian society, from the royal
family to government officials, priests, craftsmen, and common workers. From the
military perspective, these include specific allocations of "provisions for the town
militia", ami toi iln Meujav men" and "Medjay leader" — presumably Nubian
men en.iih- •■ I... Ii r. . u i u rd .it ihe p.ilace" in Thebes (AEMK 19-22).
II''
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Soldiers and officers were often given at least partially tax-exempt tracts of land
in return for service (AIB 127; TS 224; EAE 2:405). Many texts emphasize the
importance of the plunder they obtained in battle, including weapons, valuable
objects, and slaves (ARE 1:305). In addressing his troops before a campaign,
Montuhotep I {2061-2011} promised: "I will give you full title to it [lands to be
captured], [and] everything which you desire [in plunder]" (ICN 112). One sol-
dier complained that, because of lack of fighting on a campaign, he was unable to
"bring a Nubian back as captive from the [war in the] land of the Nubians" (VAE
95). Rewards were often given to successful soldiers at the end of campaigns. The
"Daybooks" or court journals of the kings recorded the distribution of rewards to
the military officers after an expedition (ECI 79). Sebek-khu records that, in
reward for his exemplary military service, king Senwosret "gave to me a staff of
electrum into my hand, a bow, and a dagger wrought with electrum, together with
the weapons [I had captured from the enemy]" (AIB 120). The career of the
Nubian mercenary Tjehemau, described on pp. 383—4, demonstrates that a recruit
could rise through the ranks and obtain great wealth and honor through military
service.
A number of technical terms were used for different types of soldiers, but the
precise distinctions between these groups is not always clear. The lack of evidence
makes it unclear whether these are general descriptions of broad categories, or
specific technical military terms. We are dealing with centuries of history, so per-
haps it is most likely that the significance of these terms changed through time.
New recruits are called the "young men" (d3mu>), or perhaps just "recruits"
(EMO 40), who need to be trained (ECI 73). When fully trained and experienced
in combat they became "young warriors" (d3mw n c h3wtyw) (EMO 40). Generally
speaking, the term mnf3t (or mnfyt) means simply "soldier", but Faulkner believes
they were distinguished from ordinary soldiers in a number of texts, and should
therefore be viewed as a more professional and elite group he calls "shock-troops"
(EMO 38). Another type of elite soldier is the kn, a "valiant man" or "hero"
(EMO 40); these "heroes" formed a formal elite corps by the early New King-
dom, but the evidence for such a special unit is unclear in the Middle Kingdom,
when the term may simply refer to an especially skilled and brave warrior. There is
also mention in the texts of frontier and desert "patrols" (phrt) and fortress "gar-
risons" (iufyt) (EMO 41), but these may refer to military functions rather than
special formal units.
The most elite group in the Egyptian army seems to have been the "followers"
(smsw) or royal retainers. The function of these "followers" was a mixture of per-
sonal retainer, courtier, staff officer, and bodyguard, from whose number the king
often chose officers for special missions and commanders for military campaigns
(EMO 38—9). Promotion through the ranks for outstanding service, culminating
in enlistment as a royal retainer, was not uncommon. The military career of
Sebek-khu, one of Senwostret Ill's "followers", shows him entering royal service
as a guardsman of the pharaoh, eventually being promoted to commanding first
60 men and then 100 men (ARE 1:306; EMO V)). In Scnwosni Ill's Syrian
I 'ii
,
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
campaign Sebek-khu was placed in overall command of the crucial rearguard as
the Egyptian army returned to Egypt. Even as an important officer, however,
Sebek-khu fought in the ranks with his soldiers, where he personally captured one
of the enemy (ARE 1:304). In reward for his faithful military service, he was given
a staff of office and ornamental weapons made of electrum, along with booty
captured from the enemy (ARE 1:305).
• A number of different military ranks or functions are mentioned in Egyptian
records and administrative documents. The catch-all rank of the Egyptian army
was "commander" or, more generally, "overseer" (imy). A rather vague term, its
technical meaning can only be understood in context. In its broadest sense it could
be used for overseers of civilian work gangs and agricultural estates (EMO 38).
From the more narrow military perspective, however, imy describes many different
types of military officer. Supreme military command in Egypt was held by the
king, but frequently exercised by the "commander of the army of Upper and
Lower Egypt" (imy-r ms c sm c w mhw), or "great [or supreme] commander of the
army" (imy-r ms c wr), who served as a type of minister of war (EMO 37). Generals
in charge of specific expeditions were "commander of the army" (imy-r ml°) (AIB
107; AEA 120; LA 2:524-5). The title "commander of the army" was used for
officers performing many different military functions: among others, by those in
charge of frontier and desert patrols, and by the garrison commanders of the
Nubian frontier forts (EMO 37). Likewise, the commander of a "company" or
"regiment" (s3) was the imy-r s3 - perhaps "company commander" or "captain";
but in a civilian context imy seems to have meant simply a work crew foreman
(EMO 41). Other paramilitary functions or offices included town militia, "dog
keepers" with watchdogs or tracking dogs who were part of the city defense, and
"baton- wielding" police (AEMK 82-4). Frontier defense duties were described by
a frontier officer named Sihathor as including "defending his [the king's] bound-
ary, watching his possessions, watchful without laxity" (ARE 1:274).
As in all ages, military life was hard, and Egyptian soldiers included the usual
number of grognards - grumblers. An inscription by an expedition leader named
Harurre describes some of the difficulties faced during operations in the Sinai and
other desert regions. "When I came from Egypt, my face flinched, it was hard for
me The highlands are hot in summer, and the mountains brand the skin ... in
this evil summer-season." None the less, Harurre s "army arrived in full quota, all
of it, there was none that fell among them . . . [because] I led my army very kindly,
and was not loud-voiced toward the workmen. I acted [well] before all the army
and the recruits, and they rejoiced in me" (ARE 1:322-3). Not only did soldiers
face the difficulties of campaigning and fighting in foreign lands, they also had
problems on the home front with their family affairs. While away on campaign an
officer named Nehesu received word of the mismanagement of his estate at home
and wrote an angry letter demanding that his affairs be put in order (VAE 107-8).
The most detailed Egyptian description of the difficulties of military life comes
from miu-h latei in the fwenticth Dynasty { 1200-1081 }, but undoubtedly reflects
the realities lm le\ph.jn soldiers of earlier periods. The text is a school essay
I M
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
exercise in which the students are told, in a rather satirical way, of the superiorin
of being a scribe over other possible professions.
Come, let me tell you the woes of the soldier, and how many are his super
iors: the general, the troop -commander, the officer who leads, the standard
bearer, the lieutenant, the [military] scribe, the commander of fifty, and the
garrison captain. They go in and out in the halls of the palace, ordering [tin
soldier]: "Get laborers!" He is awakened at any hour. One is after him as [if he
were] a donkey. He toils until the Aten [sun] sets in his darkness of night. I I.
is hungry, his belly hurts; he is dead while yet alive. When he receives the
grain-ration, having been released from duty, it is not good for grinding [due
to quartermasters giving poor-quality gram to the soldiers]. He is called up foi
[war in] Syria. He may not rest. There are no clothes, no sandals. The
weapons of war are assembled at the fortress of Sile [on the north-east cornci
of the Delta]. His march is uphill through the mountains. He drinks watei
ever/ third day; it is smelly and tastes of salt. His body is ravaged by illness
The enemy comes, surrounds him with missiles, and life recedes from him.
He is ordered: "Quick, forward, valiant soldier! Win for yourself a goo J
name!" He does not know what he is about. His body is weak, his legs fail
him. When the victory is won, the captives are handed over to his majesty, to
be taken to Egypt. The foreign woman faints on the march; she hangs herseli
on the soldier's neck. His knapsack drops, another steals it while he is bur
dened with the woman. His wife and children are in their village; he dies and
does not reach it. If he comes out alive, he is worn out from marching. Be he
at large, be he detained, the soldier suffers. If he leaps and joins the deserters,
all his people [at home] are imprisoned. He dies on the edge of the desert, ami
there is none to perpetuate his name. He suffers in death as in life [because of
lack of proper funerary ritual]. A big sack is brought for him [to be buried in];
he does not know his resting place. Be a scribe, and be spared from soldiering!
(AEL 2:172)
These fragmentary glimpses show us that Egyptian soldiers on campaign had
precisely the same problems and complaints as soldiers in all ages.
Arms and armor 10
Soldiers in the Middle Kingdom period can be divided into two types according
to their armament: archers (iry-pdt) and close-combat warriors armed alternative K
with spear (hnty) or axe (minb). The archers are generally depicted with one bow,
but occasionally had two (BH 1 §13). Close-combat troops usually had a mottled
animal-skin shield, and were armed with either spears or broad-headed axes (151 1 I
§13, §30). Archers generally did not have shields, needing both hands to shoot
their bows. During this period we first find both artistic and textual evidence ol
the Egyptian army being formally divided into tactically separate companies
of spearmen and archers. We thus begin to see the tactical specialization of certain
companies as either missile or melee troops. The most striking example of this is
the famous model soldiers from the tomb of Mesehti at Assyut {Ninth Dynasty, c.
2156-2040}, which are organized into two companies of forty men each. The
forty Egyptians are all armed with shield and spear, while the forty Nubians carry
bows and bundles of around four arrows (TEJV1 108-11; Cl/2:469). Akhtoy, the
nomarch of Assyut, describes a similar organization for his army: "I formed a troop
of spearmen and a troop of bowmen, the best 'Thousand' of Upper Egypt' "
(AEAB 28—9). The reference to the "Thousand" may be a technical term for an
Egyptian regiment, apparently composed of companies of both spearmen and
archers.
Bow (LA 1:182-4)
The bow (pdt) was the principle missile weapon during the Middle Kingdom. A
fragmentary block from Lisht shows that archery was formally practiced at target
ranges by the late Old Kingdom or early Middle Kingdom (SGAE 34; BAH 54).
Grave goods in the Middle Kingdom tombs from Deir el-Bahri at Thebes include
several bows, bowstrings of twisted animal intestines, and dozens of arrows ( c h3)
with several different types of heads. Two light wooden cylindrical leather-covered
i|uivers were also found, the oldest examples in Egypt (FP 39—46, 52). The New
Kingdom tomb of Tutankharnun also has several bows that are similar in style to
diose of the Middle Kingdom. 11 All Middle Kingdom bows are "self" or "simple"
hows, made of a single piece of wood; there is no evidence of the use of the more
powerful composite bow in Egypt before the New Kingdom. 12 Different types of
hows had differing draw weights, and therefore differing range and penetrating
power. Like Odysseus and Rama, Senwosret I {1971/1962-1928} was said to
have a bow that no one else could draw (TS 30). Bows were made in organized
workshops by skilled craftsmen (AW 1:165; EWW 36). Arrows were fletched with
three feathers, with arrowheads of flint, bone, or ebony, and, by the later Middle
Kingdom, increasingly of bronze (FP 42-3; LA 4:1005-7). Some archery equip-
ment was preserved in the "Tomb of the Warriors" from the time of Montuhotep
I {2061-2011}. Arrow-heads discovered in the tomb were of ebony (SSN 13);
bronze arrowheads are known from other archaeological sites (BAH pi. 9). Four of
(he soldiers had archers' wrist guards (SSN 10, pi. 4; FP 46; LA 2:948), which are
also known from artistic representations of archers (FP 47). A bow tip and cord has
been preserved, showing how the strings were lashed to the bows (SSN 10, pi. 5;
IT 41).
A Canaanite is depicted with a bow and what appears to be a shoulder-slung
quiver hanging on his back; this man also carries a curved axe, indicating that at
least some archers could be armed with both the bow and a melee weapon (BH 1
§30 I; AW 1:166 7). Senwosret I and Sinuhe are both likewise described as
fighting with U>\\ ami melee weapon during different phases of combat (TS 30—
\), Ouiveis wen nil ipp.miitk t.ue anions the Egyptians during this period
I V
423
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
(LA 3:460-1); most Middle Kingdom art depicts the archers without quivers,
instead carrying a bow and a packet of extra arrows, either wrapped in a piece of
leather or held loose in the hand (BH 1 §47, BH 2 §5,16,17). Some of the archers
are shown stacking their arrows on the ground while shooting (BH 1 §14, 2 §5).
The Coffin Texts describe bows being held in precisely this way: "my bow
which I stretch with my grasp belongs to me, my arrows are in my grip" (CT 585,
1013). An illustration from Beni Hasan shows an archer with two bows, and a
bundle of arrows wrapped in a proto-quiver; the fletching on the arrow is outside
the leather wrap (BH 4 §24). There is evidence that quivers were introduced in
the Late Middle Kingdom, probably allowing more arrows to be carried by each
archer (AW l:164-7). 13
The tomb reliefs at Beni Hasan provide a number of illustrations of the use of
the bow, some showing substantial detail. Hunting scenes generally depict archers
drawing the bow to their chest or the chin rather than the shoulder or ear, 14
though the deeper draw to the ear is occasionally depicted (BAH 54). The bow-
staff is sometimes depicted being held in a rather strange grip. The lower two or
three fingers grasp the staff, with the upper one or two fingers extended in front of
the staff serving as an arrow-guide to keep the arrow straight and stable. The
thumb is extended upward and braced against the back of the staff, creating
counter pressure against the lower two or three fingers. The bowstring is generally
drawn oriental-style by one or two fingers and the thumb, allowing two or three
arrows to be held with the other free fingers while the bow is being shot. 15 One
hunter lassoes the foot of a bull while the animal is harried by a hunting dog and
shot with arrows by another hunter (BH 1 §13; 2 §4); it is uncertain if the lasso was
similarly used against enemy soldiers in land or naval warfare. Archers are shown
stringing their bow with their knee for leverage, and stacking arrows on the
ground while shooting from a fixed standing position (BH 1 §14; BH 2 §5, 15;
AW 1:63).
The bow is widely depicted on funerary monuments in southern Egypt during
the Middle Kingdom, showing both the social emphasis on prowess in archery,
and the widespread use of this weapon during this period (ICN 58; AW 1:162—3).
Nubian mercenaries are generally depicted as archers; the Nubian Nenu is shown
in his funerary monument holding a bow (OHAE 129). The tomb of the nomarcli
Setka of Aswan likewise shows five Nubian soldiers shooting bows. They wear
only leather kilts and feathers in their hair; one holds at least half a dozen arrows,
and another is shown kneeling (OHAE 132).
Spear and javelin
(BAH pi. 6, 9, 14; LA 3:937, 5:1124-5)
Depictions of spears (hnty) from the murals at Beni Hasan show weapons appai
ently about 1.25-1.5 meters long (BH 1 §30-1). Some have broad, leaf-shaped
heads for thrusting, while others, with narrow needle like heads, were probabh
javelins (myth). Before the New Kingdom, most spc.it heads urn- tanked, slut into i
slot in the wood, and bound to the spear shaft (AW 1:156-7, 169). The more
stable socketed spearheads had been introduced by the New Kingdom (EWW 36-
7; FP 39). The tale of Sinuhe describes a Canaanite warrior coming to battle with
an armful of javelins (TS 33). Some spears were weighted at the back end, balan-
cing the weapon and allowing it to be held closer to the back, giving a greater
overall thrusting distance (BH 4 §23-4). The model spearmen from the tomb of
Mesehi at Asyut all have copper- or bronze-tipped spears (TEM 108-11). On the
other hand, the black-colored point on at least one javelin depicted at Beni Hasan
may indicate a ninthead (BH 4 §24). The mortuary reliefs of Ankhtifi of Hier-
akonpolis shows the nomarch spearing fish with a long spear, which, if propor-
tional to his body, would be perhaps 2.5 to 3 meters long (OHAE 128). Lances or
pikes of some length were used in battle (BH 2 §5a,c, §15c).
Axe (BAH 34, pi. 10; LA 1:587)
Battleaxes (minb) are common in the artistic depictions of warfare in the Middle
Kingdom and several examples have been recovered by archaeologists. 16 During
the Middle Kingdom, axes retained essentially the same form as those of the Old
Kingdom, the broad "epsilon" axe and the semi-circular "eye" blade, with the
broader head becoming nearly universal in the later Middle Kingdom. 17 Axes are
mentioned along with daggers and javelins as part of the plunder from an expedi-
tion to Canaan (ECI 79).
The martial scenes from the tombs of Beni Hasan depict the axe as the most
common melee weapon. Tomb 15 shows Egyptian soldiers armed only with the
narrow semi-circular bladed axe (BH 2 §5), while tomb 17 shows a mixture of
both types, with a predominance of the semi-circular narrow blade (BH 2 §15).,
Both of these tombs date to either the First Intermediate Period {2165-2061} or
the early Eleventh Dynasty {2134-1998} (EAE 1:175). Tombs 2 and 14, however,
which date to the early Twelfth Dynasty {1991-1786}, depict Egyptian soldiers
armed only with the broad-bladed "epsilon axe" (BH 1 §14, 16-17). Assuming
that these differences do not merely reflect changes in artistic convention, these
murals seem to indicate a shift from preference for the semi-circular blade to the
broader "epsilon" blade from the early to the late Middle Kingdom. Since the
broad-blade axe-head was larger and required more bronze, this shift would be
consistent with the greater availability and reduced expense of bronze in the latter
Middle Kingdom. While some axemen are shown with no shield, carrying their
axes with both hands, most carry shield and axe (BH 1 §47).
During the late Middle Kingdom we find the first evidence of a new type of
weapon, the mace-axe (h3), a mace with a curved axe-blade attached on one side
and extending somewhat down the haft (BAH 38, 69; PSE 15). This weapon is
found in the smiting scene of Amenemhet III {1843-1797}, in which the blade is
deputed in ,i ilillcicnt color than the mace head itself, perhaps indicating it is
composed ol .i Tll.i.m in. iter la! (TKM 150-1). It continued in use into the New
Kingdom | posi 1
I 'I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Daggers (BAH 39, pi. 4-5, 13; LA 1:1113-16, 4:109-13)
Flint knives remained in widespread use during the Middle Kingdom in Egypt, as
reflected in the numerous depictions of the use of such weapons in the martial
murals of Beni Hasan (BH 3 §9-10; FP 49-50). One tomb scene depicts an
organized factoiy producing flint knives (BH 3:34-7, §8-10). Double-edged
bronze daggers, with reinforcing ribs down the center of the blade, were widely
known in Canaan and Syria during the Middle Bronze Age (AW 1:61, 174-5;
MW 1:102—42, 2:387—514). A Canaanite warrior is shown with a sling in one
hand and a bronze dagger in the other (BH 1 §47), while each of the four cow
ering Canaanites in Amenemhet Ill's smiting scene holds a bronze dagger (TEM
150—1). Some of these bronze weapons made their way into Egypt as imports or
plunder (ECI 79), where the dagger was known as b(3)gsw (EG 511, sign T8; EAE
2:407-8). It is uncertain when during the Middle Kingdom the Egyptians began
producing their own bronze daggers imitating these Canaanite models. Bronze
daggers were none the less rare enough during the Middle Kingdom that few
Egyptian warriors are shown with them. One Egyptian soldier, armed with
shield and broad axe, seems to have a bronze dagger in his belt (BH 1 §47)
Another seems to be dispatching an enemy prisoner with a dagger thrust (BH ?
§5). Despite the occasional appearance of this new bronze dagger, it is likely that
the average Egyptian soldier continued to use the much less expensive flint
weapons.
Clubs or fighting sticks (EAE 2:410; SGAE 80-7)
Clubs or fighting sticks (mks) — also sometimes called parrying sticks — were widely
used as weapons, as indicated on the murals of Beni Hasan, in which a long narrow
club with a slightly curved and knotted head is used (BE1 1 §16; 2 §5, 15). I will
use the English terms clubs and fighting sticks interchangeably here to describe tin-
Egyptian mks. Some fighting sticks have hand-guards on the haft of the weapon.
One function of the club was parrying the enemy's blows, be it from club, axe oi
spear. Some soldiers are depicted as double-armed with either axe or short spear/
javelin and fighting-stick (BH 1 §16). On the other hand, the weapons were also
clearly used to strike the enemy with the end of the curved head, rather like the
perpendicular projecting end of some old-fashioned walking sticks, which was
often sharpened at the end of the curve to maximize damage.
Slings (FP 35; BAH 32; LA 5:656)
Slings have been known since Neolithic times. They are quite simple to make
consisting merely of a pouch attached to two long straps; in antiquity they wen
known to have been made of leather, papyrus, or linen. On the other hand, tin
sling is quite difficult to master, requiring years of practice lm lull proficiency
During the Old and Middle Bronze Ages slingers generally cast nuks annul tin
\ >(.
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
size of a tennis ball. The sling made its first appearance as a significant weapon
among the Egyptians in the martial murals from the tombs of Beni Hasan (AW 10;
BH 1 §47; AAK 2/1.10; FP 35). It is perhaps not coincidental that the weapon is
associated with Canaanite mercenaries serving the Egyptians (BH 1 §47), since the
weapon was a favorite of nomads. While several Canaanite mercenaries are shown
with slings, only one native Egyptian is using the weapon (BH 2 §1 5b); the
people in a besieged city are shown throwing, not slinging, rocks (BH 1 §14; BH 2
§15). In the siege scene at Beni Hasan slingers are shown standing behind the
archers, possibly indicating that their effective range was greater than that of the
Egyptian bow (BEI 2 §15b). These slings have rather short straps, perhaps 60 cm
long.
Shields and armor (LA 2:1113-15, 4:665-6, 5:626-1)
The martial murals of the tombs of Beni Hasan depict most close-combat soldiers
carrying a wood and animal-skin shield (ikm) (AW 1:159). This is confirmed by
the model soldiers from the tomb of Mesehi (TEM 108—11). The shields are
almost rectangular, square at the bottom and gently tapering to a point at the top,
presumably allowing troops with locked shields still to see around the curved
corners of the top. The shields were made of wood, or a wooden frame covered
with animal skins, with a crossbeam handle about third of the way down. The
soldiers held the shields in their left hands by the crossbeam, with their hands held
upright at the elbow. Leather straps could be attached to the handles allowing
shields to be slung on the shoulders when soldiers needed to use both hands
(FWW 34; AE 1:14). The shields were generally about a meter tall and 60 cm
wide - big enough to cover the soldier from his neck to his knees. The tomb of
Nakht contains replicas of the arms of an Egyptian soldier, including half-size
shields, spears, and two bows. 19
Larger, full-body-length shields were also known; a company of about thirty
I Egyptian soldiers with spears and large, body-size shields is shown in the funerary
reliefs of AJditoy {c. 2000} (AAK 2/1.15). However, these seem to have fallen out
of fashion, probably due to their excessive weight, and are rarely depicted during
most of the Middle Kingdom (AW 1:13; FP 52; BAH 23). Soldiers are universally
depicted dressed only in loincloths, and are often barefoot, though mention is
made of soldiers wearing sandals (AEAB 53; CT 23; AEL 2:172). There are no
hi viving examples in Egyptian art or archaeology of helmets (dbn) or body armor
(mss) before the New Kingdom (LA 4:665-6, 2:1113-15; FP 55-8). Some sol-
dins, often archers, are depicted wearing leather straps on their shoulders that
>■ ioss in the middle of the chests, or are connected to a belt-like harness (BH 2 §5,
17; AW 1 :159, 163); these leather bands might have provided some type of armor-
like protection. The Egyptian model soldiers from Meshi's tomb wear white
loincloths, while tin* Nubian archers have red loincloths decorated with large
I'.n'ni diamonds h ma\ he that different companies wore different colored loin-
i lot hs as ,ii i ■ i i I nit
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Training
The Egyptians recognized that new army recruits needed training before being
sent to combat. The First Intermediate Period nomarch Kay described his policy:
"I recruited [the city's] draftees of young men in order that its levees be
numerous ... I trained my draftees of young men and went to fight along with
[the army of] my city" (ECI 73). Training exercises included the sport of wrestling
which was depicted on the walls of several tombs from Beni Hasan. 20 Wrestlers are
shown on panels which may indicate a sequence of wrestling moves, rather like a
modern cartoon strip. These include body grappling, leg and arm holds, and trying
to throw the opponent to the ground. These tomb murals depict dozens of different
wrestling techniques, indicating that this martial sport was quite sophisticated. On
the tomb of Sonebi, one wrestler taunts another; "Please be patient! And you'll see
yourself on your face!" to which his opponent replies, "I'll bring you that! Look,
I'll make you fall on your face!" With one wrestler down, the victor cries, "Don't
boast! Look how we're here! Look at you!" (VAE 79—81). As depicted in the
tombs at Beni Hasan, soldiers would train by lifting and swinging bags of sand,
presumably increasing the weight of the bags as their strength increased (FP 84).
Stick fighting, both for training in using the club and for combat with axes, is
known from depictions in the early New Kingdom, but undoubtedly had its ori-
gins in the Middle Kingdom, if not earlier (SGAE 78—89). Target practice for
archery training is known from at least the Old Kingdom, as indicated by a frag-
mentary relief from Lisht (SGAE 34; BAH 54); most of the evidence for archery
practice, however, comes from the later New Kingdom (SGAE 35—46; LA
5:1161-9). Combat training was also associated with funeral games, as described in
the "Instructions of Amenemhet".
Make for me mourning, such as was never heard,
For so great a combat [at funeral games] had not yet been seen!
If one fights in the arena, forgetful of the past,
Success will elude him who ignores what he should know. (AEL 1:136-7)
The social importance of military skills and combat is reflected in the funeran
monuments of the period. Many of the nomarchs emphasized their individual
martial prowess in their funerary inscriptions (AEAB 25-6, 28, 30). Ameny, son of
Montuwoser, boasts: "I am a man of the army, who attacks the [enemy] hero |in
battle], but who loves life and hates death" (VAE 96). Djari, commander in i In-
time of Antef II, emphasized that he was "calm at the moment of blows" in battli
(AEAB 41). A rare glimpse into the views of the common soldier is found in thi
stele of Fengu from Naqada, near Thebes. He is shown carrying a bow and a sh< i
of arrows, and boasts: "I am the bravest of the brave, the swiftest of the swift. Tin
Overseer of the Priests, Wcscr sent me on all kinds of missions, and 1 retunx
safely" (AEAB 35). Another soldier named Ankhn likewise boasted du his fimci.il
stele: "I am a brave one who beats one braver than himself" (AHAB 103, 104)
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
Overall, the evidence from the Middle Kingdom demonstrates that the Egyp-
tian army was not a haphazard, ill-trained, and undisciplined rabble. Rather, there
were formal policies of recruitment and training in a number of different weapons and
combat techniques, with social standards stressing the importance of martial skill.
Combat (LA 6:1429-30)
Historical sources during the Middle Kingdom generally fail to provide details of
actual combat. To understand what actually happened when Egyptian armies
fought we must turn to literature and art. In the tale of his adventures, Sinuhe
gives a poetic tribute to the martial skills of Senwosret I {1971/1962-1928}, in
which he alludes to the major phases of Egyptian combat.
He [Senwosret I] is a god without peer . . .
He is lord of knowledge, wise planner, skilled leader . . .
He was the smiter of foreign lands,
While his father [Amenemhet I] stayed in the palace [during the co-regency],
He [Senwosret] reported to him on commands carried out.
He is a champion who acts with his arm,
A fighter who has no equal,
When seen engaged in archery,
Or when joining the [hand-to-hand] melee.. . .
His enemies [do not have the chance] to marshal their troops;
Vengeful, he smashes foreheads;
No one can stand against him [in battle].
Wide-striding he smites the fleeing [enemy],
There is no escape for [the enemy] who turns his back [to flee];
Steadfast in the time of attack,
He makes [the enemy] show his back [in retreat]
But does not show his own back [by fleeing from the enemy]
Stouthearted when he sees the mass [of the enemy battle line]
He is bold, descending on the Easterners
His joy is to plunder the [barbarian] bowmen.
Grasping his shield he tramples [the enemy] under foot,
I le needs no second blow to kill;
None can escape his arrow,
No [other] can draw his bow.
The [barbarian] bowmen flee before him,
As before the power of a great [god]
I [e lights as he plans [the battle]
Unconcerned about all else
[ a i larger of the frontiers,
I h' will conquer the southern (Nubian] lands,
I'lion^li lie Ins not [yct| considered the northern [Canaanite] lands,
I >s
!.•«»
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
He was begotten to smite the Canaanites
And to trample the Sand-dwellers. 21
Here we see all the elements of a typical Egyptian campaign: the divine impri-
mature given the king by the gods, preliminary orders from the king, military
planning, marshaling of troops, archery exchanges followed by bloody melees, the
pursuit and execution of the defeated enemy, and the collection of plunder. A
victorious campaign was followed by a victory triumph as the army and fleet
returned home. After one victory, the Egyptian army and fleet "returned by river and
landed in Herakleopolis and the [whole] city rejoiced . . . women and men together,
old men and boys. The son of the lord reached the city and entered his father's
court. He brought back those [of the army] who had left home [for battle] and he
buried those [who had died in battle] who had no sons [to bury them]" (MKT 23).
Provincial regiments would mobilize in their home nomes, then march or sail
to the frontier fortress where the royal army was assembling. For campaigns into
Canaan, this tended to be Sile (Tell Abu Sefa) or one of the other north-east
frontier fortresses at the beginning of the "Way of Horus" which led across
northern Sinai into Canaan. For Nubian wars, the royal assembly was generally at
Aswan. Thereafter, when in enemy territory, Egyptian armies often made fortified
camps as bases (AF 29; VAE 95-6). Unfortunately we have no illustrations of foi
tified camps from the Middle Kingdom; although Tomb 17 at Beni Hasan shows a
portable shrine, offering table and supplies (or offerings?) (BH 2 §15c), there is no
indication of camp fortifications. New Kingdom murals, especially the Kadesh
reliefs of P^amses II, show many details of Egyptian fortified camps which may
reflect earlier Middle Kingdom practices (EAE 2:219-21; AW 1:236-7).
The Coffin Texts allude occasionally to combat, complementing the order ofbattl)
described by Sinuhe. Combat begins with an exchange of missile fire, followed h\
an advance by melee troops. "The bowmen shot him [the enemy], [then] the spearmen
felled him" (CT 1127); this text may imply that it was not necessarily expected th.n
arrows alone would kill the enemy. Troops are described as advancing into oncoini 1 1
archery: "if you [the enemy] should come against me or if an arrow should com
miss, and continue its course behind me, then Apep will thrust at you [with hi
spear]" (CT 1145). Daggers are drawn in the ensuing melee; a personified weapoi
proclaims: "I am the spear which is in the hand which is stabbed at those who ai
below ... 1 am the knife which pierces the middle of his head" (CT 1141). 1 h l
is sometimes signaled by weapons breaking in the midst of combat: "my knifl
broken, my shield is split" (CT 1021), mourns a defeated soldier. The victor
the other hand, rejoice with brutal rituals of triumph: "I will cut off your head'
you who oppose my path; I will lift up your heads on my hands" (CT 660).
Military themes in the "Tale of Sinuhe" 2
The "Tale of Sinuhe" is perhaps the most celebrated ancient Kuyptun story,
provides the most detailed description of hand to hand combat Mom ,uni<
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
Egypt. There is some controversy as to the historicity of the tale, but whether
fiction, embellished history, or an authentic autobiography, it is generally agreed
that the text has historical verisimilitude.
Sinuhe was a "follower" (smsw) in the palace of Amenemhet I {1991-1962} a
mixture of courtier, staff officer, retainer, and bodyguard. Sinuhe was on an
expedition against Libya with the heir apparent Senwosret I when the pharaoh was
assassinated {1962}. Upon overhearing secret word of the coup, Sinuhe ? s "heart
failed", fearing that he might be executed as a supporter of Senwosret I if the
assassins were successful in usurping power. He therefore abandoned his master
Senwosret I, making his way to the borders of Egypt and thence into Byblos and
Qedem m modern Lebanon, where he spent half a year until he was enlisted in the
service of an Amonte bedouin chief, Amunenshi, the "ruler of northern Retjenu
ICanaa.nl" (TS 28-9), who wished to establish good relations with Egypt (TS 31)
Sinuhe married Amunenshi's eldest daughter and became a wealthy leader and
warlord of the nomadic Amorite tribe (TS 31-2).
As a champion warrior of Amunenshi's tribe, Sinuhe was eventually challenged
to single combat by a rival "hero of [another tribe of the] Retjenu ... a peerless
( hampion, who had subjugated all the land. He said he would fight with me
[Sinuhe], and planned to rob me, to plunder my cattle" (TS 32), apparently in
revenge for earlier nomadic raiding by Sinuhe, or perhaps to resolve a long-
undmg blood-feud. Sinuhe responded to the challenge: "If he has the will to
I ight, let him speak his wish! Does God not know what he has fated [for victory or
defeat m combat]?" (TS 33). What follows is the most detailed description of
personal combat we have in Egyptian literature.
At night [before the combat] I strung my bow [pit] and tested my arrows
sharpened my [bronze] dagger \b3gsw] and polished my weapons. At dawn, all
Ketenu [Canaan] had come, having incited its tribes and gathered its neigh-
boring peoples, intent on this combat He came toward me while I waited,
having placed myself near him. Every heart [of the people of my tribe] burned
lor me; the women jabbered [in anxiety]. All hearts ached for me, thinking,
"Is there another champion [as mighty as Sinuhe] who could fight him?"
(AEL 1:228, TS 33)
he duel began at a distance, with an exchange of missiles. While keeping at
i mum missile range to minimize the effect, Sinuhe let his opponent exhaust his
lipply ofjavelins and arrows, which Sinuhe dodged or knocked aside with his shield.
I [e raised his battleaxe \minb] and shield, while his armful ofjavelins [nywy]
Bew toward me. When I made his [missile] weapons attack me, I let his
■ mows pass me by without effect, one following the other. (AEL 228)
' '■'"■'■'■'"«■ ,| ""< -•• ."Mird with both axe and shield, which he holds
1,1 |H| lnl " i ! ">'.l'i "-'"d fnv to throw several javelins. This
Ml
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
combination of axe and javelin is depicted several times on the Beni Hasan murals
(BH 1 §14, 16).
Then, [when he was out of missiles] , he charged me, and I shot him, my
arrow sticking in his neck. He screamed and fell on his face; I slew him with
his [own] axe. I gave my war cry, standing on his back, while every Easterner
[in my tribe] bellowed [in triumph]. (AEL 228)
As any pious Egyptian should, Sinuhe gave thanks to the gods, the true authors
of his victory, after which he collected the spoils.
I gave praise to [the Egyptian war god] Mont, while [my dead enemy's] peo-
ple mourned him. The [Canaanite] ruler Amunenshi [Sinuhe's father-in-law],
took me in his arms. Then I carried off [my enemy's] goods; I plundered his
cattle. What he had meant to do to me I did to him. I took what was in his
tent; I stripped his camp. Thus I became great, wealthy in goods, rich in
herds. It was the [war] god [Mont] who acted [to grant me victory in battle |.
(AEL 228)
The parallels between this story and the more famous tale of David and Goliad i
(1 Samuel 17) are quite remarkable. In both we see the challenge from a mighty
enemy champion, whom only the hero dared face. In both, the weapons are pre
pared and described before battle. The enemy is wounded and felled by a missile
and then dispatched with his own weapon. Victory in battle is attributed to God,
and leads ultimately to wealth and power. Parallels to single-combat narratives in
Homer also abound. 23 Such narratives probably reflect a widespread shared mili
tary culture, in which single combat to the glory of the gods and the plundering of
a dead enemy's property were standard practices. They also reflect an oral military
culture, in which such deeds were remembered and glorified in oral tales and
poems, most of which are forever lost. In this sense Homer should be considered
to represent the end of this Bronze Age Near Eastern epic tradition, rather than tin-
beginning of Greek literature.
Despite his wealth and power in his adopted homeland, Sinuhe still longed foi
Egypt. From the Egyptian perspective, non-Egyptians were too culturally different
to be fully integrated with Egyptians. Sinuhe, who had sojourned for many year
among the Canaanite nomads, described this difference as a state of nature: "no
barbarian [from Canaan] can ever ally with a Delta man [from Egypt]; what can
establish the papyrus on the mountain?" (TS 33). Eventually a letter arrived from
king Senwosret, assuring Sinuhe that he was forgiven and welcome at court, an<1
encouraging him to return to Egypt, which he did (TS 35—9). He was honored 1>
the king and welcomed by his old friends in astonishment: 'look, Sinn lie hi
returned as an Easterner, an offspring of the nomads!" (TS 40—1). A key com < i
of Sinuhe was that he should receive a proper burial in Egypi (TS tt>, I ! '-), m.in
Egyptian soldiers on foreign campaigns may have shared a simil.u aimetv th.ii
"their death might occur in a foreign country, where Easterners will lay them to
rest" (TS 36) without the proper tomb and funerary rituals to insure a happy
afterlife. Making offerings at the funerals of old war companions seems to have
been part of a soldier's religious responsibilities. The funeral stele of Ded-Iqu
records that "the soldiers serving [with me for] his majesty [king Senwosret I]
presented things [at the tomb] to my ka [the departed spirit of the dead]"
(AEA 93).
Depictions of combat in martial art (BSMK)
The tombs of the nomarchs at Beni Hasan in middle Egypt provide the best
military art of the Middle Kingdom period. 24 Of particular interest for military
history are four tombs:
• Khety (Tomb 17); 25
• Baqet III (Tomb 15); 26
• Amenemhet (Tomb 2); 27
• Khnumhotep (Tomb 14). 28
The precise dating of most of the tombs is uncertain, but it appears that tombs 15
and 17 date from the Eleventh Dynasty in the late First Intermediate Period {c.
2050-2000}, while tombs 2 and 15 date to the early Twelfth Dynasty {c. 2000-
1950} (EAE 1:175-7). The scenes in the tombs are somewhat stylized, with
similar layouts and themes, but significant differences in detail merit close atten-
tion. The tomb murals are divided into between six and nine registers, with
wrestling scenes on the upper registers and combat on the lower. Tomb 2 has three
registers of wrestling, two of combat and one of boats; Tomb 15 has six of wres-
tling and three of combat; Tomb 17 five wrestling and three combat. Tombs 2, 15
.ind 17 all show siege scenes on the left side of the murals, which will be discussed
<n\ pp. 447-50.
The murals depict a wide variety of Egyptian soldiers with a number of differ-
nt weapons and functions. Unfortunately, most of the soldiers are shown simply
marching into battle. None the less, assuming that the proportion of troop types
icllects the real military situation as opposed to artistic convention, we can get a
l. el for the rough proportions of troop types in an early Middle Kingdom army,
lid the nature of Egyptian combat. The Beni Hasan tombs can be supplemented
ith a war scene from the tomb of Antef of Thebes {c. 2100}.
Antef{c. 2 WO} 29
\ithl s tomb depicts an assault on a Canaanite city, which will be discussed in the
<■< Hon on sicgeerali on pp. 117 50. I fere, the composition of the Egyptian army will
he summarized. The top two panels show the assault on the Canaanite city (Figure 1 1,
p I 17). the middle p.m. 1 -.Imus .nmh.it between Egyptians and Canaanites, while
132
\ ■> I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
the last two panels show Egyptians carrying off prisoners after their victory. All of
the soldiers are wearing the typical Egyptian white kilt; some have straps crossing
their chests and some have headbands; none, however, has any body armor or
helmet. The middle panel, which I interpret to depict open combat before the
siege, shows the Egyptian army in victory. Three Canaanites, bound with a single
long rope, are marched to the rear by an Egyptian with an axe. The center of the
panel depicts the combat. Two Canaanites lie on the ground with their pointed
rectangular shields and a javelin scattered around them. A wounded Canaanite is
being dispatched by an Egyptian with an axe. An Egyptian shoots his bow behind
two duels: in both scenes the Egyptians hold the Canaanites by their hair as they
strike them with an axe and what appears to be a dagger. To the rear, five Canaa-
nites flee. One, wounded by three arrows, is helped by a comrade. Three others, in
striped kilts with short thrusting spears or javelins and the standard Canaanite
shield, withdraw in good order. There are a total of twenty-three Egyptian soldiers
depicted in the assault (the first two panels), of whom five are climbing the siege
tower armed with axes. Of the remaining eighteen, six (33 percent) are archers
while twelve are melee troops. Of the melee troops, half have shields and half do
not,, Two of the soldiers have spears, and two have fighting sticks; the rest (66 percent),
are armed with axes, which are evenly divided between the broad-axe and the
semi-circular axe blade. Two also have bronze daggers. Three of the archers seem
to have a type of quiver-box for their arrows, which appears to be freestanding,
and set upright on the ground allowing the archer to draw arrows to shoot. The
prisoner panel shows three archers and five axemen; the middle panel three axes,
one archer and one man with a melee weapon which is damaged; from the posture
and thrust of the Egyptians it appears to be a dagger. Thus, the overall proportion
is about one-third archers and two-thirds axemen.
Baqet III, Tomb 15
{late Eleventh Dynasty, c. 2050-2000} (BH 2 §5)
Tomb 15, from the late Eleventh Dynasty, shows the greatest number of soldiers, a
total of 81, whose armament can be determined. 30 Of these, ten (12 percent) are
involved with logistical support, bringing bundles of spears, bows, or arrows to the
troops at the front lines; however, one of these is also armed with a bow, while two
have fighting sticks, indicating that these troops were only temporarily involve. I
with logistical support. This leaves 74 soldiers with distinguishable weapons. (
these, twenty-six are archers (35 percent), thirty-one are armed with fighting
sticks (42 percent), nine are armed with spears (12 percent), six with axes (8 pei
cent), and two with daggers (3 percent).
These broad weapon categories can be farther broken down into small, t
groups. Of the thirty-one men armed with fighting-sticks, eight (25 percent) h*\
shields. Fourteen of the shieldless men are shown wielding their hghting stick
with one hand, while nine use two hands, probably reflecting different phases m
techniques of stick fighting. Of the nine spearmen, two have ,i speai and a < luh
'
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
two have a spear and a shield, and five have pikes wielded with two hands. Three
of the six axemen have shields, while three carry the axe alone. Neither man with
a dagger has a shield or any other weapon. Only twelve of the 74 soldiers
have shields (15 percent), of whom seven have clubs, two have spears, one has an
axe, and two have either an axe or a fighting stick. Shields thus seem to be scattered
among the troops in rough proportion to the overall number of weapons of
each type.
Fifteen different melee duels are depicted in Tomb 15 (BH 2 §5), A third of the
duels are between men armed only with clubs, mostly swung with two hands. In
three instances a soldier has grabbed the fighting stick of his opponent by the haft.
One of the combatants has a shield in only three of the fifteen melees; in no melee
do both combatants have shields. This overall proportion of shielded melee duels
(20 percent) is roughly the same as the total proportion of shielded men depicted
on the murals (15 percent), which would seem to imply that shield-bearing war-
riors were not specifically organized to fight a greater share of melee combat.
Indeed, the overall impression of the mural is that, while the archers are organized
into special units, the melee troops seem to have a random mix of all types of
melee weapons.
Three duels show a soldier holding his opponent by the hair while attempting
to strike him. Another three depict combat between people with different types of
weapons. The first shows a man with shield and fighting stick against an opponent
with only an axe. In the second, a man with a shield and a stick faces a man with a
spear wielded with two hands. Finally, a man with a shield and an axe (or a club?)
faces a man armed only with a fighting stick. Two battle scenes show fighting
between more than one combatant. A man with a pike has stabbed one enemy
who is collapsing onto the ground, while a second enemy with a fighting stick has
grasped the middle of the spear and prepares to strike the spearman. A four- way
combat is also depicted: a kneeling man is grasped by the hair by an enemy who is
about to strike him with a club; a man with a shield and a stick rushes to the
kneeling man's rescue, but is held at bay by a man with a pike held with both
hands who stands behind his companion, with the pike extending beyond him and
defending him (BH 2 §5c).
Two of the duels are between an unarmed man and an opponent armed with a
dagger. In the first, the attacker holds his victim by the arm or hair as he thrusts a
digger into his stomach. The second scene is somewhat ambiguous. An Egyptian
appears to have a bronze dagger which he is thrusting into the face of an unarmed
I anaanite, who is grabbing the Egyptian by the forearm; it is unclear if this is a
fight, or if the Egyptian is attempting to help a wounded Canaanite. At any rate,
the fact that both dagger combats show unarmed opponents might indicate that
i lie daggers were generally used more for mopping-up operations than for actual
i ij'.liting. In the final two melees a man with a club is beating a fallen enemy, using
,i double-handed blow in both cases, implying that, in the hands of a properly
n ai ned Egyptian warrior, the war-club was at the very least enough to disable an
i nemy or render him unconscious.
m
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Khety, Tomb 17 {late Eleventh Dynasty, c. 2050-2000}
(BH 2 §15; AW 1:158-9)
The second late Eleventh Dynasty tomb belonged to the nomarch Khety. Here, of
a total of 67 Egyptians with discernable weapons, there are eighteen archers and
one slinger (28 percent), forty-one men with shields (60 percent), and eight men
with spears and no shield (12 percent), six of whom have fighting sticks as well.
There are finally four men in the rear carrying bundles of extra weapons to the
fighters. The forty-one men with shields carry one of three melee weapons: club,
axe, or javelin. Twenty-three have clubs (57 percent), and thirteen have axes (33
percent), most of which seem to be the smaller, semi-circular "eye"-style axe-head
typical of the Old Kingdom, although two or three of the axe-heads may be the
broad- axe more characteristic of the later Middle Kingdom. Only four have jave-
lins (10 percent). Additionally there are eight other melee soldiers without shields,
all armed with spears, six of whom have fighting sticks as well. This means that of
the total of forty-nine melee soldiers — shielded and unshielded — roughly half have
clubs, a quarter axes and a quarter spears.
Amenemhet, Tomb 2 {early Twelfth Dynasty, c. 2000-1950}
(BH 1 §14-16)
The early Twelfth Dynasty Tomb 2 shows a total of thirty-three armed Egyptian
soldiers (BH 1 §16). Of these, eleven are archers (33 percent), seven are armed
with axe and shield (21 percent), with another four (15 percent) armed with axe
and javelin or short spear, and one with axe and fighting-stick. One of these axe-
men has two javelins, indicating these weapons were be thrown, as was the case
with Sinuhe's opponent described above (TS 33). On the other hand, two men are
shown fencing with these javelins, indicating they could be used in the melee as
well. This gives a total of twelve men armed with axes (35 percent); all of these
axes are the larger broad-headed style. All men with shields also have axes,
although one-third of the men with axes do not have a shield. The final six men
are armed with one of two types of spear, but no shield. Of these, two are armed
with javelins and fighting-sticks, one with a javelin alone, one with a pike wielded
with two hands, and two with unclear weapons which are either javelins or longer
pikes. Thus, in summary, about one-third of the army is comprised of archers,
one-third axemen (of whom two-thirds have shields and one-third javelins and
axes), and one-third javelins or lances without shields. Only three actual melee
duels are depicted in Tomb 2. In the first a man wields a pike with two hands
against an enemy with a shield and an axe. The second duel is between two men,
each armed with javelin and fighting-stick. In the third a man with two fighting-
sticks is beating an enemy who has fallen to the ground; the fallen man is sup-
ported by an archer in the rear shooting arrows at his attacker.
Thus, although the overall format of the brittle scene in e;uli tomb is similar and
stylized, the specific armament shown is quite distinct. Assuming these differences
I
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
are due to the artists accurately reflecting changes in real armament, we can spec-
ulate that the army in Tomb 15 (BH 2 §5) represents a late First Intermediate
Period provincial army composed largely of poorly armed irregular militia. The
limited resources available to a provincial nomarch perhaps explains the prevalence
of fighting-sticks (42 percent) and the limited number of bronze weapons (23
percent). It is also likely that not all of the spearheads are, in fact, made of bronze;
some were likely made of flint, and therefore the number of men armed with
bronze weapons in Tomb 15 was probably less than 20 percent. The limited
number of bronze weapons in Tomb 15 may also reflect the ongoing transition
from Old to Middle Bronze Age armies, with bronze still relatively rare and
expensive.
Table 17.1 summarizes the differences in troop and weapon types found in the
Beni Hasan tombs over the course of 100 to 150 years {c. 2050-1950}.
A number of interesting characteristics appear from this chart. First, the per-
centage of archers remains relatively constant in all the murals, at about one-third
of each army. Fighting sticks outnumber axes and spears two-to-one in Tomb 15;
in Tomb 17 the proportion has become essentially even, with about a third of the
army being archers, a third having clubs and a third having axes or spears. By the
early Twelfth Dynasty Tomb 2, however, the fighting-stick has almost disappeared,
to be replaced by an even proportion of axes and spears. The proportion of axes
has nearly quadrupled from Tomb 1 5 to Tomb 2, and, furthermore, all the axes of
Tomb 2 are the of broad-head type, which probably required almost twice as
much bronze to make. During the same period the number of spearmen has
almost tripled. The differences between the armies depicted in the tombs probably
reflect the transition from a proto-Bronze Age army of the First Intermediate
Period to a true Bronze Age army of the Middle Kingdom. On the other hand,
the earlier tomb of Antef has more bronze weapons that the subsequent Inter-
mediate Period tombs, a percentage that is surpassed by the period of Tomb 2. It
may thus be that the late Old Kingdom, with its control of Sinai and international
trade, had greater access to bronze weapons. The First Intermediate Period saw a
temporary decline in the availability of bronze weapons, which was restored only
by the beginning of the Middle Kingdom.
Table 17.1 Types of troops and weapons found at Beni Hasan tombs {c. 2050—1950}
I hop /weapon type
Antef
Baquet
Khety
Amenemhet
(Tomb
15)
(Tomb 17)
(Tomb 2)
archers
33%
35%
26%
32%
fighting-sticks ( clubs)
11%
43%
37%
-
axes
44%
9%
19%
34%
;p< .11%
11%
13%
18%
34%
shields
38%
1 5%
60%
24%
"n hmn/r wo.ipons
55%
22%)
37%
68%
1 .
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Mercenaries in the Beni Hasan murals
Though most of the soldiers depicted at Beni Hasan are Egyptians, there are a
number of mercenaries involved in combat. Eleven Canaanite mercenaries are
depicted in the mural of Tomb 15. Of these, three have slings, one has an axe and a
shield, and two are unclear. Several three- to six-man groups of either Canaanite
or Libyan mercenaries are depicted wearing bright, multi-color striped loincloths
and armed with bow, axe, sling, and bronze dagger (BH 1 §16, 47; BH 2 §5b— c).
The three Canaanite mercenaries in Tomb 14 are double-armed: one with both
sling and bow, another with a bow and an axe, and a third with a sling and a
dagger - none has a shield (BH 1 §47). Another similar company of Canaanites
includes warriors with a sling and a bow, an axe and a bow, and a bronze dagger
and a bow (BH 2 §5c). This implies that at least some Canaanites served as both as
missile and close-combat troops, again paralleling the weapons and tactics attrib-
uted to Sinuhe's challenger (TS 33). Three of the Canaanites, again in brightly-
colored kilts, are shown armed with broad, curved war-clubs or axes, along with
short-spears or bronze axes (BH 1 §16 = AW 1:169). The structure of the curved
weapon is unclear here, but in the Beni Hasan tomb of Khnumhotep III, a
Canaanite has a similar weapon which clearly curves into a broad axe-head which
is structurally different from the haft (AW 1:166—7). Some of the archers appear
from their red kilts or loin-cloths — as opposed to the usual Egyptian white kilt —
and their darker skin color to be Nubians (BH 2 §15a-b; AW 1:158-9). In Tomb
17 there are two squads of Canaanite mercenaries, four of them slingers and five
armed with axes (BH 2 §15b). Of the five axemen, one has either a club or a sling
along with his axe. The other four have rectangular shields with triangular
indentations on the top and bottom and four corners projecting outwards. The
shape appears to be based on an animal skin with the four projecting corners being
the four shoulders of the legs, vaguely reminiscent of Tuareg ayar shields. 31
There are a couple of scenes showing activities in the rear of the battle line. All
the murals show columns of soldiers marching forward into battle from the rear.
Logistical support of troops on the front line is reflected in several of the scenes,
with soldiers in the rear carrying large animal skin packets filled with extra javelins,
bows, and arrows to soldiers in the front lines (BH 1 §47, 2 §5b, 15c, 16; BAH 45, 52).
Corpses are shown being dragged into piles or lines, and perhaps plundered (BH 1
§47, 2 §5c. 15b); some wounded men appear to be receiving the coup de grace (BH
2 §5c, 15c). A portable tabernacle with an altar table has been set up in the rear,
where offerings have been presented to the gods, and a cow is being sacrificed before
battle (BH 2 §15c), emphasizing the ever-present need of the aid of the gods.
Tomb of the Warriors (SNN)
The "Tomb of the Warriors" provides us with some rather gruesome detailed
evidence on the nature of Middle Bronze Age warfare. The tomb contained sixty
corpses, all killed in battle in the time of Montuhotep I [2061 201 I J, ami
I ;:
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
apparently buried simultaneously as casualties from the same battle (SSN 7).. After
nearly four thousand years the corpses were still sufficiently preserved to allow
forensic analysis of their wounds and causes of death. The Egyptian soldiers, who,
like soldiers in most ages, were probably larger and stronger than the average
Egyptian, would be considered short by modern standards; the average height of
the warriors in the tomb was about 1.6 meters (SSN 7). Some of the soldiers were
obviously veterans, with "old, long-healed wounds" (SSN 9).
According to Winlock, ten soldiers showed signs of having been wounded by
ebony-tipped reed arrows — the actual number was undoubted higher due to flesh
wounds which were no longer recognizable, and the probability that many arrows
and arrowheads had either been removed or had fallen from the corpses (SSN 11—
13, pi. 7). One of the arrows entered the chest and transfixed the lung and heart
(SSN 12, pi. 7D) 9 indicating that Egyptian archery was powerful enough to
penetrate deeply and kill. The line of trajectory of several of the arrow wounds
seems to have been from above, indicating that the soldiers were probably killed
while besieging or assaulting a fortress, with the arrows shot from the walls (SSN
13—14). Another eighteen wounds, many of them fatal, were interpreted by
Winlock as being caused by stones thrown or slung from a fortress (SSN 14-15, pi.
8-13). Fifteen of the sixty corpses were dispatched by a coup de grace to the head
from maces, creating traumatic shattering of the skull and facial bones (SSN 16—
17, pi. 9—10). Six bodies showed evidence of having been exposed after combat,
and pecked at by carrion birds, indicating there was some time between their
death and the recovery of the bodies (SSN 18, pi. 12).
Winlock describes his interpretation of the battle in which these soldiers were
killed:
We have some sixty soldiers of the army of King Neb-hepet-Re' [Mon-
tuhotep I], all of whom were either killed or grievously wounded by arrows
and stones hurled from the battlements of a fortress they were attacking or
were dispatched by the garrison during a sortie when their companions had
fled out of range. Then they were torn by vultures, during the lull before the
attackers once more dared come back to the fray. A second assault saw the fall
of the citadel and the defeat of its defenders, when so great was the triumph of
Neb-hepet-Re' that he had all the bodies of his slain soldiers gathered up from
the battlefield, including those half rotted by their exposure since the first
assault.. . . All were borne to Thebes for burial.. . . None had died in hand-to-
hand fights from slashes by axes, probably none were the victims of stabs by
spears and daggers, nor had any of them arms broken by the blows of maces
and clubs. These soldiers were killed and wounded with missiles, and such as
were grievously hurt and were helpless when the garrison made its sortie had
been clubbed to death. (SSN 23)
In all
could b
the investigation of these corpses demonstrates that Egyptian warfare
1'iinil ui.l the overall impression of combat in the martial art of
1 vi
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
the Middle Kingdom, discussed above, is confirmed by Winlock's forensic
analysis.
Fortifications 32
Archaeologically, the building of fortifications is probably the most certain sign of
militarism. If so, then the Middle Kingdom in Egypt was certainly a militaristic
age. A complex system of fortifications (Egyptian mnw) was an integral part of the
overall Middle Kingdom military strategy. There were four zones of Egyptian
fortification activity, corresponding to its four strategic zones: the Nile valley, the
north-eastern Canaanite frontier, the oases of the Western or Libyan Desert, and
the Nubian frontier.
The Nile valley
There are frequent references to fortified cities within the Nile valley, but, unfor-
tunately, millennia of human occupation and flooding by the Nile have erased
most of the archaeological evidence. It is generally assumed that most of the large
cities and great temple complexes were fortified with massive walls. The best sur-
viving remains of city fortifications comes from El Kab (Nekheb), near Edfu,
whose rectangular mud-brick city walls measure nearly 500 X 600 meters, and are
twelve meters thick and eleven meters high (Figure 9, p. 360). 33 The gate complex
is lined with stone for additional strength. In many ways the sacred enclosure of
the temple complex at Abydos (Kom el-Sultan), built by Senwosret I, is a for-
tification, with gates and projecting towers (AEA 3-5; EAE 1:7-12; HEA 3:42-4).
The north-eastern frontier
Despite the obvious military importance of the north-eastern frontier, and
numerous textual references to fortifications there, there is little surviving archae-
ological evidence for Middle Kingdom fortresses from that region. None the less,
textual evidence gives us a basic picture of the nature and function of that fortified
zone. This strategic frontier stretched from the Mediterranean to the Gulf of Suez,
roughly 120 kilometers across. However, the Egyptians made use of the impassible
lakes and marshes to limit the area requiring active defense to roughly half that
distance. The policy of fortifying the eastern frontier seems to have begun in the
reign of Akhtoy III of the Tenth Dynasty of Herakleopolis during the late First
Intermediate Period, who claims to have driven nomads from the eastern fringes
of the Delta (TS 223-4). This policy, however, was rigorously maintained
throughout the Middle Kingdom, and broke down only in the last years of the
Middle Kingdom and the early Second Intermediate Period.
The Egyptians developed a defense in depth, composed of both frontier for-
tresses and fortified cities in the delta. Amenemhet I { 1991-1962} is known as the
builder of one of the most important frontier fortresses oi the age, the "Walls o!
IK)
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
the Ruler", possibly at Wadi Tumilat near the Great Bitter Lake (LA 6:1124-6). Its
precise archaeological identification is uncertain; it could have been a single for-
tress, a series of forts designed to control access into Egypt, or even, in part, a
barrier wall. Another fortress was built at the beginning of the "Ways of Horus",
the military road leading east through the Sinai to Canaan (LA 3:62—4). Again its
exact location is uncertain, but it was probably associated with Sile (Tell Abu Sefa)
(ECI 80; LA 5:946-7). West of the frontier, the major towns of the north-eastern
delta were also fortified, providing a second line of defense against any raiders or
armies who might evade the frontier fortresses.
The Western Desert
During the Middle Kingdom the Western Desert was the least militarily active and
threatening, and consequently the least fortified. Most of the oases that were occupied
by the Egyptians, however, probably had some type of fortification, like those
surviving at the Dakhla oasis (AEA 26). At Wadi Natrun (Qaret el-Dahr), to the west
of the delta, there is a 47 X 59-meter fortress dating to the time of Amenemhet I
{1991-1962} (HEA 3:205-6). A small dry-stone fortress in Wadi el-Hudi was
built to protect the amethyst miners in the Eastern Desert as well (HEA 3:207-8).
The Nubian frontier 54
Archaeologically, the most spectacular surviving Egyptian fortifications are the
four- thousand-year-old "Second Cataract Forts" in central Sudan. Indeed, they
are the finest examples of Bronze Age fortifications anywhere in the world. Tra-
gically they have been submerged and destroyed by the creation of the Aswan
Dam and Lake Nasser in the late 1960s. Before their destruction, however, several
fortresses received careful archaeological and photographic documentation.
Although fortification of the southern frontier of Egypt had begun in Pre-
Dynastic times, the "golden age" of Egyptian fortress building in Nubia was the
Twelfth Dynasty of the Middle Kingdom. The fortifications constructed on the
Kushite frontier were massive, requiring the expenditure of immense resources in
their creation and maintenance, and representing both the need to sustain Egyptian
imperialism in Nubia through military occupation and the significant potential
military threat from the southern kingdom of Kush. The Cataract Forts were not
created in a haphazard manner, but represent a carefully planned defensive system
with four major purposes: 1, to maintain military control over Nubia; 2, to control
trade from Kush into Egyptian Nubia; 3, to prevent raids or major military invasions
from Kush; and 4, to provide bases for possible military intervention south into
Kush. To achieve these goals the Egyptians created four fortress zones in Nubia
(see Map 4, p. 309). 35
The first /one was at the First Cataract, the traditional boundary between Egypt
and Nubia, whi< h had been fortified since Pre -Dynastic times. There were two
major sui \ w mh* l< h ii esses there:
I
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
• Elephantine (Abu), 53 X 53 m (AEA 80-1);
• Senmut (on the island of Biga).
In addition to these fortresses, Senwosret I seems to have built a wall as a barrier to
further control traffic and prevent raids; it was six kilometers long, two meters
thick and six meters high (AEF 71).
The second fortification zone was rather more than 100 kilometers south of
Aswan, where Montuhotep I {2061-2011} and, more extensively, Amenemhet I
{1991-1962} built fortresses at the mouth of Wadi Allaqi to control access to the
gold and copper mining regions to the east. These included:
• Ikkur (Baki), 82 x 1 10 m (AEA 115);
• Kubban (also called Baki), 70 X 125 m (AEA 132);
• Amba (Miam), 87 X 138 m (AEA 18).
The third fortification zone was at the Second Cataract, some 300 kilometers
south of Aswan at the frontier established by Senwosret I {1962-1928}. Forts here
included:
• Faras ("Repelling the Medjay"), 75 x 85 m (AEA 90);
• Serra East ("Embracing the Two Tands"), ? X 80 m (AEA 219);
• Buhen (Buhen), city wall 215 X 460 m; fortress 150 X 170 m (AEA 39-40);
• Khor (Buhen), 250 x 600 m (AEA 125);
• Mirgissa (Iken), 100 X 175 m (AEA 152);
• Dabenarti, 60 X 230 m (AEA 64).
A century later Senwosret's great-grandson and namesake Senwosret III {1878—
1843} created the forth fortress cluster about 100 kilometers further south at
Semna, about halfway between the Second and Third Cataracts. These fortresses,
representing the southernmost extension of Egyptian control in Nubia during the
Middle Kingdom, were:
• Askut ("Removing the Sethi"), 77 x 87 m (AEA 22);
• Shalfak ("Curbing the Countries"), 47 X 95 m (AEA 221);
• Uronarti ("Repelling the Inw"), triangular, 57 X 114 X 126 m (AEA 251);
• Semna ("Khakaure [Senwosret III] is powerful"), 135 x 135 m (AEA 213);
• Kumma ("Warding off the Bows"), 70 X 117 m (AEA 132).
In creating these fortification systems the Egyptians made extensive use of the
defensive potential of geography. The first and third fortification zones wen
respectively at the First and Second Cataracts, where any Nile River traffic
must necessarily stop. Thus, in a sense, the cataracts had already naturally fortified
the river, to which the Egyptians simply added land fortifications. The fourth
zone, at the Semna gorge, was the narrowest point in tin* Nile valley between
1 I >
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
the Second and Third Cataracts. The narrow Semna gorge was ideal for defen-
sive purposes.
Although the building of the Nubian fortifications was associated with the
imperialist policies of specific pharaohs, once built the forts took on a life of their
own, continuing long after the original policies of the kings were abandoned or
transformed by changing circumstances. Many of these forts remained in use for
centuries, and were repaired or expanded a number of times by subsequent kings
(e.g. ARE 1:293). Some of the forts, originally established for purely military
reasons, developed into large cities and became centers of cultural and religious life
in the area. Trade flourished at the forts, with a regular flow of merchandise
between Egypt and Kush. The fortresses of Nubia remained in Egyptian hands
into the early Thirteenth Dynasty, when the kings of Kush conquered Nubia as far
north as Aswan; thereafter the fortresses remained in Kushite hands during most of
the seventeenth and sixteenth centuries (see pp. 459—61). They were eventually
reconquered by the Egyptians during the New Kingdom.
Characteristics of Egyptian forts: the example of Buhen
(FB; BI; AEA 39-40)
Before the flooding of Lake Nasser, the best-preserved Egyptian fortress was Buhen
(Figure 10, p. 444). The excavation and magisterial publication by Emery, Smith
and Millard provides vital archaeological data on the characteristics of Middle
Kingdom Egyptian fortifications. Built by Senwosret I {1971-1928} to con-
solidate his Nubian conquests, the fortress was occupied for centuries and refur-
bished many times. The Buhen fortress complex was built at the Second Cataract,
adding man-made strength to this natural barrier in the Nile. Buhen was actually a
pair - two fortresses on opposite banks of the Nile - to insure that no ship stop-
ping at the Second Cataract could evade Egyptian notice. Modern archaeologists
call these two forts Buhen and Khor, but they were both called Buhen by the
ancient Egyptians, indicating that the Egyptians conceived these two fortresses as a
single fortress system.
Buhen, like the vast majority of Egyptian fortifications, was constructed of
mud-brick, although some other Egyptian forts have stone foundations to give the
fortress greater stability. Like many other Nubian fortresses, Buhen had one wall
against the Nile, allowing direct access to supplies and reinforcements from the
river, again emphasizing the importance of the Nile as the logistical artery of the
Egyptian army. Although Buhen was essentially rectangular in shape, many other
fortresses were irregular, maximizing the defensive qualities of the terrain. The
military engineers at Buhen clearly understood the principle of concentric
fortification. The inner fortress measured 150 X 170 m, with walls five meters
thick and up to eleven meters high, reinforced with wooden beams and reed
mats to increase stability. The walls of other Egyptian fortifications measured as
much as twelve meters thick. Hie defensibility of the walls was increased by reg-
ularly plated siju.ue towers .iiul huge projecting defensive bastions at the corners.
in
\/
R1C0MSTRUCT1ON OF THI
WEST QMW OF
HXONOMETRIC PROJECTION
SCBLE ? 1 1 1 T 1 i i i i - f METRES
F^wre 70 Middle Kingdom Egyptian fortifications at Buhen, Sudan {20-1 8C}. Until its
inundation by Lake Nasser, the Egyptian fortress of Buhen was the best-pre-
served and most complex fortress from the Middle Bronze Age Near East. The
fortress included a dry moat, glacis, concentric walls, projecting towers, postern
gates, arrow slits, crenellation, and a massively fortified gate complex.
Source: Drawing by Walter B. Emery, from Walter B. Emery, H. S. Smith and A. Millard,
The Fortress at Buhen: The Archaeological Report (Excavation* at Hulwti I) (I ondon: The Egvpt
Exploration Society, 1979). Courtesy of the Egypt Exploration Society.
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
Two small gates gave access the Nile, with a huge fortified monumental land-gate
to the west.
This inner wall was surrounded by a second outer wall reinforced with thirty-
two semi-circular towers. These towers had a double-row of loopholes for archers,
angled in such a way as to allow a wide arc of fire. This entire complex was sur-
rounded by a deep dry moat with mud-brick-lined glacis and counterscarp,
creating a triple barrier against any assault. The monumental land-gate had a long
narrow passageway, with tall towers projecting over the dry moat. A drawbridge
on rollers within the gate could be withdrawn, blocking access to the inner gate,
which was closed with heavy wooden doors. It is quite remarkable that by at least
the twentieth century BC the Egyptians had already developed most of the basic
concepts and principles of fortification that would remain foundational to for-
tification engineering until the development of gunpowder weapons nearly 3500
years later.
Garrisons and the Semna military dispatches (SD)
Within the walls of Egyptian fortifications there were a number of different types
of buildings for the administration and maintenance of the fortresses. These
included barracks, houses, and offices for the officers, armories, production areas,
temples or shrines, granaries and supply houses, bakeries, and sometimes gardens.
The frontier fortresses were manned by permanent garrisons which sent out
regular border patrols. There is also evidence of watchtowers to supplement bor-
der patrol observations. When fleeing from the turmoil of a palace coup, Sinuhe
faced the problem of evading the border patrols. When he "reached the Walls of
the Ruler [Amenemhet I], which were made to repel the [raids of] the Syrians and
to crush the Sand-farers. I crouched in a bush for fear of being seen by the guard
on duty upon the wall" (AEL 1:224). When Sinuhe returned to Egypt years later,
he was stopped "at the Ways of Horus", one of the forts on Egypt's north-eastern
border, probably at Sile (Tell Abu Sefa). There the garrison commander,
undoubtedly astonished by a bearded man in bedouin clothing claiming to be an
Egyptian who had been summoned by the king, sent a message to the royal palace
asking what to do (TS 39, 42). These incidents suggest that, while individuals or
small groups could evade the garrisons and border patrols, large raiding parties or
armies would find it difficult to elude the strict Egyptian border garrisons and
patrols.
Eight remarkable military dispatches survive from the Nubian frontier fortresses
during the reign of Amenemhet III {1843—1797}, giving us a glimpse of garrison
organization and administration in the Middle Kingdom. Although written by
officers in the Nubian frontier garrisons to their commanders, copies were kept at
Thebes, indicating "the pervasiveness of the State administration" (VAE 93). Most
of the letters end with the stylized assurance, "All the affairs of the King's
I )omain I if<\ I lealth and Peace [upon liiin| - are safe and sound." The focus of
the surviving letters is on the movement ol Nubians and the nomadic Med jay, and the
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
monitoring of trading activities. Protection from Nubian raiders was obviously i.
high priority, and the frontier troops kept careful watch on population movements
between Nubia and Egypt, with regular patrols describing sightings of people or
even recent tracks in the desert. The fortresses also served as centers of trade, with
the frontier garrison providing security for merchants (AEMK 191).
Nothing seems to be too trivial for recording in the dispatch archives; several
letters mention the movements of only half a dozen Nubians (SD §1, 3, 5). Five
Medjay bedouins, complaining that "the desert is dying of hunger", came to Ele-
phantine begging to be allowed to "serve the Great House [of Egypt]" as mer-
cenaries (SD §5), presumably to keep from starving. Some Nubians were turned
away and not permitted to stay near the Egyptian fortresses (SD §6). Other letters
discuss the arrival and departure of Nubian merchants by boat and donkey to trade
at one of the forts (SD §1, 7). Medjay bedouins were hired as mercenary troops to
patrol the desert against the incursions of other Nubians: "two [Egyptian] guards-
men and seventy [or seven?] JVledj ay-people went following a track [in the
desert]". They captured three Medjay men and three women, who were brought
to the fortress and questioned. "Then I [the fortress commander] questioned these
Medj ay-people, saying, 'Whence have you come?' Then they said, 'We have come
from the Well of Yebheyet' " (SD §3).
The most complete dispatch describes such a tracking expedition which lasted
three days:
Another letter brought to him by the liegeman Ameny who is in [the fortress]
Khesef-Medjaiu ["Repeller of the Medjay" = Faras], being [a message] given
by fortress to fortress. It is a communication to the Lord, may he live, prosp< i
be healthy, to the effect that the soldier Nekhen, Senu's son, Heru's son
Reniqer and the soldier from Tjebu, Rensi's son, Senwosret's son Senwosivt
came to report to this humble servant in year 3 [of Amenemhet III, = 1S 1 1 1
4th month of spring, day 2, at the time of breakfast, on a mission from th<
officer of the town regiment, Khusobek's son Montuhotep's son Khusobek .
who is the deputy [sergeant?] to the officer of the ruler's company in th<
garrison of Meha [a district in Nubia] saying: "The patrol that went oui I
patrol the desert edge [near] the fortress of Khesef-Medjau in year 3, ;
month of spring, last day, has returned [after three days on patrol in the dc\< i
to report to me, saying, 'We have found the track of thirty-two men ami iln
donkeys [...]' This humble servant has sent [the report from fortress | to t«-i
tress." (VAE 94-5 = SD, §4)
This remarkable document, which was preserved in a Theban archive win
copy had been forwarded from Nubia, shows that the Egyptian army maim n
detailed archives with the names of each individual soldier and every patrol
fully recorded. It is likely that there were once thousands of sm h papvn n i
archives documenting all aspects of Egyptian military all. ins, luit tod. is <■
merest fragments survive.
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
Siegecraft 36
The extensive program of fortification undertaken by the Egyptians in the Middle
Kingdom demonstrates that they viewed such defenses as necessary and worth the
expenditure of resources. The Coffin Texts describe this view of the value of for-
tifications, promising that "there will not go up to you those who would destroy
your gate or wall" (CT 21). None the less, it is clear that, given enough time and the
proper techniques, Bronze Age fortresses could be captured by assaulting armies.
As depicted in the earlier Old Kingdom siege murals from the tombs of Kaemheset
(AW 1:147, EWW 38; NEA 30-2) and Inty (AW 1:146, FP 141-2; NEA 30-2,
Figure 2a), there were two basic methods of capturing a fortified city by assault during
the Egyptian Bronze Age: breaching, and scaling. Neither ramp building nor under-
mining walls are attested as siege techniques in the Egyptian sources for this period.
Middle Kingdom evidence confirms the continued use of both scaling and
breaching techniques, but with two major technical innovations: siege towers, and
rams. Unfortunately, this Middle Kingdom evidence, though evocative, is quite
limited. We have only two artistic depictions of Egyptian siegecraft in the Middle
Kingdom: the siege mural of Antef (Thebes tomb 386) (Figure 1 1, p. 447; EWW 38;
NEA 38-9, Figure 3) {c. 2100}; and the siege murals at the tombs of Beni Hasan
(BH) {c. 2050-1950}.
Scaling
In a scene reminiscent of the Old Kingdom murals in the tombs of Kaemheset and
Inty, the tomb of Antef has a relief depicting the siege of a Canaanite city being
assaulted with what appears to be a free-standing siege tower (GJ §2; EWW 38).
II ns device differs from earlier Old Kingdom depictions of siege ladders in two
ways. First, the Old Kingdom ladders are shown leaning against the wall for sup-
jprt, while this siege tower is shown upright. Second, the Old Kingdom ladders
i.'vr only a single set of rungs. The Antef siege tower shows three upright beams
jptfa two sets of rungs, allowing two pairs of Egyptian soldiers to ascend the tower
I -m. I ! *
I 'I r
ib n! Antef (Thebes, Egypt) fc. 2100}
llf.
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
simultaneously. There are two possible explanations for this. It may be that this is
simply a double ladder with a shared middle beam. On the other hand, the artist
might be trying to depict, without the benefit of artistic perspective techniques, a
freestanding square tower. Another feature argues in favor of the square tower
interpretation. In the depiction the tower doesn't actually touch the wall, which it
would have to do if it were a ladder. Instead, it appears that a beam or plank
extends from the top of the tower to the top of the wall, which the attackers
would use to make the assault from the tower to the wall. A soldier on the top of
the tower, armed with shield and axe, seems to be engaged in a melee with a
Canaanite as the Egyptian struggles to get from the siege tower to the wall. Four
soldiers with their axes thrust into their belts are ascending the tower, while a fifth
man on the ground with axe and shield seems to be preparing to follow them up
the tower.
This tower thus seems to be an attempt to create a more stable platform from
which to assault the wall, as well as more numerous climbing rungs to allow more
soldiers to ascend simultaneously. On the ground level to the left of the tower
there is a partially damaged circle which may represent a wheel for the tower,
similar to wheels depicted on Old Kingdom siege ladders. The city the Egyptians
are assaulting has no glacis, meaning the tower can be pushed fairly close to the
wall. The glacis depicted in later fortresses on the Beni Hasan murals may have
been made in part to prevent siege towers from being pushed up against the for-
tifications. Dry moats characteristic of some Middle Kingdom Egyptian fortifica-
tions would have had a similar effect.
The Canaanite defenders of the fortress, with beards, headbands, and multi-
colored kilts, are fighting the Egyptians with arrows and stones. Egyptian missile
counter-fire seems to be effective; two Canaanites have been wounded by arrows -
one in the arm and one in the forehead - while another four have tumbled off the
walls. Five Canaanites are shown with their heads barely peeking over the ram
parts, while another four are standing up to shoot arrows or throw stones. One
man has the pointed-rectangle style of Canaanite shield, discussed on p. 438.
Beneath the siege scene we see the aftermath of the siege, with bound men being
dragged off as prisoners, women and children wailing and following behind;
infants are carried on their shoulders. Egyptian soldiers armed with axes (five) and
bows (three) guard, and sometimes abuse, the prisoners; some prisoners are pulled
by their hair.
Breaching
Breaching the fortress walls by simply digging through the mud bricks wa
obviously a potentially very costly operation, for the assaulting army was exposed
to withering missile fire from the defenders who remained protected atop the < M
ramparts. The Coffin Texts describe the fear of soldiers facing such a missile lui
rage: "the ramparts are high, and I die in their limit 11 (CT 1 I.V>). I'hc nature ol ih
injuries suffered by the soldiers in the Tomb of the Warriors (SNN), ni.im ■ ■
i I
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
whom were wounded or killed by missiles or stones throne from above, reflects
the brutal fate of many of those assaulting a fortified and strongly defended city.
Thus, rather than using the Old Kingdom method of directly digging through
the mud-brick walls of an enemy fortress with mattocks, axes, and crowbars, while
facing deadly enemy fire from above, Middle Kingdom siege engineers developed
two new technologies to protect soldiers while attempting to breach fortress walls:
the battering-ram, and the penthouse or protective shed. Both of these are
depicted on the martial murals from the tombs at Beni Hasan. 37
All of the murals depict essentially the same siege scene; it is not certain if this is
because the depictions reflect the standard technique of the period, or if the artists
were simply repeating the same conventional scene over and over again. The castle
being assaulted has either one or two gates, tall walls, and machicolation. It also has
glacis - sloping earthworks at the foundation of the walls - a characteristic of for-
tifications which appear in both Egyptian and Canaanite fortresses from this per-
iod (ALB 202—5). The exact purpose of the Bronze Age glacis is uncertain. In one
sense the glacis simply serves to stabilize the walls, allowing them to be built taller.
A second possible function of the glacis would be to make breaching the walls
more difficult; attackers attempting to undermine the base of the wall would have
to dig through the glacis before reaching the wall itself. Finally, the sloping glacis
would prevent siege towers from being placed directly against the wall, thereby
limiting their effectiveness. As noted, the siege tower depicted in Antef's tomb has
been placed against a wall with no glacis. It is possible, then, that glacis were made
in part as a direct response to the development of siege towers. Likewise, a glacis
would force attackers to place ladders further from the base of the wall and at a
shallower angle; the ladders would thus need to be longer, and would be less stable.
It is likely that all of these considerations were elements in the development of the
glacis.
The defenders of the forts in the Beni Hasan murals appear to be Egyptians,
with shields and other equipment similar to that of the Egyptian attackers; the
sieges represented here were thus probably part of the wars of the late First Inter-
mediate Period. The defenders are armed with bows, javelins, and stones (though
no slings), which they hurl with great fervor at the attackers. Some of the soldiers
,ire protected by shields from the missiles of the attackers; others hang out over the
parapets to get a better aim. The attackers likewise return missile fire by both
.iK hers and slingers; arrows are shown sticking in the walls and in some of the
defenders. A large part of the siege was thus a missile duel, with the defenders
having the advantage of the protection of their walls and the improved view, range
uid penetrating power brought by shooting at an enemy from above. On the other
hand the attackers might have an advantage in that they could mass more troops
shooting more missiles against a single section of the wall which could support
Only .i limited number of defenders.
The most interesting feature shared in all of the Beni Hasan siege murals is the
ilepit tion oi the protected ram used by the Egyptians. The Egyptians have built a
protective shelter to defend then men from enemy missiles. The exact nature of
I \'>
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
the shelter is uncertain; it clearly has a wooden frame, with crossbeams to support
the structure. The roof is curved to deflect missiles. There are two uncertainties,
however. First, is the structure a wooden frame covered by animal skins, or are
there wooden planks on the roof and between the main structural beams? Given
that the defenders' missiles are arrows, javelins, and stones, it seems likely that
cured leather would provide sufficient protection for the attackers, which would
also make the structure light enough that it could be easily carried into position.
Second, the artist has depicted the structure in a cutaway view, allowing us to see
inside, so it is not clear how much protection there really was on the sides of the
shelter. Clearly there must be some type of opening to allow the Egyptians to use
their ram. I suggest that the structure was completely covered on the top, had an
opening at head and shoulder level which allowed the soldiers to see out and thrust
their ram. The shelter was further protected by side panels on three sides, but was
open to the rear allowing the soldiers to come in and out.
There are two or three soldiers in the protective structures, carrying long poles
used as rams. Assuming the soldiers averaged about 1.6 meters tall (see p. 439; SSN
7), and that the artist depicted the rams in accurate proportion to the soldiers
(which is not at all certain), the poles would be about 4-5 meters long. Given the
height of many of the walls, however, I suspect many were actually longer thar
this. It is not clear from the artwork, but the poles may have had some type of
metal head. It appears to me that the poles were thrust out between the gap
between the roof and the protective side panel, and rested on the front crossbeam
of the defensive structure, creating a point of leverage. The soldiers used their
weight to hold the back of the pole down, lifting the front of the ram upward at
something less than forty-five degrees. The pole was then rammed into the brick
wall and used as a lever in an attempt to crush or dislodge the mud-bricks. When
enough bricks had been dislodged, the upper courses of the brickwork of the
fortress would collapse, creating a breach, through which an assault could be
undertaken. In all of the Beni Hasan murals the ram is being used against the
upper portions of the wall rather than the base. This may in part be because the
glacis prevented the ram from doing much damage to the base of the wall. It is also
likely that, if enough of the upper portions of the wall collapsed, the resulting
slumping of the bricks would create enough of a gap and slope for an assault to be
made.
Blockades
We have no accounts during the Middle Kingdom of blockades or sieges lasting
for months in an effort to starve out the besieged. Why might this be? It may
simply be that such sieges did indeed occur but the surviving fragmentary records
do not preserve accounts of them. It is only in the early New Kingdom that we
have our first account of a multi-year siege. The autobiography of a ship's captain
serving in the wars of king Ahmose tells us that, during the wars of expulsion ol
the Hyksos from Egypt, "Sharuhen |a major Hyksos city in southern (\m.un
I .ii
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
either Tell el-Far'ah or Tell Ajjul] was besieged for three years" {c. 1550} (ANET
233b), implying that long-term sieges were feasible by this period. However, we
do not know if such blockades were undertaken earlier. It may be that the mud-
brick walls of most fortifications of the period could be breached with a few weeks
of consistent effort, making long sieges unnecessary On the other hand, the for-
tifications of Sharuhen in Canaan were also of mud-brick; if brick walls were easy
to breach, thereby removing the need for lengthy sieges, why did it take three
years for the Egyptians to capture Sharuhen?
It is also possible that, during the Middle Kingdom, the Egyptians lacked the
logistical capacity to feed and support large armies in the field for more than a few
months. If a city could not be taken within the framework of the maximum
logistically feasible period, the siege would have to be abandoned; thus long sieges
did not occur because the attackers starved before the defenders. But it is most
likely that lengthy sieges are not mentioned in the records because, outside of civil
wars in Egypt, the Egyptians generally did not face enemies with massive for-
tresses. The only exception to this was Canaan, where the Bronze Age city-states
were highly fortified. But, as discussed on pages 406-7, the Egyptians did not, in
fact, intervene extensively in Canaan during this period. The fact that they faced
large, well-fortified Canaanite cities in that region may have been part of the
reason. Unfortunately, the lack of data precludes a definitive answer.
Naval warfare 38
The overall technology and pattern of naval warfare in the Middle Kingdom
remained broadly similar to those of the Old Kingdom, though there were a
number of technical advances. Landstrom details these in his marvelously illu-
strated book (SP 75-97). A number of model boats (TEM 93), artistic depictions,
and archaeological remains (such as the Dashur boat, EBS 28) give us a good
understanding of Egyptian nautical technology. Several different types of Middle
Kingdom boats with sails, oars, and large rudders, are depicted on the tomb reliefs
at Beni Hasan. 39 Some Middle Kingdom ships are depicted with shields hanging
from the sides of the deckhouse (SP 78, 81, 85, 89). This may in part simply be a
convenient, out-of-the-way place to store the shields, but may also be an attempt
to strengthen the thin papyrus matting of the deck house against javelins or arrows
in combat situations (SP 81). The Coffm Texts and other sources provide detailed
nautical terminology describing many different parts of the celestial ships of the
gods. 40 Although these celestial ships are close counterparts of earthly ships, they
are described in mythic terms where each part of the ship represents a different
god or mythic creature; the ship itself becomes a microcosm of the Egyptian
universe. '
There were four major zones of Egyptian naval activity during the Middle
Kingdom: the Egyptian Nile, the Nubian Nile (from the First to the Third Cat-
anu ts), the Red Sea and (he eastern Mediterranean Sea. Fundamentally, during the
two Intermediate Periods Egyptian naval combat focused on the struggle between
I .1
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
'
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
rival Egyptian princes on the Nile river. Thereafter, although the Nile remained
crucial for transporting troops and materials during the Middle Kingdom, we
naturally see little river warfare on the Egyptian Nile, since Egypt was a unified
state firmly controlling the Nile to the First Cataract and beyond. Instead, during
the Middle Kingdom, naval warfare shifts to the Nubian Nile, the Red Sea and the
Mediterranean Sea.
We have several accounts of river campaigns during the First Intermediate
Period, which have been discussed in Chapter Fifteen. Henenu the steward
describes part of his responsibilities as "sailing up the river at the head of his
troops" (AEAB 52) indicating the importance of the river for transporting Egyp-
tian armies. King Merikare {c. 2070-2050?} led a river campaign in Middle Egypt
in person, sailing his fleet to Shashotpe (Shutb), near Asyut {c. 2055?}, where a
standoff with the upstart princes of Thebes ensued (ARE 1:185—6 = MKT 23, see
p. 377). Ankhtifi of Hierakonpolis' campaign against Thebes {c. 2030} included
strong support from his river fleet, which sailed with impunity up and down the
Nile, either carrying troops or supporting them as they marched on the banks of
the river (AF 37; OHAE 131, p. 371-3). The Nubian mercenary Tjehemau
mentions campaigning by river and fighting on Lake Faiyum during Montuhotep's
wars of reunification {c. 2040}. He describes . . .
Going forth . . . against the Lake of Sobek [Faiyum] ... I overthrew the
[enemy on the] sandbank . . . [and] the river, to lead the sand-dwellers [nomad
mercenaries] and [the Nubian mercenaries of] Wawat ... to put to flight the
man [king] of the North. Then it [the northern kingdom of Herakleopolis]
mustered its war-fleet and it traversed all its nomes of the entire [northern]
land to defend itself. (ITM 11-20)
Tjehemau also describes an amphibious assault against troops marshaled on the
riverbank:
I went down to the district of Thebes. I found [the enemy] standing on the
riverbank. They planned fighting. The opposition fell [before our attack],
fleeing because of me ... in the district of Thebes. (ITM 11-20)
These accounts emphasize the integral part river fleets played in Egyptian
warfare. It would be safe to say that on the Nile river an army seldom campaigned
without the assistance of a fleet for combat, transport, and logistical support.
During the campaigns against Nubia in the Middle Kingdom, Egyptian fleets
played precisely the same role south of the First Cataract that they had played on
the Egyptian Nile during the First Intermediate Period. Several accounts, dis-
cussed in Chapter Sixteen, describe the role of the river fleet in the Nubian wars
during the Middle Kingdom. Crucial to the success of the Egyptian conquest oi
Nubia was the use of the canal bypassing the First Cataract at Aswan, which \)m\
been built in the days ofWeni in the late Sixth Dynasty (< 2310] (All 1:21 I)
This canal was dredged and widened in the eighth year of Senwosret III {1870} to
facilitate his conquest of Nubia by allowing the free passage of his war fleet, troop
transports, and supply ships into Nubia (ARE 1:291-2). Thereafter, a royal river
fleet was apparently maintained on the Nubian Nile (RA3 213).
We have no accounts of actual sea - as opposed to river - combat during the
Middle Kingdom. We do know, on the other hand, that Egyptian ocean fleets
were operating widely and frequently in the eastern Mediterranean and the Red
Sea during this period (EAE 2:358-67). In the Mediterranean Sea, Egyptian fleets
were known to have operated as far as Crete (EAE 1:315), Cyprus (ECI 79), and
Syria. The Syrian city of Byblos served as the major Egyptian naval base for
resupply, fleet repair, and trade, and was crucial in the success of Egyptian mar-
itime enterprises in the Mediterranean. (EAE 1:219-21, see p. 410). This gives a
likely total range for naval operations in the Mediterranean of 700 kilometers from
Egypt, and perhaps as far as 1000 kilometers, depending on how one interprets the
significance of the presence of Egyptian artifacts in the Aegean Sea. The total
range of naval operation in the Red Sea is even further, up to 2500 kilometers
from Egypt, again depending on where, precisely, Punt was located (EAE 3:85-6).
Most of these naval operations were essentially peaceful trading expeditions, but
many, if not all of them, included a military component, if only a contingent of
soldier for the protection of the fleet. Amenemhet lis annus mirabilis {c. 1910},
discussed on pp. 399-402, included the dispatch and return of a fleet of ten ships
on a raid to the Lebanese coast (ECI 78-9). At the same time another fleet plun-
dered two cities in Cyprus or on the Syrian coast and returned with 1,554 pris-
oners (ECI 79). The size of the fleet is not known but it must have been fairly
substantial to have been able to carry enough soldiers and sailors to sack two cities
and have room to return with over 1500 prisoners. The Egyptians in the Middle
Kingdom clearly had the naval capacity to send several thousand men anywhere on
the eastern coast of the Mediterranean.
The First Intermediate Period and Middle Kingdom preserve a number of
sources which give us our first glimpses of actual naval combat on the Nile. The
most impressive of these is the naval combat relief from the tomb of Antef (Intef)
(Theban tomb 386), nomarch of Thebes, and early ancestor of the kings of the
Eleventh Dynasty (Figure 12, p. 454; GJ §1; NEA 39; EBS 35). These murals
depict three boats, all propelled by oars with large rudders at the back; no sails are
visible. If the soldiers are drawn in proportion to the boat, the river boats are rather
small, perhaps eight meters long; other vessels are known to have been thirty meters
long with 60 rowers (EBS 36). These boats are propelled, respectively, by ten,
fourteen or eighteen rowers, with half that number depicted on one side of each
boat. In two of the ships they sit, rowing in unison; in the other they stand while
rowing., Two of the ships have four warriors, one has at least five, and perhaps a
sixth in a damaged section of the mural. Two of the ships have only archers, while
the third has one archer and three men armed with shields and broad- axes. Some
of the w;n i iors stand on the prow of the ship, shooting their bows; two axemen on
the prow .u< pi. |* ii up,- in .iss.mll another ship, or perhaps to jump ashore.
I
I , \
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
Figure 12 Naval combat scene, Tomb of Antef (Thebes, Egypt) {c. 2100}
Source: Drawing by Michael Lyon (partly restored)
The details of the Antef naval mural thus shows that Middle Kingdom n.iv.
combat included both archery and shipboard melees, which is confirmed by tex
tual accounts of naval combat from this period. The most detailed of these com
from the autobiography of Tefibi, nomarch of Asyut, against his rivals at Thebci
{c. 2080} and is the first eye-witness narrative of a naval battle on the Nile.
I [crossed over from the west bank] and reached the east side [of the Nile|,
sailing upstream [south]. There came another jackal [Antef s general] with
another army from his confederacy [from Thebes]. I went out against him.
He hastened to battle to the [thirteenth] nome [of Asyut].. . . I ceased not i««
fight to the end, making use of the south wind as well as the north wind, i
the east wind as well as the west wind [for maneuvering rny fleet on the 1 1\
er].. . . He [the enemy general] fell in the water [after being wounded or kil
led]; his ships [fled and] ran aground.. . . Fire was set [to their ships]. I du>
out the rebellion by the plan of [the jackal god] Wepwawet, [the head-god
Asyut] . . . When a man did well, I promoted [him] to the head of my soldii I
(ARE 1:182-3)
This narrative depicts ships fighting a battle on the river and using the wind' h
maneuvering to gain tactical advantage. When die enemy geiu*r.il w.is killed n
battle — by missile or melee is uncle. ir he fell in the nvei, deiiioiali/mt* In
i >l
THE MILITARY SYSTEM OF THE MIDDLE KINGDOM
i loops. As the battle was won, the fleeing enemy beached their boats, abandoning
hem to be burned by the victors. This general pattern of naval warfare is supple-
mented by a passage from the Coffin Texts, describing demonic opposition to the
passage of the celestial ship of the gods into the heavens in terms of naval warfare,
Itfa tactics of shattering enemy oars to prevent maneuver, and setting fire to
uemy ships: "the oars of those who are hostile are broken ... I am he who
apposed the destroyer who came setting fire to your bark.. . . They shall not attack
our bark while I am in it" (CT 1099).
Thus, by the Middle Kingdom, river naval combat had become quite sophis-
b ated, including the use of a combination of sails and oars to maneuver the ships,
attempts to use the wind to gain tactical advantage over the enemy, combat with
.mining to shatter oars and fire to disable enemy ships, and archery and boarding
■ idee against enemy crews. In this, Middle Kingdom naval warfare broadly par-
lllels the characteristics of naval combat in the New Kingdom as depicted on the
i nous martial reliefs on the southern wall of the temple of Ramses III at Medinat
i [abu. 42
MI
CHAPTER EIGHTEEN
Early Second Intermediate Period Egypt
{1786-1667} 1
The death of queen Sobekneferu and the end of the Twelfth Dynasty in 1786
inaugurated a period with a remarkable dearth of historical sources in Egypt.
Royal and noble inscriptions with information on military affairs almost entirely
disappear, in favor of formulaic ritual texts with little substantive historical content.
"Sources for the period include neither royal annals nor private autobiographies
with information on military events" (EAE 3:395). The names of many kings
ruling Egypt during this period are unknown, due to lacunae in the Turin Canon
king-list, even when supplemented by scarab seals with royal names which become
popular during this period. 2 All this means that the military historian can hope to
understand only the broadest trends during this period.
The paucity of sources naturally creates uncertainty and ambiguity, leading to
several different ways of understanding the history of Egypt during this period.
Some scholars rightly note that there are many areas of cultural continuity between
the Middle Kingdom and the Second Intermediate Period. From the perspective
of military history, however, the discontinuities are more significant. Among
Egyptologists there are different ways of interpreting the reasons for the shift from
the Middle Kingdom to the Second Intermediate Period. Some scholars include
the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Dynasties {1786-1667} as part of the Middle
Kingdom, with the Second Intermediate Period covering only the Fifteenth
through Seventeenth Dynasties {1667—1569}. Others, whom I will follow, 3 date
the Second Intermediate Period from the end of the Twelfth Dynasty in 1786 to
the beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty and the New Kingdom period in 1569. I
will use the following tentative chronology of the Second Intermediate Period (see
Table 18.1). 4
In this section I will examine only the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Dynasties,
culminating in the invasion of the Hyksos and the introduction of the war-chariot
into Egypt around 1667.
Thirteenth Dynasty {1786-1667} (SIP 69-93, EAE 3:394-8)
Due to the paucity of sources, the military history of the Thirteenth and Four
teenth Dynasties can only be described in the bro.ulesi generalities, ami this often
I w,
EARLY SECOND INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
Table 18.1 Tentative chronology of the Second Intermediate Period
Dates
Dynasties
1991-1786 Twelfth Dynasty (Middle Kingdom)
1788-1667 Fourteenth (Canaanite) Dynasty at Avaris dominates the Delta
1786-1667 Thirteenth (Egyptian) Dynasty in middle and southern Egypt
1 667 "Hyksos" conquest of Avaris and Memphis ends Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Dynasties
1667-1602 Sixteenth (Egyptian) Dynasty at Thebes
1667-1558 Fifteenth (Canaanite) "Hyksos" Dynasty dominates the Delta
1602-1600 "Hyksos" conquest and temporary domination of Thebes
1600-1569 Seventeenth (Egyptian) Dynasty at Thebes
1569—1315 Eighteenth Dynasty at Thebes; beginning of the New Kingdom
1569 Year 1 of Ahmose of Thebes; beginning of the Eighteenth Dynasty
1558 Year 11, Ahmose conquers Avaris and ends the Fifteenth "Hyksos" Dynasty
only through inference from scanty inscriptional and archaeological remains. A
basic, though fragmentary list of kings is found in the Turin King-list, which can
be supplemented with scarabs and inscriptions (SIP 69—75, 94—9; CS 1:72—3).
However, most of these kings remain nothing more than ephemeral names. The
capital of Egypt remained at the earlier Middle Kingdom capital of Itjawy (Lisht),
and there was some dynastic continuity between the Twelfth and early Thirteenth
dynasties - the first two kings of the Thirteenth Dynasty were sons of Amenemhet
IV of the Twelfth Dynasty (SIB 75). The major military event of the early Thir-
teenth Dynasty, which inaugurated the Second Intermediate Period, was the rise
to independence of the rival kings of the Canaanite Fourteenth Dynasty in the
eastern delta (see p. 461). This was undoubtedly accompanied by warfare, and,
although we are left uninformed of the details, it is clear that the Canaanite war-
riors of the delta were ultimately successful in establishing their independent state.
Thereafter there was at least some level of peace and accommodation between the
Egyptian Thirteenth and Canaanite Fourteenth Dynasties, as indicated by trade
relations and the finds of Thirteenth Dynasty seals in Fourteenth Dynasty territory.
The period as a whole was ruled by over fifty kings, generally with short reigns
and few major monuments. There are no records of foreign military expeditions to
the Sinai, Canaan, or Nubia, though a few inscriptions mention mining expedi-
tions to the quarries at Wadi Hammamat in the Eastern Desert and Gebel Zeit on
the Red Sea. Likewise there is inscriptional evidence mentioning a "commander"
and a "lieutenant" in the western oases, indicating a Thirtheenth Dynasty military
presence there (SIB 78-9). Any dynastic continuity with the rulers of the Twelfth
Dynasty was ended with the rise to power of king Sobekhotpe III {1749-1747?}.
He was an "elite officer", I he son of the "elite officer" Montuhotep, who rose to
power muiei mil imwn i in ninstances; Ryholt speculates that there was some type
Table
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
18.2 Schematized and simplified chart of the dynastic divisions of Egypt during the
Second Intermediate Period, 1786-1569
Year
Thebes
Middle Egypt
Memphis
Avaris— Delta
1810
Middle Kingdom
Twelfth Dynasty, 1991-1786
1800
1790
Thirteenth Dynasty
(Egyptian)
1786-1667
Fourteenth
Dynasty
(Canaanite)
1788-1667
1780
1770
1760
1750
1740
1730
1720
1710
1700
1690
1680
1670
1660
Sixteenth Dynasty
(Egyptian, Thebes)
1667-1602
1602-1600: Hyksos domination at Thebes
Fifteenth Dynasty
(Canaanite— "Hyksos")
1667-1558
(109 years)
1650
1640
1630
1620
1610
1600
Seventeenth Dynasty
(Egyptian, Thebes)
1600-1569
1590
1580
1570
1560
1550
New Kingdom
Eighteenth Dynasty (Thebes)
1569-1315
1540
1530
1520
1510
1500
Source: Based on SIP 6, 191; all dates approximate. I
ir map, \c<
I IAAJ
mI V\l II
! ■
EARLY SECOND INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
of military coup against the weak and ineffectual kings of the early Thirteenth
Dynasty (SIP 222-4, 297). However this may be, Sobekhotpe III initiated a tem-
porary revival in Egyptian military power.
Sobekhotpe's successor, though not his son, was Neferhotpe I {1747-1736?},
under whose rule Egypt's military prestige was somewhat restored. An inscription
of Neferhotpe in northern Nubia indicates that Egypt still exercised some control
of that region. On the other hand, a building inscription mentions soldiers
accompanying king Neferhotpe I on a pilgrimage to Abydos (ARE 1:334, SIB
226—8), which may indicate some concern for the security of the king. Seals of
Thirteenth Dynasty kings and officials have also been discovered in Canaan and
Syria, indicating trade and diplomatic relations with Egypt (SIB 85). Seals of
Egyptian military officers have likewise been found in the Levant, implying that
some type of military escort accompanied Egyptian trading and diplomatic expedi-
tions (SIB 86). All this implies that either the Thirteenth Dynasty kings had direct
access to the Mediterranean via a western branch of the Nile, or the Canaanite
kings of the Fourteenth Dynasty, who controlled at least the eastern Delta, allowed
southern Egyptian trade to pass through their country. The discovery of a relief
from Byblos of "governor Yantinu, son of governor Yakin" with a cartouche of
Neferhotpe I {1747—1736} attests that the rulers of Byblos at least nominally
acknowledged Neferhotpe as their overlord (SIB 87), and may imply that the vassal
relationship between Egypt and Byblos that had existed in the Middle Kingdom
continued on through the early Thirteenth Dynasty; the last indications of contact
between Thirteenth Dynasty Egypt and Byblos is in the reign of Sobekhotpe IV
{1734-1725} and his successor Ya'ib {1721-1712} (SIB 89-90).
This resurgence of Egyptian power was brief, however. Neferhotpe was suc-
ceeded by his two brothers, but did not create a long-lasting dynasty (SIB 225—31 , 298).
During the last thirty-odd years of this period, from roughly 1700 to 1667, over
twenty kings seem to have ruled Egypt in the Thirteenth Dynasty, indicating a
period of instability and possible collapse of royal power. The military result of this
instability and weakness was successful foreign invasions by both the Kushites from
the south and the Canaanite Hyksos from the north, who captured the capital at
Itjawy and ended the dynasty. Resistance to both Hyksos and Nubian invaders was
taken up by the regional Egyptian nomarchs of Thebes, who formed a new Egyptian-
controlled government known as the Sixteenth Dynasty {1667-1602}, later suc-
ceeded by the Seventeenth Dynasty {1600—1569}, likewise based at Thebes. These
two dynasties retained control of much of middle and southern Egypt for nearly a
century. Building on this center of military resistance, the Eighteenth Dynasty
{ 1569-1315} would eventually arise, which would defeat both the Hyksos and the
Nubians, and reunite Egypt, creating the Egyptian empire of the New Kingdom.
Nubia f Kushy and the Thirteenth Dynasty 5
I hiring the Middle Kingdom (he Nile flood levels were recorded each year at the
Vnm.i hum in Nubi.i |m»i\ idling some type of advanced notice on Nile flooding.
W)
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
and hence expected agricultural productivity and the expected tax returns of
Egypt. The custom of marking the Nile level continued through the early Thir-
teenth Dynasty, indicating ongoing Egyptian control and occupation of northern
Nubia. An inscription mentions "the commander of the army, Renseneb", who
was commander of the Semna fortress (ARE 1:331). A funerary inscription by a
deputy treasurer at Abydos describes his mission to inspect the fortresses in Nubia,
"in the surrounding foreign lands [of Kush] which rebel" against Egypt. Children
of Nubian chiefs were kept and trained at the Egyptian court during this time as
quasi-hostages (SIB 93). These texts demonstrate a continued Egyptian military
interest in the Nubian fortresses, which is confirmed by Cemetery K at the Buhen
fortress which has Egyptian-style burials during the Thirteenth Dynasty (OHAE
207). Diplomatic relations continued between Kush and Egypt; a papyrus details
the allotment of provisions for two Nubian chiefs who were escorted to Egypt,
perhaps being enlisted as mercenaries (SIB 92). At some point in the late
Thirteenth Dynasty, however, Egyptian military dominance of Nubia began to
erode. The exact time and circumstances in which the Egyptians withdrew
from Nubia are uncertain, but strong Egyptian control seems to have continued
through the reign of Sobekhotpe IV {1734-1725}. There may have been an
Egyptian campaign to Sai Island south of Semna under Sobekhotpe IV, but the
inscription is so damaged that the reading is quite uncertain (AN 119-20, disputed
by SIP 90).
With the declining authority and competence of Egyptian kings during the
unstable later Thirteenth Dynasty, however, the Egyptian commanders of the
Nubian fortresses seem to have become increasingly autonomous, with power
devolving into the hands of the garrison commanders who passed their offices and
authority on from father to son. The fortresses became progressively more self-
supporting and independent, with intermarriage between Egyptian soldiers and
Nubian women, and growing reliance on Nubian mercenaries, blurring the cul-
tural and ethnic distinction between the garrison troops and the Nubians and
Kushites they were meant to defend Egypt against (BI 72—6, 83—5).
There have been a number of suggestions concerning the cause of the Egyptian
loss of the Nubian fortresses. 6 The Nubian provinces may have been intentionally
abandoned due to high costs and declining state revenues. Indeed two of the
Nubian frontier fortresses — Semna South and Serra East — were abandoned during
the last decades of the Middle Kingdom (SIP 91). Egyptian troops may have been
withdrawn to face mounting danger from the Canaanite Hyksos in the Delta. On
the other hand, Egyptian garrisons, finding themselves isolated and neglected by
the kings of the collapsing Thirteenth Dynasty may have made a separate peace
with the king of Kush to the south. However this may be, the Kushites captured
some of the fortresses by siege or assault; Buhen, for example, was clearly burned
and sacked. It is possible that the Kushite alliance and dynastic marriage with the
Canaanite Thirteenth Dynasty in the delta (see pp.- 462— 3), which began by leas!
1720 and probably continued through 1680, might have strengthened the iinlit.it \
position of the Kushite kings sufficiently to allow them to .it t.u k I rvptun Nuhi.i
'
EARLY SECOND INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
The Kushite king marked his victory with an Egyptian-style stele, depicting him-
self with bow, mace, and the crown of Upper Egypt (BI 84).
None of these explanations are mutually exclusive: it may well be that the
garrisons were neglected and weakened during the late Thirteenth Dynasty,
allowing the Kushites to capture several forts by assault after which the others
surrendered on terms. It is clear from tomb inscriptions of the Sobekemhab officer
family at Buhen that, after the fall of Buhen, some of the surviving former Egyp-
tian garrison troops and officers enlisted in the army of the king of Kush, and
remained on garrison duty in the partially ruined Buhen fortress, from which they
undertook military operations for Nejeh {1650?-1630?}, king of Kush. The fall of
the Nubian fortresses probably occurred in the 1660s - at the time of the final
collapse of the Thirteenth Dynasty and the rise of the Hyksos in the Delta.
Thereafter, the fortresses remained in Nubian hands until the reconquest by
Kamose of Thebes {1571-1569}. Nubia thus remained part of the Kushite king-
dom for nearly a century (BI 80-5).
Fourteenth (Canaanite) Dynasty
{1788-1667} (SIP 94-117)
During the Twelfth Dynasty there was a slow but steady peaceful migration of
Semitic peoples from Canaan into the eastern Delta. The Egyptians knew these
peoples generically as c 3mw, perhaps pronounced roughly as Amu; they are prob-
ably to be related to the contemporaneous migration of the Semitic Amorites
throughout Syria, Canaan, and Mesopotamia in the nineteenth century. The exact
relationship between the Canaanites and the Egyptians in the Delta are vague.
Some of the Canaanites undoubtedly remained semi-nomads. Others became
integrated into Egyptian society. Some seem to have served the Egyptians as mer-
cenaries or officials. It is clear, however, that many retained their separate cultural
and linguistic identity, forming a significant and growing minority in the popula-
tion of the Delta (SIP 293-4).
Sometime late in the reign of Amenemhet III {1843-1797}, or during the
reign of Amenemhet IV {1798-1790} or Sobekneferu {1790-1786}, the Canaa-
nites seem to have become at least semi-autonomous, as implied by the fact that
there is no evidence for Egyptian expeditions to the Sinai and Byblos during the
last decades of the Middle Kingdom — a fact that could be explained by an inde-
pendent state in the Delta cutting Egyptian land and sea access to the Sinai and
Canaan. Exactly when and how full independence was eventually achieved
remains unclear. Low Nile floods late in the Twelfth Dynasty may have contributed
to economic decline and political instability (OHAE 169), which may have
facilitated the rise of independence among the Delta Canaanites. It may simply
have been that a Delta nomarch took charge of local affairs as the central autho-
rities proved increasingly incapable or unwilling to deal with growing problems.
I [owever l his may be, sometime around 1788 a Canaanite leader, Yakbim
j 17SS? !77(l ; !. asserted full independent authority at Avaris (modern Tell el-Dab'a;
W.0
WARFARE IN THE ANCIENT NEAR EAST TO 1600 BC
EAE 1:351-4; AEA 240) in the north-eastern Delta, inaugurating the Fourteenth
Dynasty {1788-1667}, the first non-Egyptian dynasty to rule in Egypt. The
Canaanite origin of this dynasty is confirmed by both the Semitic names of its
rulers, and the Canaanite archaeological remains in the eastern Delta during this
period (SIP 99—100). Although the exact nature of this transition is uncertain,
there was clearly a military component in the Dynasty's rise to independence. Fifty
percent of the male burials from this period at Avaris included weapons burials,
with bronze daggers of the Middle Bronze IIA style from Canaan (SIP 76, 295);
since many of the tombs had been plundered; the actual number of burials with
weapons was undoubtedly higher, perhaps almost universal. This clearly indicates
an important military component among the Canaanite population in the Delta.
These weapons burials could be explained by Canaanite mercenaries in Egyptian
service who eventually usurped independent power and formed their own dynasty.
On the other hand, it is also possible, if not likely, that local Canaanites living in
the Delta called upon their relatives from Canaan to come to Egypt and help in
their efforts at independence, creating an additional influx of Canaanite warriors
into the Delta at the time the Fourteenth Dynasty rose to independence. Broadly
speaking, developments in the Delta may have some parallels to the rise to power
of Germanic warlords and mercenaries in fourth- and fifth-century Rome; 8 ,i
combination of peaceful migration, mercenary service, the rise to power of semi-
independent mercenary warlords, militant migration, and finally the creation of a
fully independent state controlled by the former mercenaries.
Within a few years the first king of the Fourteenth Dynasty, Yakbim, had
conquered or otherwise come to dominate the entire eastern Delta, and possibly
some of the western Delta as well. The precise boundaries of the Fourteenth
Dynasty kingdom cannot be determined with certainty due to the scarcity of
monuments and contemporary documents. Their control over the eastern Delta is
clear from Canaanite archaeological remains. The minimalist interpretation main
tains that this was the full extent of their domain. The maximalist view, however,
asserts that they might also have held some type of hegemony over much of the
western Delta and southern Canaan (SIP 77, 103). Yakbim's first three successors
are little more than names: Ya'ammu, Qareh and 'Ammu, ruling from perhaps
1770 to 1740.
The tomb of the Deputy Treasurer of the Fourteenth Dynasty, Aamu, at th<
Dynasty's capital of Avaris, reflects the military culture of the age. The tomb
included the sacrificial burial of five donkeys and three humans (I = OHAE 191)
A bronze dagger and battle-axe were also discovered in the tomb, emphasizing tli
martial interests of the rulers. The burial with the ruler of donkeys rather iIi.h
horses probably indicates that the horse-drawn war-chariot had not yet bei I
introduced into Egypt in the early eighteenth century (SIP 104—5).
The discovery of dozens of scarab seals with the names of Fourteenth 1 )yn.iM
rulers and officials provides insight into their foreign relations. Seal discovcin
range from Nubia and Egypt to northern Canaan and Syri.i, and are ilmm-lr
to indicate the range of diplomatic and trade relationships (SIP !<>> I ') I h
K. '
EARLY SECOND INTERMEDIATE PERIOD EGYPT
connection with the kingdom of Kush in the central Sudan was important.
Numerous Fourteenth Dynasty seals have been discovered at the Kushite capital of
Kerma, indicating ongoing trading and diplomatic relations, perhaps by river with
the permission of the Thirteenth Dynasty, or perhaps over the difficult desert trails
via the western oases. It seems likely that the Canaanite kings of the Fourteenth
Dynasty and the kings of Kush established a long-term alliance against the Egyp-
tian Thirteenth Dynasty, as we find better documented in the later Hyksos period
(ANET 232, 555). When - or even if- this alliance resorted to war with the
Thirteenth Dynasty of Egypt is uncertain. The alliance was cemented by at least
one dynastic marriage, that of king Sheshi {1730P-1710?} to the Kushite queen
Tati (SIP 114-15, 252-4). Sheshi's successor, his son by this Kushite queen, was
named Nehsy - "the Nubian 9 ' (SIP 1 15), who came to the throne around 1710.
Diplomatic relations, and perhaps a military alliance, between Kush and the
Canaanite Fourteenth Dynasty continued at least through the reign of Ya'qub-Har
{1680s?}, whose seals have been found in Kush (SIB 300). After around 1710 the
Thirteenth Dynasty was plagued by several decades of ephemeral kings with short
reigns. The brief rule might indicate some type of rotating kingship, co-regency,
or political instability with frequent coups. There is also evidence, however, for
famine and mass burials from this period - perhaps the victims of plagues or war -
which might indicate that the frequent change in kingship and brief reigns was due
to an epidemic (SIP 300-1). At any rate, the dynasty was seriously weakened by
1667 when it was overthrown by rival Canaanites known as the Piyksos, who
formed the Fifteenth Dynasty {1667-1558}.
The establishment of Hyksos hegemony {1667} 9
Phis study comes to a close with the Hyksos invasion of the Delta and conquest of
Avaris and Memphis around 1667. This date is chosen because it is generally
assumed that the horse and the war-chariot were introduced into Egypt by the
I lyksos, though the introduction could have occurred somewhat earlier under the
Canaanite kings of the Fourteenth Dynasty (LA 6:1130-5). The introduction of
i he horse and the war-chariot created a military revolution in Egypt and
throughout the Near East, which I hope will be the subject of a future study
143
Notes
10
Introduction
Michael S. Neiberg, Warfare in World History (London and New York: Routledge,
2001), 9-20. Scholars now tend to replace traditional chronological markers AD and
BC with CE (current era) and BCE (before the current era). Both systems still in.nl
the transition between AD/CE and BC/BCE at the traditional year of the birtli ol
Christ.
Charles Messenger (editor), Reader's Guide to Military History (London: Fitzroy Dcai
born, 2001). See p. xxviii for a chronological listing; ancient Egypt {to 330 BCE}, yy
151-2; ancient Near East {1000-500 BCE}, pp. 444-5. There is also one entry on
China {1600 BCE - 906 CE}, pp. 96-8, and another on South Asia {to 1000 C\:\
pp. 553-4.
Gerard Chaliand (editor), The Art of War in World History: From Antiquity ot the Nu<l< ,
Age (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994), 49-60.
Christon I. Archer, John R. Ferris, Holger H. Herwig and Timothy Travers, Wort
History of Warfare (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 2002), 1-29; pages 29 r.l
cover ancient Persia, China and India.
Nine of eleven pages devoted to the ancient Near East in Chaliand's The Art of Wa\ it
World History are on the battle of Kadesh, two are from Deuteronomy. Of the twent
nine pages on ancient Near Eastern military history in Archer et al, World History ■
Warfare, six (14-19) retell the battle of Kadesh. Likewise, Arther Ferrill, in his usefil
Origins of War (OW) devotes ten of his thirty-one pages on the pre-Assyrian Near l-.i ■
period to Kadesh and Megiddo.
For background to archaeological dating techniques and other methods, see the relc
vant articles in Brian Fagan, Oxford Companion to Archaeology (Oxford University Press
1996), EAE 1:104-9; for radiometric dating and its use in archaeology, see EA 2: 1 I >
17. For an introduction to issues specific to ancient Near Eastern chronologies, si
CANE 2:651-4; EAE 1:264-8; DANE 73; CAM 16.
There are several other highly technical forms of dating which are not discussed hen
seeEA 2:115-17.
EAE 1:264-8; for more technical details, see Robert Ehrich (editor), Chronologies i
Old World Archaeology, 2 vols, 3rd edn (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1 ( > ( ' '
Dates for Mesopotamian rulers and dynasties are conveniently collected in chron
ological charts by Roux in AI 500-15, which I have followed. DANE, ANF, CAM
Cl/2 and C2/1 all also follow the Middle Chronology with some slighi vai i.itions
The Epipaleolithic was formerly called the Mesolitliic ("Middle Stone" Age), ,i trim
still in use in some publications.
EAE 1:260-1, 360-3, 448 5K; FA 2:130 y S:M SI.
h.l
NOTES
11
12
13
In general, see CANE 4:2097-486: Sumenan (CANE 4:2107-16; EA 5:92-5),
Akkadian (EA 1:44-9); Egyptian (CANE 4:2135-51; EAE 2:258-7); Hittite (CANE
2367-78; EA 3:81-4); Eblaite (EA 2:184-6).
CANE 4:2161-79; EA 2:86-9, 4:516-27, 5:352-8.
For an insightful discussion, contextualizing the issue in the broader range of intellec-
tual history of the study of warfare, see John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York:
Alfred Knopf, 1993), 3-60, 386-92.
Chapter One
1 Some scholars suggest that war-like behavior can be found among some primates, CB
77-86; FA 20-37, and the interesting bibliography cited on FA pp. 217-8.
2 The differences between these four categories relate to both size and social organiza-
tion. Band = egalitarian, up to several dozen people; tribe = egalitarian, informal lea-
dership, up to a few thousand; chiefdom — formal leadership, social stratification and
rank, up to tens of thousands; state = central government, laws, stratification, ability to
enforce obedience, up to hundreds of thousands (WBC 26-7).
3 Brian Ferguson and Neil Whitehead (editors), War in the Tribal Zone: Expanding States
and Indigenous Warfare (Santa Fe: School of American Research Press, 1992) examine
warfare between "tribes" and "states".
4 For general introductions to the Neolithic period in Mesopotamia, see Hans J. Nissen,
The Early History of the Ancient Near East, 9000-2000 BC (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 1988); Charles Keith Maisels, The Emergence of Civilization: From
Hunting and Gathering to Agriculture, Cities, and State in the Near East (London: Rou-
tledge, 1990).
5 For a discussion of Bronze Age nomads and their military significance, see pp. 155—7.
6 EA 4:1-15; CANE 3:1503-21, with full bibliographies to technical studies.
7 CH; EA 1:438-40; DANE 66-7; CAM 43-6; CAM 43-6; OW 30.
8 CH 171, §54, 61-4; xiii; AANE §14; for clear and detailed photographs see Astrid
Nunn, Die Wandmalerei und der Glasierte Wandschmuck im Alien Orient (Leiden: Brill,
1988), plates 4-6, 20-29.
9 Mircea Eliade (editor), The Encyclopedia of Religion (New York: Macmillan, 1995),
4:199-200, 5:455-6.
10 EA 2:448-9, 1:124-5; ET 117-18; PA 151-65.
I I AS 14—98; ED 45—74. The most important Neolithic sites in Syria are Abu Hureyra
(Tel Haror) (EA 2:474-6; AS 25-31, 57-9, 72-6); Bouqras (EA 1:354; AS 120-46);
Jayrud (AS 27-8) ; Jerf al-Ahmar (AS 52-5); Mureybet (EA 4:65-6; AS 31-2, 49-52);
Tell Halula (AS); Tell Sabi Abyad (AS 64-7, 112-114).
12 I. Hnjara, The Halaf Period in Northern Mesopotamia (London, 1997); AS 99-180; EA
2:460-2, 5:251-2; DANE 137-8, 304-5.
I S ALB 35—58; major Neolithic sites in modern Israel, Palestine, and Jordan include: Ain
Ghazal (EA 1:36-8); Basta (EA 1:279-80); Jericho (EA 3:220-4); Nahal Oren (EA
4:89-90); Yiftahel (EA 5:378-9).
I I ALB 40-2; EA 3:220-4; DANE 160; M= CAM 32.
15 PAH 44-83; E. Carter, and M. Stolper, Elam: Surveys of Political History and Archae-
ology (Berkeley: University of California, 1984); W Hinz, The Lost World of Elam:
Rendition of a Vanished Civilization (London: Sidgwick and Jackson, 1972); EA 4:277—
81.
In Summaries and bibliographies found in PAE 45-83; EA 5:106-10.
I I'AI- (,<> 71. 7<> SI; FA 3:406-9; DANE 22,
IS Barbara Adams and Krzysztof Cialowicz, Protodynastic Egypt (] Buckinghamshire: Shire
l ; .i'.v|M..U'.\. I«>')7); 1 BE, IT; b.AI : 3;(> I 5; [A6:l()6<) 76; DA H 226-8.
t(. •
NOTES
19 WBC 37; F. Wendort, "Site 117: A Nubian Final Palaeolithic Graveyard near J eb el
Sahaba, Sudan", in F. Wendorf (ed.) The Prehistory of Nubia, 2 vols (Dallas: Southern
Methodists University Press, 1968), 2:954-95.
20 Nissen, The Early History of the Ancient Near East; EA 3:476-9; CAM 18-41; M =
CAM 43, 49.
Chapter Two
1 EH A 39—128; EM; AI 66-84; Charles Maisels, The Emergence of Civilization (London
and New York: Routledge, 1990).
2 FC 10-16; EA 5:294-8; CAM 60; DANE 312-3.
3 An alternative title for many Sumerian rulers was ensi, perhaps "steward"; the term
originally referred to the mortal ruler's role as representative and steward of the patron
god of the city who was the real ruler. Its meaning was somewhat ambiguous, because
an ensi of the god was supreme ruler on^ earth, but an ensi might also be a representative
or steward for another earthly ruler (EM 260—74).
4 PAE 67-9; AFC 22-4.
5 FI; CAM 72-3; EA 4:509-12; DANE 85-6.
6 AFC 22; AM §18; AAM §14; AANE §228; SDA 75; AW 1:118. Some scholars inter-
pret both figures as the Priest-king in two different phases of the hunt.,
7 P. Hunter, The Royal Hunter: Art of the Sasanian Empire (New York: The Asia Society,
1978); the biblical hunter-king Nimrod is probably part of this tradition, Genesis 10.8—
12.
8 Guillermo Algaze, The Uruk World System: The Dynamics of Expansion of Early Mesopo-
tamian Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993); ME 53—86; AS 181—
201; HE1 14-18; PAE 52-71.
9 T. Jacob sen, The Sumerian Kinglist (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1939); a transla-
tion can be found in KS 328—31, which I will generally cite; an abridged translation of
the antediluvian and pro to-historic kings can be found in ANET 265—6; P. Micha-
lowski, "History as Charter: Some Observations on the Sumerian King List" , Journal of
the American Oriental Society, 103 (1983); CANE 4:2350; 0/2:105-109. Readers of
Italian can consult G. Pettinato, / re di Sumer 1: Iscrizioni reali presargoniche delta Mesopo-
tamia (Brescia: Peideia Editrice, 2003).
10 0/2:93-144; 238-314; for chronological charts see 0/2:998-9; AI 502-3; RH 60.
Archaeological reports on the major excavated Early Dynastic Sumerian city states can
be found at: Abu Salabikh (EA 1:9-10); Adab (EA 1:14-15); Endu (EA 3:258-60);
Fara (Shuruppak) (EA 3:301-3); Girsu (EA 3:406-9); Ism (EA 4:186-7); Kish (EA
4:298-300); Lagash (EA 3:406-9); Larsa (EA 4:331-3); Nippur (EA 4:148-52); Tell el-
Oueili (EA 4:191-4); Sippar (EA 5:47-9); TeU el-Ubaid (EA 5:251-2); Ur (EA 5:288-
91); Uruk (Warka) (EA 5:294-8).
11 AI 122-145; KS 33-72; M = CAM 83; RH 57-9.
12 HTO 341-4; 0/2:110-11; Herman Vanstiphout, Epics of Sumerian Kings: The Matter
of Aratta (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2003).
13 "Bilgames and Agga", EOG 143-8 = ANET 44-7 = CS 1:550-2; the Sumerian has a
variant spelling, Bilgames, for Gilgamesh; I have normalized this to the standard Eng-
lish Gilgamesh.
14 Inscriptions, PI 97-101; 0/2:112-13; DANE 309-11; on the archaeology of Ur see
EA 5:288-91 and bibliography; on the royal tombs, see RTU and AFC 93-132.
15 Trevor Watkins, "Sumerian Weapons, Warfare and Warriors", Sumer, 39/1-2 (1983):
100-2.
16 See cover art; Figure 5a, p. 133; AFC 98-9; AANE §46; AM 72, xi; RTIMI; AW I : \\ I
17 Best viewed in AM §64; see also Fl §723; cf. AAM §44.
|,,
NOTES
20
21
22
18 A late tablet purporting to be the record of a king Lugalannimmundu of Adab, who
claims hegemony over Sumer, describes an unsuccessful revolt of thirteen cities against
him. Past scholars have accepted this king as authentic (KS 50-1; Cl/2:115), but it is
now generally thought to be a late unhistorical literary text,
19 KS 52-6; 0/2:116-20; RH; though I will cite the primary sources from PI, many
of the same sources are also found in RH 44—56. Both of these translations will
soon be superseded by Douglas Frayne, Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia, Early Periods,
Vol. 1: Pre-Sargonic Period (to 2334 B> C) (Toronto: University of Toronto Press,
forthcoming).
PI 33-46; RH; KS 53-6; CHI/2: 117-19.
The identity of Enakale as king of Umma in Eanatum's wars is found in PI 55,
This stele has been photographed many times, but it is generally only the largest
portion, with the chariot and phalanx, that is reproduced in military histories (FA 82;
AW 1:135); the stele should be studied in its entirety to fully understand its message.
The full stele, with both sides, can be seen in AFC 190—1; the entire obverse is
shown in AAM §118. The most detailed photographs are found in AM §66-9, plus
AAM §120 for the vultures (from which the stele gets its name) and AAM §121 for the
burial mound. See also SDA 134—7. The inscription which fills the background of
the stele can be read in PI 33—9. Throughout my discussion I will refer to the photo-
graph with the most detail for the particular point under consideration. See Irene
Winter, "After the Battle is Over: The Stele of the Vultures and the Beginning of His-
torical Narrative in the Art of the Ancient Near East", in H. Kessler and M Simpson
(editors), Pictorial Narrative in Antiquity and the Middle Ages (Washington, DC, 1985),
pp. 11-26.
PI 19, 54, 86; AM §43, 70 = AAM §35-8.
E3/1T50-1, 154, 166, 175, 178, 180, 189, 197, 199, 201, 206, 208, 212.
PI 47-54; RH 28-30; KS 56; CI /2: 119.
The foreign mercenary are not specifically named, but in the cultural context they
could have been Semitic speakers from central and northern Mesopotamia, proto-
Gutians from the central Zagros Mountains, or Elamites from, south-western Iran. The
mention of both Mari and Elam as enemies of Eanatum (PI 42) makes either possible.
The Hebrew Bible is strikingly distinct in this regard.
Eanatum II {c. 2385-2367} (PI 68); En-entarzi {c. 2367-2350} (PI 68); Lugalanda {7
years; c. 2350-2343} (PI 69-70).
PI 70-85; RH 33-6, 51-2; S 58.
"Year names" are names given to regnal years of Mesopotamian kings and often
mentioned on various administrative tablets. They are generally formulaic - "the year
the king built this temple" or "the year the king conquered that city" - but are
important sources for military history, since they frequently mention military events.
Many of the year names have been collected on the internet at http://cdli.ucla.edu/cll/
yearnames/yn_index.htm (accessed 6.7.2005).
PI 94-7; RH 33-6; 0/2:143-4, 331; AI 144-5; KS 58-9.
AW 1:60-1, 135-6; MW 1: 142-3, 170-1, 2:514. The term sickle-sword is something
of a misnomer, since the cutting edge of the weapon is on the outside of the curve,
rather than the inside like a sickle. However, I will retain it since it has become the
standard term used to describe these weapons.
FA 82; AFC 190-1; AW 1:135; SDA 135; AM §66, 68; the details are most clear in
SDA 135.
WV §13, § 17, §32, §35; in AAM § 49 the upper right figure holds an object similar to
Eanatum's.
AAM <>! >5; the side of the stele, generally not reproduced, shows four men, all of
whom seem to lie cirrvint; this same type of axe (Mli 99).
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
V\
M
\S
NOTES
36 There are a number of examples of the curved sickle-axe where the haft and blade
cannot be differentiated: FI §540, §763; AANE §410; a bronze statue of a god also
holds the same type of curved sickle-axe, Mesopotamia {19C} (SDA 285).
37 Artisitic depictions (FI §794; SDA §380; AAM §G-5, 8); archaeological find: Lagash.
{c. 2000} (AW 1:172a); Shechem, Canaan, {19C} (AW l:172d); Byblos {19C} (AW
1:172c); MW 142-3.
38 Elam: artistic, FI §763, SDA §383, EM 20, PAE 319. Syria: artistic, FI §169, AANE
§448; archaeological, Byblos {19C} AW 1:172c. Canaan: artistic, FI §872, GG §31a;
archaeological, Shechem {19C} AW l:172d. Egypt: archaeological, Abydos {18C}
(AW 1:172b).
39 PAE 87-100; ME 90-6; Cl/2:644-7; for Neolithic Elam, see pp. 30-32. Elam is the
ancient name for the modern province of Khuzistan in south-western Iran.
Chapter Three
1 R2; LKA; M. Liverani (editor), Akkad, the First World Empire (Winona Lake, IN:
Eisenbrauns, 1993); 0/2:417-54; AI 146-60; CANE 2:831-42; EA 1:49-54; M =
CAM 97.
2 R2:7-39; LKA 33-172; 0/2:417-34; DANE 251-2.
3 The chronology of Sargon's campaigns is uncertain; I here follow the suggestions of
Frayne in R2.
4 Prisoners in precisely such neck stocks are found in Akkadian martial art, AM §118.
5 Campaigns in Elam: R2:22-7; PAE 100-3; ME 97-100; 0/2:432-3.
6 AM §114—5; the figure of S argon in the Susa stele looks very similar to the famous
bronze head of an Akkadian king (AM §xxii— xxiii) .
7 Some scholars believe that the cultic list of cities in a hymn of En-hude-ana, high
priestess and daughter of Sargon, represents the extent of Sargon's empire; see discus-
sion and bibliography in R2:7.
8 E2:224; LKA 83, 137-9, 185, 305, 316, 321.
9 R2:40-73; 0/2:437-40.
10 The closeness of the figures for captive and expelled may indicate that the two cate-
gories are the same: those who were expelled were made slaves.
11 This insertion comes from a parallel inscription, R2:58.
12 Meluhhans are also said to have participated in an Elamite coalition against Naram-Sin,
LKA 251. On Meluhha, see D. Potts, "The Road to Meluhha," JNES 41 (1982): 279-
88; further references in LKA 251 n. 12; DANE 152-3; CANE 3:1456-9.
13 R2-.74-83; 0/2:437-40; PAE 106; ME 103-5.
14 R2:84-181; LKA 173-331; 0/2:440-5; AI 156-8; DANE 206-7.
15 S. Tinney, "A New Look at Naram-Sin and the Great Rebellion," JCS 47
(1995): 1-14.
16 A later literary epic recounting the rebellion is found in LKA 225-61, providing
interesting insights on the martial mentality; poetic lists of the city-states in the rebel
lion can be found on LKA 241-5, 249-53.
17 There is no firm chronology for the campaigns of Naram-Sin 's reign; this outline i
simply one option.
18 This is based on Frayne's reading of some obscure characters (R2:90). A later literary
account of this campaign can be found in LKA 176-87.
19 For the remarkable archaeological discoveries at Ebla confirm the destruction of du-
cky by the Akkadians, DANE 98-9; EA 2:181-3; AS 277-82; sec further discussion a!
pp. 241-4.
20 AAM §125; AFC 192; SDA 174a; AANE §361. L. Nigro, "The 'I wo Steles <>( S.u r on
Iconography and Visual Propaganda at the Beginning of Royal Akk.uli.ui Rehel ",. luu\
NOTES
60 (1998): 1-18; L. Nigro, "Visual Role and Ideological Meaning of the Enemies in
the Royal Akkadian Relief", in J. Prosecky (editor), Intellectual Life in the Ancient Near
East (Prague, 1998), 283-97.
21 Only two soldiers are visible from the usually reproduced front view. All five can be
seen from the side view, reproduced in ME 99.
22 AM §114; AAM §138; SDA 172, 174; AW 1:151a; AANE §362.
23 AM §1 17; AW 1:151b; AANE §359; AAM §134-5 shows the two pieces side-by-side.
24 AM §122-3; AFC 196; AAM §155-6; SDA 176-7; AW 1:150; this should be com-
pared with 5 in the list on p. 87.
25 AAM §153; SDA 175; AANE §360.
26 AM §118-19; AAM §136-7; the original form of the stele is reconstructed in ME 108
and AFC 204.
27 AM §xxh-xxm; AANE §48; AAM §154; SDA 171-3; AFC 194.
28 R. Miller, E. McEwen, and C. Bergman, "Experimental Approaches to Ancient Near
Eastern Archery", World Archaeology, 18/2 (1986): 178-95; E. McEwen, R. Miller, and
C. Bergman, "Early Bow Design and Construction", Scientific American, 264/6 (June
1991): 76-82.
29 AW 1:6-8, 46-8, 62-4, 80-3, 150-1.
30 Y. Yadin, "The Earliest Representation of a Siege Scene and a 'Scythian Bow' from
Mari", Israel Exploration Journal, 22/3 (1972): 89-94.
31 OW 40; FA 94, 97; EAA 180.
32 AS 133; D Collon, "Hunting and Shooting", Anatolian Studies, 33 (1983): 51-56, pi. xviii.
33 AW 1:118; SDA 75; AANE §228; AFC 22; AM §18.
34 Yadin, "The Earliest Representation"; AFC §99
35 HE2: 128—9; P. Michalowski, "Foreign Tribute to Sumer during the Ur III Period",
Zeitschrift fur Assyriologie, 68 (1978), 36.
36 Barry Eichler, "Of Slings and Shields, Throw-Sticks and Javelins", journal of the Amer-
ican Oriental Society, 103 (1983): 95—102, gives an excellent review of the philological
problems surrounding interpreting ancient Near Eastern technical military terms.
Astour, HE2:128— 132, follows Eichler's interpretation.
37 Brigitte Groneberg, u Tilpanu = Bogen", Revue d' Assyriologie, 81 (1987): 115-24.
38 In each case I will give the approximate length of the strung undrawn bow based on
the proportional relation to the body of the man holding the bow, assuming the aver-
age man is 165 cm tall, a height derived from the height of the mummies of con-
temporary Egyptian warriors (SSN 7; see pp. 438—40).
39 AW 1:150; SDA 176-7; AAM §156; AANE §49; AM 122-3; FA 96.
40 The two can be compared side-by-side in AAM §156—7.
41 AFC §150 has the largest and clearest reproduction; see also FI §641; AM §113a.
42 AW 1:151; SDA 174; AAM §134; AM §117; AANE §359.
43 Since the data is limited, and the categories and military systems overlapping, I have
combined a discussion of the Akkadian and Neo-Sumerian military systems here;
much of this discussion also applies to Chapter Four.
44 MAS 27; Benno Landsberger, "Remarks on the Archive of the Soldier Ubarum", JCS
9/4 (1955): 121-31.
15 For the archive of Umma, see USP; specifically military records are found at USP 15—
17; however, the non-military parts of the archive still illustrate the detail and com-
plexity of the logistical system of the Sumerians and Akkadians.
\d J. S. Cooper (editor), The Return of Ninurta to Nippur (Rome, 1978).
17 My translation is a synthesis of R3/l:92— 3 and E.J. Wilson, The Cylinders of Gudea:
Transliteration, Translation, and Index (Neukirchen-Vluyn: Verlag Butzon, 1996),
pp. U" 52.
IS R V. IS2 20S; ( :i/2:-I>1 (> I .
168
U.'J
NOTES
Chapter Four
1 For background on the Amorites, see pp. 155—9.
2 CAH 1/2:454-63; ME 119-21; DANE 135; RA 3:708-20; R. Hennckson, "A
Regional Perspective on Godin III Cultural Development in Central Western Iran",
Iran 24 (1986):23.
3 A letter of a farmer describes the devastation to his farm caused by Gutian raids: S.
Smith, "Notes on the Gutian Period," JRAS (1932):295 ff.
4 The Umman-Manda appear in the Naram-Sin epics as a rather obscure but powerful
enemy of Naram-sin. It is unclear if they are an ethnic group or a place-name. They
are perhaps best understood more generically like the English term "horde", meaning
a vast barbarian army (see LKA 265—6 for discussion and bibliography).
5 The epic "Cuthean Legend" or "Naram-Sin and the Enemy Hordes" (LKA 263—331)
is set in the reign of Naram-Sin, but is generally thought to reflect memories of the fall
of Akkad under his successors.
6 R3/1; DANE 134; AI 166-8.
7 There are occasional scenes of gods or kings enthroned holding weapons: AAM §201;
AFC §317; AANE §404.
8 PAE 122-8; ME 122-3; Cl/2:652-4; his name means the "protege of [the Elamite
god] Inshushinak", in an Akkadian and Elamite form of the name. A stele of Puzur-
Inshushinak from Susa shows him with Akkadian-style regalia, AAM §158.
9 R2:280— 96; Romer, W. "Zur Siegesinschrift des Konigs Utuhegal von Unug," Orien-
talia 54 (1985):274-88.
10 Cl/2:595-631; AI 161-78; M = CAM 102.
11 R3/2:9-89; LC 13-22; 0/2:595-631; DANE 312.
12 R3/2T2-14, 21, 39, 41; ANET 523b.
13 On the background of the Amorites, see pp. 155—9.
14 R3/2:20; Samuel Kramer, "The Death of Ur-Nammu and His Descent to the Neth-
erworld," JCS 21 (1967).
15 R3/2:91-234; DANE 270-1; 0/2:585-623; CANE 2:842-57; I follow the
chronology established in R3/2:92— 110, assuming that Year One of Shulgi is
2094 BC.
16 W. Hallo, "Simurrum and the Hurrian Frontier," Revue Hittite et Asianique, 36 (1978)
71—83; based on the year names the three Hurrian wars were in 2070—2067, 2063
2061 and 2052—2046; on the Hurrians, see pp. 303—7.
17 R3/2:235-84; 0/2:607-9.
18 P. Steinkeller, "The Administrative and Economic Organization of the Ur III
State: The Core and Periphery", in M. Gibson and R. Biggs (editors), The Organi
zation of Power (Chicago: Oriental Institute, 1987), 19-41; HE2:87-8; M = CAM
102.
19 On this alliance and the subsequent military campaign see R3/2:287— 90 and 296—300
unattributed quotations in this section are to the latter inscription; see Piotr Micha
lowski, "Bride of Simanum", Journal oj the American Oriental Society, 95 (1975): 716 l'»
20 On the Hurrians, see pp. 303—7; on Tish-atal, see R3/2:457— 64.
21 R3/2T91; on Ebih as Jabal Hamrin, see RGTC 2:38.
22 EA 3:186; R. Barnett, "Xenophon and the Wall of Media", Jo u mat of Hellenic Stiuiu
83 (1963): 1-26.
23 DANE 74-5; CAH 1/2:611-17; Thorkild Jacobsen, "The Reign o( Ibbi-Sucif , /<
7 (1953): 36-47.
24 For sources on spiraling prices and the defections of the city states, sre K \ \ ^(>(>
and the bibliography cited there.
25 MC 243-51; Jacobsen, "Reign of Ibbi-Suen, p. 42.
26 First portion, PH 9; second portion, MC 253 6H
"
NOTES
27 On the other hand, this could have reference to a literal flood which devastated
southern Mesopotamia (LD 37), which would only have served to compound the
economic, social, and military disruption of the era and further weakened Ur.
28 HTO 233-72; Ninurta is war god closely associated with Ningirsu DANE 214- GDS
138, 142-3.
29 I have removed the refrain "before holy Inanna, before her eyes, they are parading"
which recurs after each line in the poem, along with some non-military details of the
procession.
30 On oracular dreams in antiquity, see A. Oppenheim, The Interpretation o^ Dreams in the
Ancient Near East (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1956); similarly,
Alexander's soothsayer Anstander was an expert at consistently interpreting every
omen encountered as favorable to Alexander: e.g. Arrian 1.11.7.
Chapter Five
1 WV §13, 17; E3/l:73; cf. Ezekiel 1, 10, where the Israelite god rides a wheeled
celestial chariot. The sun-god Shamash is described as riding his chariot through the
sky (EOG 25). Ishtar's celestial chariot - presumably an exalted version of a royal
chariot - is described as made "of lapis lazuli and gold, its wheels shall be gold and its
horns shall be amber, driving lions in a team and mules of great size" (EG 48). M,
Civil, "Isme-Dagan and Enlil's Chariot", Journal of the American Oriental Society 88/1
(1968): 3-14. h
2 I will use the term "war-cart" to describe the military vehicles of the Early Bronze
Age, to distinguish them from the "chariot", the light, spoked, two-wheeled vehicles
of the late Middle Bronze period; a full discussion of the differences between war-cart
and chariot is given in this chapter. It is not clear that ancient Near Eastern peoples
made this type of distinction.
3 I. Shaw, "Egyptians, Hyksos and military technology: Causes, effects or catalysts?", in
A. J. Shortland (editor), The Social Context of Technological Change, Egypt and the Near
East, 1650-1550 BC (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 2001), 59-71, discussed at 60-2 EAE
3:452.
4 Richard Bulliet, The Camel and the Wheel (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
1975); likewise, although the principle of the wheel was widely known in Pre-
Columbian Mesoamerica, there is no evidence that wheeled vehicles were used (EWT
14-5), perhaps because of the lack of an adequate draft animal.
5 A. Schulmann, "Chariots, Chanotry and the Hyksos", Journal of the Society for the Study
of Egyptian Antiquities, 10 (1980): 105-53; Shaw, "Egyptians, Hyksos and military
technology."
6 I wiU use the term "equid" to refer to any of the species or hybrid species of the genus
equus known in the Bronze Age Near East, including donkeys, onagers, onager-donkey
hybrids, mules or horses. The linguistic and artistic ambiguities of our third millen-
nium evidence often make precision and certainty in distinguishing the species difficult.
Nicholas Postgate, "The Equids of Sumer, Again", in R. Meadow and Hans-Peter
Ucrpmann (editors), Equids in the Ancient World, vol. 1 (Wiesbaden: Ludwig Reichert
Verkg, 1986) 1:194-206.
Hvidence for horses equipped with bits comes from Dereivka in the Ukraine in the
early fourth millennium, and from Botai in the northern steppes of Kazakhstan in the
l;ite fourth millennium, leading some scholars to argue for domestication and horse-
riding in the fourth millennium steppe: David Anthony, "The Domestication of the
Horse", in K. Meadow and Mans Peter Uerpmann (editors), Equids in the Ancient
WotU. vol. 2 (Wu-skulru I udwig Reichert Verlag, 1991) 2:250-77; D. Anthony and
[) f*i'*)\vn, " I he mie.ms ..| hoisrku k ruling", Antiquity, 246 (1991): 22-38, and "The
171
NOTES
NOTES
10
11
12
opening of the Eurasian steppe at 2000 BCE", in Victor H. Mair (editor), The
Bronze Age and Early Iron Age Peoples of Eastern Central Asia, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.:
The Institute for the Study of Man, 1998). See also the webpage of the Institute for
Ancient Equestrian Studies, http://users.hartwick.edu/iaes (accessed 7 July 2005).
This evidence is, however, ambiguous and inconclusive, and a third millennium date
appears more likely: see Marsha Levine, "The origins of horse husbandry on the
Eurasian Steppe", in Marsha Levine et al. (editors), Eate Prehistoric Exploitation of
the Eurasian Steppe (Cambridge: McDonald Institute, 1999); Marsha Levine, "Botai
and the origins of horse domestication", fournal of Anthropological Archaeology, 18
(1999): 29-78, and her "Domestication, Breed Diversification and Early History of the
Horse" at http://www2.vet.upenn.edu/labs/equinebehavior/hvnwkshp/hv02/levine.htm
(accessed 7 July 2005). Basically, the bit is not conclusive evidence of horse-riding,
since a horse can be given a bit for other purposes; nor is horse-riding alone evi-
dence for military equestrianism. To further complicate the problem it must be
remembered that horses can be ridden without bridle or saddle, and hence the absence
of riding accoutrements is not evidence for the absence of horse-riding. Here I will
focus on the more limited question of military equestrianism in the Bronze Age Near
East.
EEH 117—19; D. Owen, "The 'first' equestrian: an Ur III glyptic scene", Acta Sumer-
ologica, 13 (1991):259— 71; P. Moorey, "Pictorial evidence for the history of horse-rid-
ing in Iraq before the Kassites", Iraq, 32 (1970): 36-50; Augusto Azzaroli, An Early
History of Horsemanship (Leiden: Brill, 1985); R. Meadows and H. Uerpmann (editors),
Equids in the Ancient World, 2 vols (1986-1991); A. R. Schulman, "Representations
of Horsemen and Riding in the New Kingdom", JNES, 16 (1957): 263-7; LA
4:1009-13.
Robert Drews, Early Riders: The Beginnings of Mounted Warfare in Asia and Europe (New
York: Routledge, 2004); an east Asian perspective is given by Nicola Di Cosmo,
Ancient China and its Enemies: the Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History, (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). David Anthony argues, unconvincingly to
me, that mounted warfare on the steppe occurred in the fourth millennium, and that
chariot warfare developed after the rise of mounted warfare: "Early Horseback Riding
and Warfare in the Steppes," http://users.hartwick.edu/iaes/.
Cavalry divisions were used in many regular armies throughout World War Two:
Janusz Piekalkiewicz, The Cavalry of World War II, 1939—1945 (Harrisburg PA: His-
torical Times, 1979). Horses and mules were also still used extensively for transporta-
tion in World War Two: the average German infantry division in 1939 had 4000-6000
horses; the Germans employed 625,000 horses for their invasion of Russia in 1941.
The Soviet army used an incredible 21 million horses during all of World War Two,
two thirds of which died: I. Dear (editor), The Oxford Companion to World War II,
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 37-8. Even in the late twentieth century
mules and donkeys were still being used for the covert transportation of arms to
Afghan rebels fighting the Soviet Union: George Crile, Charlie Wilson's War: The
Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History (New York: Atlantic
Monthly Press, 2003). Despite the widespread mechanization of modern armies, it is
likely that the limited use of horses and mules for highly specialized military transport
needs will continue into the foreseeable future.
Keith H. Beebe, The Dromedary Revolution (Claremont CA: Institute for Antiquity ami
Christianity, 1990); EA 1:407-8.
AW 1:37-40, 128-39; WV 13-36; Wolfram, Nagel, Die mesopotamische Stmtwagen mid
seine Entwicklung im ostmediterranen Bereich (Berlin: Berliner Beitnige /ur Vor uml
Fruhgeschichte 10, 1966); J. Crouwel, Chariots and Other Means of Laud Transport in
Bronze Age Greece (Amsterdam: Allard Pierson Museum, 1981); I .A !:4H5 7.
I '.'
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Wheels and a frame of the war-cart were discovered from Kish (AW 1:37; WV §5); a
silver terret for holding the reins was found at Ur {ED IIIA, 2550-2400} (RTU 165;
AFC 116; AW 1:131; WV §10; SDA 21; AM §83); while a bronze "tire" or casing for
the disk wheel for protection and added traction was found at Susa (AW 1:38; WV
§19).
WV 15-36; AW 1:37-40. In addition to the military examples presented here there are
a number of recently published cylinder seals showing ceremonial four-wheeled carts
from Tell Beydar {2400-2250} (EEH 116, §5-9), a terracotta model from Kish (WV
§4; AW 1:132), and a shell inlay of equids pulling a cart from Nippur (WV §6); none
provides any additional military information. In this chapter I will make parenthetical
reference to the specific pieces evidence by citing the number assigned in the following
lists; e.g. (item 1) refers to source number one.
WV 20-2; There is also a terracotta model from Kish {ED II?, 2650-2550} (AW
1:130).
WV 14-22; SDA 21; modern illustration: FA 83; Terence Wise and Angus McBride,
Ancient Armies of the Middle East (London: Osprey, 1981), plate B.
AAM §121; for a detailed discussion of the overall meaning of the Stele of the Vultures,
see pp. 55-9.
Unfortunately, this particular fragment of the stele (the third register) is generally left
out of most reproductions; it shows people climbing onto a large mound of corpses
with baskets of earth to cover the bodies in a burial mound (AAM §121; AFC 190).
Ur-namma {2112—2095} also built a ritual war-cart for the goddess Ninlil during this
period, which may be fragmentarily depicted on the Ur-namma Stele (E3/2:17; cf.
IYN 26; AFC 445); unfortunately, he did not leave a detailed description of this
vehicle.
This description is repeated twice in the text (E3/l:73), once when Gudea is com-
manded by an oracle to build the chariot (lines vi 12-23), and again when he actually
builds it (lines vii 13-23). I have merged the most important elements from both pas-
sages into one.
Based on E3/l:96— 7 and Wilson, Cylinders of Gudea, 168-70; unfortunately, neither of
Gudea's descriptions tell us if the chariot he made had two or four wheels. Based on
the contemporary Neo-Sumerian artistic evidence discussed above, we should prob-
ably assume it was two-wheeled.
Debates about what is a "true" chariot seem sometimes almost to be more about the
meaning of the word "true" than the word "chariot".
CG 74-120; WV 48-72; EWT; P. Moorey, "The emergence of the light, horse-drawn
chariot in the Near East, c. 2000-1500 BC", World Archaeology, 18/2 (1986): 196-
215; David W Anthony and Nikolai B. Vinogradov, "Birth of the Chariot", Archae-
ology, 48/2 (1995): 36-41; M. Littauer and J. Crouwel, "The Origin of the True
Chariot", Antiquity, 70 (Dec. 1996): 934—9; P. Raulwing, Horses, Chariots, and Indo-
Europeans, Archaeolingua, Series Minor, vol. 13 (Budapest: Archaeolingua Foundation,
2000).
R. Miller, E. McEwen and C. Bergman, "Experimental Approaches to Ancient Near
Eastern Archery", World Archaeology, 18/2 (1986): 178-95.
WV 50-5, §28-40; ELH.
Three cylinder seals from Karum Kanesh, Anatolia {2000-1850} seem to depict
similar, non-military scenes of four-wheeled carts in ritual settings: 1, WV §24; ELH
§2; 2, WV §25; ELH §3; 3, FI §727. It is possible that four-wheeled vehicles survived
for religious and civic processions after they had disappeared from the battlefield.
MM 31 2; MK 159-65.
M. ( iivil, "lsme-l )agan rind Enlil's Chariot", Journal of the American Oriental Society, 88
(1W>H):3 14, translation on pages 6-7.
473
NOTES
29 Four-wheeled vehicles are eriqqum (Sumerian GI§ .mar.gid.da); the two wheeled vehicle is
a narkabtum (Sumerian GI§ .gigir), MM 31. There is not a clear linguistic distinction in
terms of the function as opposed to the structure of the vehicle.
Chapter Six
1 Non-Mesopotamian military aristocracies which ruled Mesopotamia at various times
over the past four thousand years include the Amorites, Kassites, Achaemenid Persian:
Seleucid Greeks, Parthians, Sasanids, Arabs, Daylamites, Selchuq Turks, Mongols,
Timurids, Jalayrid Turks, Safavids, Ottoman Turks, and British.
2 AUP; M. Anbar, Les Tribus Ammorites de Mari, Orbis Biblicus et Orientalis 108. (Frei-
burg: Gottingen, 1991); M. Liverani, "The Amorites", Peoples of the Old Testament
World, D. Wiseman (editor) (Oxford, 1973), pp. 100-33; SHP 37-8, 160-74; DANE
16-17; CANE 1231-42; EANE 1:107-11; M. Streck, Das amurritische Onomastikon der
altbabylonischen Zeit, (Miinster: Ugarit-Verlag, 2000); on the archaeological problems of
dealing with archaeology of nomads and semi-nomads, see Roger Cribb, Nomads in
Archaeology, 2nd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
3 This description is collated from a number of texts given in AUP 92-3, 330—2.
4 DANE 215; EA 4:253—6; Victor Matthews, Pastoral Nomadism in the Mari Kingdom, c.
1830-1760 (Cambridge MA: American Schools of Oriental Research, 1978).
5 DANE 64; EANE 1:407-8. Keith H. Beebe, The Dromedary Revolution, (Claremont,
CA: Institute for Antiquity and Christianity, 1990). Richard W. Bulliet, The Camel and
the Wheel, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1975).
6 Sources cited in Liverani, "Amorites", 104-5.
7 Specific details of the military encounters between the Amorites and Mesopotamians
from the Akkadian to Ur III periods have been described in Chapters Three and
Four.
8 DANE 156-7; AI 181-5; 0/2:631-43.
9 R4:6-14, IYN 13-21; CAH 1/2:613-17.
10 J. van Dijk, "Ishbi-Erra, Kindattu, l'homme d'Elam, et la chute de la ville d'Ur", JCS
30 (1978): 189-208.
11 Year names in IYN; royal inscriptions, nearly all dealing with religion in R4:15-
106.
12 FSW, upon which I base my description. Four color maps based on Frayne can be
found in CAM 109; the year names have been collected and collated in IYN and LYN.
Many Mesopotamian year names can be found online at: http://cdli.ucla.edu/dl/
yearnames/yn_index.htm (accessed 8.7.2005).
13 DANE 175; RA 6:500-6; EA 3:331-3; AI 181-5, 199-200; 0/2:631-42.
14 R4:270-316; LYN 37-60; FSW 26-8; 0/2:641-3.
15 EA 1:225-33; ANE 1:81-9.
16 A1.-7-46, AR1T-19, CS 1:463-4. OAC; H. Saggs, The Might that was Assyria (Lon-
don: Sidgwick & Jackson, 1984), 23-34.
17 AR 1:1-8, RLA 6:101-16, CS 1:463-4; OAC 34-40.
1 8 The chronology of the Old Assyrian kings before Shamshi-Adad is quite uncertain .
The dates given here roughly follow AI; OAC 40-3 and CAH 1/2:740-62 give-
slightly higher dates.
19 Military conquest theories are summarized by OAC 63—71; for Larsen's interpretation
see OAC 71-80.
20 AL47-76; PH; CAH 2/1:1-8; CANE 2:873-83; DANE 264-5; EDS 204-12.
21 OAC 42, EANE 5:188-90.
22 Cl/2:636, C2/l:l; AI 190; CANE 2:873.
23 CAH 1/2:762, DANE 264; R4:560.
I I
NOTES
24 AR 1:18-28; Al:47-76; PH; C2/ 1:1-8; CANE 2:873-83; DANE 264-5; M = CAM
116.
25 R4:324-31; AI 181-94; C2/1T-28; PH; M = CAM 120; D. Edzard, Die "zweite
Zwischenzeit" Babyloniens (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1957), 122-53.
26 For a summary of our limited knowledge of Sippar during this period, see ASD
1-10.
27 Sabmm {1844-1831}; Apil-Sin {1830-1813}; Sin-muballit {1812-1793}, R4:327-31.
28 Primary: R4:332-72, LC 71-142; ANET 269-71; L; Secondary: ANE 1:108-17,
CAH 2/1:176-227; CANE 2:901-15; DANE 138-9, WANE 65-6; M. van de Mier-
oop, King Hammurabi of Babylon, (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005).
29 The letters of Zimri-Lim's last years, which provide great detail on military affairs in
Mesopotamia, have been recently translated with numerous notes and commentary by
Wolfgang Heimpel, Letters to the King of Mari (Winona Lake: Eisenbrauns, 2003), cited
as L.
30 MK, 1-29; M.-H. Gates, "The Legacy of Mari", Biblical Archaeologist 47 (1984).
31 The official title of the rulers of Elam was sukkalmah, often translated as "vizier" or
"grand regent" (PAE 160—3); for simplicity I will simply translate it as king. On Siwe-
palar-huppak's reign, see PAE 166-71.
32 PAE 169-71; for more details, see D. Charpin, "Les Elamites a Shubat-Enlil", In
Fragmenta Historiae Elamicae: Melanges Offerts a M. J. Steve, edited by L. De Meyer
(Paris: Editions Recherche sur les Civilisations, 1986), 129-37.
33 I generally foDow the translation in LC 76—140, but occasionally prefer ANET 163—
80.
34 This perhaps has reference to an inauspicious eclipse on the day of battle. Conversely,
Yahweh prolongs daylight to intensify the Israelite victory on the field of Gibeon
(Joshua 10.12-15).
35 In this passage the god Zababa serves as Hammurabi's bodyguard ("on my right side"),
while Ishtar is Hammurabi's arms bearer; Ishtar is frequently depicted in contemporary
art with a mace, axe, and sickle-sword in a quiver on her back.
36 Middle Bronze art relating to war-carts and chariots are discussed in Chapter Five
37 FI §167, 199, 538, 772, 784; SDA 285.
38 SDA §380, 383; FI §191, 794; AAM G5.
39 R4:372-403, ANET 271; C2/l:220-2; AI 243-4.
40 AI 241-52; PJV 5:464-73; EA 3:270-5; DANE 164-5; CANE 2:917-30; J. Bnnkman,
Materials and Studies for Kassite History I (Chicago: Oriental Institute, 1976).
Chapter Seven
1 For general background on Man see DANE 189-90; CANE 2:885-99; EA 3:413-16,
419-21; MK; MM.
2 Wolfgang Heimpel, Letters to the King of Mari: A New Translation, with Historical Intro-
duction, Notes, and Commentary (Winona Lake, IN: Eisenbrauns, 2003), hereafter cited
as L. When possible I will cite Heimpel's translation by page number. The standard
edition of the tablets, with French translation, is published in the Archives Royales de
Mari, (Pans, 1950ff), (cited as APJV1).
3 MM 36-7; WM 128-38; on Mesopotamian magic and divination in general, see
. CANE 3:1782-3, 1895-1909, 2013-17,, 2071-4; DANE 218-19; MK 112-38.
4 CANE 3:1904-6; MK 127-33; L 656-7 gives a chart with technical terms. Letters
reporting the results of extispicy are common in the Mari archive.
5 At the battle of Drepanum in the First Punic War {249}, the Roman commander
( l.iiulius Pulcher sailed into battle despite bad auguries and was soundly defeated,
l irero / V Slatura I hvrum, V v
I .
NOTES
NOTES
6 Mary Beard, John North and Simon Price, Religions of Rome, 2 vols (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1998), 1:21-8, 55-8, 188; 2:205; on the importance of
divination and prophecy in Roman Empire, see David Potter, Prophets and Emperors,
(Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1994).
7 On Greek martial divination, see W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War, Part
III: Religion (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
8 Ammianus Marcellinus, Res Gestae, trans. Walter Hamilton, The Later Roman Empire
(A.D. 354-378) (Penguin, 1986), 25.2.
9 Timothy D. Barnes, Constantine and Eusebius (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 1981), 42-3.
10 In Israel, king David's census to determine the military strength of his new kingdom
was condemned as an act of impiety, bringing plague upon Israel, 2 Samuel 24.
1 1 Heimpel describes these groups in L 34-6, 15-18, and provides an index to all refer-
ences in L 882-4; MK 142-5.
12 The administrative records of Sippar provide us some insights into military organiza-
tion in the Old Babylonian state {1894-1595} (ASD 86-116).
13 L 508; MM 15; WM 91; L 578, index, where Heimpel translates this term as "division
commander", which to the modern reader sounds like an officer in charge of more
than 100 men; I consistently use the term "captain" where Heimpel uses "division
commander".
14 L 438, 508; L 586, index; ASD 88, 93; MM 15; WM 91-2; ASD 91-3.
15 W HaUo, "The Road to Emar", JCS 18 (1964): 57-88.
16 §26—38 = ANET 167-8; Meek translates ba'irum as "commissary", reflecting his
understanding that they were to collect food for the army
17 Heimpel translates this term as "shock troops" (L 595, index; MM 17); my sense is
more of elite troops.
18 Specific passages for armies of 10,000-20,000 can be found in the index in L 599;
APJV1 1.42.
19 See EA 2:142—4 for discussion and bibliography. A hectare is 100 ares, an are 100 x 100
meters, or 10,000 square meters, equivalent of 2.47 acres. Based on ethnoarchaeolo-
gical studies, scholars have determined a population average of 250 people per hectare
(or 100 per acre) in ancient Near Eastern towns. However, some sites might have had a
density of as high as 500 people per hectare.
20 In the index on pages 599—601, Heimpel provides a complete list of all numbers
mentioned in the texts he translates. Of these, there are fifteen references to armies
ranging from 3000 to 6000 men, twenty-four references to armies from 1000 to 2000,
thirty-five references to armies from 100 to 1000 men, and twenty-five references to
under 100 men.
21 L 383; see also APJV1 6.32, 13.54; MM 25; MK 148.
22 By comparison, six jars of wine cost one shekel (L 407); a house could be bought for
five shekels (L 412). A captain of 100 men was paid 20 shekels in a campaign season.
23 L 175, 239, 306, 308, 360, 364, 393, 513.
24 Other encounters likewise point to low casualties, fifty in one case (L 342).
Chapter Eight
1 WAM 25-38; AW 1:69-71; PXA 1:471-2; MK 145-7; MM 33-4.
2 FI §749 = Brussels O. 437. It was originally published in L. Speleers, Catalogue <!<■■•
intailles et empreintes orientales des Musees Royaux du Cinquan ten aire (Bruxelles, 1917),
213. I would like to thank Professor Doctor Eric Gnbel, Senior Keeper in the And
quity Department of the Royal Museums of Art and History, Brussels, foi sharing with
me a recent clear digital photo ot this seal, which was a great help.
I 'i.
3 Some examples (which could be further multiplied): Durum, R4:42; Isin, R4:79, 92,
103; DunnumR4:98; Larsa, R4:118, 125, 191; Bad-tibara, R4: 176; general R4:253 '
4 R4:149, 160, 166, 240, 243.
5 R4:243, with additions from 237; cf. 237-43.
6 WM 173-5, 181 nl8, with illustration; O. Neugebauer, Mathematische Keilschrift-Texte
(Berlin, 1935), 1:149, 182-4; H. Waschow, "Wehrwissenschaft und Mathematik im
alten Babylonien", Unterrichts -blatter fur Mathematik und Naturwissenschaften 39 (1939)
370; FA 97.
7 This figure of 22 meters for the height of the wall presumably includes the height of
the tell (since by this time most cities were already on artificial mounds composed of
the ruins of former levels of the city), the earthen ramparts built around the city, and
the actual brick or stone wall which was built on top of the earthen rampart. Including
all three of these elements together makes the target height of the siege ramp reason-
able based on archaeological evidence.
8 David Ussishkin, The Conquest of Lachish by Sennacherib (Tel-Aviv: Tel Aviv University,
Institute of Archaeology, 1982).
9 A device called the kiskisum may also have been used in siegecraft, but its precise nature
is uncertain (L 364).
10 L 253, 331, 489; WM 156; CAD 1/2:428-9.
11 L 239, 253, 331; WM 156; CAD 3:144-7.
12 The meaning of xattassi is unknown. It is presumably a technical term for part of the
siege engines, perhaps the main beam for a ram, or the large heavy corner beams for a
tower.
13 AFC 158; Y. Yadin, "The Earliest Representation of a Siege Scene and a 'Scythian
Bow' from Mari", Israel Exploration Journal, 22/2-3 (1972): 89-94.
14 The exact meaning of the word lu'u hamannu is unknown. Heimpel translates it as a
"frontal brace", used to support steep packed earthworks (L 458). From the context I
see it as some type of earthwork designed to counteract the siege ramp of the enemy,
hence my term "counter-ramp". Just such a counter-ramp was discovered at Lachish
in Judea, see Ussishkin, The Conquest of Lachish (note 8 above).
Chapter Nine
• 1 AS; SHP; EDS; Cl/2:315-62, 532-94; C2/1T-41, EA 5:123-31; CANE 2:1195-
1218; Mark Chavalas, "Ancient Syria: A Historical Sketch", in Mark Chavalas and
John Hayes (editors), New Horizons in the Study of Ancient Syria (Malibu, CA: Undena
Publications, 1992), 1-22.
2 Based on AD; AS 102, 156, 186, 215, 236, 291-2; EDS 43; I use a simplified version
here.
3 AS 181-210. Major Chalcolithic sites include: Abu Hureyra, Bouqras, Chagar Bazar
(DANE 69-70), Halaf (EA 2:460-2), Mureybit, Tell Brak (EA 1:335-6; AS 185-90).
4 Guillermo Algaze, The Uruk World System: the Dynamics of Expansion of Early Mesopo-
tamian Civilization (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993).
5 AS 211-87; EDS 122-33; major archaeological sites of Early Bronze Age Syria
include: Aleppo; Byblos; Ebla; Horns; Mari; Qatna; Tell Brak; Tell Chuera (EA 1:149-2);
TeU Hamoukar; Tell Leilan (EDS 128-9; EA 3:341-7; DANE. 179-80); Tell Mozan.
6 Aleppo (EA 1:63-5), Damascus (EA 2:103-6), Hama (EA 2:466-8), Man (EA 3:413-
17), Qatna (EA 4:35-6), Ugarit (EA 5:255-66); other important Early Bronze fortified
sites include Tell Ashara, Tell Chuera (EA 1:491-2), Tell Khoshi, Tell Hamoukar a- d
Tel] Mozan (EA 4:60-3).
I III; I IF2; AS 235-46; SHP 21-38; EA 2:180-6; CANE 2:1219-30; DANE 88-9;
hi )N 134-48; Paolo Matthiae, Ebla: An Empire Rediscovered (Garden City, NY:
477
NOTES
Doubleday, 1981); Paolo Matthiae et al, Ebla: alle origini delta civilta urbana (Milan:
Electa, 1995).
8 Michael Astour, "The Date of the Destruction of Palace G at Ebla", in Mark Chavalas
and John Hayes (editors), New Horizons in the Study of Ancient Syria (Malibu, CA:
Undena Publications, 1992), 23—40, (and in HE2 58—76) argues that the palace was
actually destroyed before the Akkadian invasions.
9 HE1 25, 51—52; the client kingdoms included: Emar, Burman, Ra'aq, Abarsil, Gasur,
Hazuwan, Sugurum, Ebal and Manuwat (HE1 32-6),
10 HE1 26—51, M= HE1 27; Giovanni Pettinato, "Bollettino rnilitare della campagna di
Ebla contro la citta di Mari", Oriens Antiquus, 19 (1980): 231-45; SHP 28 n35.
11 PI 86-9; KS 329; EA 3:413-17; AS 262-7; AFC 135-64; EDS 129-33.
12 PI 86-9; KS 328; HE1 28, 50; CANE 2:1222 the precise dates of these kings of Mari
are not known. The six numbered kings are assumed to be those from the Sumeriar
King-list, where most names are lost but the regnal years survive (KS 328).
13 The god is presumably Ba'al (SAF 146-7), though the precise god may differ in dif-
ferent chronological, regional, cultural and ritual settings (SAF 145—50). Some of the
armed figurines are female, probably representing the warrior goddess Ashtarte — Ishtar
in Mesopotamia (SAF 145—6). Like Athena of the Greeks, Ashtarte-Ishtar was a god-
dess of war. For purposes of the study of arms and armor, I will simply call all the
figurines gods. Excellent photographs of several of these gods (unfortunately without
weapons) are found in AANE §69—73.
14 AFC 157. An eighteenth-century mural painting from Mari has a column of (mostly
lost) small soldiers marching beneath the main scene; one of them has a kilt, cape, and
some type of bundle hanging from a weapon on his shoulder (SDA 275, 282) — though
this has been interpreted as a fisherman carrying a net. The Urnammu stele has a man
with a bundle of construction equipment slung from an axe he is carrying on his back
(AFC §317). It is likely that hanging bundles from weapons carried on the shoulder
was a standard practice, a type of Bronze Age pack.
15 AFC 157-60; AW 1:137-9; SDA 142; AM §75.
16 AFC 158; Y. Yadin, "The Earliest Representation of a Siege Scene and a 'Scythian
Bow' from Mari", Israel Exploration Journal, 22/2—3 (1972): 89—94.
17 For illustrations see MW 2, figs. 1-58; AW 1:12, 41-2, 60-1, 136-40, 148-9, 156-7,
18 On weapons in third millennium Syria, see MW; warrior burials at Carchemish and
Tel Barsip, MW 1:188; metal helmets at Ur, AFC §56; AW 1:49; the golden helmet/
crown of Ur: AM §xvi; AANE §45.
19 See Chapter Four; AS 277-82; SHP 33-35; Cl/2:321-7; HE2 78-80.
20 AS 282-7; HE2 164-71; H. Weiss et al, "The Genesis and Collapse of Third Mil-
lennium North Mesopotamian Civilization", Science, 261 (1993): 995—1004; Nuzhet
Dalfes et al. (editors), Third Millennium BC Climate Change and Old World Collapse
(Berlin: Springer Verlag, 1997); more generally, N. Yoffee and J. Clark (editors), Col-
lapse of Ancient States and Civilizations (Tucson, TX: University of Arizona Press, 1988).
21 SHP 36-7; HE2 101-33. Ebla (EA 2:180-6); Aleppo (EA 1:63-5); Byblos (EA 1:390-
4); Carchemish (EA 1:423-4); Qatna (TeU Mishrifeh) (EA 4:35-6).
22 EDS 186—91; for the origin and background of the Amorites, see pp. 155—7.
23 AS 288-326; SHP 39-83; EDS 185-244; C2/1T-41; CANE 2:1201-5.
24 Dagger blades (SAF §120, 124, 128; LMB 216-19); javelin and spear heads (SAF §123
5; LMB 215; AW 1:156-7); "duckbill" axe (SAF §126; LMB 211; AW 1:148; EDS
243, with a mold for casting bronze axes in EDS 183); "eye" axe (SAF ^123, 12S;
LMB 211;); narrow-headed socketed axes (LMB 213).
25 The qurpissum/ gurpissum has been traditionally translated as "hauberk" (CA1) vol
G:139b; WM 157, 165 n26), but is now thought to be a helmet (MM 10 I). 11,
no artistic evidence for metal body armor until the very late Middle Uroii/e pciiml
I :-.
NOTES
Glock's interpretation of a royal statue with a robe with triangular markings as scale
armor (WM 157, 162) is unlikely, since the king is wearing the robe on one shoulder
which would have been impossible for a ten-kilogram robe of scale armor extending
to the ankles. The robe would constantly fall off the shoulder. Furthermore, a
woman wears the same type of dress (AFC §92), which undoubtedly represents sheep
fleece.
26 Unfortunately, we are not given time of service in the pay documents from the Mari
archive (L 498-500, 508). In reality, the pay could be as low as a fifth of a shekel (2
shekels per ten men) per campaign season (three months? L 312). This would make a
soldier's wages for three months the same as four bronze arrowheads.
27 SDA 275; AANE §61 ; AM §166; SDA 270-1; AAM §206; see related paintings of elite
dress at Mari in EDS 178-9.
28 FI §728-9; see Chapter Five for a full discussion of chariots.
29 Shelley Wachsmann, Seagoing Ships and Seamanship in the Bronze Age Levant (College
Station: Texas A&M University Press, 1998); Marie-Christine De Graeve, The Ships of
the Ancient Near East, c. 2000-500 B.C (Louvain: Department Orientalistiek, 1981).
30 Major Early Bronze maritime sites include: Ashkelon (EA 1:220-3); Beirut (EA
1:292-5); Byblos (EA 1:390-4); Tel Gensa (EA 2:394-6); Tell Sukas (EA 5:90-1); Tyre
(EA 5:247-50); Ugarit (EA 5:255-62); most of these sites continued to be inhabited
during the Middle Bronze period as well.
31 Major Middle Bronze maritime sites include: Achziv (EA 1:13-14); Akko (EA 1:54-
5); Amnt (EA 1:111-13); Ashdod (EA 1:219-20); Gaza (TeU el-Ajjul) (EA 1:38-40);
Jaffa (EA 1:206-7); Sidon (EA 5:38-41); Tel Michal (EA 2:20-2); Tel Mor (EA 4:49-
50); Tel Narm (EA 4:96-7); TeU el-Kazel (Sumur) (EA 3:275-6); Yavneh-Yam (EA
5:374). Some of these cities, such as Sidon, have dense modern populations over the
ancient sites, making detailed archaeological study difficult; some were probably
inhabited in the Early Bronze period as weU.
32 Alalakh (EA 1:55-61), Aleppo (EA 1:63-5), Byblos (EA 1:390-4), Carchemish (EA
1:423-4), Damascus (EA 2:103-6), Ebla (EA 2:180-3), Hama (EA 2:466-8), Khana
(EA 5:188-90; AS 317-18), Man (EA 3:413-17), Nagar (TeU Brak; EA 1:355-6),
Qatna (EA 4:35-6), Shekhna (TeU Leilan; EA 3:341-7), Ugarit (EA 5:255-66) Urkesh
(EA 4:60-3).
33 R4:779-97; SHP 49-64, F. AbdaUah, Les relations internationals entre le royaume d'Alep/
Yamhad et les villes de Syrie du Nord, 1800 a 1594 av. J.-C (Paris, 1985); EA L63-5-
CANE 2:1201-3; DANE 325-6; EDS 191-4.
34 AS 313-17; L; ARM; WM; DANE 189-90; CANE 2:885-99; EA 3-413-16 419-21-
MK; MM.
35 SHP 65-70; DANE 236-7; EA 4:34-5.
36 AT 2-4; R4:798-802; DANE 10-11; EA 1:55-9; AS 304-5.
37 WM 95-6; ARM 2.131 = ANET 483a.
38 AT 180; CS 3:237, 276-7; they are frequently mentioned in the fourteenth century
Amarna Letters; see the index of WiUiam Moran (translator), The Amarna Letters (Bal-
timore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 392-3; DANE 135.
39 SHP 77-8; EA 255-62; DANE 305-6; CANE 2:1255-66.
40 CS 1:357; SHP 39, 43, 45, 77-8. Assuming a date of around 2000 for the establish-
ment of the dynasty, the kings, with very rough estimates of their dates, are: Yaqaru {c.
1900}, Niqmaddu {c. 1880}, Ibiranu I {c. I860}, Niqmepa I {c. 1840}, Ibiranu II {c.
1820}, Niqmepa II {c. 1800}, Ammurapi I {c. 1780}, Ibiranu III {c. 1760}, Niqmepa
III {c. 1740}, Ya'duraddu {c. 1720}, Ibiranu IV {c. 1700}, Ammurapi II {c. 1680},
Niqmepa IV {c. 1660}, Ammittamuru {c. 1640-1620}. The next several names for
the Middle Bronze period are lost; many other kings for the better documented Late
Bronze period are also known. K. Kitchen, "The King List of Ugarit", Ugarit- Forschungen,
479
NOTES
9 (1977): 131— 42; CANE 2:1260. Egyptian Execration Texts mention several cities and
kings of southern Syria (CS 1:50—2).
41 SHP 79-80; DANE 62; EA 1:390-4; 0/2:343-51; see also the discussion om p. 410
on the relationship between Byblos and Egypt.
42 Possible exceptions are the enigmatic Byblos Syllabic Texts. George E. Mendenhall,
The Syllabic Inscriptions from Byblos (Beirut: American University of Beirut, 1985), has
provided an interpretation which has not met universal acceptance. If his interpretation
is correct, the following passage represents a late Early Bronze royal inscription: "The
words of Huru-Ba'il [king of Byblos]: I brought the lands into covenant to which they
have bound themselves submissively because of my mighty deeds [of war] . Therefore
you shall guard the ordinance of my kingship. Whoever enters honorably among lis
becomes one with the multitude. Thus the house has become the tribe of Huhash, and
they shall be the loyal followers of [king] Huru-Ba'il" (Mendenhall, Syllabic Inscriptions.
33).
43 LMB 103; SHP 36, 45, 79: the kings of Byblos, with very rough estimates for dates,
are: Ibdadi {c.2000}, Huru-Ba'il {19C?}, ? {1980-1820}, Abi-shemu I {c. 1820
1795}, Yapi-shemu-abi I {c. 1795-1780}, Yakin-El {c. 1780-1765}, Yantm-Ammu
{c. 1765-1735}, Ilim-yapi {c. 1735-1720}, Abi-shemu II {c. 1720-1700}, Yapi
shuemu-abi II {c. 1700-1690}, c Egel/ c Egliya (Akery) {c. 1690-1670}, RYNTY {c
1670-1650}, Ka'in {c. 1650-1630}, Hasrurum {c. 1630-1610}.
44 SHP 70-4; EA 1:423-4; DANE 65.
45 HE2; P. Matthiae, "Ebla and Syria in the Middle Bronze Age", in E. Oren, The Hyk
sos: New Historical and Archaeological Perspectives (Philadelphia: University Museum.
1997), 379-414; E4:807-8; EDS 213-16.
46 I follow Astour's interpretation, HE2 133—64. There is a synchronism between year 7
of Amar-Suena {2040} and the reign of Mekum (HE2 133, 155); many earlier scholar,
have understood Ibbit-Lim, the writer of the inscription, to be the king, EER 58-9
SHP 39, 41.
Chapter Ten
1 ALB 35-231; EAE 3:335-43; 0/2:208-37.
2 Based on ALB 30. Note that the dates of each archaeological period can vary from h.ill
a century to a century among different scholars; see MW 3.
3 ALB 59-90; M = MBA §16.
4 COT; P. Moorey, "The Chalcolithic Hoard from Nahal Mishmar, Israel, in Context",
World Archaeology, 20/2 (1988): 171-89; ALB 72-5; AW 1:126.
5 ALB 91-150; M = MBA §17, 21.
6 MW 1:164-5; AW 1:148-9; ALB 103-4; Cl/2:227-9.
7 The major Early Bronze city-states larger than about 8 hectares include: Ai (el-T
(EA 1:32-3); Arad (EA 1:169-76); Bab el-Dhra' (EA 1:248-51); Beth-Shean (I
1:305-9); Beth-Yerah (Khirbet Karak) (EA 1:312-14); Dan (EA 2:107-12); Ein-Besor
(EA 2:219-20); Hazor (EA 3:1-5); Jericho (EA 3:220-4); Lachish (EA 3:317 ?, I
Megiddo (EA 3:460-9); Tel Erani (EA 2:256-8); Tel Halif (Lahav) (EA 3:325-6); Tell
el-Far'ah (north; Tirzah) (EA 2:304-5); Tell el-Sa'idiyeh (EA 4:452-5); M = ALB 9 i
MBA 17.
8 ECI 36-37; ALB 117; EA 1:170; THL 89.
9 PS 134-5 = ARE 1:64; EDE 92, 160; EAE 1:219-21; ALB 117
10 ALB 151-173; ECI 63-9; Cl/2:532-7.
11 EA 1:107-11; CANE 2:1231-42; later biblical tradition describes Amorites living in
Canaan during the Israelite migration.
12 AEL 1:18-23 = ANET 227-8; EAE 3:496; M MliA '<i22.
i'
NOTES
13
14
15
17
18
19
20
21
22
ALB 174-231; ECI 69-97; EAE 3:337-8; C 1/2:537-94; J. Wemstem, "Egyptian
Relations with Palestine in the Middle Kingdom", Bulletin of the American Schools of
Oriental Research, 217 (1975): 1-16; M = MBA §21.
Major Middle Bronze II sites with fortifications include: Acre (Akko) (EA 1:54-5);
Aphek (EA 1:147-51); Ashkelon (EA 1:220-3); Beth-Shean (EA 1:305-9); Beth-
Shemesh (EA 1:311-12); Dan (EA 2:107-12); Dor (EA 2:168-70); Gezer (EA 2:396-
400); Hazor (EA EA 3:1-5); Jericho (EA 3:220-4); Kabri (EA 3:261); Lachish (EA
3:317-24); Megiddo (EA 3:460-9); Sharuhen (Tell el-'Ajjul) (EA 1:38-40); Shechem
(EA 5:19-23); Shiloh (EA 5:28-9); Tel Gerisa (EA 2:394-6); Tel Masos (EA 3:437-9;
Tel Zeror (EA 5:389-90); Tell Beit Mirsim (EA 1:295-7); Tell el-Far'ah (north) (EA
2:303-4); Tell el-Far'ah (south) (EA 2:304-5); Timnah (Tel Batash) (EA 1:281-3);
Yavneh-Yam (EA 5:374-5); Yoqneam (EA 5:381-3).
Peter Parr, "The Origin of the Rampart Fortifications of the Middle Bronze Age
Palestine and Syria", Zeitschrift des Deutscher Palaestina-verein, 84 (1968): 18-45.
Barbara Gregori, " 'Three-Entrance' City-gates of the Middle Bronze Age in Syria
and Palestine", Levant, 18 (1986): 83-102.
Major Middle Kingdom art depicting Canaanites include: Tomb of Antef (Theban
Tomb 386, EWW 38; NEA 38-9, Figure 3); Pectoral of Mereret (TEM 150-1); and
several scenes from the Beni Hasan tombs, 2 (BH 1 §16; AW 1:169), 3 (AW 1:166-7;
OHAE 192), 14 (BH 1 §47; AW 1:59), 15 (BH 2 §5), and 17 (BH 2 §15; AW 1:158-9)!
Alternatively this figure may hold an ankh, an Egyptian religious symbol.
For an overview of the debate and a defense of the moderate historicist position, see
William G. Dever, What Did the Biblical Writers Know and When Did They Know It?
What Archaeology Can Tell Us about the Reality of Ancient Israel (Grand Rapids, MI:
Eerdmans, 2001). Dever deals mainly with the royal period in Israel, after c. 1000. He
is more dubious about the historical reliability of earlier biblical narratives; see his Who
Were the Early Israelites and Where Did They Come From? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans,
2003). For a minimalist view, see Thomas L. Thompson, The Mythic Past: Biblical
Archaeology and the Myth of Israel (London: Basic Books, 1999); Dever reviews the
major minimalist literature on pp. 23-52; for a moderate inerrantist approach, see
Alfred J. Hoerth, Archaeology and the Old Testament (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Books,
1998).
E. Hostetter, Nations Mightier and More Numerous: The Biblical View of Palestine's Pre-
Israelite Peoples (Richmond Hills, TX: BIBAL Press, 1995).
The Execration Texts are discussed in detail on pp. 415-8; MAEM 136-90; EAE
1:487-9. Partial translations: CS 1:50-2, ANET 328-9, VAE 125-6. M = MBA §23.
On interpreting the Canaanite geography of the Execration Texts in Canaan, see ECI
87-93, and Yohanan Aharoni, The Land of the Bible: a Historical Geography, 2nd edn
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1979), 144-7; M= MBA §23.
An introductory bibliography on the Hyksos is given on p. 493, n. 9.
Chapter Eleven
1 Based on AFC xx.
2 Cl/2:363-7.
3 John Garstang, Prehistoric Mersin: Yumuk Tepe in Southern Turkey (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1953), 130-41, plates xvh-xxi; ET 128-30; EA 1:124-5, 2:8-11; PA 130-5. A
photo of the fortress remains can be found in S. Lloyd, Ancient Turkey (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1989) 29.
I Cl/2:368-410; C2/l:228-55; EA 1:127-31; KH 7-14.
5 Irina Antonova, The Gold of Troy (New York: Abrams, 1 ( )9(>); the Aegean coast of
Anatolia will not be examined in detail in this study.
IS1
NOTES
6 Mellaart, 0/2:390-5; Yadin also accepts them as authentic in AW 1:142-5.
7 CG; KH 9-14; 0/2:406-10; EA 3:385-6.
8 G. Steiner, "The immigration of the first Indo-Europeans into Anatolia Recon-
sidered", Journal of Indo-European Studies, 18 (1990): 185—214.
9 M. Larsen, The Old Assyrian City-State and its Colonies (Copenhagen: Akadmisk Forlag,
1976); KH 21-43; ANE 1:90-5; CANE 2:859-71, DANE 163-4, EA 3:266-8; CI/
2:707-28.
10 KH 35; all dates for the Anatolian kings of the eighteenth century in this section are
conjectural, to give a sense of the relative chronology.
11 KH; GH; J. Macqueen, The Hittites and their Contemporaries in Asia Minor 2nd edn
(London: Thames and Hudson, 1986). Trevor Bryce, Life and Society in the Hittite World
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); EA 3:84-8; C2/l:228-55, 659-85.
12 KH 66—72; events in Labarna's reign are retrospectively described in the Telipinu
Proclamation (CS 1:194a) and the Testament of Hattusilis (CS 2:81a). Labarna/
Tabarna became a royal title among the Hittites, rather like Caesar among the Romans.
13 KH 72-89. We have three main sources (KH 66-7) for the reign of Hattusilis I: the
Annals of Hattusilis (MHT 50-5 = HW2 47-55); the Testament of Hattusilis (MHT
100—7 = CS 2:79—82); these two are supplemented by a later retrospective summary in
the Proclamation of Tilrpmu (MHT 132-39 = CS 1:194-8).
14 Tawananna was a title of the leading female member of the Hittite royal family (KH
96-9).,
15 Kurt Bittel, Hattusha: The Capital of the Hittites (New York, 1970); EA 1:333-5; DANE
54-5.
16 GH 148—9; KH 11—%; HW2 66—9; siegecraft in the Mari documents is discussed in
Chapter Eight, exhibiting numerous parallels with the Hittite account. G. Beckman,
"The Siege of Ursu Text (CHT 7)",JCS, 47 (1995): 23-34.
17 This practice is mentioned frequently in the Bible (where it is called herem, "utter
destruction") and in the Mesha Stele (CS 2:137-8; ANET 320-1); P. Stern, The Bib-
lical Herem (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989); S.-M. Kang, Divine War in the Old Testament
and in the Ancient Near East (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1989). The practice was continued in
classical warfare, such as in Alexander's destruction of Thebes {335} and Persepolis
{330}, and the Romans' destruction of Carthage {146}, Corinth {146}, and Jerusalem
{70 CE}.
18 WH2; For Late Bronze Age Hittite military organization, some of which probably
reflects earlier practices, see Richard H. Beal, The Organisation of the Hittite Military, Texte
der Hethiter 20 (Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1992) and summary in CANE 1:545-554.
19 Cylinder Seal, Kultepe (Karum), Anatolia, MBI, (WV §29; ELH §4); cylinder seal,
Anatolia, MBII (FI 57, §841).
20 The standard study is WH; see also DANE 150; EA 3:125-30; AS 284-7 for more
recent bibliography.
21 For a summary of the theories on the origin and homeland of the Hurrians, see C
Burney, "Hurrians and Proto-Indo-Europeans: the Ethnic Context of the Early Tras-
Caucasian Culture", in K. Emre et al. (editors), Anatolia and the Near East (Ankara:
Turk Tarih Kurumu Basimevi, 1989), 45-51.
22 Kharbe (Tell Chuera, EA 1:491-2), Nagar/Nawar (Tell Brak, EA 1:355-6), ami
Urkesh (Tell Mozan, EA 4:60-3).
23 W. Hallo, "Simurrum and the Hurrian Frontier", Revue Hittite et Asianiqtte, 36 (197S)
71-83.
24 N. Na'aman, "The Hurrians and the End of the Middle Bronze Age in Palestine' 1
Levant, 26 (1994): 175-87.
25 The site of the Mi tanni capital at Washukanni has not been identified; il is perhaps lell
Fakhanyah, EA 2:300-1. For bibliography on the Milamii, see: DANF .^K); CAN!
NOTES
2:1243-54; texts from fifteenth and fourteenth century Nuzi (EA 4:171-5; DANE
216; CANE 2:931—48) reflect Mitanni Hurrian culture, and include numerous items
of military interest for Late Bronze warfare: T. Kendall, Wafare and Military Matters in
the Nuzi Tablets, Ph.D dissertation (Waltham, MA: Brandeis University, 1974).
Chapter Twelve
1 For a popularized natural history of the Sahara, see Marq De Villiers and Sheila Hirtle,
Sahara: A Natural History (New York: Walker & Co., 2002).
2 EAE 63-4; EBP; LA 4:344-8, 6:1069-76; EE 17-33.
3 EAE 2.493—4. Methodologically it should be emphasized that in the ancient Near East
we are at the mercy of the happenstance of archaeological survival and discovery in
attempting to reconstruct the origins of warfare, Although Naqada's importance in
these developments should not be underestimated, it is quite possible that other equally
or even more important sites existed, the remains of which have either not survived -
potentially buried under several meters of Nile sediment — or have not yet been dis-
covered or excavated. As a general principle, this applies to much of our historical
knowledge of the military history of the ancient Near East.
4 EAE 1:200, 295; M= AAE 21 and HAAE 18, showing the major natural resources
available to ancient Egypt,
5 DAE 226-8; EAE 3:61-5; LA 6:1069-76.
6 EAE 1:552-9, DAE 102-3; For the Pre-Dynastic period, see HEA 1:46-8 and A.
Lawrence, "Ancient Egyptian Fortresses", JEA, 51 (1965): 69-70.
7 EAE 1:256-8; DAE 166-7; LA 3:414-15.
8 EG 510; AW 1:40, DAE 167, FP 33-5; EAE 2:407; disk-shaped mace heads remained
in use largely for ritual purposes.
9 EDE 32, EWA 1; EWP 20-1, EE 36-7, AW 1:117, MB 44-5; PSE Figures 5-6; BAH 17.
10 DAE 109, EWP 26; AW 1:116, FP 157.
11 Hunter's Palette: EE 57; MB 93-118. Compare with figures depicted in GP 79.
12 See the "Towns" or "Libyan" Palette and the Bull Palette, discussed on pages 319 and
326. The depiction of two Horus banners among the hunters may imply some type of
military function.
13 EE 54; EWP 29, MB 119-44; EWA 2; ISP 22-3.
14 Barbara Adams, Ancient Nekhen: Carstang in the City of Hierakonpolis (New Maiden:
Egyptian Studies Association, 1995); EDE 36-51; OHAE 61-7; DAE 226-8; EAE
2:98-100, 3:61-5; LA 2:1182-6; M= HAAE 22-3; AAE 30-1.
15 All dates given for this period are problematic estimates that could be higher or lower
by as much as fifty years.
16 The name of this king of Abydos is actually unknown; Uj is apparently the name of the
tomb that I am here using for the tomb's owner.
17 EDE 56-7; EE 56-7; AE 42-3; EBP 312-17. The name "Scorpion" derives from a
hieroglyphic sign on his ceremonial mace-head; the Egyptian pronunciation is uncer-
tain, perhaps something vaguely like Daret (d3rt).
18 EE 56, AW 1:121, MB 226-7, EAE 1:257; ISP 28-9.
19 EDE 39—40; AAA 28—34; Bruce Williams interprets some elements of Egyptian
kingship as originating in Nubia: "Qustul: The Lost Pharaohs of Nubia", Archaeology,
33/5 (1980): 13—21, with a more technical presentation in Excavations Between Abu
Simbel and the Sudan Frontier. The A-Group Royal Cemetery at Qustul: Cemetary L (Chi-
cago: University of Chicago, 1986), 163-90; for critiques of Williams's theory, see the
summary and bibliography in EDE 39—40. The Kingdom of Ta-Sety, or Qustul, is
associated In .in h.ieologists with the "A-Group" Nubian culture (EAE 1:44—6).
20 liWI 1 \u, MH I ' \\ ui)\ I 1>I., 48, 51, 177-9.
;
NOTES
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
For translation of the Palermo Stone (hereafter PS), with detailed commentary, se<
Toby A. H. Wilkinson, Royal Annals of Ancient Egypt: the Palermo Stone and its Associated
Fragments (London: Kegan Paul International, 2000). A dated translation can be found
in AM 1:57-72; DAE 218 gives references to recent studies; EWP 24.
Using Classical historians as evidence for Egyptian history two millennia earlier is
certainly fraught with difficulties; see J. Dillery, "The First Egyptian Narrative History
Manetho and Greek historiography", Zeitschrift fur Papyrologie und Epigraphik, 127
(1999): 93-116.
General surveys: OHAE 67-85; EDE 60-82, HAE, 52-4; LA 6:486-93, 1069-76.
EDE 67-70; EAE 2:494-5, 377-8; DAE 181,196-7; AE 43-9; LA 4:348-50.
Her. 2.4, 99; Man. 33; Diod. 1.45.
There is some controversy over whether the Menes of later Egyptian tradition should
be associated with Narmer or with his son and successor Aha, or even with a confla
tion of several legendary kings (see discussions found in bibliography in EDE 68; EAI
2:377-8; DAE 17-18, 181, 196-7). For narrative purposes I here tentatively accept the
link with Narmer.
TEM 40-1; AW 1.122, 124; MB 161-200; EWP 29; ISP 14-15.
EE 53, EWP 28, ECI 26, AW 1:51, FP 139; MB 229-32.
EDE 357-62; EAE 2:373-6; DAE 180, Her. 2.99; seals of Narmer's father Ka have
been found in cemeteries near Memphis, indicating some type of settlement there
before Narmer; Narmer probably greatly expanded the settlement and made it his
capital, rather than creating an absolutely new city, EDE 58.
Remains of an additional Early Dynastic fortress have been found at Elephantine Island
at Aswan, showing some of the characteristics of Early Dynastic fortifications, and ma\
represent the southern frontier garrison of the new state; EWP 34.
Narmer's campaign — or that of a near successor — into Libya is memorialized in the
"Cities (or Libyan) Palette" mentioned on p. 319 (EE 53, EWP 28, AW 1:51;
TEM 38).
ECI 25; see also Yadin s interpretation of a symbol on the Narmer Palette as repre
senting, in part, a campaign in Palestine, AW 1:124—5.
Or Hor-Aha; the name means "[the wargod] Horus fights". EDE 70-1; DAE 17-18;
AE 49-56; LA 1:94-6. As noted above (note 26), some scholars equate Aha, rather
than his father Narmer, with the legendary Menes.
EDE 71-3; DAE 86; AE 56-64; LA 1:1109-11.
PS 190 = ARE 1:58; EDE 71.
Djer Palette, AE 60; PSE Figure 7; label depicting head-smiting of a naked enemy,
EWA9; LA 6:1126-7.
On Djet, see EDE 73-4; DAE 86-7; AE 69-73; on Merneith, see EDE 74-5; AE 65-9.
EDE 75-8; EAE 1:416; DAE 18, 84; AE 73-80; EWA 10-16; LA 1:1071-2.
EDE 76-7; EE 87, AW 1:125, FP 164, EWP 34, EDE 156, MB 214, EWA 12. It is
traditional in Egyptology to describe the peoples of the Sinai, Canaan and Syria as
"Asiatics" ( c 3mw), based on Classical Greek conceptualizations of "Asia" as the lands
east of Europe (LA 1:462—71). In modern English, however, the term Asia(n) brings to mind
India, China and Japan rather than Syria and Palestine. I therefore prefer the term
"Easterner" and have changed all references in translations from "Asiatics" to "Easterners"
EDE 78-80; DAE 33, 257-8; AE 80-6; early interpretations of an inscription ol
Semerkhet in the Sinai at Wadi al-Mughara have now been shown to be from
Sekhemkhet of the Third Dynasty, discussed on p. 330.
EDE 80-1; DAE 236; AE 86-91; EWA 17.
For general summaries of Second Dynasty, see EDE 82-94; Aidan Dodson, "The
Mysterious Second Dynasty", KMT, 7/2 (1996): !9 31; O] iAE <SS S; (1 '■ »0 \ ,
AE 91-111: EAE 1:417-18.
: I
NOTES
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
PS 125-6 = ARE 1:62; EDE 85; EWA 18.
ECI, 36-7; ALB 117; EA 1:170.
Both the chronology of the Early Bronze Age in Canaan and that of the Egyptian kings
of the early dynasties are quite uncertain. Depending on how one interprets the var-
ious possible chronologies, if Arad fell to Egyptians it could have been to any king in
the Second or even the late First Dynasty.
EDE 89-91; AE 95-7; DAE 220. I here follow the suggestion of Wilkinson and DAE
that Sekhemib-perenmaat is an alternative name for Peribsen. If not, then Sekhemib-
perenmaat should be included as an additional king before Peribsen.
ANET 228a = EDE 89-90. In EWA 19-23, Redford interprets inw as "benevolence",
euphemistically referring to tribute. From the Egyptian perspective, tribute and con-
quest were inseparably bound.
Some scholars believe that the myth of the war between Seth and Horus found in later
Egyptian documents is in part a reflection of the cultic struggles and wars of the late
Second Dynasty. H. te Velde, Seth, God of Confusion (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1967); CI/
2:33; LA 3:25-7, 6:84-6.
EDE 91-4; EBP, 348-54; EAE 2:231; LA 1:910-12; AE 98-103, who follows older
views that Khasekhem is a different ruler than Khasekhemwy - it is now understood
that they are the same person and the second name was taken by the king after his
reunification of Egypt.
The major sources for the arms and army of Early Dynastic Egyptian warriors are:
"Painted tomb", EE 36-7, AW 1:117; Gebal el-'Araq knife handle, AW 1:116;
Battlefield Palette, EE 54; Hunter's Palette, EE 57, AW 1:118-19, FP 155; Narmer
Palette, EE 52, AW 1:122-4; Libyan or Cities Palette, EE 53. Each of these has been
discussed in this chapter.
PSE summarizes the evidence. The most prominent examples include: Narmer Pal-
ette: EE 52, AW 1.122-4, EWP 29; Den inscription, EE 87, AW 1:125, EDE 156;
Cylinder seal from Hierakonpolis, AW 1:125.
The military art of this period includes numerous examples of icons for cities as walled
enclosures; see ECI 27; EDE 119. The "City Palette" is the most famous; ECI 26; MB
230; EWA 4.
EWP 38, FP 128; AEA 71; HEA 1:46-8, EE 60,72-3; site plans of many tomb enclosures,
presumably broadly paralleling fortification techniques, can be found in AE 38-104.
Bull Palette: AW 1:123; MB 144; EWA 3.
PS 92, 134, 136 = ARE 1:58, 64; EDE 210; LA 5:279-80.
SP 11-25; EBS 11-20; EAE3:281-4.
Conveniently collected in SP 12-25 and GP 68-74, 151-4, 192 and plates 9, 11-13,
15-16, 18-21, 23; EBS 11-20.
Lionel Casson, The Ancient Mariners, 2nd edn (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
1991), Figure 1; EBS 16.
DAE 109; EWP 26, AW 1:116, EBS 18.
PSE 4-7 discusses major examples; MB. See EWA 134-40 for a list of all Early
Dynastic and Old Kingdom sources depicting the ritual execution of enemies. Other
forms of early human sacrifice are discussed in EDE 265-7. Although the Narmer
Palette is the most striking and famous example from the period of the iconography of
the victorious pharaoh ritually slaughtering his defeated foes, it was already the cul-
mination of several centuries of artistic and ideological development.
Chapter Thirteen
I For general surveys and additional bibliography, see Gl/2:145-207; EAE 2:585-605;
IDMH 105; HOK; MAI- f>3 101 ; Ol IAI- S«) 1 17; M= HAAE 27.
NOTES
2 For general surveys and additional bibliography, see Cl/2:145— 60; EAE 2:585—6, 591
3; EDE 94-105; EOK; HAE 63-7; OHAE 90-3. Most of these accounts under
standably focus on the great religious and cultural achievements, and funerary momi
ments such as Djoser's Step Pyramid at Saqqara.
3 Illustrations and translations of all these inscriptions from Wadi al-Mughara can h<
found in IS; hereafter I will provide only additional references to more accessible
sources for illustrations of the Sinai martial reliefs; M= AAE 188.
4 EDE 94-5; king Djoser is more properly named Netjerikhet, but he is widely know i
today by the name Djoser, as preserved in later king-lists.
5 EDE 95-8; EOK 32-4; DAE 87; EWA 25a, FP 165.
6 MB 215, FP 166, PSE Figure 12; EDE 98-9; EOK 35; DAE 256-7; EWA 25b. I hen
follow Wilkinson's ordering of the kings.
7 EDE 101-3; EOK 36; EE 101, MB 215; PSE fig 10.
8 Inscription at Elephantine summarized in EAE 586a; a drawing of the fortress can I
found in EWP 34.
9 For recent general overviews of the Fourth Dynasty with additional bibliography set
€1/2:160-79; EAE 2:586-8, 593-7; HAE 66-75; OHAE 93-109.
10 EAE 3:299-300; HAE 67-9.
11 PS 141 = ARE 1:66; the "sheep and goats" are 'wt, meaning literally "small cattli
On the dating and relative chronology of the fragments of the Palermo Stone, see I'
140, 259.
12 On Buhen, see the magnificent study by W. B. Emery et al., The Fortress ofBuhen, 2 vo
(London, Egypt Exploration Society, 1977-79), and discussion on pp. 443-5.
13 ANET 227b; EWP 40 and IS, figs 8 and 9, FP 167, PSE figs 13-14; EWA 27.
14 PS 235; the numbers are a bit obscure and have alternatively been read as 1 1,004
captives with 13,000 animals. Given the standard human-to-animal ratio of pastoi
societies, Wilkinson's reading, given above, seems to be more accurate, and is also
broadly proportional to the plunder figures from Nubia; see also EWA 26.
15 PS 141-3 = ANET 227a = ARE 1:65-6; for illustrations of such vessels from il
Middle Kingdom, EBS 35.
16 EOK 43-5; PE 98-121; Cl/2:169-72; HAE 69-71; EAE 2:234, 586; DAE 152
Greek writers (Her. 2.124-6; Man. 14-16; Diod. 1.63, calling him Chemmis) all t<
tales about the Great Pyramid; none record any military legends. Unfortunately, il-
registers on the Palermo Stone covering the reigns of Fourth Dynasty kings .itt •
Sneferu are largely lost. Inscriptions of Khufu and subsequent rulers are largely fiini
ary, with no military data (see ARE 1:83-95).
17 ANET 227b = ARE 1:83; IS Figure 7; FP 168; PSE, Figure 15; EWA 28.
18 On the late Fourth Dynasty, with additional bibliography, see: EAE 2:587—8, 5*>l
HAE 66-75; CI /2: 160-79.
19 PE 121-37; 0/2:174-6; HAE 73-4; EAE 2:229-31, 378-9, 588; DAE 149; I I
2.127; Diod. 1.64.
20 EAE 2:378; PE 137-51; Cl/2:176-8; DAE 181-2; Diod. 1.64.
21 For general overviews of the Fifth Dynasty with additional bibliography see: (
2:180-9; EAE 2:588-90, 597-601; HAE 75-80; OHAE 109-13.
22 Stephen Quirke, The Cult ofRa: Sun Worship in Ancient Egypt (New York: Thames .n
Hudson, 2001); on Heliopolis, see AEA 105-6; EAE 2:88-9; LA 2: 1 1 1 1 i 3.
23 HAE 76-7; EAE 2:588-9, 598; Cl/2:182-3.
24 PS 168 = ARE 1:70, 108; PSE Figure 16; EWA 31-2.
25 NEA 23; Ludwig Borchardt, Das Gmbdenkmal des Konigs S<ihu re (1 eip/ig: |. < ' Hi
richs'sche Buchhandlung, 1910), plate 1. In pari this scene is rceonstrih led by a ■ I"
copy found in the Mortuary Temple of iVpi II (Ni.A ! \)
26 NEA 24; Borchadt, Stihu-Rc, plates I 1 and 12; I'.WA \ \
NOTES
27 HAE 77-8; EAE 2:589a, 599; EWA 35a. Evidence for expeditions from funerary
temple: AEA 159; Miroslav Verner, Forgotten Pharaohs, Lost Pyramids, Abusir (Prague:
Academia Skodaexport, 1974), pp. 133—54.
28 HAE 78-9; EAE 2:589-90, 600.
29 For recent general overviews of the Sixth Dynasty with additional bibliography see:
EAE 3:33-4, 2:590-1, 602-4; HAE 80-9; Cl/2:189-97; OHAE 113-17.
30 I will cite Lichtheim's translation, AEL 1:18-23; see alternatively: ANET 227-8; ARE
1:134-5, 140-4, 146-50; EAE 3:496; M = MBA §22. No chronological information
is given in Weni's autobiography, so precise dates for his five campaigns are unknown,
and are simply roughly estimated here.
31 The dates given here are a very rough estimate. Weni began service under Teti {2374-
2354}; assuming he began his service late in Teti's reign {c. 2360} at around the age of
20 it would put his birth between 2380—2375. Weni apparently died during the reign
of Merenre {2310-2300} (AEL 1:22) - the last king mentioned in his autobiography —
which would put his death in his seventies, a venerable age for the time. His minimal
dates are 2370-2310.
32 M = HAAE 27. This roughly corresponds to the modern area from Aswan in Egypt to
Firka in Sudan.
p Thomas Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic Empires and China, 221 BC to AD
1757 (Cambridge: Blackwell, 1989), 87.
H Lichtheim translates imy-r c w as "chief of scouts"; I prefer "commander of foreigners",
or even " commander of foreign mercenaries", on which see AAA 37, 95—6, n. 55 for
extensive bibliography. The term imy-r is translated in different contexts as "comman-
der", "overseer", or "chief", while c w is translated "scouts", "foreigners", or "drago-
mans" (interpreter) (EMO 34). I will consistently change such variants to "commander
of foreigners" throughout quotations from translations without further notification.
>5 EAE 2:603-4; AEN.
W) AEL 1:23-7 = ARE 1:150-4, 157-61; EAE 2:116-17; LA 2:1129; Hans Goedicke,
"Harkhuf's Travels", JNES, 40 (1981): 1—20; for map of Horkhuf 's expeditions, see
HAAE 27.
1 7 A. Spalinger, "Some notes on the Libyans of the Old Kingdom and later historical
reflexes", Society for the Study of Egyptian Antiquities journal, 9 (1979)- 125-60; LA
3:1015-33; EAE 2:290-3, 3:497-501; maps: HAAE 27; HAE 86. For general back-
ground on this region, see Lisa Giddy, Egyptian Oases (Warminster: Aris & Phillips,
1987).
><S EAE 2:291; Technically, the ethnonym Libyan derives from the Libu, a different,
though probably related ethnic group which displaced the Tjehenu by about the
Eighteenth Dynasty {beginning 1569}.
*9 AE 53, EWP 28, ECI 26; MB 229-32.
in EAE 3:34-5, 2:604; DAE 220; LA 4:928.
1 1 These figures are from Man. 21, but are supported by some contemporary evidence;
other scholars suggest a total reign of 64 years.
I ! AEAB 15-16 = ARE 1:161-4; EAE 3:33; LA 4:929; M = HAAE 27.
43 MAEM 139, 149-50; related rituals may be found in the Pyramid Texts, 244, 476, as
well as in numerous Coffin Texts.
II My spelling of the names is an approximate transliteration; the original, purely con-
sonantal spellings are given by MAEM, 139.
I i The text is somewhat obscure; a variant reading might be 200 soldiers and workers in
total.
\<t iiAli 1:32 7. Proper treatment of war dead — or, alternatively, acts of ritual abuse and
mutilation of corpses has been a serious religious and cultural issue from ancient
tunes to the present streets ol l : alluja in Iraq. For the vastly greater evidence from
I »,
is
NOTES
classical Greece, see W. Kendrick Pritchett, The Greek State at War: pt. 4, licit
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), 94—259; the Bible also reflects I
concern in the treatment of the corpses of Saul and Jonathan, 1 Samuel 31.8—13.
47 The term "scout" appears to be a technical term for Nubian light infantry men i
aries, reflecting their frequent military function.
48 German readers should consult R. Muller-Wollermann, Krisenfaktoren im agyptisch
Staat des ausgehenden Alten Reiches, Dissertation (Tubingen: 1986).
49 LA 4:513-14; BDAE 93; HAE 89; for later legends see Man. 21, Her. 2.100, I
Diod. 1.64.14.
Chapter Fourteen
1 For a translation of the Pyramid Texts, see PT; for general background with referem
to major studies, see Erik Hornung, The Ancient Egyptian Books of the Afterlife, tin
David Lorton (Ithaca NY: Cornell University Press, 1999), 1-6, and the bibliograph]
on 159-62; EAE 3:95-7.
2 On the myth of the combat of Horus and Seth, H. W. Fairman, The Triumph of Horn
an Ancient Egyptian Sacred Drama (London: Batsford, 1974), J. G. Griffiths, The Con)
of Horus and Seth from Egyptian and Classical Sources (Liverpool: Liverpool Univci lit
Press, 1960); EAE 1:294-5, 2:119-22.
3 Khafre, EWP 67, TEM 69; Menkaure, EWP 68, 77, TEM 70-1.
4 The "Nine Bows" generally is a reference to all the traditional enemies of Egypt (I )A
203-4; EAE 2:164-5; LA 1:844-5, 4:472-3).
5 One text describes the "sword which is in your hand when you ascend from il
Netherworld" (PT 247), but "sword" here is an anachronistic translation.
6 PT 21, 424, 461, 483, 509, 536, 610, 667, 667A, 669, 689.
7 See also PT 666A, 667, 667A, 724.
8 AW 1:146, FP 141-2; EWA §52; NEA 30-2, Figure 2a; AAK 2/1.4.
9 A famous scene from the tomb of Niankhkhnum at Saqqara {c. 2450} depicts worl
men smelting metal, confirming its increasing importance in Egyptian society by 1 1 1
time (EWP 88; ISP 80-1; FP 25).
10 The more narrow and elongated blade of the New Kingdom era (AW 1:180—1, 1 8 I
FP 47—8), designed for penetrating rather than cutting, called 3khw (EG 511, sign I
is not known in the Middle Kingdom.
11 AEA 91-3; EAE 1:552-3; LA 2:194-204. A. W. Lawrence, "Ancient Egyptian Foi
tifications", JEA, 51 (1965): 69—71. References in this section to AEA provide bib
liography for the archaeological reports for each site.
12 PT665, 665B, 611, 665A, 715, 720.
13 AW 1:146, FP 141-2; EWA §52; NEA 30-2, Figure 2a; AAK 2/1.4
14 AW 1:147, FP 140. EWW 38; EWA §53; NEA 30-2.
15 Gaballa (NEA 31) interprets the scene as people and animals entering a shelter. I i
the objects at the right and left of the third and fourth panels as piles of grain; they be n
broad resemblance to related hieroglyphs for a "heap of corn" (EG 483, sign M S i
"sandy hill" (EG 489, sign N29) and "half-loaf of bread" (EG 532, sign X7). Tli.
animals are clearly thrusting their heads into the object, possibly eating from the grain pil<
16 Gaballa (NEA 31) sees the women as berating and striking the men who ran from ih-
battle; this may be implied in a couple of instances, but in others the women s< i i
clearly to be caring for the wounded.
17 Other passages also describe a ladder by which the king ascends into heaven: I' I '
306, 478, 530, 572, 586A, 625.
18 P. Lipke, The Royal Ships of Cheops (Oxford: BAR, I'W); SB >(> \-\- IBS M \ I \\
3:281-4; OI IAR 07; ISP 10! 5; IT !<.'> Shipbuilding is mentioned in the rov.il ami
I
NOTES
of Khufu (PS 223). This remarkable boat has been restored and can be seen in a
museum beside the Great Pyramid.
1 9 SP 94-7; EWP 90-3; TEM 52-3; SGAE 101-3; ISP 41.
Chapter Fifteen
1 For general surveys see OHAE 118-47, 457-9; EAE 1:526-32; LA 6:1437-42; CI/
2:464-531; HAE 137-54; Barbara Bell, "The Dark Ages in Ancient History I: The
First Dark Age in Egypt", American four nal of Archaeology, 75/1 (1971): 1-26.
2 Modern scholars view Manetho's Ninth and Tenth dynasties (Man. 27-30) as a single
dynasty, mistakenly divided in two by later Egyptian tradition (EAE 1:527-8). Here I
will simply call both dynasties the Ninth, or Herakleopolitan Dynasty; there will thus
be no discussion of a Tenth Dynasty. Its capital, known by its Greek name Her-
. akleopolis (ancient: Heneneswe; modern: Ihnasiya), was the capital of the twentieth
nome in middle Egypt; see EAE 2:91-3; LA 2:1 124-8; DAE 124. M = HAAE 31.
3 AF 29-41 = AEAB 24-6 = AEL 1:85-6 (abridged) = HAE 142; EAE 1:94-5; LA
1:267-8.
I John and Deborah Darnell, "New Inscriptions of the Late First Intermediate Period
from the Theban Western Desert and the Beginnings of the Northern Expansion of
the Eleventh Dynasty", fNES, 56 (1997): 241-58, quotation on 251.
5 Darnell and Darnell, "New Inscriptions", 244; EAE 1:528.
6 C2/l:466-8; HAE 143-7.
7 Background, EAE 2:169-70; translation TS 212-34 = VAE 52-4 = AEL 1:97-109
(abridged) .
S Lichtheim agrees that the text contains "valid, rather than fictitious, historical infor-
mation" (AEL 1:97); Grimal also accepts its historicity (HAE 140—6).
9 Ralph D. Sawyer (trans.), Seven Military Classics of Ancient China (Boulder, CO: West-
view, 1993), 145-186. Sun Tzu is traditionally said to have written in the early fifth
century BC, but many scholars feel the text attributed to him was actually written in
the third century BC (Sawyer, 149-50).
K) Adrian Goldsworth, The Complete Roman Army (London: Thames and Hudson, 2003),
27.
I 1 Henry Fischer, "Nubian Mercenaries of Gebelein during the First Intermediate Per-
iod", Kush, 9 (1961): 44-80.
Chapter Sixteen
1 Cl/2:464-531; CANE 2:735-48; EAE 2:393-400; HAE 155-81; OHAE 148-83;
MKT; Janine Bourriau, Pharaohs and Mortals: Egyptian Art in the Middle Kingdom
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988).
2 0/2:472-95; HAE 155-8; OHAE 148-57.
3 EAE 2:436-8; 0/2:479-88; HAE 155-8; DAE 183; AEA 149-50; LA 6:66. His
names mean "[The Theban war god] Montu is content". Some scholars reckon this
Montnhotep as the second, counting his distant ancestor, a nomarch at Thebes, as
Montuhotep I.
i ITM 26-7; as noted on p. 489, n. 2, following current historical interpretation I am
calling the combined Ninth and Tenth Dynasties the "Ninth" Dynasty.
5 Kedford, LCI 70, believes the term "Easterners of D3ty" in Tjehemau's inscription has
reference to Canaanites rather than to a Nubian tribe.
(> < 1 >: IKS «>2; I IAE 157-8; OHAE 155-7; LA 6:68.
7 ALAB 52 •! ARIi 1:208-10; W. C. Hayes "The Career of the Great Steward
llenemi iimlei Nabhepetre, MenUihotpe" ,//:/!, 35 (1949): 43-9.
IS 1 )
NOTES
8 Wadi Hammamat Inscription of Amenemhet I (ARE 1:211—16 = AEL 1:113-15 and
ECI 71—2 (both partial). The expedition lasted at least a month, with dates on the
inscriptions ranging from day three to day twenty-eight of the "second month".
9 "Prophecy of Neferti" = TS 131-43 = AEL 1:139-45 = CS 1:106-10 = VAE 34-6;
EAE 2:512-13; LA 4:380-1.
10 For general overviews with additional bibliography, see: EAE 3:453—7; Cl/2:495— 31;
HAE 158-81; OHAE 158-83.
11 AIB; EAE 1:68-9; 0/2:492-499; HAE 158-64; OHAE 158-60; LA 1:188.
12 TS 203-11 = AEL 1:135-9 = ANET 418-19 = VAE 48-52; EAE 2:171.
13 The best study of the military affairs in the reign of Senwosret I is SI (in French); LA
5:890-9; EAE 3:266-8; 0/2:499-505; HAE 161-5; OHAE 160-2.
14 AEA 138 = ARE 1:251; See also the fragmentary inscription of the nomarch Sir-
enpowet from an Aswan tomb, ARE 1:247, note b.
15 Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 BC: A Historical Biography (Berkeley:
University of California Press, 1991), 402—11.
16 0/2:502-4; HAE 165-6; LA 1:189; OHAE 163-4.
17 Donald Redford, Pharaonic King-lists, Annals and Day-books (Mississauga, Ontario:
Benben Publications, 1986); EAE 1:95-7, 2:105-6.
18 0/2:503; LA 5:899-903; OHAE 164-5.
19 Robert D. Delia, "A Study of the Reign of Senwosret III", Ph.D. dissertation (New
York: Columbia University, 1980); 0/2:505-9; EAE 3:268-9; HAE 166-9; LA
5:903-6; OHAE 165-7.
20 Her. 2T01-7, 137; Man. 34-6; Diod. 1.53-8; Diodorus gives an extraordinarily
exaggerated and anachronistic size for the Syrian campaign army — 600,000 infantry,
24,000 cavalry, and 27,000 war-chariots (1.53).
21 AAA 58-63; M = HAAE 51, CAAE 41. His achievements in Nubia led to his later
deification as a patron god of Nubia. Late Greek legends on the Nubian campaign :
Diod. 1.55.
22 An inundation mark from Dal near the Third Cataract, dated to year 10 {1868},
indicates ongoing Egyptian administrative activity in the area, probably associated with
the building of the fortification complex.
23 On the early Kingdom of Kush, see Stuart Smith, Askut in Nubia: The Economics and
Ideology of Egyptian Imperialism in the Second Millennium B. C. (London: Kegan Paul
International, 1995); Timothy Kendall, Kerma and the Kingdom of Kush, 2500—1500
BC (Washington, DC: ational Museum of African Art, Smithsonian Institution, 1997);
Barry J. Kemp, "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period in
Egypt," in j. D. Clark (editor), The Cambridge History of Africa, vol. 1: From the Earliest
Times to c. 500 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 658—769; EAF
2:250-2; LA 3:888-901; M= AAE 187, HAAE 51.
24 Herodotus 2.100-110; Diodorus 1.53-58. K. Lange, Sesostris (Munich: 1954), reviews
these classical legends.
25 It appears that the Greeks attributed a number of unknown stele and inscriptions to
Senwosret (Diodorus 1 .55), much in the same way that medieval Arabs would attribute
many ancient monuments to the ubiquitous "Pharaoh".
26 Ronald J. Leprohon, "The Reign of Amenemhet III", PhD dissertation (Toronto:
University of Toronto, 1980), hereafter FLA3; 0/2:509-12; EAE 1 :69-70; HAE 1 69
70; LA 1:190; OHAE 167-70.
27 Her. 2.148-9; Man. 34-6; Strabo 17.1.3, 37, 42; Diod. 1.61, 66, 89, 97; Pliny, Natural
History, 36 A3; EAE 14.
28 P^A3, 10—184, translates all known inscriptions from Amenemhet'.s reign.
29 EAE 1:219-21; DANE 62; RA3 228; LA 1 :889-91 .
30 EAE 3:301; HAE 171; LA 1:191; OHAE 170 1.
I'M.
NOTES
Chapter Seventeen
1 EAE 2:238-45; D. O'Connor and David P. Silverman (editors), Ancient Egyptian
Kingship (Leiden: Brill Academic Publishers, 1995), Oleg Berlev, "The Eleventh
Dynasty and the Egyptian concept of Kingship", in Dwight Young (editor), Studies
Presented to Hans Polotsky (East Gloucester, MA, 1981), 361-77.
2 Harakhty was a manifestation of Horus (EAE 2:146-7).
3 Divine support of Alexander the Great on his expedition to Siwa Oasis in the Western
Desert was manifest by a similar unexpected rainstorm in the desert that saved the
army from thirst; Peter Green, Alexander of Macedon, 356-323 BC: A Historical Bio-
graphy (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 274.
4 Descriptions by Diodorus (1.53) of oracular dreams concerning Senwosret III (Sesoo-
sis) derive from the Greek worldview, but may parallel earlier ancient Egyptian tradi-
tions of prophecies and oracular dreams.
5 Partial translations: CS 1:50-2, ANET 328-9, VAE 125-6. Discussions: MAEM 136-
90, with detailed bibliography; EAE 1:487-9; 0/2:508-9. For general introductions
to Egyptian magic see MAEM; EAE 2:321-36; Geraldine Pinch, Magic in Ancient Egypt
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1994); Bob Brier, Ancient Egyptian Magic (New
York: Quill, 1981).
6 Jeremiah performs a similar ritual curse symbolized by the breaking of a pot, Jeremiah
19.1-11.
7 TEM 40-1; AW 1.122, 124; MB 161-200; EWP 29; ISP 14-15.
8 Although the Coffin Texts are mythic and magical rituals regarding the afterlife, I am
here assuming that their descriptions of weapons and warfare reflect actual practices.
On the background of the Coffin Texts, see EAE 1:287-8 and Erik Hornung, The
Ancient Egyptian Books of the Afterlife (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1999) 7-12
162-4.
9 Rituals of protection against enemies or cursing enemies are fairly common in the
Coffin Texts; see, for example, CT 45, 49, 89, 313, 439, and 454, among many others
10 EWW 31-9; EAE 2:406-12; BAH 20-59; FP 21-74.
11 Wallace McLeod, Self Bows and Other Archery Tackle from the Tomb of Tut'ankhamun,
Tut'ankhamun's Tomb Series 4 (Oxford: Oxbow Books, 1982).
12 On the different designs and nomenclature of early bows, see Edward McEwen,
Robert L. Miller and Christopher A. Bergman, "Early Bow design and construction",
Scientific American (June 1991), 264/6: 50-6.
13 The tomb of the Eighteenth Dynasty {1569-1315} Nubian archer Maiherperi in the
Valley of the Kings has some well preserved Egyptian archery equipment (FP 44-6),
much of which would have been similar to Middle Kingdom equipment.
14 BH 1 §13, §30; BH 2 §13, §34; BAH 53; FP 40-1. Observations on the different
penetrating power derived from different methods of drawing the bow were made by
the sixth-century Byzantine historian Procopius, History of the Wars, 1.1.6-17, trans.
H. Dewing, Procopius, 7 vols (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1914-1940)
1:4-9.
15 BH 1 §30, BH 2 §4; FP 40, 47; AW 1:9; BAH 53-4.
16 Janine Bourriau, Pharaohs and Mortals: Egyptian Art in the Middle Kingdom (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1988), pp. 162-3, includes examples of daggers and axes
from the Middle Kingdom.
17 EWW 35; AW 1:146-7, 154-5, 168-71; FP 49; BAH pi. 10.
18 FP 50-1; PSE figs 33-4, 50, 54-6, 63-6, 70-3, 85.
19 AW 1:158; FP 52; EWW 34; BAH 58.
10 S( fAE 70-82, AW 1:71, EWP 120-1, 126; BH 1 §14-16; BH 2 §5, 8, 32.
'I This translation is a mixture of AEL 1:225 6 and. TS 30-1, with my own interpreta-
tions .ulik'il in m|iui<' In .u kcts.
I'M
NOTES
22 Translations: TS 21-53; AEL 1:222-35; CS 1:77-82; ANET 18-22 (abridged). Stu
dies: ECI 83-6; LA 5:950-5; EAE 3:292.
23 B. Fenik, Typical Battle Scenes in the Iliad (Wiesbaden: Steiner Verlag, 1968).
24 BH; EAE 1:175-7; EWP 120-1, 126; NEA 39-40.
25 BH2§15; AW 158-61; EWP 120; FA 94-5.
26 BH 2 §5; SGAE 75.
27 BH 1 §14-16; AW 169; EWP 121, 126.
28 BH 1 §47.
29 Theban Tomb 386: GJ §2; EWW 38; NEA 38-9, Figure 3.
30 There are also eleven Canaanite mercenaries in the mural of Tomb 15, which are dis
cussed on pp. 279—80 and p. 438.
31 Christopher Spring, African Arms and Armor (Washington, DC: Smithsonian Institution
Press, 1993), 29, pi. 4.
32 FB; BI; AEF; AW 1:16-24; EAE 1:552-9; AEA 90-3; LA 2:194-203; FP 127-38.
33 AEA 82-3; EAE 1:467-9; HEA 3:38-42; FP 128.
34 AEA 91-3; FP 130-4; HEA 3:200-29; Somers Clarke, "Ancient Egyptian Frondei
Fortresses", JEA, 3 (1916): 155-79.
35 The major fortresses will be listed by their modern archaeological name, followed In
the ancient Egyptian name where known; the Egyptian names are taken from EAI
1:555. The rough size of each fortress is given in meters, along with a reference to
AEA, where full bibliographic references to the major archaeological reports and stu
dies are provided. M = HAAE 5 1 .
36 SW; AW 1:69-71; LA 3:765-86; FP 138-48.
37 The fullest mural is from Tomb 17: BH 2 §15, AW 1:158-9, SW 14, FA 94-5; each oi
the murals have slight differences in detail, making them worth consulting individually;
see also Tomb 15, BH 2 §5; and Tomb 2, BH 1 §14, FP 148.
38 SP 75-97; EWW 59-63; EBS 27-36; EAE 3:281-4.
39 BH 1 §14, §16, §29; BH 2 §12.
40 Dilwyn Jones, A Glossary of Ancient Egyptian Nautical Titles and Terms (London: Kegan
Paul, 1988).
41 CT 398, 400, 404, 405, 409.
42 AW 2:340-1; SP 111-13; EBS 45; EAE 2:356-8; AEA 143-5; Harold Nelson (editor).
Medinet Habu, vol. 1: Earlier Historical Records of Ramses III (Chicago: University oi
Chicago, 1930), pi. 37-41; AAK 2, pi. 115-17.
Chapter Eighteen
1 SIP; LA 6:1442-8; EAE 3:260-5; Barry J. Kemp, "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom
and Second Intermediate Period in Egypt", in J. D. Clark (editor), The Cambridge
History of Africa, vol. 1: From the Earliest Times to c. 500 BC (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1982), 736-60.
2 On the Turin Canon king-list for this period, see SIP 9-33, 69-74, 94-9, 118 I"
151-6, 164-5 = CS 1:71-3; for the scarab seals see SIP 34-68. The Abydos King-lists
ignore this period entirely, CS 1:69—70.
3 SIP; for alternative views, see EAE 3:260—5 and the bibliography found there.
4 This chart is based on SIP 6, 186-91. However, Ryholt follows a chronoloi-.n .il
interpretation that places the end of the Twelfth Dynasty in 1803, while EAF chron
ology, which I follow, places it in 1786. Ryholt also dates the accession of Ahinose to
1550, whereas the EAE dates it to 1569. Thus, according to the FA l : . < limnology th»
Second Intermediate Period is twenty-six years shorter than in Ryholfs chronokn r ,\
To be consistent I will follow the EAE chronology, taking the surplus twenty si\ ve.n
from the period of the Thirteenth and Fourteenth I )ynastn
!«>.»
NOTES
5 Stuart Smith, Askut in Nubia: The Economics and Ideology of Egyptian Imperialism in the
Second Millennium B.C. (London: Kegan Paul International, 1995). 81-140; EAE
2:250-2; Kemp, "Old Kingdom, Middle Kingdom and Second Intermediate Period in
Egypt,": 747-60; AAA 64-72.
6 Summarized by AAA 67-70; Smith, Askut, 110-30.
7 Dates for all Fourteenth Dynasty kings are very rough estimates, based on SIP 114 (and
elsewhere), and adjusted to match the difference between SIP chronology and that
used in this book.
8 Thomas S. Burns, Rome and the Barbarians: 100 B.C. - A.D. 400 (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 2003).
9 On the Hyksos, or Fifteenth Dynasty, see SIP 118-50, 256-8, 301-5, EAE 2:136-43,
ECI 98—122, E. Oren (editor). The Hyksos: New Historical and Archaeological Perspectives
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania, 1997); M. Bietak, Avaris, The Capital of the
Hyksos (London: British Museum, 1996).
r>'.
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iiir.
Index
Aamu 462
Abba-el 264
Abda-El 158-9
Abisha 401
Abraham 280-1
Abu Fanduweh 31
Abu Hureya 27
Abydos 316, 440; Tomb U-239 33
Adab 107
administration 95-7, 192-204, 409, 418-20
Aegean 265, 366, 453
Afghanistan 23, 46, 245
Agga 45-7
agriculture 17-18, 33, 36; surpluses 18
Aha 320
Ahab of Israel 191
Akhtoy I 370
Akhtoy III 276, 375-82, 440
Akkad 6, 73-101
Akkadian Empire 67, 73-101, 248-9,
289-90, 304
Akshak 64
Akurgal 51
Alabaster Victory Stele (Sargon) 77
Alaca Hoyuk 292
Alalakh 264-5, 295, 306
Aleppo 6, 84, 116, 170-7, 220, 257-60,
263-4, 295-302
Alexander 301, 399, 402, 407
Alisar 288
alliances 212—3
Amalekites 281-2
Amar-Girid 82
Amarsm95, 110, 113-15, 261
ambush 208
Amenemhet (nomarch) 436—7
Amenemhct 1 390 6, 414, 440
Amenemhel [I W> |o\ .|S3
Amenemh i 111 1" In. -MS
Ameni 397-8
Amontes 83, 110-11, 118-20, 154-84,
250-3, 265-8, 281-2, 431
Amun 371
Amunenshi 431
Anatolia 6, 17, 76; Chalcolithic 285-6;
Neolithic 20-1, 24-7
Aniba 442
animals 17, 129-32
Amtta 292-4
Ankhtifi 371-4, 452
annus mirabilis 399, 453
Antef (nomarch) 447, 453-4
AntefI372
Antef II 374-5, 412-3, 433-4
Anshan 31-2, 80, 105, 118, 163
Anubanini 94
Anzu56-7, 117
Aaplahanda 267
Arabia 34
Arabs 18
Arad 273, 320, 322
Aratta 23, 46
archery 19, 25, 27-28, 33-4, 38-40, 48-
50, 53, 60, 72, 85, 88-95, 98, 112, 121
123-4, 133, 144-6, 148-53, 198, 219,
221, 230, 245-8, 252-6, 279-80, 282-:
303, 315-6, 321, 324-5, 332, 356-8,
362, 378-80, 388, 392, 402, 406, 422 ■■
430-1, 433-9, 448-50, 453-4, 469,
491
Armna 296, 302
aristocracies (martial) 37
Ark of the Covenant 56, 141
Armant 372
armor 48-50, 56-8, 133, 246, 324-5,
433-8; bronze scale 145 h, I .SO >K-I
314, 427; sve also helmets, shields
Aroer 276
507
INDEX
Arpachiyeh 34
arrow see archery
Arslantepe 286
art (martial) 8, 10-11, 22, 25-6, 28, 37-9,
49-50, 55-60, 70-1, 105, 132-5, 141-3,
147-50, 180-1, 218-9, 245-8;
Akkadian 85-95, 141-3; Canaanite
279-80; Egyptian 314-7, 332-3, 358-9,
422-7, 433-8, 447-51; Mari frescoes
180, 255-6; Syrian 245-8, 252-6
Arzawa 296-7
Ashur see Assyria
Asikli Hoyuk
Askut 442
assassination 396
assembly see council
Assyria 75, 115, 166-77, 290-1; kmglist
167-8
Aswan 347, 360, 402
Asyut 375-7
Atal-Shen 305
Atamrum 232—4
autobiographical inscriptions, Egyptian
328-9, 340
Avaris 461-2
Awan 71-2
axe 19-21, 27, 29-33, 48, 56-7, 60, 67-
70, 86-8, 98, 112, 126, 138, 149, 180,
245, 252-6, 265-6, 270-1, 278-80,
282-3, 288, 303, 311, 315, 324-5, 358,
400, 402, 422, 425, 431-2, 433-8, 448,
453-4
Azag 122-5
Babylon 133, 147, 153-214, 295, 301
Bahrain 34
ba'irum see marine
banners 40, 221, 247, 271, 292, 326, 330
Baqet III 434-5
bar ding 136
Bashar, Mt. 83, 100, 103, 110, 156-8
battalion 77, 97, 124, 421
battering ram see ram
battle 207-8
battle-axe see axe
Battlefield Palette 26, 315, 327, 345
battle net see net
bazahatum (Akkadian) see border guards
bedouins see nomads
Beidha 30
Bern Hasan 94, 279-80, 393, 397, 401,
422-7, 433-8, 447-51
Beycesultan 286
Bible 280, 481
boats 18-19, 29, 47, 50, 60, 113, 122, 153,
197-8, 201-3, 213, 229, 243, 321, 366,
451—5; Dashur boat 451; see also ships
bodyguard 47, 49-50, 57, 75, 95, 396;
see also "followers"
Bogazkoy see Hattusas
booty see plunder
border guards 48, 197, 224
Bouqras 28
bow see archery
bowmaker 91
bronze 21-3, 240-1, 270-2, 290-1, 433-8
Bronze Age 5
Buhen 325, 342, 361, 398, 402, 442-5,
460-1
bureaucracy see administration
burial mounds 31, 51, 53, 57-9, 72, 80,
140-1, 182
burial, weapons see tombs
Byblos 114, 237-9, 252, 256, 265-7, 273,
323, 327, 331, 334-5, 400-1, 410, 453,
459, 461
Caesar, Julius 191
camel 8, 132, 155-6, 256, 344, 474
campaigns 204—9
camps 127, 207, 226-7, 298, 372, 430
Canaan 6, 21, 71, 94, 250-1, 269-84,
320-1, 401-2, 415-8, 433-8, 456-63;
Chalcolithic 269-71; Early Bronze 271-4;
Egyptian intervention 336—40, 388,
405-7; Middle Bronze 274-84;
Neolithic 29-38
Can Hasan 20, 26
Cannibal Hymn 364—6
captain 97, 195-6
Carchemish 171, 258-9, 266-7
Catal Hoyuk 21, 25-6
cataracts 308—9
cavalry 8
Cave of Treasures 270-1
Cayonu 20, 24
Cemi Tepesi 24
census 192
ceremonial vehicles 130, 136-7, 143, 151
Chalcolithic 4-5, 22, 29
chariot 2, 135, 145-53, 151, 158, 243,
256, 266, 284, 293, 300, 303, 456, 46 ! \
471-4; sec also war carl
charioteer 1 32 53
,«i
INDEX
chief (abum) 157-8
chiefdom 15—16
Chogha Mish 31
chronology 2—5; Middle Chronology 3
citadel 222, 266
Cities Palette 319, 326, 345
city-states 36, 256-68, 272, 312-4, 418
club 20, 67, 324, 426
Code of Hammurabi 206
Coffm Texts 413, 417-8, 451-2, 455
colonel 195-6
combat 185-214, 357-9, 428-38
combat, single 124-5, 282—3
commander (Egyptian) 338, 347, 354-5,
371, 421
composite bow 89-95, 254, 284
conscription 192-3
Constantine 192
copper 20-3, 28, 270-1, 311-2, 325, 336
corpses (treatment of) 26, 28, 49-50, 55-9,
124, 314, 319, 439
corruption 202
council (of war) 47-8, 127, 210
Crete 265
cylinder seals 37-40, 50, 132-5, 142-3,
147-9, 256
Cyprus 400
Dabenarti 442
dagger 19, 25, 27 29-30, 40, 48-50, 60,
68-9, 72, 88, 98, 125-6, 149, 180-1,
247-8, 252-6, 265-6, 272, 276, 278-
80, 288, 311, 313-4, 324-5, 356-8,
406, 426, 431, 433-8
Dan see Tell Dan
dance 25-6, 123-4
David 432
decapitation 26
Den 230-1
dendrochronology 3
Der 110
Dilmun 81; see also Persian Gulf
dimtum (Akkadian) 229 see siege tower
diplomacy 210-4, 378
divination 99-100, 106, 127, 150, 176,
182, 186-92, 214, 221, 249, 379, 414-
5, 476; see also dreams
Djan374
Djedkare Izezi 334
Djer320
Djet320
Djosn \M\
dogs 50, 129
domestication of plants and animals 17-1
32
Dongola 399, 405
donkeys see equids
Dorak Treasure 288
dreams (oracular) 55—59, 127, 471; see ah
divination
drums 113, 125, 127
dub.sar martu (Sumerian) see secretary c
the army
Dura-Europos 261
Dynasties, Egyptian: Eighth 366; Elevent
373-5, 382-93; Fifth 333-5; First 318-
21; Fourteenth 461-3; Fourth 329-30
Ninth 369-73; Second 321-7; Seventl
368-9; Sixth 335-44; Tenth 489; Thir
329-30; Thirteenth Dynasty 456-61 ;
Twelfth 393-411
Eanatum 4, 52-9
Early Dynastic Mesopotamia 35-72; Earl
Dynastic I 44-50; Early Dynastic III 5(
66
Eastern Desert 33
Easterners see Canaanites
Ebla 6, 59-60, 76, 237, 241-4, 246-50,
267-8, 305-6
eclipse of the moon 1 88
ecological crisis 249—51
Edfu 371
Egypt 6, 21-2, 24, 94, 130-1, 149, 257,
266, 273-84, 308-463; Civil War
390-3; Early Dynastic 317-27; First
Intermediate Period 368—81;
Geography 308-10; Middle Kingdom
382-455; Neolithic 32-3; Old
Kingdom 328-67; Pre-Dynastic 310
17; Second Intermediate Period 456— 6
Egyptian Dynasties see Dynasties, Egyptin
Em Gedi 270-1
Ekallatum 175
Elam, Elamites 6, 23, 39-41, 46, 54, 61,
63, 79-80, 89, 100-5, 109, 113-14,
119-22, 159, 161, 163, 170-7, 184,
232, 467; Early Dynastic 71-2;
Neolithic 30-32
Elephantine 325, 330, 371, 30.1, 405, 442
elephants 132
Elite troops 107, 107 8, 420
El Kab MO
El Shaddai J81
INDEX
Emar 243
Emporio 286
Enakale 53
Enanatum I 60-1, 136, 139-40
En Besor 326
En-entarzi 62—3
Engineering 227—34
Eninmar 74
Enkidu 126-7
Enlil 52-3, 64-5, 74, 99-100, 106-7, 113,
115, 117, 150, 160, 163, 166, 179, 181
Enmebaragesi 45—7
Enmerkar 46
Enmetena 61-2, 140
Enna-Dagan 243—5
Enshakushana 64
ensi (Sumerian) 466; see governor
Epic of Gilgamesh see Gilgamesh
epirum (Akkadian) see ramp
Epipaleolithic 4-5, 16, 29, 32-3
equids 57 61-2, 129-53, 471-3; donkeys
18, 50, 57, 202-3, 389, 462; horses 136,
266—7; combat riding 131—2
Erishum I 167—8
Erra-imitti 163
Erridu-pizir 104-5
Eshnunna 161, 170-7, 189, 199
ethnography 6—8
ethnonyms 6
Execration Texts 283-4, 348-9, 405, 41 5-8
extispicy (liver divination) 1 86—92
Faiyum 345, 385, 452
famine 391, 446
Farras 442
fighting sticks 279-80, 315, 324, 426,
433-8
fire signals 224
"fishermen" see marines
flint 19-20, 27, 32-3, 245, 272
followers (Egyptian srnsw) 396, 420—1, 431;
see also bodyguard
fortifications 8, 18-19, 31-2, 35, 37-41,
46-7, 62, 75, 78, 80, 110, 121-2, 160,
163, 173, 176, 182-3, 207, 215-36,
238, 240-1, 244-5, 257, 265-8, 272-3,
277-8, 282, 286-8; 291, 293, 481;
concentric 31-2, 444-5; Egyptian 312-
3, 319-26, 330, 339, 355, 360-1, 388,
391-5, 402-5, 409-11, 430, 441-51;
Neolithic 24-34; see also gates, moats,
siegecraft, towers, walls
funeral games 428
furlough 193
gal.martu (Sumerian) see general
gangplank (on siege tower) 229-30
garrison 230, 408, 445-6
gate 25, 41, 45, 47, 180, 223-4, 244, 257,
265, 278, 286, 288, 357, 360, 444-5;
see also fortifications
Gebel el-Araq knife handle 326
Gebel Sahaba 32
Gebel Sheikh Suleiman 317, 326—7
general 97, 114, 158, 195-6
geography 5-8
Gerzean see Naqada
Gezer 278-80
Ghassulian 270—1
gigir (Sumerian) see chariot; see also Gl $.gigir
Gilgamesh 45-8; king 45-6, 220; Epic of
46-8, 94, 126-8, 180, 217
Girgawi 394
gir.nita (Sumerian) see general
GI§ . gigir (Sumerian) 135; see chariot
glacis 272, 444-5, 448-9; see also
fortifications
glyptic art see cylinder seals
gods, of war 23
gold 311-2, 397-8, 404, 409
Goliath 432
governors 95-97, 114, 242, 336, 350-2,
405; see Nomarchs
Greek warfare 1
guards 197-8
Gudea 60, 91, 98, 104-5, 143
Gu'edena 52—4
Gungunum 163
gunpowder 236
Gutians 84, 100-12, 119-20, 122-5, 171,
250-1, 304
Habiru 264-5
Habuba Kabira 40-1 , 239-40
Hacilar 25—7
Halaf Period 28
Halula 27
Halys River 292
Hammurabi 153, 159, 166, 172-81, 185-
214, 225, 257-9, 263; ideal martial
kingship 177-79
Hana nomads 190, 200, 205, 262
Harapsilis 301-2
I lassun.i 34
■Hi
INDEX
Hattusas 288, 291-5
Hattusilis 260, 264, 267, 294-302
Hazor 257, 278-80
Heb-Sed festival 354
Heliopolis 333
helmets 48-50, 56-7, 87, 98, 246-8, 254,
279, 303, 325; see also armor
Henenu 389, 452
Herakleopolis 369-73, 382-6
Hermopolis 390-1
Hetepsekhemwy 321-2
Hierakonopolis 316-7, 323, 371-4
highlander 6, 30, 71-2, 81, 84, 100, 109-
11, 116-19, 156, 159, 213
Hittites 153-4, 184, 257-60, 264, 268,
288-307
holy war 12
Homer 432
Horites 281-2
Horkhuf 341-4, 345
horse, cost of 152; see equid
Horus 313, 318, 338, 353-4, 364, 371,
379, 412
Humbaba 126-7
Hunter's Palette 33, 314-5
hunting 15-16, 25-6, 32, 38-40, 60, 89-
90, 293, 313
Hurnans 103, 110, 116, 153, 157, 161,
184, 250-1, 260, 263, 268, 289, 294-6,
300-7
Huzziya 298
Hyksos 95, 284, 450-1, 456-63
Ibalpiel 173-7, 210, 259
Ibbism 117-21
Ibdadi 266
Ibes 398
Ibni-Shadum 163
iconography see art, martial
ideology, martial 24, 36-7, 50, 160, 177-9,
186-92, 302, 353-4, 412-5
Idrimi 265
Ikkur 442
Ila-kabkabu 168-9, 214
Ila-salim 146
imy-r (Egyptian) 9, 356, 487; see
commander
Inanna 37, 47, 52-4, 63, 115, 125
Indo-Europeans 288—90
nidus Valley (Meluhha) 79-81, 104, 468
Instructions of Akhtoy 376—9
Inty 358-62
Iphur-Kish 81-2
Ipiq-Ishtar 163
Iran 6, 20-1, 71-2; Neolithic 30-32
Iraq see Mesopotamia
iron 357
Iron Age 5
Ishbi-Irra 118-20, 159-63
Ishhi-Adad 263
Ishme-Dagan 150, 171-7, 189, 225, 228
Ishtar 37, 70, 74, 85, 164, 178, 182-3,
255
Ism 159-63, 166, 172
Isin-Larsa Period 154-5, 159-66
Israel see Canaan
Itinerary (of march) 107
Itjawy see Lisht
Itur-Asdu 257
Jamdat Nasr 35
Jarmo 33
javelin 19, 27, 40, 48, 60, 67, 69, 88, 12
135, 246-7, 252-6, 272, 282-3, 303,
314, 400, 402, 424-5, 431-2, 433-8,
449-50
Jebelet el-Beidha 245
Jebel Sahaba 15
Jericho 24, 29-30, 272
Jerusalem 274
Jordan see Canaan
Julian the Apostate 191
Ka'a 321
Kadesh 1-2, 303, 464
Kaemheset 359, 362
Kahat 207-8
Kaku 79
Kamose 461
Kanesh 23, 168, 288-91
Karahar 305
Kaska 294
Kassite 181-4, 302
Kazallu 163
Kerma 399, 405
Khafajah 135
Khafre 332
Khasekhemwy 266, 273, 323, 325-7
Khety 436
Khnumhotep 393
khopesh see scimitar
Khor 442
Khufu 331-2
Kindaiki 161-2
INDEX
king and kingship 24, 36-7, 42, 45, 120,
177-9, 250
Kinglist, Sumerian see Sumerian Kinglist
Kish 42-73, 81-2, 134, 164, 182;
hegemony 45-6
kisri or kiseri see battalion
knife see dagger
Kubban 442
Kudur-Mabuk 165
Kukkutanum 235
Kullab 221
Kultepe 147
Kumma 442
Kurucay Hoyuk 25
Kush 398-9, 402-6, 459-61, 490; see also
Nubia
Kussara 292-3
Labarna 294
Labyrinth 407
Lachish 228
ladder 228-30, 272, 362-3, 447-9
Lagash 44, 50-63, 79, 104-5, 108, 134,
139
lance see pike
land for service 194-5
languages 9
lapis lazuli 23
Larsa 163-6, 170-7, 212, 225
Lebanon 237-68, 331, 399; see also Byblos,
Phoenicia
Libya, Libyan 6, 310, 326, 328, 330-3,
343-7, 361, 379-80, 386-8, 395-6
Libyan Palette see Cities Palette
lieutenant 97, 195-6
Lisht 396, 457-9
logistics 19, 46, 95-7, 129-30, 201-2,
224-5, 235, 303, 338-9, 343-4, 350,
362, 389, 402
lugal (Sumerian) see king
Lugalannimmundu 467
Lugalbanda 46, 221
Lugalkiginedudu 63
Lugalzagesi 64-66, 74
Lullubu 84, 86, 88, 94, 104
Luwians 289, 294-6
mace 20-1, 25, 33-4, 38-9, 47, 56-60, 74,
88, 98, 112, 122-5, 144, 246-8, 270-1,
303, 313-6, 319, 324-5, 356-8, 433-8
Magan 81, 84, 104, 117 see also Persian
Gulf
magic, martial 99, 283-4, 348-9, 364-6,
379, 415-8; see also Execration
Texts
Manetho 330, 407
Manishtusu 84, 98
Marathon 1
Marduk 124, 178
Man 54, 59-60, 66-7, 70, 76, 94, 104,
108, 134, 137, 141, 146, 151, 168-77,
185-214, 229, 243-8, 257-63, 306;
archive 173-4, 185-6
marines 198
martial art see art, martial
Mashkan-Shapir 225
material culture 5
Medinat Habu 455
Mediterranean Sea 41
Megiddo 1, 257
Melchizedek 281
Meluhha see Indus Valley
Memphis 319, 325, 368
Menes see Narmer
mercenaries 419—20, 438; see also Nubia,
Libya, Canaan
Merenre II 341
Mereret 408
Menkare 376, 386
Mersa Gawasis 390
Mersin 286
Mesehi 424-5
Meskiaggasher 46
Mesolithic see Epipaleolithic
Mesopotamia 6, 17, 21, 24; Early Dynasty
35-72; Neolithic 33-4
metallurgy 19—23; casting 21
methodology 8—11
Middle River 79
military manuals 377—9
military threshold 16, 35
Milvian Bridge 192
Mirgissa 442
Mitanm 6, 257, 302, 306-7
moat 29, 182, 223, 444-5
money system 1 96
Montu 371, 395, 398, 401, 412-3, 432
Montuhotep I 374, 380-1, 382-8, 412
Montuhotep II 388-9
Montuhotep III 390
Montuhotep IV 390-1
mounds see burial mounds
mubabbilum (Akkadian) sec si. unlaid heaivi
Mursilis 154, 260, 295, 300 >
•I »
INDEX
Nablanum 158
Nagar 142-3, 240, 249, 304-5
Nahal Mishmar 270-1
Naqada 310-6
Naram-Sin (of Eshnunna) 169
Naram-Sm 74, 81-8, 84, 91-4, 98, 100,
157, 218, 220, 249, 289, 304, 468
narkabtum (Akkadian) 151; see chariot
Narmer 273, 318-20, 484
Narmer Palette 26, 271, 318-9
Natufian
naval warfare 98, 108, 256, 323, 326-7,
331, 340, 366-7, 372-3, 375-7, 383-6,
394-5, 399-400, 409-10, 451-5, 479
Necherophes 330
Neferhotpe I 459
Neferkahor 370-1
Nehry 390-1
Nejeh 461
Nekhen Samontu 409
Neolithic 4—5, 17; cave paintings 15;
"revolution" 16—17; weapons 15; war
14-34
Neo-Sumerian 91, 93, 95-9, 102-28,
143-5
Nesha see Kanesh
net 55-6, 85
Nevali Con 24, 26
Nile River 32, 308-9
Nine Bows 357, 387, 488
Nmgirsu 104, 140-1
Ninhursag 52-9
Ninsun 127
Ninurta, Epic of 122-5, 144-5
Ninuter 322
Nippur 64-6, 111, 113, 115, 117-19, 160,
162-3, 183
Niridagal 113
Nitokerty 351-2
nomads 8, 17-18, 118, 155, 190, 194, 197,
212, 243, 250, 256-60, 264, 274-7,
283, 304, 320-1, 334, 337, 345, 349,
369, 378-9, 386-8, 395, 445-6, 461,
474
nomarchs 368—81; see governors
nubanda (nu.banda; Sumerian) see captain;
see also lieutenant
Nubia 6, 15, 32, 275, 283, 308-9, 316-7,
320, 323, 325-6, 328, 330, 337, 341-
50, 355, 381-7, 394-9, 402-6, 409-10,
416, 419, 441 6, 452, 459 63; see also
Kush
Nubt see Naqada
numbers of troops 198—201
Nur-Ahum 161
Nur-Daggal 78
oases 322, 342-3, 346, 360, 383, 385-8,
396, 441
oath 21 1-4, 291,387
obsidian 27, 33, 245
officers 195—6, 356; see also captain,
lieutenant, colonel, general
Old Kingdom Egypt 328-52
oracles see divination
oracular dreams see dreams
organization: Akkadian 95—9; Babyloniar
192-204; Egyptian 354-6, 418-22;
Hittite 302-3; Neo-Sumerian 95-9
Osiris 413
Pabilgaltuk 51
pack animals 130-1, 201-4
Paleolithic 4; war 15—16
Palermo Stone 317, 320, 322, 326, 329
Palestine see Canaan
Papahdilmah 294-5
Papursag 51
patrols 445-6
pay 194-7, 378,319-20
peace treaties 213—4
Pelusium 393
Pepinakht 347-50
Pepy I 335-6,
Pepy II 346-51, 368
Peribsen 273, 322-3
periodization 4-5
Persian Gulf 34, 41, 51, 75, 78, 80-1, K-l
98, 108, 117
Phoenicia (Lebanon) 6, 46, 126, 239, 26=
6, 366-7
pike 58-9, 86, 88, 123-4
pilsum (Akkadian) see undermine
Pithana 292-3
plants, domestication 17
plunder 49-50, 87, 96, 112, 195, 205 7,
226, 236, 276, 297, 302-3, 339, .V><>
401, 404, 414, 420
poetry, martial 339
Poliochm 286
prehistoric 4
Priest-king 37-9, 42, 89 90, >l i (,, '!;•;
249, 46()
priests 24, l >7, 160, 182, 209
INDEX
prisoners 49-50, 87, 109, 112, 122, 205-9,
283, 334; torture and ritual massacre
38-40, 51-2, 208-9, 262, 327, 358,
363-6, 406,417,448
projectile points 30, 32
propaganda see ideology
Prophecy of Neferti 391-3, 415
psychological 418
Punt 334, 347-9, 389-90, 401, 453
purification rituals 75, 124, 128, 188
Purushkhanda 76
Puzur-Inshushinak 105
Puzur-Shulgi 119
Puzzur-Ashur 167
Pyramid Texts 319, 353—6
pyramids 329, 331
Qatar 34
Qatna 170-7, 263-4
Qedes 381
quivers 28, 94, 112, 134-7, 148-9
Qustul 316
rob (rabian) Amurrim (Akkadian: "chief of
the Amorites"), see general
radiometric dating 3
raid 30, 63, 156, 205-7
rakib (Akkadian: "rider") 151—2; see
charioteer
ram 216, 219-21 228-30, 298-9, 306,
449
Ramesses II 1, 303
Ramesses III 455
ramp 227—36, 298—9, 303; counter-ramp
231-2
ransom 206
Razama 232—3
Re 333, 413
rebellion 61, 75-80, 100, 114, 179, 181-2,
187, 260, 264-5, 298, 339, 378, 392,
409
recruitment 192, 378, 393, 397, 418-20
Red Sea 390, 397; see also Punt
refugees 122
reinforcements 234—5
Rephaim 281—2
Retjenu see Canaan
Rim-Sin 165-6, 173-7, 212, 263
Rim-Sin II 181
Rimush 78-80, 86
rivers 18—9
Roman warfare 1
Sabm 350
sacrifice 186-92, 214, 221
Sahara Desert 32, 308-10, 345
Sahure 333, 345, 366
Sallahsuwa 296
Samarra 33
Samsu-ditana 183
Samsu-iluna 181-3, 222-3
Sanahuitta 294-6
sapiru sabim (Akkadian) see colonel
Saqqara 366—7
Sargon 65-6, 73-8, 85-8, 95, 245, 289,
297, 304, 468; legends 73, 77-8
scarab seals 456, 462
scimitar 71, 279, 400; see sickle-sword
Scorpion 316
scouts 197, 204-5, 224
scribes 192-202, 418-9
Sealand dynasty 183
seals, cylinder see cylinder seals
Sebek-khu 283, 403, 406, 420
Second Cataract Forts 441—6
secretary of the army 1 92
Sekhmet 417
Semna 403, 442, 445-6, 460
Senmut 442
Senwosret I 396-9, 431, 443
Senwosret III 283, 402-7, 413-4, 429; see
also Sesostris
Serra 442
Sesostris, legends 407
Seth 322-3, 353-4, 364
shadu (Akkadian) see highlander
shagina (Sumerian) see general
shakkanakku (governors of Mari) 251, 261
Shalfak 442
Shamash 178, 190, 213
Shamshi-Adad 154, 166-72, 189, 200-1,
228, 254, 258, 263, 268, 291-2
Shapur 261
Shar-kalli-shan 98, 100-1, 158
Sharlagab 101
Sharlak 101-2
Sharraya 232-3
Sharuhen 450-1
Shauskha 304
Shechem71, 283,406
Shekhna 241
Sheshi 463
Sheshonq 310
shields 56 8, l ><>, 121 13 . 181, 217, 230,
233, 236, 247-8, 252-6, 279-80, 282-3.
>! I
INDEX
303, 314, 356, 358, 422, 425, 427, 429,
431, 448, 453-4
Ship of Khufu 366
ships (seagoing) 34, 51, 203-4, 340,
451—5; see also boats
Shubat-enlil 171, 227
Shu-ilishu 162
Shulgi 68, 76, 91, 109-13, 117, 305;
martial hymns 111—13
Shunet el-Zebib 325
Shusin 115-7, 251, 305
sickle-sword 56-7, 66-71, 139, 180-1,
279, 400, 467
siege tower 216-21, 228-9, 298-9, 447-9
siegecraft 18, 38-9, 65, 78, 121-2, 248,
306; blockade 450-1; defensive 230-4;
Egyptian 325-6, 362-3, 438-40, 447-
51; Mesopotamia 215—36; Akkadian
216-21, 272-3; Babylonian 221-36;
Hittite 298-300; see also engineering,
ladder, ramp, siege tower, undermine
Simashki 110
Sinai 30, 321, 325, 329-30, 348-9, 386-8,
408-9
single combat see combat, single
Sin-iddinam 164
Sm-Muballit 213
Sinuhe 282-3, 425, 430-3
Siwe-palar-huppak 173—7, 213
skeletons 15, 27
slaves 398
sling 19, 34, 112, 121, 123, 221, 255, 279,
362, 426-7
smiting scene, pharaonic 318, 328, 389, 408
smsw see follower
Sneferu 330-1, 345
Sobekhotpe III 457-9
Sobekhotpe IV 460
Sobekneferu 410-1, 456, 461
sources 8-11
spear 19, 25, 33-4, 39, 48, 88, 112, 121,
138, 180-1, 233, 246-8, 252-6, 265-6,
272, 276, 278-9, 288, 303, 315, 324-5,
378, 422-5
spies 204-5
standard bearer 195—6
Standard of Ebla 246
Standard of Ur 10, 49-50, 133-4, 137-40,
246
standard srr banner
Stele of: Darband-i-C.awai S7, l ) y ; Naram
Sm ,S-1 7, 92; NasNivv.i S Kniiush So.
92; Sargon 85; Vultures 26, 51, 55-9,
67, 85, 134-9, 467
stick fighting 428
sticks see fighting sticks
Story of Sinuhe see Sinuhe
stratigraphic dating 3
Subartu (northern Mesopotamia) 54, 75,
83, 177
Sudan see Nubia
Sumer, Sumerians 23, 33-101, 238-40,
286—7, 305; see also Neo-Sunierian
Sumerian Kinglist 34, 42-8, 102, 466
Sumu-El 164
Sumu-Epuh 171, 258-9, 262
Sun Tzu 377
supplies see logistics
Susa21, 31, 41, 54, 71-2
synchronism 3
Syria 6, 17-18, 40-1, 69, 71, 153, 237-6
Chalcolithic 238-40; Neolithic 21, 27-
Ta Sety see Nubia
Tal-i Bakan 31
Tall-i Iblis 21
Talpus-atah 304
Taurus Mountains 22
Tawananna 294
tebibtum (Akkadian) see census
Tefibi 375-6, 454
Tel Erani 273
Tel Yarmut 272
Tell al-Sawwan 34
Tell Brak 239
Tell Dan 180, 223, 278
Tell el-Judeideh 246
Tell el-Sultan see Jericho
TellHalaf33
Tell Malyan see Anshan
Tell Mashnaqa 18, 29
Tell Sabi Abyad 27-8
temples 37, 106, 186; portable 123
Tepe Gawra 28, 33-4
Tepe Ghabristan 21
Tepe Hisar
Tepejowi 34
Terqa 245, 263
Teshub 300, 304
textual sources 9 10
Thebes 372-5, 382 111, 152, 456 M
Thermopylae 1
Thinis *73, \BA
TlmimtiM- IN I
-I ,
INDEX
Tidnum 115
tilpanum (Akkadian) 91, 254, 469; see also
archery, composite bow
tin 21, 40, 46, 245; Tin Road 23, 168, 290
Tirigan 105—6
Tish-atal 305
Tjauti 374
Tjehemau 383-6, 452
Tjehenu see Libyans
Tjemehu see Libyans
Tomb of the Warriors 386, 438-40
tombs 22, 45, 71, 333; Byblos 400; Royal
Tombs of Ur 48-50, 56, 466; weapon
burials 239, 248, 252-6, 276-79, 286,
292, 325, 462
tool typology 5
towers 41, 257, 265, 278, 360-2, 444-5;
see also fortifications and siege towers
training 428—9
trampling 49-50, 142, 147-50
trebuchet 236
tribes 32
tribute 114, 243-4, 398
triumph 112, 125, 138, 208, 384-5
Troy 286
Turkey see Anatolia
Turukkean 171, 174, 177, 207, 209, 213
Tuttul 249
typology 3, 5
Ubaid Period 28, 34, 36
Ugarit 237, 252, 256-8, 265, 306, 400-1,
479
ugula (Akkadian) see lieutenant
Uj 316
Ulishum
Umma44, 50-66, 79, 118
Unas 334-5
undermine 217, 227, 363
Ur (city and kingdom) 48-51, 79, 111, 135,
222; Lament for 120—2; Third Dynasty
67, 91, 95, 107-26, 143, 158, 161
Urkesh251, 304-5
Urluma61, 140
Urnammu 105, 108-9, 143
Urnanshe of Lagash 51
Ur-ninurta 164
Uronarti 442
Ursha 171, 298-300, 306
Uru'inimgina 63—4, 141
Uruk (city) 36, 39, 45-8, 74, 105-8, 126,
147, 164, 166, 172, 305; Early period
34, 89; Expansion 40-42, 238-9; Late
period 35-40; Second and Third
Dynasties 63—6, 305
Ur-Zababa 73-4
Userkaf333
Ushashum 158
Ushtashm-El 234
Utuhegal 105-8, 305
vassal 161, 210-2, 243, 264-5
Victory Stele see stele
village 24, 27-8
Wadi Abu Wasil 33
Wadi Allaqi 397
Wadi al-Mughara 329-31, 334, 388, 408
Wadi Gawasis 397
Wadi Hammamat 335, 390, 414
Wadi Tumilat 395, 441
walls, city 220-36
walls, regional 110-11, 115-16, 161, 331,
388, 392, 395, 440-1
war, definition 11—14
war, Neolithic see Neolithic war
war, origin 14—16
Warad-Sin 165, 222
war-carts 45, 49-50, 55-62, 72, 85, 123-5,
129-45, 243, 247, 256, 471-3; four
wheeled 132-4, 147; two-wheeled 13^5,
147; see also chariot
Warsama 291—2
Washukanni 6, 307
weapons; divine 99, 123, 179, 262, 417;
Egyptian 433-8; Neolithic 15, 19-23;
Syrian 245—8, 252—6; see also archery,
armor, axe, club, composite bow,
dagger, fighting stick, helmet, javelin,
mace, pike, quiver, scimitar, shield,
sickle-sword, sling, spear
Weni 275-6, 336-40, 345, 355, 452
wheel 129-30; disk 135; spoked 147-50
wrestling 60, 428-9
Yadin, Yigael 89-95
Yagid-Lim 214, 261,264
Yahdun-Lim 169-70, 258, 261-2
Yakbim 461-2
Yantinu 459
Yanuh-Samar 207
Ya'qub-Har 463
Yarim-Lim 212, 259
Yasini 1 >agan 1 88
.h.
INDEX
Yasmah-Adad 200-1, 263
yassabum (Akkadian) 229 see ram
year names 162, 467
Zababa 178, 182
Zabshali 116
Zagros Mountains 6,
116, 122-5, 171
46,84, 102, 111,
Zaruna 296
Zimri-Addu 231-2
Zimri-Lim 70, 141, 173-7, 185-214, 23.
4, 255, 259; palace frescoes 180, 255-
Zinnum 161
Zipani 289
Zippasna 297
Zulpuwa 293, 295
517
W*Rl*Kt IN
vJt ')\ I »J lih r ()l Y
Routledge History
Warfare in World History
Michael S. Nieburg
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Introduction to Global Military History
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Jeremy Black
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